TURKISH CIVIL SOCIETY, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE STATE IN THE SYRIAN
REFUGEE CRISIS

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By

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CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read *Turkish Civil Society, Public Opinion, and the State in the Syrian Refugee Crisis* by Pelin Gul, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in International Relations at San Francisco State University.

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TURKISH CIVIL SOCIETY, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE STATE IN THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

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This thesis presents a critique of Securitization Theory by arguing that the roots of securitization of referent subjects may be generated by societal actors instead of at the state level. I examine the changing public perceptions about the Syrian refugees and the shifting and rotating involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in providing assistance to refugees in Turkey. The argument of this thesis is that while the Turkish government has followed liberal policies towards the refugees since the inception of the refugee crisis in 2011, Turkish civil society organizations and public opinion about refugees increasingly adopted a securitized approach. I argue that the level of securitization may fluctuate among the host society depending on already existing 'threat' perceptions and the level of CSOs involvement in the crisis may also vary depending on their position in regards to the state and the rest of the civil society.

I certify that the abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Chapter I: Introduction

Scholars of Securitization Theory argue that the success of securitization relies on the authority of the securitizing actor. Hence, there is a consensus among securitization theorists that the securitizing actors are state officials. However, this International Relations Master's thesis will challenge the Securitization Theory by arguing that the roots of securitization of referent subjects may be generated by societal actors instead of state officials. It aims to contribute to the securitization studies by identifying an underexamined actor, society, in the securitization process, and showing that the securitization can also be a bottom-up process. Empirically, this thesis is an attempt to analyze the different identities of the host society during the securitization processes and the determining factors behind their attitudes and perceptions towards the refugees.

The research question of this thesis is that although the Turkish government has tried to desecuritize the refugee issue since the Syrian refugee crisis started in 2011, why Turkish society has securitized the refugees. To answer this question, I will examine different groups in Turkish society and focus on the public and civil society organizations (CSOs) separately because I will argue that societies are not monolithic entities, in contrast, they include different identities with varied 'threat' perceptions. Therefore, the level of securitization may fluctuate as well as completely contradict to each other among host societies. This thesis will examine the securitization of the Syrian refugees among the Turkish public since 2014 when the Turkish government implemented Temporary Protection Regime (TPR) and among CSOs since 2011 when the Syrian civil war broke out.

While the government's liberal policies could create a backlash against the refugees among the host society, this host hostility could also play a catalyzer role among certain CSOs to step up to counter the effects of host hostility. For the Syrian refugee case in Turkey, I will argue that the government's liberal policies could catalyze the host hostility against new coming minorities when some identities among the society question the government's purpose of the liberal policies. Since societies are not monolithic entities, the level of securitization may fluctuate among the host society. Besides, I will also argue that this host hostility may lead some CSOs to increase their work for the refugees. Depending on their position in regards to the state and the rest of the civil society, certain CSOs may utilize international funding, to counter the host hostility towards the refugees by providing them services and assistance.

This thesis applies the case study method to critique the Securitization Theory's explanation of the securitization processes. In literature, critics of the case study method argue that single case study fails to grasp the set of understanding on issues requires a mass amount of data collection. However, this thesis suggests that Securitization Theory cannot grasp the anomaly of identifying the public as 'securitizing actor.' Hence, I have chosen the small-N study which does not fit the expectations of the Securitization Theory. Alternatively, proving even one case that unfits for the explanation of the theory would lead to an improvement in the theory. The type of case study method of this thesis can be identified as the deviant case study. This method has its advantages and disadvantages. For instance, Lakatos argues that if the scholar fails to provide an

explanation for their improvements in the theory, the study will be ineffective.[1] Nonetheless, going between the theory and evidence, this thesis will contribute to the security studies by proving that the societal actors may generate the referent subjects in securitization processes.

To examine the reasons behind the different levels of securitization among the public and the changing and shifting involvement of secular CSOs to the refugee crisis, I apply both process tracing and survey methodologies. Process tracing methodology leads the study to provide a variety of evidence that allow researchers to draw a conclusion whether there is a causal relationship between the variables.[2] While this methodology helps to identify causal mechanisms, it also retains the defect of a Humean theory of causation as constant conjunction.[3] In other words, process tracing methodology cannot determine whether the sequence events have any causal connection. However, I have chosen to follow this methodology because process tracing helps me to provide a plausible narrative about what has happened and test it with data.

To uncover the independent variables behind the changing perception of the Turkish public about the refugees, First, I will determine the significant events since the refugee crisis started and trace how the discourse has changed along the way. To measure the determined understandings of individuals and groups in society, scholars often apply

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[1] Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes' in *Criticism and the growth of knowledge,* edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), quoted in Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, *Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield* (Washington D.C.: Comparative Political Studies, 2007), 178.

[2] Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, *Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield* (Washington D.C.: Comparative Political Studies, 2007), 183.

[3] David Waldner, *Process Tracing and Qualitative Causal Interference,* (Virginia: Security Studies, 2015), 241.

public opinion surveys. I will also apply survey data to measure the perception of Turkish society about the refugees. I have selected this methodology because I wish to understand how the perception of the Turkish public as its minorities and majority has changed about the refugees. Survey methodology has the advantages as statistical representation and standardization.[4] Some see the standardization aspect of the survey methodology as a disadvantage based on the argument that the same question might be interpreted differently by different correspondents.[5] Nonetheless, I have chosen to apply survey methodology to understand the Turkish public perception about the refugees because, in fact, one eliminates the possibility of a different interpretation with the same wording of a question. In addition, there have been multiple public opinion surveys on the Turkish public perception about the refugees. Hence, I have the chance to pick the surveys that focus on different groups in Turkish society. To examine the public perception about the refugees, first, I will determine the significant events related to the refugee issue occurred by year. Following, I will present the survey data collected after the significant events.

I focus on the secular CSOs in contrast to state- aligned ones in order to examine the attitudes of groups leery of the state policies in contrast to the ones that share the same ideology with the state. To uncover the independent variables behind the changing attitude of secular CSOs in Turkey, I will trace the secular CSOs' work for the refugees with their funders and when their works have increased. To understand the change, I will look at whether there is a correlation between the increase in their international funds and the level of involvement in the work for the refugees. However, as mentioned above, I

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[4] Mariano Sana and Becky Conway, 'Surveys and ethnosurveys' in Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies edited by Steven J. Gold and Stephanie J. Nawyn, (London: Routledge, 2013), 484.
[5] Ibid., 487.

start the tracing by examining the evolvement of civil society and the state-civil society relationship in Turkey. In doing so, I will identify the essential steps in the process – when and how the civil society has become more diverse and independent from the state institutions and the state has stymied these attempts.

I have determined three secular CSOs- 'Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (SGDD),' 'The Research Center on Asylum and Migration (IGAM),' and 'Support to Life (STL)' by examining their description of the organizations. Then, I will explore their works for the refugees with the funders. Accessing the data for Support to Life projects and their financiers seem easier because the organization is financially transparent on its annual reports. However, for the latter two organizations, I will search each project, start date, and their financiers separately. Due to this difference, I will provide the data by year for STL, but I will make a pile of list for the other two CSOs.

Coming back to collecting my data, I will download all annual reports of STL as well as list of all projects of SGDD and IGAM. Then, I will highlight each project aiming to help the refugees. Later, I will check the financiers of these projects, whether they are funded by international organizations or the Turkish state. Lastly, for STL data, I will calculate what percentage of the yearly income comes from the foreign-funded refugee-related projects. However, for SGDD and IGAM, I will make a pile of their works to show the high volume of their relief works for the refugees funded by foreign institutions.

As follows, I will, first, explore the security theories in literature and then particularly the Securitization Theory of Copenhagen School with its explanation of the securitization process, and its core concepts: securitizing actors, audiences, referent

objects, and referent subjects. Later, I will focus on the conceptualization of civil society and compare the meaning of the concept in western literature and weak democracies. Then, in the third chapter, I will focus on the evolution of Turkish civil society and its ideologically bifurcated nature. In this section, the importance of ideology throughout history on the state-civil society relationship in Turkey will shed light on today's relationship between the state and secular CSOs. Here, I will propose that since the establishment of the republic in 1923, the Turkish state has a culture of impeding the independence of civil society. Then, in the fourth chapter, I will focus on the Turkish state's welcoming response to the Syrian refugees. Later, I will present the data chapter with public opinion and CSOs. The public opinion data chapter will prove that the level of securitization among the Turkish public has fluctuated due to different identities with varied 'threat' perceptions. The civil society data chapter will demonstrate how Turkish civil society had extended its capabilities during the refugee crisis with the help of international funds and how the Turkish state responded to this development.

This thesis will conclude that securitization may begin at the societal level on issues regarding refugees, in contrast to the explanation of Securitization Theory. Besides, the societal securitization is subjected to shifting and changing, as will be evidenced by public opinion shifts and CSOs' level of involvement in Turkey. Hence, societies should be analyzed in security issues. However, it will also suggest that host societies are not monolithic entities, and therefore, one needs to compart the host society according to stratifications in the society because not only the attitude of the public may differ from the actions of CSOs, but also the attitudes of some groups in host society may differ from the others in security issues.

Chapter II: Literature Review

<u>Theory</u>

The preponderance of scholars applies security theories to understand the transformation of migration policies and discourses. Before going into the societal securitization theory, I will review the security theories and the critiques of these theories in migration studies. The primary securitization schools are (1) traditional realism, (2) critical security studies (CSS), and (3) the Copenhagen School.[6]

First, traditional realism gives the center of security studies to international structure and actors' intentions. Traditional realists assume that insecurity obtains from objectively threatening issues due to uncertainty of other's malign/benign intentions in the anarchic political structure.[7] Therefore, states are always suspicious of each other.[8] Waltz defines 'security studies' as 'the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.'[9] Besides, traditional realists include national security, military threats, and war-related issues to security studies.[10] However, this theory has some limitations in the context of migration studies. Bilgic explains the limitations of the conventional realism framework in migration studies as (1) the structure is anarchy; (2) intentions of actors vis-à-vis others; (3) dichotomous identities.[11] He argues that traditional realism ignores that

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[6] Ola Wæver, *Securitisation:Taking stock of a research programme in Security Studies,* (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2003), 7.

[7] Ali Bilgic, *Towards a New Societal Security Dilemma: Comprehensive Analysis of Actor Responsibility in Intersocietal Conflicts*, (Ankara: Review of International Studies, 2013), 185.

[8] Thierry Balzacq and Sarah Leonard, *'Securitization' revisited: Theory and cases,* (Paris: The Institute for Strategic Research, 2015), 3.

[9] Stephen M. Walt, *The Renaissance of Security Studies,* (Cambridge: International Studies Quarterly, 1991), 212.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ali Bilgic, *Towards a New Societal Security Dilemma,* 186.

actors' behavior constructs the anarchic political structure rather than the vice versa; actors' understanding of security may vary because security understanding is subjected to change; identities are not fixed and also subjected to change. Therefore, traditional realism cannot grasp societal security issues completely.

Second, the CSS scholars seek to understand the discourses of security in defining group identity by either enabling a particular policy or legitimating a specific actor as a securitizing actor.[12] CSS mainly focuses on three central themes. While the first one is to critique the state-centered aspect of traditional realist approaches,[13] the other two are the concerns that are related to CSS scholar's critique of traditional realism. In contrast to traditional security scholars who prioritize the state in security issues, CSS scholars ask fundamental questions such as 'whose security should be prioritized.'[14] One concern regarding the traditional realists' security approach is the politics of security, leading to the question of what security does politically. The second concern is the ethics of security, leading the question of the definition of 'good' and 'bad' regarding security issues.[15] In sum, CSS points out that security studies should either reformulate security or escape the discourse. However, according to Browning, although the subjects of CSS are crucial, CSS needs to extend its scope from its focused themes towards a more contextual analysis to provide a more convincing understanding of security.[16]

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[12] Christopher S. Browning, and Matt McDonald, *The Future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of security,* (Coventry: European Journal of International Relations, 2011), 236.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.*,* 238.
[15] Ibid., 236.
[16] Ibid., 248.

The third central securitization school is the Copenhagen School, which addresses the need for new security issues.[17] Securitization theory argues that securitization stems from the interaction between a securitizing actor and its audience.[18] According to this theory, securitization does not necessarily have to end with a military operation since the interaction between a securitizing actor and its audience can happen in any sector of social life. The core concept of securitization theory is the securitizing actor, the audience, the referent subject, and the referent object, the context and the adoption of distinctive policies.[19]

According to securitization theory, the securitization process of an issue includes non-politicization, politicization, and securitization of the object.[20] In security discourse, if an object is presented as causing an existential threat, it is considered to be a security issue. Security means survival and survival has different meanings for states and civil societies. While survival implies sovereignty to a country, it means identity to society.[21] Therefore, the sovereignty of states and national identities are the most common referent objects in the securitization processes. Traditionally, securitizing actors are state representatives.[22] The audience of the securitizing process is mostly the citizenry[23] since they are the ones who are told what a threat to their existence of a state or national identity is. According to Wæver, a successful security speech act can be done by the

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[17] Claire Wilkinson, *The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe,* (Birmingham: Centre of Russian & East European Studies, 2007), 6.
[18] Thierry Balzacq, *'Securitization' revisited*, 3.
[19] Ibid., 2.
[20] Ola Wæver, *Securitisation: Taking stock of a research programme*, 10.
[21] Ibid., 15.
[22] Ibid., 9.
[23] Ibid., 11.

securitizing actors who have to be in a position of authority.[24] Buzan adds that the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.[25]

Table 1. The Core Concepts of Securitization Theory

The Securitizing Actor	The Referent Object	The Referent Subject	Audiences
The securitizing actor is the agent who presents an object as a threat.	The referent object is the entity that is being threatened.	The referent subject is the entity that is threatening.	The audience is the agreement of which is necessary to confer an intersubjective status to the threat.

Although the above-mentioned security theories put the state in the center of securitization analyses and consider the securitization as top-down processes, society can also be a securitizing actor. Hence, this thesis adopts the concept of societal securitization. This theory argues that securitization can also be understood in the social concept. The main subject of the theory is the existential threat to 'identity communities.'[26] Roe explains societal security as 'the ability of a society to persist in its

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[24] Ola Wæver, *Securitisation: Taking stock of a research programme*, 14.

[25] Barry Buzan*, Peoples, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), quoted in Piotr Razniak, Anna Winiarczyk Razniak, *Influence of the societal security level on population migrations in Poland,* (Cracow: The 3rd Geography Symposium, 2014), 3.

[26] Mikhail A Alexseev, *Societal Security, the Security Dilemma, and Extreme Anti-migrant Hostility in Russia,* (San Diego: Journal of Peace Research, 2011), 511.

essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats.'[27] According

to the societal securitization theory, cultural differences and the level of distrust can

create social tension among the host population and the new coming minorities. In other

words, the societal securitization theory contends that the securitizing actor does not

necessarily have to be the state. If society perceives the new coming minorities as a

threat to their identity including language, culture, religion, nationality, and custom, then

society can become a securitizing actor.[28] Hence, one needs to take into account society

in security issues.

According to the theory, host societies see migrants as a threat to the survival of

their identities.[29] It analyzes how the interests of host population lead the hostility against

new coming minorities. However, host populations are not monolithic entities and they

are stratified by their position to the power. Hence, the level of threat perception among

society may fluctuate depending on the groups' identities. Therefore, this thesis

bifurcates Turkish society as the public and CSOs. Besides, the level of threat perception

may also vary among the public and CSOs depending on the group of people's already

existing threat perception and the position of CSOs in regards to the state and the rest of

the civil society. In other words, some groups' are relatively disadvantaged in comparison

to the powerful groups among the host population.[30] Bozorgmehr et al. claim that

societies are always stratified by the hierarchy of power relations between the majority

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[27] Ali Bilgic, *Towards a New Societal Security Dilemma,* 188.

[28] Mikhail A Alexseev, *Societal Security,* 511.

[29] Ibid., 509.

[30] Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Anny Bakalian, and Sara Salman, Host hostility and nativism in *Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies* edited by Steven Gold and Stephanie J. Nawyn, (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 189.

and minorities.[31] Even though host population means both the majority of the society and native-born minorities,[32] minority groups in host societies are relatively more disadvantaged in comparison to the powerful majority groups.[33] Hence, their level of 'threat' perception may vary depending on their identities. Therefore, this thesis bifurcates the Turkish public as the majority and the minorities in the society and divides CSOs as the state-aligned and secular organizations due to their position in regards to the Turkish state during the refugee crisis.

The table below shows the comparison between the analysis that securitization scholars usually conduct and analysis of this thesis.

Table 2. Improvement in the Core Concepts of Securitization Theory

	Securitization Studies	This Case Study
The Securitizing Actor	State	Public
The Referent Object	Immigrants, refugees, minorities	Immigrants, refugees, minorities
The Referent Subject	Either identity of the nation or the sovereignty of the state	Identity
Audiences	Public	State

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[31] Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Anny Bakalian, and Sara Salman, Host hostility and nativism, 189.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.

Conceptualizing Civil Society Organizations

Studies on civil society require clarification since the definition of civil society is vague. The concept traces back to eighteenth-century Europe. The ancient definitions of civil society represent the homogenous public, bounded by the state. However, as the communities have become more fragmented, the meaning of civil society has transformed. This thesis adopts the modern definition of civil society, rather than the ancient definition. In modern societies, the individuals and groups associate with each other in the public area in which their perceptions of particular subjects are determined. In this public sphere, there are the public and CSOs with varied identities, rather than one homogenous entity. While the public opinion matters in democracies, CSOs play a pre-requisite role in the democratic system.[34] With the right of voting, public opinion can involve in the decision-making processes in democracies.[35] Nevertheless, groups of people come together to advance their interests via CSOs. Due to their different roles in democratic societies, I divide my analysis as the public and civil society. This thesis uses civil society interchangeably with CSOs.

Having said that, I shall dwell into the concept of civil society and its aspects in modern societies. With the communist countries disintegrated in Eastern Europe in the 1970s, the meaning of civil society altered to a tool for a space where people mobilize against repressive governments.[36] The fundamental aspects of civil society can be arrayed

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[34] Neera Chandhoke, *'The 'Civil' and the 'Political' in Civil Society'* in Civil Society and Democracy: A Reader, edited by Carolyn M. Elliott (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 261.
[35] Piers Robinson, *'The Role of Media and Public Opinion'* in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 188.
[36] Carolyn M. Elliott, `*Civil Society and Democracy: A Comparative Review Essay*` in Civil Society and Democracy: A Reader, edited by Carolyn M. Elliott, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1.

as 'active participation,' 'autonomy from the state institutions,' and 'restriction of the state institutions.'

Modern civil society requires active participation in societal and political issues. The most commonly used definition of civil society is 'the arena, outside of the family, the government, and the market, where people associate to advance their interests.'[37] This description emphasizes that the interaction of social values occurs in civil society and the requirement of the development of civic and political participation.[38] People's interest in and awareness of societal and political issues are essential for civil society.[39] For example, trade unions and employer assassinations are considered as CSOs due to their aspects of participating decision-making process by challenging the rules.

Another aspect of modern civil society is that the autonomy of active participation in civil society from the political institutions and the ability to limit those institutions.[40] Western scholars argue that civil society should act as a defense mechanism when there is a risk of state abuse by creating more space for the public. Due to this aspect of civil society, scholars agree that civil society is a cornerstone of a strong democracy. Elliott emphasizes that civil society benefits democracy by limiting the state power, providing space for marginalized voices, and sustaining the balance of power between the state and society'.[41] Akboga also argues that CSOs play a significant role in democracies by

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[37] Carmen Malena, *Can We Measure Civil Society? A Methodology for International Comparative Research,* (Abingdon: Development in Practice Journal, 2007), 340.

[38] Cristiano Bee and Ayhan Kaya, *Youth and Active Citizenship in Turkey: Engagement, Participation and Emancipation,* (Istanbul: South East European and Black Sea Studies, 2017), 129.

[39] Ibid., 130.

[40] Isil Cerem Cenker Ozbek, *Civic Space in Turkey: A Social Capital Approach to Civil Society,* (Antalya: Turkish Studies, 2017), 690.

[41] Carolyn M. Elliott, *Civil Society and Democracy: A Comparative Review Essay,* 1

playing checks and balances on state power.[42] Anheir states that civil society is a sphere

between the state and the market to limit their powers.[43] To be able to challenge state

power, civil society needs to be autonomous from the state institutions. Muller

emphasizes that an autonomous civil society can protect the public against abuses of state

power.[44] To do so, autonomy is the *sine qua non* of civil society.

Although modern civil society concept includes limiting state power, it is

essential to acknowledge that the existence of civil society depends on state power.

Considering CSOs cannot accomplish legislative changes, there is still a necessity for

legislative power. Elliott argues that civil society cannot bring about democracy without

the state.[45] Jorgensen also agrees with Elliott that CSOs must be aware that their work is

related to the state's authority.[46] To illustrate, the state delineates the rights of civil

society under law; the state is the authority to decide which CSOs are permitted under the

law and how much autonomy is given to civil society.[47] Furthermore, the state could also

be a cooperating partner with civil society. Chandhoke illustrates the relationship that if a

CSO is fighting against civil rights, the state is needed to punish the violators.[48] CSOs

may compete with each other to cooperate with the state to be involved in the decision-

making process. Oxhorn adds that states might prefer to work closely with some CSOs

[42] Sema Akboga, *Civil Society, Democracy and Islam in Turkey: The Case of Civil Society Organizations,* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 2011), 26.
[43] Helmut K. Anheier, *Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy,* (London: Routledge, 2004), 20.
[44] Karel B. Muller, *The Civil Society-State relationship in Contemporary Discourse: A Complementary Account from Giddens' Perspective,* (London: Political Studies Association, 2006), 316.
[45] Carolyn M. Elliott, *Civil Society and Democracy: A Comparative Review Essay,* 35.
[46] Lars Jorgensen, '*What are NGOs Doing in Civil Society'?* in NGOs, Civil Society, and the State: Building Democracy in Transnational Societies, edited by Andrew Clayton, (Oxford: INTRAC, 1996), 36.
[47] Neera Chandhoke, *The 'Civil' and the 'Political' in Civil Society*, 243.
[48] Ibid., 246.

than others.[49] Alternatively, the state does not only delineate the rights of civil society but also determine the law for all society members. Hence, civil society needs the state's support to provide a legal framework that enables a democratic society.

In addition to the legislative role of the state in the development of civil society, scholars agree that the state should also encourage a diverse civil society in democratic countries. Civil society might support some groups more than others without state involvement. Therefore, the state should enable CSOs with all kinds of views. Walzer argues that 'civil society is a setting of settings: all are included, none is preferred.'[50] Baynes suggests that the state has a responsibility to promote a diverse and robust civil society.[51]

Even though the concept of civil society was established in western literature, it has diffused to other cultures. Hence, the meaning of civil society has extended its meaning that peculiar to the West. As explained below, western authors describe the fundamental aspects of civil society as active participation, autonomy from the state institutions, and aiming to limit their powers as well as the importance of the state in the development of diverse civil society. However, these aspects of civil society have transformed in weak democracies with the centralist ideas of the strong state culture.

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[49] Philip Oxhorn, *Civil Society Without a State? Transnational Civil Society and the Challenge of Democracy in a Globalizing World.* (Montreal: World Future, 2007), 328.
[50] Michael Walzer, *'The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction'* in Civil Society and Democracy: A Reader, edited by Carolyn M. Elliott, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 72.
[51] Kenneth Baynes, *'A Critical Theory Perspective on Civil Society and the State'* in Civil Society and Government, edited by Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 133.

First of all, the sense of political and social participation among the public in weak democracies is strongly influenced by the strong state power. In weak democracies, the public stays passive and the state institutions take the responsibility to shape the community in contrast to the western usage of civil society. This power of state limits the participation of the public to political and social life.[52] Hence, the level of participation is lower in weaker democracies than in western countries.

Secondly, the ideology has been more important than diversification of civil society in weak democracies. The state might limit the autonomy of civil society and align with CSOs close to its ideology rather than encourage diversity among CSOs. Elliot describes the civil society in weak democracies as becoming a tool of domination for the state to protect the state elites' interests.[53] These CSOs only seek to influence public opinion for particular purposes, rather than further democratization. Chandhoke emphasizes that the groups align with the state in weak democracies may extend the state power in the domain of civil society.[54]

As a result of the role of the state in the development of civil society in weak democracies, the distrust among civil society against the state establishes. Jensen and Miszliyetz argue that the main problem with CSOs in weak democracies is the lack of

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[52] Cristiano Bee and Ayhan Kaya, *Youth and Active Citizenship in Turkey: Engagement, Participation and Emancipation*, 132.
[53] Carolyn M. Elliott, *Civil Society and Democracy: A Comparative Review Essay,* 23.
[54] Neera Chandhoke, *The 'Civil' and the 'Political' in Civil Society,* 258.

trust of civil society about the state.[55] This distrust creates divisions among the civil

society as the state-aligned CSOs and others.

The above-mentioned aspects of civil society in weak democracies are also true

for Turkey's case. Belge argues that the development of Turkish civil society did not

emerge in the civil society context in Western countries.[56]

First of all, even though there had been some processes in history, Turkish CSOs

have been always either dependent on state institutions or limited by them.[57] Since there

is no legal guarantee for the state's involvement in CSOs in Turkey, CSOs always have

the pressure of being closed by the state.[58] There have been three significant points where

civil society had expanded its capabilities to free themselves from the domination of the

state, but it has faltered with the state's pressure. Each time, when civil society had

enhanced its autonomy, it has been stymied by the strong state tradition.

Secondly, the Turkish state has historically used civil society to extend its official

state ideology. While some CSOs have played a progressive role by pushing the state for

more progressive policies and protecting rights, some have played a regressive role by

spreading state ideas to society. Karaman and Aras call CSOs in Turkey as 'civil society

[55] Jody Jensen and Ferenc Misclivetz, 'The Second Renaissance of Civil Society in East Central Europe and in the European Union' in The Languages of Civil Society' (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 142.
[56] Murat Belge, *Sivil Toplum Nedir?,* Sivil Toplum ve Demokrasi Konferans Yazilari No:1, 2003. https://stk.bilgi.edu.tr/media/uploads/2015/02/01/belge_std_1.pdf
[57] Bahar Rumelili and Buke Bosnak, *'Taking stock of the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey,'* in Europeanization of Turkey: Polity and Politics, ed. Ali Tekin and Aylin Guney, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 127.
[58] Liana Varon, Sezin Dereci, and Tevfik Basak Ersen, *'Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development: Turkey Country Report',* (Istanbul: TUSEV, 2017), 10.

of the political state' due to their aim to spread the state ideology.[59] This aspect of

Turkish civil society has led to distrust between non-state aligned CSOs and the state in

Turkey.[60]

Chapter III: Evolution of Civil Society in Turkey

As Hall argues that one needs to look at history to understand the evolution of

civil society in a country,[61] I will examine the historical evolution of the civil society and

the state-civil society relationship in Turkey to better understand the today's division in

the Turkish civil society. Historically, Turkish civil society is divided along with

ideological and cultural fragments.[62] Due to its bifurcated nature in Turkey, this thesis

limits the term CSOs as the most salient ideologies in Turkish political history as Islamist

and secular CSOs.[63]

With the establishment of Turkey in 1923, the Turkish state defined the Turkish

identity as secularism, nationalism, republicanism, populism, statism, and revolutionism

as six principles of Kemalism. Hence, between 1923 to 1946, these principles were the

ideology of the state.[64] During the single-party period, the 1924 constitution was

established in order to lay the groundwork for democratization in the new republic. This

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[59] Lutfullah Karaman and Bulent Aras, *The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey,* (Istanbul: Journal of Economic and Social Research, 2000), 53.

[60] Helen Mackreath and Sevin Gulfer Sagnic, *Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey,* (Istanbul: Citizens' Assembly of Turkey, 2017), 46.

[61] John Hall, *The Nature of Civil Society,* (Montreal: Society, 1998), 35.

[62] Bahar Rumelili and Buke Bosnak, *Taking stock of the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey*, 131.

[63] Sema Akboga, *Civil Society, Democracy and Islam in Turkey,* 5.

[64] Nilufer Gole, *Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites,* (Istanbul: Middle East Journal, 1997), 49.

constitution re-established the state and civil society relationship by determining the right of both parties.

Akboga argues that the Turkish political culture of excluding people's participation in politics through CSOs has been shaped by the idea of increasing state power to create a completely new structure in 1923.[65] According to Article 79 of the 1924 Constitution, the freedom to establish associations could be restricted according to the law.[66] However, secular national identity required the elimination of Islam in the political and social realm as well as the ignorance of the demands of minorities.[67] The new republic disassociated the religion from the public and political sphere,[68] after Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925.[69] Republican People's Party (CHP) closed all CSOs that are not linked to its official ideology and enforced CSOs to obtain the government's permission for establishing associations in 1938 with the Law for Associations (No. 3512).[70] These rulings not only decreased the number of CSOs but also determined the relationship between the state and civil society.

After 1946, the transition to the multiple political party period, a new period for civil society started. In its first years, Democrat Party (DP) followed more liberal policies. As a result, some 2,000 CSOs formed at the time. However, as the economic

[65] Sema Akboga, *Civil Society, Democracy and Islam in Turkey,* 81.

[66] Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasa Mahkemesi, Teskilati Esasiye Kanunu, accessed on January 31, 2020, available at: https://www.anayasa.gov.tr/tr/mevzuat/onceki-anayasalar/1924-anayasasi/

[67] Sema Akboga, *Civil Society, Democracy and Islam in Turkey,* 5.

[68] Nilufer Gole, *Secularism and Islamism in Turkey,* 49.

[69] Samil Sen, *Sivil Toplumun Demokratiklesme Surecindeki Yeri and Kamu Yonetiminin Etkisi,* (Konya: Unpublished MA thesis, 2005), 75.

[70] Tijen Dundar Sezer, *Dernek Kurma Ozgurlugunun Icerigi ve Gelisim Sureci Uzerine Karsilastirmali Bir Inceleme,* (Izmir: Journal of Dokuz Eylul University Social Sciences Institute, 2008), 35.

problems started, the DP increased its authority on dissidents and civil society to oppress the criticism.[71] The DP not only had banned the leftist CSOs, [72] but also established an investigatory commission to acquire information on the opposition's activities.[73] In other words, while the CHP banned CSOs are not linked to the party and its ideology, the DP did the same and, banned CSOs are not linked to its ideology.

After the 1960 *coup d'état* overthrew the DP administration, the military government with the help of various civil actors made a new constitution that aimed to protect democracy and enhance its operating mechanism. The 1961 constitution guaranteed free speech and free association.[74] With the Law for Labor Union in 1963, the restrictions on establishing labor unions were lifted as well.[75] As a result of these laws, political participation and the number of CSOs created by both Islamists and seculars increased.[76] One can say that the 1961 constitution paved the way for a more democratic society in Turkey.

On March 12, 1971, the Turkish military delivered an ultimatum to the President, Suleyman Demirel to oust the government. The military ultimatum played havoc with the gaining of the 1961 constitution. After the ultimatum, the military established the 1971 constitution and the Law of 1488 restricted the right to establish associations once again. The military government had closed all CSOs due to their contradictory ideologies to

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[71] Samil Sen, *Sivil Toplumun Demokratiklesme Surecindeki Yeri and Kamu Yonetiminin Etkisi*, 77.
[72] Ibid., 76.
[73] Ibid., 77.
[74] Sema Akboga, *Civil Society, Democracy and Islam in Turkey*, 63.
[75] Ibid., 65.
[76] Nilufer Gole, '*Authoritarian Secularism and Islamists Politics: The Case of Turkey*' in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed. Augustus Richard Norton, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 36.

secularism and cut their financial aids. Following these changes, the conflict between

Islamists and seculars had escalated which led to the 1980 *coup d'état.* During the early

1980s, the new military government redefined the state-civil society relationship with the

1982 Constitution. The new constitutional reform restricted the autonomy of CSOs by

limiting collective agreement and union rights.[77] The military government passed a new

Associations Law which affirmed the right of the state over civil society.[78] After the 1980

coup d'état, the military regime aimed to depoliticize the society in the name of national

unity; hence it closed about half of the CSOs in Turkey.[79] As a result, the development of

Turkish civil society had damaged once again.

In the post-1980s, the concept of civil society had revived in Turkey. There were

both global and domestic factors behind this revival. Following the collapse of

communist regimes in Eastern Europe, civil society concept had sprouted out globally as

neo-liberalism diffused.[80] Civil society has become the symbol for minimizing the role of

the state in the public realm and limiting the state power.[81] This upsurge coincided with

Turgut Ozal administration and his neo-liberal policies in Turkey. Ozal, came to the

power in 1983 after the military government, ushered the neo-liberal policies in Turkey.

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[77] Liana Varon, Sezin Dereci, and Tevfik Basak Ersen, *Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development*, 6.

[78] Trends in Turkish Civil Society, CAP, IPC, and IAI, July 2017, 8, available https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/07/10/435475/ trends-turkish-civil-society/

[79] Sefa Simsek, *The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality,* (Istanbul: Turkish Studies Journal, 2004), 48.

[80] Funda Onbasi, *Civil Society Debate in Turkey: A Critical Analysis, (Ankara: Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2008),* 16.

[81] Hande Paker, *Social Aftershocks: Rent Seeking, State Failure, and State-Civil Society Relationship in Turkey,* (Montreal: Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2004), 185.

He aimed to decentralize the state power to separate the realms of the state and society.[82]

During Ozal administration, the advocates of different ideologies successfully

transformed political debates to policy-based rather than ideologies.[83] According to Gole,

Ozal administration led to a shift in social engineering from the state elites to social

actors.[84] Ironically, Ozal's policies constituted a watershed in the development of civil

society even though the 1980 coup aimed to depoliticize society. Between 1983 to 2004,

the number of CSOs have tripled.[85] Turkish society had experienced the rise of Islamist

groups, Kurdish nationalism, and the national women's movements. These movements

have challenged state power by demanding greater rights.[86] Alternatively, with the global

and domestic factors, civil society in Turkey had extended and diversified in the post-

1980s.

When we come to the 1990s, there had been positive changes on the development

of Turkish civil society. First, the government loosened various legal regulations imposed

on 1982 constitution regarding the founding of organizations and unions in 1995.[87]

Second, the 1999 Habitat II Conference with the United Nations held in Turkey. This

conference mobilized CSOs in Turkey to participate in the global civil society movement

[82] Nilufer Gole, *Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey,* 218.
[83] Ibid., 214.
[84] Ibid., 215.
[85] Trends in Turkish Civil Society, CAP, IPC, and IAI, July 2017, 8 , available
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/07/10/435475/
trends-turkish-civil-society/
[86] Metin Heper, `*Trials and Tribulations of Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic*` in Politics in the Third
Turkish Republic edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), 239.
[87] Samil Sen, *Sivil Toplumun Demokratiklesme Surecindeki Yeri and Kamu Yonetiminin Etkisi,* 85.

as well as rallied awareness about civil society in Turkey. [88] In this sense, the conference led Turkish civil society to act together as a social actor.[89]

Following these improvements in civil society, another strike from the military on Turkish civil society occurred in 1997. As a result of some military members' perception of the threat of radical Islam, the so-called post-modern coup of 23 February 1997 occurred.[90] Even though the military wanted to obtain public support and develop civil society in contrast the previous coups in Turkey,[91] the post-modern coup stymied the development of civil society once again. Onbasi argues that the 1997 coup brought to the question of possibility of an autonomous civil society functioning in Turkey.[92] In sum, after each autonomy attempt of civil society, there has been a strike to by either the military or the state. While the 1924 and 1961 constitutions had positive impact on the developments, the 1982 constitution damaged the developments.

In the 1990s, there have been some events that had interrupted the dominancy of strong state tradition on civil society and catalyzed the autonomy of CSOs. These events could be arrayed as the 1999 Marmara earthquake, Turkey's European Union (EU) candidacy process, and the refugee crisis. While the EU process led to a more autonomous civil society by putting the pressure on the state for more space for civil

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[88] Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition, Civicus Civil Society Index Country Report for Turkey, Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV), March 14, 2020, 37, available at: https://tusev.org.tr/en/research-publications/online-publications/civil-society-in-turkey-an-era-of-transition-civicus-civil-society-index-country-report-for-turkey

[89] Daniella Kuzmanovic, *Project Culture and Turkish Civil Society,* (Copenhagen: Turkish Studies, 2010), 431.

[90] Funda Onbasi, *Civil Society Debate in Turkey: A Critical Analysis,* 21.

[91] Sema Akboga, *Civil Society, Democracy and Islam in Turkey,* 72.

[92] Funda Onbasi, *Civil Society Debate in Turkey: A Critical Analysis,* 21.

society, the state's insufficiency responding to the crises- the Marmara earthquake and the refugee issue led Turkish civil society to extend their space.

First, the 1999 Marmara earthquake, which caused the demise of 17,480 people led to a more independent civil society in Turkey. The state failed to manage the crisis after the quake, and this led to an unprecedented increase in the number of CSOs. [93] Paker arrays the failure of the state in the Marmara earthquake as the disconnection of communication services, the lateness of relief and rescue arrival, the ineffectiveness of transportation, and the low quality of the relief.[94] World Bank describes the state's emergency response to the quake as 'the most difficult emergency management crisis faced by a nation in recent history.'[95] During the crisis, CSOs played an important role by providing relief services for the victims and representing the interest of multiple segments.[96] After the earthquake, not only CSOs became more involved in societal issues but they also started criticizing the government.[97]

Although the state's response to the crisis began immediately, they were insufficient as the state was unprepared. The state set up crisis centers to ensure the smooth flow of aid and rescue services to the areas. However, all communication was down after the quake and roads were closed. [98] There was no coordination between local

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[93] Helen Mackreath and Sevin Gulfer Sagnic, *Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey,* 29.

[94] Hande Paker, *Social Aftershocks: Rent Seeking, State Failure, and State-Civil Society Relationship in Turkey*, 77.

[95] World Bank, *Turkey-Marmara Earthquake Assessment,* (Ankara: World Bank, 1999), 8. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/474251468781785112/Turkey-Marmara-earthquake-assessment

[96] Helen Mackreath and Sevin Gulfer Sagnic, *Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey*, 29.

[97] Rita Jalali, *Civil Society and the State: Turkey after the earthquake,* (Ankara: Disasters, 2002), 131.

[98] Ibid., 124.

authorities, foreign assistance, and the Prime Ministry.[99] Even Prime Minister Ecevit

could not establish communication with the affected areas.[100] There were no police on

those roads to help relief services go to the affected areas.[101] Official research and rescue

teams arrived the earthquake area 20 hours later than the disaster and although the foreign

assistance arrived shortly after the earthquake were in delay due to the transportation

failure. Another reason for the delay of foreign assistance into the area was the failure of

the organizational management of local authorities. Some foreign teams had to wait at the

Istanbul airport for hours.[102] Jalale demonstrates the failure of the state after the quake

with interviews which she had conducted with CSOs fieldworkers. Her interviewers

described the first days after the quake as 'utter chaos and confusion.'[103]

During the crisis, CSOs played an important role in the relief and rescue work.

Many CSOs across the country arrived at the affected areas shortly. They constructed tent

cities and soup kitchen for the victims.[104] People volunteered to CSOs and a group of 40

CSOs started new initiatives such as the Civil Society Earthquake Coordination

Committee.[105] Even the state relied on the Coordination Committee.[106] Shortly after the

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[99] Hande Paker, *Social Aftershocks: Rent Seeking, State Failure, and State-Civil Society Relationship in Turkey*, 79.

[100] Rita Jalali, *Civil Society and the State: Turkey after the Earthquake,* 125.

[101] Hande Paker, *Social Aftershocks: Rent Seeking, State Failure, and State-Civil Society Relationship in Turkey*, 78.

[102] Ibid., 79.

[103] Rita Jalali, *Civil Society and the State: Turkey after the earthquake,* (Ankara: Disasters, 2002), 124.

[104] Paul Kubicek, *The Earthquake, Civil Society, and Political Change in Turkey: Assessment and Comparison with Eastern Europe,* (Oxford: Political Studies, 2002), 767.

[105] Rita Jalali, *Civil Society and the State: Turkey after the earthquake,* 130.

[106] Ibid.

quake, CSOs held a meeting and distributed the roles of each organization during the crisis.[107]

With exceeding their capacities, CSOs attempted to transform the role of the organizations. First, members of the organizations started criticizing the state's poor response to the crisis. For instance, the chairman of the Turkish Medical Association (TTB) Fusun Sakey criticized the Ministry of Health for its failure to provide help services for survivors.[108] Another example of critiquing the role of the state in the crisis would be the statement of the chair of the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) where he expressed his suspicion about the Ministry of Public Works' ability for conducting a damage assessment. [109]

Following, the state responded to these criticisms quickly by refusing to allow critical CSOs' work in affected areas and freeze or close non-state aligned CSOs' bank accounts.[110] It also directed the funds of these associations to the state.[111] The Ministry of Public Works refused to grant permission to TMMOB to inspect the buildings in quake areas. Religion-based CSOs accused the state for only cooperated with the CSOs close to its ideology.[112] CSOs protested the state and over 100 of those published a manifesto criticizing the state's repression to CSOs for relief work. In sum, although the state

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[107] Rita Jalali, *Civil Society and the State: Turkey after the earthquake,* 130.
[108] Ibid. 131.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Paul Kubicek, *The Earthquake, Civil Society, and Political Change in Turkey,* 767.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Rita Jalali, *Civil Society and the State: Turkey after the earthquake,* 128.

attempted to oppress the growth of civil society, the insufficiency of the state after the earthquake led to a more critical and independent civil society in Turkey.

Second, the Europeanization process had enhanced the autonomy of CSOs from the state institutions by providing funds, fostering networks, and enforcing the state to lift sanctions on CSOs.[113] The Copenhagen Criteria require the state to provide the conditions for a more democratic society and protect the rights and freedoms of minorities.[114] As economic enhancement had tightened the ties between the EU and Turkish civil society, the EU introduced Civil Society Dialogue (CSD) in 2005.[115] It enforces CSOs for active involvement in the EU accession process as well as aims to provide a mutual understanding between the EU and candidate countries. The first phase of CSD was implemented under the 2006 Financial Agreement with a budget of 19,3 million Euros.[116] Since then, there have been five stages of the program where the EU funds CSOs in Turkey for their projects. Furthermore, the EU accession process led the state to lift its restrictions pave the way for the state interference civil society.[117] As mentioned below, the state restricted the development of civil society until the late 1990s. However, in the late 1990s, the state started to change its influence on civil society due to EU membership proceedings as 'democratization packages' require.[118] In doing so, CSOs

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[113] Bahar Rumelili and Buke Bosnak, *Taking stock of the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey,* 131.
[114] Fuat Keyman, *Turkiye'de Sivil Toplumun Seruveni: Imkansizliklar Icinde Vaha, (Ankara: Civil Development Center, 2006),* 37.
[115] Ozge Zihnioglu, *'EU Civil Society Support in Turkey,'* in EU-Turkey Relations: Civil Society and Depoliticization, (Routledge: London, 2019), 108.
[116] T.C. Disisleri Bakanligi Avrupa Birligi Baskanligi, *'AB ve Turkiye Arasinda Sivil Toplum'un Gelistirilmesi Projesi,'* (accessed on February 10, 2020), available at: https://www.ab.gov.tr/_5966.html
[117] Bahar Rumelili and Buke Bosnak, *Taking stock of the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey*, 136.
[118] Sema Akboga, *Civil Society, Democracy and Islam in Turkey*, 74.

in Turkey extended their knowledge about efficiency and involving decision making processes at the state level. As a result, CSOs in Turkey have reinforced their capacities.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP), came to the power in 2002, inherited loosened pressure of the state on civil society. In the beginning, the AKP also contributed to the independence of the civil society by passing a new Associations Law in 2004. This law dismantled the sections of previous Associations Law which require CSOs to receive permission from the state for foreign funds and cooperation with foreign associations, and it also requires security forces to obtain a warrant for searching associations.[119] However, although both the Europeanization process and the AKP government eased the state interference on CSOs, ironclad strong state tradition of supporting the CSOs close to its ideology has never disappeared. The government amended the 2006 Anti-terror law which has played an impediment role in the process of strengthening CSOs from state institutions once again.[120] This law had stymied the development of civil society with its vague definition of 'terror,' and restricting freedom of speech. This law had used to prosecute political dissident civil society activists.

One can see that the historical aspect of the Turkish state stymieing the development of CSOs has continued during the refugee crisis. Akkoyunlu and Oktem describe this period as the government created near-monopolization of civil society in which non-compliance cost has become higher.[121] First, following the 2013 Gezi Park

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[119] Trends in Turkish Civil Society, CAP, IPC, and IAI, July 2017, 11 , available https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/07/10/435475/trends-turkish-civil-society/

[120] Bahar Rumelili and Buke Bosnak, *Taking stock of the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey*, 136.

[121] Karabekir Akkoyunlu and Kerem Okten, *Existential Insecurity and the Making of a Weak Authoritarian Regime in Turkey,* (Graz: Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2016), 514.

Protests and 2016 failed coup attempt, the state has attempted to increase its strict control over civil society. In 2013, the Gezi Protests started with a group of activists against the government's urban development plans in the Gezi Park, Istanbul. When security forces violently repressed the protests, activism turned into a national outcry over the AKP government's policies. Following the protests, the state has taken repressive actions such as charging people who joined the protests and banning YouTube and Twitter to cut the communication between protestors. Furthermore, criminal investigations started against CSOs and their organizers under anti-terror law as they were seen as alleged protest organizers by the state.[122] For instance, police arrested some fifty members of Taksim Solidarity Platform which included members of multiple political parties and CSOs in Gezi Protests.[123]

Although the civic space has become smaller after Gezi Protests, the state's actions to suppress opposition has peaked after the July 15th failed coup attempt in 2016. Six days after the coup attempt, the Turkish government announced a state of emergency. This decision paved the way for more arrests, extending 'terrorist activities' and suppressing opposition. Under the state of emergency, the state issued an executive decree No. 677 on November 22nd [124] which followed by purging over 140,000 civil servants, closing 1,500 CSOs and seizing their assets for their alleged links to 'terrorist organizations'.[125] Shutting down many politically dissident CSOs is an explicit threat to

[122] Amnesty International, *Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey*, 42. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/12000/eur440222013en.pdf
[123] Ibid., 43.
[124] T.C. Resmi Gazete, Olaganustu Hal Durumunda Bazi Tedbirlerin Alinmasi Hakkinda Kanun Hukmunde Kararname/677, 22 November 2016, https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/11/20161122-1.htm
[125] Erdogan Says He Will Extend His Sweeping Rule Over Turkey, New York Times, May 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-state-of-emergency.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope&_r=0

the organizations that are still active. In other words, the state of emergency has put pressure on civil society once again. In sum, after the 2013-2016 period, the Turkish government's insecurity heightened in parallel with its control over civil society.

Chapter III: The State Level Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Historically, Turkey is known as both a transit country for migrants and a country of emigration.[126] Nonetheless, Turkey has experienced mass influxes of people since the 1980s: the 1989 arrival of Bulgarian refugees, the flow of *peshmerga* fleeing from Iraq, the influx of people fleeing from the Iran-Iraq war, a large number of people fleeing from Yugoslavian civil wars, and people flee from the Kosovo crisis.[127] Turkey's migration identity has changed as the country has become a destination for regular and irregular migrants.[128] Turkey has faced another and a much more significant mass influx of people since the Syrian civil war broke out. According to the Turkish government's statistics and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of Syrian refugees was only 635 before 'open door' policy was introduced by the Turkish government in 2011.[129] However, the number was increased to 900,000 in 2014.[130] The change in Turkey's migration identity led to the decision of implementation of temporary

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[126] Rebecca Kilberg, *Turkey's Evolving Migration Identity,* Migration Policy Institute, July 24, 2014, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/turkeys-evolving-migration-identity

[127] Nuray Eksi, 'The Types of International Protection and the Legal Status of the Syrians in Turkey' *in Refugee-Asylum Seeker Policy of Turkey,* ed. Engin Akçay and Farkhad Alimukhamedov. (Ankara: Journalists and Writers Foundation, 2013), 51.

[128] Rebecca Kilberg, *Turkey's Evolving Migration Identity.*

[129] Kemal Kirişçi, *Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality.* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2014), 11.

[130] Ulku Doganay, and Hatice Coban Kenes. *Yazılı Basında Suriyeli 'Mülteciler': Ayrimci Söylemlerin Rasyonel ve Duygusal Gerekçelerinin Insası.* (Ankara: Mulkiye Dergisi, 2016), 145.

protection regime (TPR) under Article 91 of the Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and

International Protection.

Turkey retains a reservation to its ratification of the 1967 amendment of the

Refugee Convention that removed geographical and temporal limits to the status of

refugees.[131] Therefore, Turkey can only grant refugee status to people who are fleeing

from Europe.[132] This has two ramifications for the Syrian refugees in Turkey. First,

Syrian refugees do not have the right to be asylum-seeker in Turkey. However, although

Turkey has this geographical limitation, the country still has to follow the 1951

Convention's principle of *non-refoulement*.[133] Another reason for implementing short-

term policies for the refuges is that at the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Turkish

policy-makers expected that the Syrian humanitarian crisis would end shortly and the

refugees would return to Syria.[134] Hence, 'open door' policy seemed sufficient for the

crisis at the time. The second ramification of Turkey's reservation to the 1967

amendment for the refugees is Turkey's lack of law and experience in integration. Since

the number of refugees comes from Europe has been always low, Turkey had never

adopted a comprehensive integration policy for the refugees. The lack of law and

experience has become a problem after the Syrian refugee crisis because the length of the

war has exceeded, and the situation has escalated year by year. Therefore, a law that

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[131] The UN Refugee Agency, Protocol Relating to Refugee Status, accessed on April 3, 2018, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/convention/4dac37d79/reservations-declarations-1967-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html

[132] Human Rights Watch, accessed on February 11, 2018, available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/turkey2/Turk009-10.htm

[133] According to the principle of *non-refoulement*, refugees should not be sent back to their countries where they have serious threats.

[134] Kemal Kirişçi, *Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2015), 210.

gives rights to the refugees became a necessity in the longer term. Hence, Turkey

implemented 'temporary protection regime' for all Syrians, Palestinians, and stateless

persons who live in Syria in 2014.[135]

TPR is an international legal norm that was established as response to mass

influxes of refugees.[136] It provides the legal basis for states to eschew granting refugee

status with the framework of the 1951 Refugee Convention, its companion 1967 Protocol,

and the Statute of the UNHCR.[137] Although TPR gained prominence as a response to

forced migration during the 1990s, in fact, its establishment date back to the 1969 African

Refugee Convention.[138] Afterward, the same concept had been debated in the late 70s and

80s as a response of people fleeing from Central American Civil Wars, and the mass

influx of Southeastern people.[139] Later in the 90s, the EU member states had experienced

various versions of TPR. Multiple EU states introduced national TPR for Bosnians and

Kosovars fleeing from the wars.[140] However, these schemes were inconsistent and

voluntary.[141] In other words, not only states had to implement new policies for each crisis

but also the voluntary aspect of the scheme paved the way for countries eschew helping

the refugees. As a result, the need for a determined protection directory became

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[135] T.C. Icisleri Bakanligi Goc Idaresi Genel Mudurlugu, *Turkiye'de Gecici Koruma*, (accessed December 1, 2018,) available at: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/turkiye%E2%80%99de-gecici-koruma_409_558_1097_icerik

[136] Susan M. Akram, and Terry Rempel, *Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees,* (Boston: Boston University International Law Journal, 2004), 5.

[137] Susan M. Akram, and Terry Rempel, *Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees*, 5.

[138] Joan Fitzpatrick, *Temporary Protection Regime of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime,* (Cambridge: The American Journal of International Law, 2000), 279.

[139] Ibid.

[140] Hanne Beirens, Sheila Maas, Salvatore Petronella, and Maurice van der*, Study on the Temporary Protection Directive*, (Brussels: European Commission, January 2016), 84.

[141] Ibid.

evident.[142] Therefore, the EU countries agreed on the harmonization of temporary

protection regimes.[143] Although European states had hard negotiating processes to agree

on some points such as the definition of 'temporary protection,' 'mass influx,' 'time-

frame,' 'obligations of member states,' the EU countries, finally, adopted the Temporary

Protection Directive (TPD) in July 2001. [144]

The TPD has some differences in critical subjects of the lives of the refugees than

the Refugee Convention. First, the TPD adopts a broader definition of 'refugee' compare

to the Refugee Convention.[145] In other words, according to the TPD, more people qualify

to be 'refugee' than the Refugee Convention.[146] Second, the TPD is an exception for the

mass influx of people while the Refugee Convention presents permanent norms and rules.

In this respect, the TPD benefits states by allowing refugees to repatriate their countries

once countries become safe.[147] By doing so, receiving states may eschew spending

money for integration and providing social and economic benefits of asylum-seekers.[148]

Although the TPD ensures the protection of refugees by both defining broader

criteria of eligibility and providing a temporary solution,[149] it also has some weaknesses

regarding refugees and host states. According to *the Study on the Temporary Protection

Directive*, the TPD has five weaknesses.[150] First, as mentioned earlier, the definition of

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[142] Hanne Beirens*, Study on the Temporary Protection,* 84.
[143] Susan M. Akram, *Temporary Protection as an Instrument,* 5.
[144] Hanne Beirens*, Study on the Temporary Protection,* 8.
[145] Joan Fitzpatrick, *Temporary Protection Regime of Refugees,* 282.
[146] Ibid., 280.
[147] Joan Fitzpatrick, *Temporary Protection Regime of Refugees*, 299.
[148] Susan M. Akram, *Temporary Protection as an Instrument,* 5.
[149] Joan Fitzpatrick, *Temporary Protection Regime of Refugees*, 283.
[150] Hanne Beirens*, Study on the Temporary Protection Directive*, 14.

'mass influx' is broad in the TPD. The unsettlement of the definition of 'large number' is considered both a strength and a weakness.[151] Even though it covers different types of inflows with its broad definition of 'mass influx', the equivocal nature of the definition paves the way for different interpretations.[152] Second, the TPD does not have a mandatory period for states to adopt temporary protection decisions after the Commission's proposal.[153] On the one hand, it allows states to decide case-by-case and proviso immediate temporary protection if necessary; on the other hand, implementation of temporary protection could be time-consuming with its bureaucratic obstacles, and states cannot respond to the mass influx promptly.[154] Third, the solidarity principle of the TPD can be both strength and weakness with its aspects of responsibility-sharing, burden-sharing, and 'double volunteerism.'[155] While the first two aspects require solidarity among states in case of mass influx, the latter lay the foundation for states eschew physical solidary.[156] Last, as a significant benefit for those under temporary protection, the TPD determines the minimum rights that member states have to provide.[157] While it is a strength for people under protection since it adopts universal human rights, it can also be a weakness from the states' point of view in the sense of averting the risk of secondary movement.[158] In sum, all the above-mentioned aspects of

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[151] Hanne Beirens, *Study on the Temporary Protection Directive*, 6.
[152] Ibid., 14.
[153] Ibid., 6.
[154] Ibid., 21.
[155] UNHCR, International Solidarity and Burden-Sharing in All Its Aspects: National, Regional, and International Responsibilities for Refugees, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/excomrep/3ae68d978/annual-theme-international-solidarity-burden-sharing-its-aspects-national.html
[156] Hanne Beirens, *Study on the Temporary Protection Directive*, 14.
[157] Ibid., 24.
[158] Ibid., 25.

the TPD could be viewed as positive and negative depending on the position of the host country or the refugees.

In Turkey's case, foremost rights given to Syrian refugees in Turkey through temporary protection regime are below:[159]

- Foreigners under temporary protection regime will not be punished for their illegal entry into or stay in Turkey. (Article 5)
- The Council of Ministers upon the proposal of Ministry of Labor and Social Security after receving the opinion of the ministry determine the principles for the employment of persons under temporary protection regime. (Article 29)
- Foreigners under temporary protection regime can have access to social services. (Article 30)
- Temporary protection status of Syrians who voluntarily leave Turkey will be dissolved.[160]

Although the Turkish state has not recognized the influx of people coming from Syria as refugees with Geneva Convention rights, the Turkish government has welcomed the refugees by establishing its own structure of refugee management. The government's attitude and rhetoric towards the refugees have been oriented around 'guests.' As mentioned above, the state has framed the refugee rights under the TPD. Besides, although there was no immigrant law in Turkey until 2014, the state has provided rights for the refugees through economic and social services. It has applied temporary economic

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[159] 'Temporary Protection Regulation' https://www.documentclous.org/documents/2703514-Temporary-Protection-Regulation-Turkey.html
[160] Nuray Eksi, *The Types of International Protection,* 69.

relief through cash stipends, legal consultation and distribution of essential items. With the new law, the state has provided free access to primary education, health care and medication as well as laid the groundwork for refugees' access to higher education and work-permit. Besides, to ease the problems in integration of the refugees, the state has added language courses to the state's public education centers.

In addition to the legal framework, the state has also applied 'guest' rhetoric to describe refugees. This rhetoric is presented as Turkish state's solidarity with oppressed Muslims in Syria.[161] Some authors make sense of the humanitarian discourse of the government about the refugees by arguing sectarian and neo-Ottomanist desires of the AKP in the Middle East have led the government to welcome the refugees.[162][163] Regardless of the reason behind the rhetoric, it is apparent that the state has welcomed the refugees by reference to narratives of brotherhood in religion.

Chapter IV: Data Chapter

Data Chapter I: Public Opinion

For the purpose of this thesis, I argue that Turkish public discourse about the refugees has become more securitized since 2014 even though the Turkish government has tried to desecuritize the issue. Moreover, I argue that the level of securitization about

[161] Daniele Belanger and Cenk Saracoglu, 'Syrian Refugees and Turkey: Whose Crisis' in *The Oxford Handbook of Migration* edited by Cecilia Menjivar, Marie Ruiz, and Immanuel Ness, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 8.

[162] Ibid., 8.

[163] Burak Cop and Ozge Zihnioglu, *Turkish Foreign Policy under AKP Rule: Making Sense of Turbulence,* (Istanbul: Political Studies Preview, 2017), 35.

the refugees varies among Turkish society in parallel with the existing different identities and their threat perceptions. Hence, I apply public opinion surveys which specifically focus on both the majority- the AKP supporters and the minorities- other political party supporters.

I explore the events related to the refugee issue occurred in Turkey to make sense of the difference in the level of securitization about the refugees and understand how the refugee issue has become a unified subject among overall Turkish population. I start my data collection from 2014, where the Turkish government implemented TPR. With this decision, the Turkish public has realized that the prolongation of the refugees would exceed than expected. This chapter will explore six significant events (1) implementation of temporary protection regime, (2) the increasing number of attacks from Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), (3) granting citizenship to Syrian refugees, (4) demographic change in some cities due to the high number of Syrian refugees, (5) the amount of money that the Turkish government has spent on refugees.

The hostility among the overall population towards the refugees has been already established among Turkish society in 2014. Nonetheless, the hostility among the groups of people who feel more marginalized was higher than the dominant identity. Alternatively, minorities and opposition party supporters had felt more insecure about the refugees than the governing party supporters. According to the study, 20% of the population agreed with the statement that Syrians are a burden to Turkey.[164] However, when the supporters of the AKP and opposition parties- the CHP, Nationalist Movement

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[164] M. Murat Erdogan, *Suriyeliler Barometresi: Suriyelilerle Uyum Icinde Yasamin Cercevesi,* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Publication, 2017), 97.

Party (MHP), and People's Democratic Party (HDP) examined separately, it is seen that the hostility among the opposition party supporters is higher than the AKP constituency. According to the survey, conducted by Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, while 17% of the AKP supporters agree with the statement that the government should repatriate the refugees, this percentage is greater for the opposition party supporters: 46% of the CHP, 48% of the MHP, and 30% of the HDP advocates agree with the previous statement.[165] This survey demonstrates the division between the governing party and opposing party supporters on the refugee issue in 2014. In a nutshell, the minorities and opposition party supporters received the refugees more of a threat than the AKP advocates felt in 2014.

Threat perception about the refugees among the Turkish public increased in 2015 due to the dramatic increase in the number of Syrian refugees and the terrorist attacks orchestrated by PKK and ISIS. One of the most devastating attacks of 2015 include the deadliest terrorist attack in Turkish history, caused the death of 130 people in Ankara[166] and the attack in Suruc, Sanliurfa killed 32 people.[167] While these attacks inflamed the public tension, the number of Syrian refugees also increased from 1,622,839 million to 2,503,549 million in the same year.[168] According to the survey, which was conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in 2015, 84% of the Turkish population

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[165] Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, Public Opinion Survey of Turkish Foreign Policy 2014/1, Reaction mounting against Syrian refugees in Turkey, p: 1.

[166] Ankara Explosion: Timeline of bomb attacks in Turkey between 2015 and 2016, Independent. February 17, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/a-timeline-of-bomb-attacks-in-turkey-between-2015-2016-a6879841.html

[167] Suicide Bomber in Suruc Is Said to Be a Turk with Possible Ties to ISIS, The New York Times, July 22, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/europe/turkey-suruc-bombing.html

[168] UNHCR, Operational Portal Refugee Situation, Registered Syrian Refugees by Date, available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113

was worried about the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey.[169] Furthermore, as the

number of refugees lives outside of the camps increased, the question of integration also

has risen. According to the same survey, 81% of Turkish society thinks that refugees do

not integrate well into Turkish society.[170] Alternatively, the upsurge of the refugees and

terrorist attacks led to a more securitized discourse about the refugees.

Security concerns among the Turkish public escalated in 2016. As mentioned

above, I determine the significant events about the refugees in 2016 as the increase in the

terrorist attacks from PKK and ISIS, the demographic change in the districts made up of

minorities, and the decision of granting Turkish citizenship to the refugees.

First, although terrorist attacks from PKK and ISIS increased in 2015, they have

escalated in 2016. As Alexseev argues that the public may interpret migrants as the

state's failure,[171] the Turkish public interpreted the terrorist attacks as the failure of the

government's refugee policies. The ISIS attacker who orchestrated the suicide bomber

attack on January 12, [172] entered into Turkey as a refugee. [173] Besides, on August 20, 50

people were killed in Gaziantep by ISIS;[174] on December 10, 44 people were killed by

Kurdish militants.[175] The Turkish public has imputed to the 'open door' policy for the

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[169] The German Marshall Fund of the Unites States, Turkish Perception Survey 2015, available at: http://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/TurkeySurvey_2015_web1.pdf

[170] Ibid.

[171] Mikhail A Alexseev, *Societal Security,* 512.

[172] Recent Terrorist Attacks in Turkey, New York Times, December 31, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/31/world/europe/turkey-recent-attacks.html

[173] Ankara Explosion: Timeline of bomb attacks in Turkey.

[174] Erdoğan Blames ISIS for suspected suicide attack at wedding in Turkey, The Guardian, August 22, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/20/several-dead-in-suspected-terrorist-blast-at-wedding-in-turkey

[175] Istanbul Explosions: 44 killed, 155 wounded in twin blasts, CNN, December 22, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/11/europe/istanbul-explosions/index.html

upsurge in terrorist attacks. According to the survey, conducted by the Economist

Platform, 78% of the public believe that Syrians had made Turkey less safe.[176] These

attacks led Turkish society to believe that the 'open door' policy paved the way for

terrorist attacks by letting people come into Turkey easily.

Second, the existing distrust of the state among the opposition party supporters

and minorities escalated the feeling of insecurity as the demographic change became

more evident in 2016. While Kurds in Turkey have conceived the refugees as advocates

of ISIS and the Free Syrian Army whom both fight against the Democratic Union Party

(PYD) supported by Kurds, secular minorities have received the refugees as a tool for the

government to spread Islamist practices.[177] This existing distrust has escalated as

demographic change in minority-oriented cities became more evident in 2016. According

to the Crisis Group's 2016 report, the opposition believes that the government is

intentionally resettling the refugees in certain districts to achieve political goals.[178]

Yücebas presents an analysis of the shift in public discourse in Gaziantep, which is one of

the cities that has the highest number of Alevi population. He shows that the perception

of Syrians has changed from 'innocent and demanding guests' to 'disobedient threats in

peaceful neighborhoods.'[179] Moreover, International Crisis Group's 2016 Report also

underscores the importance of the demographic change in border-cities. In doing so, the

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[176] Ekonomistler Platformu, *Suriyeli Gündem Araştırması,* September 30, 2017, 14.
http://ekonomistler.org.tr/english/2017/11/08/perception-towards-syrians-in-turkey/
[177] Daniele Belanger and Cenk Saracoglu, Syrian Refugees and Turkey: Whose Crisis, 13.
[178] Turkey's Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence, International Crisis Group, November 20, 2016, 18
available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-s-refugee-crisis-politics-permanence
[179] Mesut Yücebaş, *Gaziantep Yerel Basınında Suriyeli Imgesi: Yeni Taşranın Yeni Suskunları: Suriyeliler.*
(Istanbul: Birikim, 2015), 44.

report adds other minorities in the picture. According to the report, minorities including Kurds, Alevis, Turkmens, and Arab Alawites are skeptical about the government's purpose of helping the refugees and offering them citizenship. Alternatively, minorities believe that the government is settling refugees in the areas where mostly minorities live to change the demographic dynamics.[180] These communities worry that the underlying goal of the AKP government is to transform Turkish national identity. Since minorities are already marginalized in most of the districts in Turkey, they are afraid of being marginalized in the neighborhoods that they are dominant. Therefore, the fear of the Islamization of Turkish identity has created insecurity among all these minority communities.

Third, President Erdogan's statements about the refugees are also identified as significant events of 2016. First, on July 3rd, President Erdogan announced that Turkey would grant Turkish citizenship to the refugees. [181] Second, on October 10th, President Erdogan threatened the EU that Turkey could open the border gates and allow millions of refugees to go into Europe.[182] According to the comparison survey which was conducted by Metropoll in 2014 and 2016, while 14% of the public approved the naturalization of Syrian refugees in 2014, it decreased to 9,6% in 2016.[183] The same survey also shows that not only opposition party supporters but also the ruling party advocates disagree with

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[180] Turkey's Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence.

[181] Erdoğan'ın Açıkladığı 'Vatandaşlık' Düzenlemesinin Ayrıntıları Ortaya Çıktı. CnnTurk, July 3, 2016, https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/erdoganin-acikladigi-vatandaslik-duzenlemesinin-ayrintilari-ortaya-cikti

[182] Erdoğan Warns Europe that Turkey could open migrant Gates, Reuters, November 25, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-europe-erdogan/erdogan-warns-europe-that-turkey-could-open-migrant-gates-idUSKBN13K0R6

[183] MetroPOLL Arastirma Turkey's Pulse March 2016: Do you approve of the naturalization of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Twitter post, July 2016, https://twitter.com/metropoll/media

the government's decision about granting Turkish citizenship to Syrian refugees. While 97% of the CHP, 94% of the MHP, 69% the HDP supporters are against the government's decision, 78% of the AKP advocates also disapprove of the policy.[184] In a nutshell, even though the level of securitization about the refugees fluctuates, the refugees have become more securitized among the overall population.

When we come to 2017, it is seen that the economic concerns about the refugees among Turkish society also increased as the state representatives started to politicize the refugee issue. One can see that the government representatives' statements unintentionally escalated the negative perception of the society about the refugees. On March 16, the Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management reported that the number of Syrian refugees increased to 2,957,454.[185] After, on September 23rd, the Interior Ministry General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs Manager Sinan Guner stated that over 12,000 Syrians had become Turkish citizens and the citizenship applications of 50,000 were in process.[186] Lastly and most importantly, at the 71st session of the UN General Assembly, President Erdogan stated that Turkey has spent $25 billion on refugees.[187] All these statements escalated the economic concerns about the refugees among the public.

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[184] MetroPOLL Arastirma Turkey's Pulse March 2016: Do you approve of the naturalization of Syrian refugees in Turkey.

[185] Turkiye'deki Suriyeli Sayisi Resmen Aciklandi, HaberTurk, March 16, 2017, https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1427703-yaklasik-3-milyon-suriyeli-kayit-altinda

[186] Turkey Processing Citizenship for 50,000 Syrians, Daily Sabah Turkey, September 23, 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2017/09/23/turkey-processing-citizenship-for-50000-syrians

[187] Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Mülteciler için 25 Milyar Dolar Harcadık, Kamu Personelleri, September 20, 2016, https://www.kamupersoneli.net/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-multeciler-icin-25-milyar-dolar-harcadik-h13210.html

According to the Turkish public's narrative, Syrian refugees have caused two serious economic problems in Turkey. The first is that the average payment in the labor market has decreased because Syrian refugees are willing to work for lower pay in informal sectors.[188] International Crisis Group's 2016 Report expounds that seasonal workers used to get 50 TL but since Syrian refugees entered into the market, the wage of seasonal workers has decreased to 30 TL. A 2018 report shows that the resentment among the minorities migrated from eastern Turkey to bigger cities where work in the informal sector has upsurge due to their competition for low-wage jobs in the informal economy.[189]

Secondly, after President Erdogan's statement, the Turkish public started to think that the government has spent too much money on the refugees which would cause an economic problem. In the context of 'other,' Unal's analysis of Turkish public discourse about the refugees points out that the language Turkish society use about Syrian refugees shows that the public wants to keep economic resources to themselves.[190] According to the survey, which was conducted in 2017, 66% of Turkish society believes that the presence of Syrian refugees affects the Turkish economy very negatively.[191] According to the same survey, 69% of the Turkish population believes that Syrian refugees accept working for a lower wage. According to the narrative, the refugees do not only take Turkish citizens' jobs but also pave the way for the lower average pay.[192] In sum, the government's effort to show that Turkey has been following liberal policies toward

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[188] Turkey's Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence.
[189] International Crisis Group, Turkey's Syrian Refugees.
[190] Serdar Ünal, *Turkey's Unexpected Guests: Foreign Immigrants and Refugees Experience in the Context of 'Other,'* (Aydın: Zeitschrift für die Welt der Türken, 2014), 72.
[191] Ekonomistler Platformu, *Suriyeli Gündem Araştırması,* 6.
[192] Ibid., 8.

Syrian refugees and needs help from the EU has backfired, and the Turkish public interpreted it differently.

The hostility towards the refugees became more of a unified issue among society in 2018. In the anti-migrant rhetoric, Turkish society would prefer sending the refugees back to Syria. According to the survey which aimed to analyze the polarization among the Turkish public, while there are only two commonalities among the Turkish population, the most commonly shared perception among the Turkish public is on Syrian refugees. [193] When they asked the question of whether Syrian refugees should go back to Syria, the answer was 'yes' regardless of the political party the correspondent supports. This data demonstrates although the level of securitization has fluctuated among the Turkish public and divided between the ruling party and opposition party supporters, host hostility towards the refugees diffused among all political party supporters in 2018.

As mentioned above, President Erdogan used the refugees as a bargaining tool against the EU in 2018. The politicization of the refugee issue by the state has accelerated when we come to 2019. Correspondingly, the nationalist and anti-migrant rhetoric among society has heightened. On October 6th, 2019, the Turkish military conducted a military operation to Syria called 'Operation Peace Spring.' The aim of this operation was to create 'safe zone' in Northern Syria where the Syrian refugees in Turkey could be settled. Alternatively, the Turkish state's welcoming approach towards the refugees has shifted in parallel to the public perception. According to Metropoll's public survey, 79% of the

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[193] Center for Migration Research, *Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey,* (Istanbul: Bilgi University, 2018), 7.

Turkish public either partially or completely support the Operation Peace Spring.[194]

While the lowest support to the operation was among the HDP advocates with 32,4%, all

other political party advocates in TBMM with high percentages stated their support to the

state's decision to settle the refugees in a safe zone in Northern Syrian- 93,5% of the

AKP, 77% of the CHP, 92,4% of the MHP, 74,3% of Iyi Party (IP).

Data Chapter II: Civil Society Organization's Involvement

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, since 2014 when the Turkish

government implemented the TPD, the public's hostility has escalated. Although the

hostility against the refugees has become a unified issue among the public, the level of

securitization has fluctuated depending on the group of people's identities in the process.

In alignment with the public's perception, CSOs' interest in helping the refugees had also

depended on the identity of the organization. This chapter focuses on the interest of

secular CSOs in helping the Syrian refugees and how the refugee crisis has influenced the

Turkish civil society.

As shown in the literature review, even though the Turkish civil society has

attempted to be more autonomous and diverse in the past, the state has always limited

these efforts. The latest attempt of civil society to extend its space and decrease its

dependence on the state occurred during the Syrian refugee crisis. The crisis has

catalyzed the autonomy of Turkish civil society as it led to both a quantitative increase

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[194] Public Support for Turkey's Syria Offensive at 79 Percent: Poll, *Duvar English,* November 18, 2019, https://www.duvarenglish.com/politics/2019/11/18/public-support-for-turkeys-syria-offensive-at-79-percent-poll/

and diversification among CSOs.[195] Not only new CSOs were established as a response to the refugee crisis but also the existing ones increased their work for the refugees.[196]

As mentioned earlier, CSOs in Turkey have been bifurcated as Islamists and seculars. Depending on the ideology of the state, while one ideology is oppressed, the other becomes dominant. During the refugee crisis, one can say that secular CSOs are non-state aligned and critique of the state. The interest of CSOs in issues, including the refugee crisis, varies depending on their ideologies. [197] Therefore, before going into the reasons behind the attitude of secular CSOs towards the refugees, it is necessary to mention the difference between attitudes of state-aligned and secular CSOs in the refugee crisis.

The first difference is the language used to describe the refugees among CSOs. The most evident difference is the predominant religion-oriented language among state-aligned CSOs. Mostly used word to describe the refugees among state-aligned CSOs is *Muhajirs* which is an Arabic word to describe Muslim emigrants. The term *muhajir* reminds the Turkish public of the generosity of *ansar* who hosted the first Muslim migrants in their homes. Hence, they use the word *muhajir* to refer the refugees.[198] While state-aligned CSOs use the *muhajir-ansar* discourse for the refugees, secular CSOs are against this discourse due to its implication of hierarchy between the *ansar* and

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[195] Ulas Sunata and Salih Tosun, *Assessing the Civil Society's Role in Refugee Integration in Turkey: NGO-R as a New Topology,* (Journal of Refugee Studies, 2018), 17.

[196] Helen Mackreath and Sevin Gulfer Sagnic, *'Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey,* 31.

[197] Metin Corabatir, *The Evolving Approach to Refugee Protection in Turkey: Assessing the Practical and Political Needs*, (Washington D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), 13.

[198] Emrin Cebi, *The Role of Turkish NGOs in Social Cohesion of Syrians,* (Sakarya: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2017), 146.

muhajir.[199] In contrast to state-aligned CSOs' 'charity' based discourse, secular CSOs use right-based discourse for the refugees.[200] Therefore, they ignore the religion of people in need.

Second, while state-aligned CSOs have been in the field to ease the needs of the refugees since the beginning of the crisis, secular CSOs had eschewed the effort. Although secular CSOs' interest in helping the refugees has increase, even now, the relief works in the field for the refugees are done by mostly state-aligned CSOs.[201] At the beginning of the conflict, some secular CSOs construed the refugees' arrival with the Turkish government's retaliation of the Syrian regime.[202] Hence, secular CSOs were leery of the refugees.[203] In lieu of assisting the refugees, secular CSOs abstained from working for the refugees. However, there has been an upsurge in the secular CSOs' involvement in the work for the refugees. In sum, while state-aligned CSOs have been working in the field for the refugees and their works are centered around religious discourse; secular CSOs were slow to involve the work for the refugees and apply a more human-rights discourse.

Protracted presence of the refugees followed by the change in the attitudes of secular CSOs. I argue that the determining factors behind the change in the attitudes of secular CSOs are (1) the Turkish government's insufficiency in helping and integrating the refugees, (2) realization of the need for integration followed by the dramatic increase

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[199] Helen Mackreath and Sevin Gulfer Sagnic, *Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey*, 37.
[200] Ibid.
[201] Emrin Cebi, *The Role of Turkish NGOs in Social Cohesion of Syrians*, 139.
[202] Metin Corabatir*, The Evolving Approach to Refugee Protection in Turkey: Assessing the Practical and Political Needs,* 13.
[203] Ibid.

in the number of refugees living outside of the camps, and (3) increased international funds on the projects related to the refugees.

First of all, the Turkish state has failed to respond to the refugee crisis with long term solutions. The reasons behind short-term policies include Turkey's reservation to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol which are the most important legal documents related to refugee rights.[204] Instead, as discussed above, Turkey adopted the TPR to address the needs of the refugees. Even though the TPR seemed enough at the time, it also became insufficient with its uncertainty about the rights of the refugees for the longer-term. The necessity for the integration became evident as the length of the war exceeded and refugees built their lives in Turkey. The state has started to focus on the integration of refugees. In addition to the failure of long-term solutions at the beginning of the crisis, although the state started to follow more sustainable solutions, its attempts were still insufficient to respond to this large-scale flow of refugees. The state has increased its integration effort in schooling, employment, health, and language areas.

As education is the cornerstone for integration and the total number of refugee school-age children, younger than 18 years old, is 1,7 million, [205] the Turkish state established the Temporary Education Centers (TECs) where the Syrian curriculum was followed. TECs aimed to be a transition process for Syrian children before going to Turkish schools. Moreover, the government established the Department of Migration and

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[204] Khalid Kose, *International Migration: A Very Short Introduction.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 66.

[205] T.C. Icisleri Baskanligi Goc Idaresi Genel Mudurlugu, *Gecici Koruma*, March 19, 2020 https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638

Emergency Education (*Goc ve Acil Durum Egitim Daire Baskanligi*) to respond to the need for education laws in a case of flow of migrants or other emergencies. This department aimed to coordinate and control the TECs.[206] Later in 2018, the Education Ministry decided to close all TECs and transfer all students to the Turkish schools to further integrate the children, live outside of the refugee camps. [207]

Although the state has attempted to increase the number of Syrian students attend schools, the education problem has not been solved for the refugee children yet. While the percentage of refugee children attend elementary school has become 96,3%, the percentage for high school is only 26,4%.[208] According to the report, aims to evaluate the education in Turkey, reasons for the decrease in the percentage of refugee children after elementary schools are the refugee families' financial impossibilities, and children's need to contribute to the family economy.[209] Due to their financial needs, children drop out of school and start working after elementary school.

In addition to the school-age refugees, the government has also laid the groundwork for the college-age students to attend universities. First, it has paved the way for the Syrian university students had started their programs in Syria to complete their degrees in Turkey as well as the Syrian students who attended schools in Turkey and passed the

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[206] T.C. Milli Egitim Bakanligi, Goc ve Acil Durum Egitim Daire Baskanligi'nin Gorevleri, May 15, 2016, http://hbogm.meb.gov.tr/www/goc-ve-acil-durum-egitim-daire-baskanligi/icerik/497

[207] T.C. Milli Egitim Bakanligi, Yabancilara Yonelik Egitim-Ogretim Hizmetleri, September 23, 2014, available at: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:5qeBG9-4fAwJ:mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/dosyalar/1715.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

[208] Turkiye, Suriyeli Cocuklarin Okullasmasinda Dunya Ortalamasini Gecti, Anadolu Agency, May 3, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/egitim/turkiye-suriyeli-cocuklarin-okullasmasinda-dunya-ortalamasini-gecti/1468778

[209] 2018 Egitim Degerlendirma Raporu, Tedmem, April 2019, available: https://tedmem.org/yayin/2018-egitim-degerlendirme-raporu

Foreign Student Exam *(Yabanci Ogrenci Sinavi)* to attend Turkish universities.[210]
Besides, a government agency, Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities
(Yurtdisi Turkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Baskanligi) provide 50% scholarship and full
tuition waiver for Syrians study at public universities.[211]

Despite all these improvements, in fact, only 4% of the refugees continue higher
education in Turkey. There are multiple difficulties the refugees encounter for higher
education. First and foremost, the financial problems are still an obstacle for university
education. As mentioned above, the state agency provides a 50% scholarship to some
refugees, but the scholarship only covers 20% of Syrian students.[212] Academic Turkish
proficiency is another problem for higher education among refugees.[213] It does not only
cause refugee students to have hardship for classes but also makes it more difficult to
make local friends at universities.[214] Hence, the state's reforms to ensure the level of
education increase among the refugees are still scant.

In addition to the educational changes, the state also paved the way for the refugees,
who have been registered, to have work-permit. However, the refugees could receive
work-permit if an employer offers the job. Besides, when the refugees desire to change
their jobs, they need to reapply for work-permit.[215] Alternatively, although the Ministry
of Labor and Social Security laid the groundwork for a work permit for the refugees, the

[210] M. Murat Erdogan, *Suriyeliler Barometresi: Suriyelilerle Uyum Icinde Yasamin Cercevesi,* 32.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Begum Dereli, *Refugee Integration through Higher Education: Syrian Refugees in Turkey,* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018), 11.
[214] Ibid., 15.
[215] Bade Vardarli, Amal Khatib, Sevgi Uygur, and Mesut Gonultas, *Turkiye and Almanya'daki Suriyeli Siginmacilara Sunulan Haklar ve Yasanan Sorunlar,* (Izmir: Electronic Journal of Social Science, 2019), 659.

employment process is still problematic for the refugees. According to Crisis Group's 2018 report, only 15,000 out of 3,5 million refugees legally work in Turkey. Some employees prefer avoiding the expenses of the work permit application for the refugees and do not hire refugees while some others prefer that refugees work without a work permit.[216] The data below demonstrates that the state's attempt to increase the employment of the refugees has not been successful either.

Health is another essential need that the state has attempted to provide access to the refugees. In the beginning, while only the refugees in camps had access to free healthcare, the state has changed the law as both the refugees in the camps and outside of the camps have access to free healthcare and medication.[217] However, unregistered refugees are not covered.[218] Besides, refugees can only go to state hospitals in the cities where they are registered.[219] According to the research conducted by Kaya and Kirac, while 25% of the refugees do not have access to healthcare services, 22% of them have only partial access.[220] Although the state has aimed to provide free healthcare for the refugees, the need for better healthcare for all refugees still exists in Turkey.

Besides the above-mentioned problems, education, employment, and health, the language is also a problem for further integration. The refugees do not speak Turkish,

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[216] Bade Vardarli, *Turkiye and Almanya'daki Suriyeli Siginmacilara Sunulan Haklar ve Yasanan Sorunlar,* 659.
[217] Mustafa Filiz and Turkan Yildirim, *Evaluation of Health Policies for Migrants in Turkey and the European Union Countries,* (Ankara: Turkish Research Journal of Academic Social Science, 2019), 26.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Basak Bilecen and Dilara Yurtseven, *Temporarily Protected Syrians' Access to the Healthcare System in Turkey: Changing Policies and Remaining Challenges,* (London: Migration Letters, 2018), 118.
[220] Ayhan Kaya and Aysun Kirac, *Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Istanbul,* (Istanbul: Support to Life, 2016), 28.

encounter problems in social interactions and legal matters. To decrease these problems, the government has added more 'Turkish for Foreigners' classes to both Public Education Centers (PECs) and state-established CSO, Yunus Emre Institute.[221] However, refugees' access to these courses is still limited. According to the research, aimed to examine the experience of language education of the refugees in Turkey, the language classes are overcrowded and the waitlists for the courses are too long. [222] Furthermore, the same research shows that the language courses mostly cover A1 and A2 level Turkish, rather than more advanced levels.[223] Hence, language education has still been limited for the refugees.

Although the Turkish state has changed its laws for the benefits of the refugees in education, employment, and health, one of the obstacles for further integration has been escalated by the government: the politicization of the issue. The government politized the refugees and used them as a bargaining tool against the EU and the Syrian war. As mentioned earlier, President Erdogan repeatedly threatened the EU that Turkey could open its borders and allow millions of refugees' flow into Europe.

First, in March 2016, the EU and Turkey signed a deal where the refugees have become highly politicized. According to the deal, every person arriving irregularly in Europe will be returned to Turkey and the EU will take one Syrian from Turkey in return. In exchange, Turkey will receive 6 billion Euros in refugee assistance and Turkish citizens will be granted visa-free entry to the EU countries. Later in the same year,

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[221] M. Murat Erdogan, *Suriyeliler Barometresi: Suriyelilerle Uyum Icinde Yasamin Cercevesi,* 31.
[222] Maissam Nimer, *Turkiye'deki Suriyeli Multecilerin Turkce Dil Egitimi Deneyimleri ve Kurumsal Yapilar,* (Istanbul: Istanbul Politikalar Merkezi, 2019), 20.
[223] Ibid., 9.

President Erdogan threatened the EU countries if they freeze talks on Turkey's

membership accession. Then, on October 10th, 2019, Erdogan used the same threat

against the EU for support of its Operation Peace Spring into Northern Syria. He,

explicitly, stated that if the EU countries identified Turkey's operation as an occupation,

Turkey would open the border gates and allow millions of refugees to go to Europe.[224]

One can see that the state has politicized the refugee issue by using the refugees as a

bargaining tool against the EU for its political aspirations.

Later, in February 2020, the state has politicized the refugee issue further after a

Syrian air raid killed Turkish soldiers in Idlib, Syria. After intermittent clashes between

Turkish and Syrian forces in Idlib, at least 33 Turkish soldiers died. This attack was the

deadliest single attack that the Turkish military had suffered in the last two decades.

Moreover, as the war in Idlib has intensified, the fear of more Syrians coming into

Turkey has exacerbated.[225] In response to this attack, the Turkish military launched

Operation Spring Shield. Following, Turkey opened the border gates for the refugees to

go into Europe, in retaliation to the EU's lack of solidarity with Turkish military

operations in Syria and the EU welshing on the 2016 EU-Turkey deal.[226] Turkey blamed

the EU for not supporting Turkey's effort to end terrorism, Turkey's proposal for 'safe

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[224] Cumhurbaskani Erdogan: Operasyonumuza Isgal Harekati Derseniz, Kapilari Acariz 3,6 Milyon Multeciyi Gondeririz, Yeni Safak, October 10, 2019, https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-operasyonumuza-isgal-hareketi-derseniz-kapilari-acariz-36-milyon-multeciyi-gondeririz-3509828

[225] Berkay Mandiraci, *Sharing the Burden: Revisiting the EU-Turkey Deal,* International Crisis Group, March13, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/sharing-burden-revisiting-eu-turkey-migration-deal

[226] EU and Turkey Hold 'Frank' Talks over Border Opening for Refugees, The Guardian, March 9, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/turkey-erdogan-holds-talks-with-eu-leaders-over-border-opening

zone' in Syria for the refugees, and failing to allocate the promised amount of money in the 2016 deal.

In sum, in the beginning, the Turkish state had responded to the refugee crisis with short term solutions. As the war exceeded and the stay of the refugees started to seem permanent rather than temporary, the state has taken steps to ensure refugee rights in education, employment, and health. Even though the Turkish state started implementing long term solutions for the refugees, more improvements in the above-mentioned areas are still needed. Besides, the politization of the refugees has hardened the integration process. As the government's response to the crisis was insufficient, the need for civil society has become more evident.

Second, the estimated number of refugees living outside of the camps had increased to 1,700,000 in 2015.[227] The dramatic increase has ramifications regarding the assistance since the state mainly focused on refugee camps.[228] The insufficiency of the state to meet the refugees' needs revealed the need for a stronger civil society. As a result of the upsurge of the refugees, a considerable increase in the number of CSOs occurred. Considering, refugees mostly live in border cities close to refugee camps, and then the biggest cities,[229] the correlation between the number of refugees and CSOs can be seen easily. According to the data shown by the Ministry of Interior Department of Associations, the number of CSOs across the country has boosted from 88,646 to 111,307

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[227] Fikret Elma and Ahmet Sahin *'Suriye'den Turkiye'ye Goc ve Aciga Cikan Temel Sorun Alanlari'* in Turkish Migration Conference 2015 Selected Proceeding ed. Guven Seker, Ali Tilbe, Mustafa Okmen, Pinar Yazgan, Deniz Eroglu, Ibrahim Sirkeci (London: Transnational Press London, 2015), 435.
[228] Helen Mackreath and Sevin Gulfer Sagnic, *Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey,* 21.
[229] Fikret Elma and Ahmet Sahin*, Suriye'den Turkiye'ye Goc ve Aciga Cikan Temel Sorun Alanlari,* 435.

between 2011 to 2017.[230] For instance, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa are the cities have the highest percentages of the refugees amounted to the population of the cities. According to 2019 data, 452,500 refugees in Gaziantep consist of 22% of the population.[231] In the same year, 429,888 refugees consist of 21% of the population in Sanliurfa.[232] According to the same data presented by Turkish officials, the number of CSOs in Gaziantep increased from 1,151 to 2,718 between 2011 to 2018 as well as it increased from 638 to 1,182 in Sanliurfa in the same time period.[233] This data sheds the light on the upsurge in the number of CSOs correlates with the increase in the number of refugees.

To illustrate the secular CSOs' work for the integration of refugees and the state's efforts to remain its control over civil society, one can look at the learning center activities of civil society. Most CSOs started learning centers to help the refugees to integrate society better. Although most of these centers had completed protocols district governors require, the state canceled more than one hundred of these activities. The state started to require a permit from the Ministry of Education for CSOs to open learning centers in order to increase state authority over CSOs' activities.[234] While state-aligned CSOs have received their permits shortly and continued to operate freely, secular CSOs have faced difficulties in acquiring the permits and their processes have gone slowly. According to the Crisis Group's interview with a Turkish official, the state has wanted to

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[230] Helen Mackreath and Sevin Gulfer Sagnic, *Civil Society and Syrian Refugees in Turkey,* 29.
[231] Multeciler Dernegi, *Turkiye'deki Suriyeli Sayisi Kasim 2019,* (accessed November 20, 2019) https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/
[232] Ibid.
[233] T.C. Icisleri Bakanligi Sivil Toplumla Iliskiler Genel Mudurlugu, *Yillara gore faal dernek sayisi*, (accessed November 20, 2019), https://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/yillara-gore-faal-dernek-sayilari
[234] Turkey`s Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions, International Crisis Group, January 29, 2018, 20.

increase its control over the activities because they did not know who operated these organizations.[235] In a nutshell, the strong state culture in Turkey has once again shrunk the civic space and impeded the progress of autonomous civil society.[236]

Lastly, even though the need for civil society during the refugee crisis became evident, Turkish civil society had still been dependent on the state's funding. However, there has been an increase in international support to the refugee-related projects in Turkey which catalyzed the work of secular CSOs. Although the EU's instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) has been funding Turkish CSOs since early 2008, it has achieved its peak to fund projects related to the refugees in 2015.[237] Other foreign funds also played an important role in the change in the secular CSOs' attitude towards the refugees. These funds have led civil society to be less dependent on the state funds, accordingly, have become more autonomous from the state and its institutions.

To prove the increase in the EU funds, I will analyze the refugee-related projects financed by IPA during the refugee crisis. IPA aims to create a sustained platform, CSD, for enhancing mutual knowledge between cultural, political, and economic systems in candidate states and EU countries between the EU and the candidate countries.[238] There have been five phases under CSD. The first and second phases started before the refugee crisis, hence, I limit my focus to the projects after 2011. Even though the third phase

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[235] Turkey's Syrian Refugees: Defusing Metropolitan Tensions, International Crisis Group, 20.

[236] Turkey 2018 Report, European Commission, (accessed November 30), 4. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lLl7mT3o9wYJ:https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-turkey-report.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

[237] Ozge Zihnioglu, *European Union Civil Society Support and the Depoliticisation of Turkish Civil Society,* (Istanbul: Third World Quarterly, 2019), 507.

[238] Civil Society Dialogue, *Civil Society Dialogue-Fifth Phase Grant Projects Catalogue,* (accessed November 25, 2019) http://siviltoplumdiyalogu.org/besinci-donem/

started in 2014 when the number of refugees was already more than a million in Turkey, the EU did not fund any CSOs projects regarding the refugees. However, during the fourth phase (2015-2017), the EU provided almost 1,300 million Euros to the projects focus on the refugees in Turkey, whilst the total fund in this phase was 11 million Euros. The funded projects include 'Syr-Round the Children,' 'Harmonization of Refugees,' 'Women on the Move I,' 'Mediterranean Dialogue Bridge' 'Migration Network in Europe and Turkey,' 'Organization of Migrants Accommodation,' and 'Power of Civil Society against Human Trafficking.' During the fifth phase, the EU funded some 600,000 Euros to three CSOs for their work in the refugees, a total number of 7 million Euros to 40 projects in Turkey. These programs include 'Strengthening the EU-Turkey Civil Society Cooperation for the Support of Integration of Refugees and Migrants,' 'Photolift: Photography-based Psychosocial Support for Enhancing Syrian Children's Integration,' and 'Women on the Move II.' This data demonstrates that the EU increased its funds for CSOs' projects related to the refugees in 2015.

In addition to the EU funding, other foreign funds also become available for secular CSOs' refugee relief works. To prove that secular CSOs became less dependent on the Turkish state in virtue of the international funds, I will examine three secular CSOs in Turkey with their project financiers during the refugee crisis.

I identified 'Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants' (*Siginmacilar ve Gocmenlerle Dayanisma Dernegi*), 'The Research Center on Asylum and Migration' (*Iltica ve Goc Arastirmalari Merkezi)* and 'Support to Life' *(Hayata Destek)* as secular CSOs due to their description of the organizations.

In their websites, all these three associations describe themselves as 'right-based.'

SGDD describes the organization as

'SGDD serves for all refugee and asylum-seekers regardless of their language, religion, sex, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.'

IGAM describes the organization as

'The association was established to inform the public without discriminating any religion, language, sex, sexual orientation, and nation; accepting that human rights have higher values than all kinds of ideologies and world views; in the direction of Universal Declarations of Human Rights- the United Nations, European Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights treaties, documents, values, and principles; performing activities described on Article A, particularly researching about asylum and migration fields.'

STL describes the organization as

'We are an independent humanitarian organization founded with the principle aim of helping disaster-affected communities meet their basic needs and rights. We are conducting our activities since 2005 with principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and accountability.'

I have examined all these three CSOs' works for the refugees and their financiers since the Syrian refugee crisis started. First, one of the secular CSO I have determined is SGDD which was established in 1995. On its website, SGDD arrays its projects and their funders. According to my research, SGDD has thirty-one projects aiming to help the refugees living in Turkey. More importantly, the organization either received international funds or cooperated with international NGOs for thirty out of thirty-one

projects. The name of the projects and their financiers or supporting partners are listed in Appendices A.

The second secular CSO I have examined is IGAM which was established in 2013 after the refugee crisis had started. On their official website, IGAM arrays its projects and their financiers. Examining each project since the establishment of the organization, I have determined that IGAM had nine projects for the refugee relief work in Turkey in which eight of them funded by international organizations. Projects and their financiers are listed in Appendices B.

Although the first two CSOs list their projects on their official website with short descriptions, STL is more transparent and provides detailed information about its projects. The organization has annual reports that helped me to examine each year separately. However, although the organization was established in 2005, it only provides annual reports as far as 2013. Hence, I was able to examine all projects and their financiers since 2013.

The 2013 annual report shows that STL had twenty-one projects in 2013, where thirteen of these projects both funded by foreign organizations and aimed to help Syrian refugees. With total income being 9,531,196 TL, only the budget for the projects aim to help refugees, received funding from international organizations was 8,344,662 TL. Alternatively, 87,55% of 2013 income of STL came from the internationally funded refugee projects.

According to the 2014 annual report, STL had a total of twenty-five projects in which eleven out of twenty-five are the projects for refugee relief work. All projects

aiming the help for the refugees were funded by foreign organizations. Besides, the funding of these eleven projects consists of 79% of the 2014 annual income. Alternatively, one can say that the most internationally funded projects of STL in 2014 were the projects for the refugee relief work.

According to the 2015 annual report, the organization received funding for twenty-five projects. Whilst 'food aid and winterization' project targeted both the refugees and locals in need, and 'Child Labor in Seasonal Agriculture' project aim to reduce child labor, all other projects aim to relieve the consequences of the refugee crisis for the settlers in Turkey. According to the same report, the total cost of 2015 projects is 8,716,143 Euros and 8,687,447 Euros of the cost is funded by foreign institutions. In other words, whilst 92% of STL 2015 projects aimed to help refugees, 99% of its funds came from international organizations.

The 2016 Annual report of STL shows that the organization had nine different categories for the project. Five of these categories aimed to help refugees. While the total income in 2016 was 15,450,548 Euros, the total income of the projects, aim to help refugees funded by international organizations, was 13,828,808 Euros. Alternatively, 89,5% of 2016 income consists of internationally funded refugee relief works.

In 2017, the organization had eleven categories for the projects and, other than 'Child Protection in Seasonal Agriculture,' and 'Capacity Building in Civil Society,' all other categories target specifically the refugees. 5,002,587 Euros out of the total income of 6,466,781 Euros was spent on refugee relief work in 2017. To put it differently, whilst 82% of STL projects focused on the refugees in 2017, 94,7% of its income in the same year came from international organizations.

In 2018, STL had a total eleven projects. Other than 'Strengthening Capacities in Civil Society,' all other projects either only aim to help the refugees or both the local people and refugees. The total income of 2018 was 5,542,069 Euros where 5,454,583 Euros funded by international organizations. In other words, 98,42% of its 2018 income came from foreign institutions.

In sum, all three secular CSOs examined for the thesis prove that secular organizations have received more foreign funding for their projects focus on the refugees than any other issues since 2011. Considering, Turkish civil society has been dependent on the state and its institutions historically, one can say that not relying on the state's funding paves the way for more autonomous civil society in Turkey. Alternatively, as the state's insufficiency to meet the needs of the high number of refugees has revealed the need for independent civil society in Turkey, increased foreign funds have prepared the ground for more diverse civil society by financially supporting non-state aligned CSOs.

Chapter V: Conclusion

This thesis has explored the securitization theory and its explanation of the securitization processes. Although multiple international relations theories put the state in the center of the securitization processes and describe the process as top-down, their understandings of securitization cannot explain the securitization of Syrian refugees in Turkey. My primary concern was to show that the securitization may start at the societal level and the level of securitization may fluctuate among host societies depending on the group of people's identities. In order to explore this argument, I focused on the securitization of the Syrian refugees among Turkish society including the public and civil

society. Besides, since identities among the public and CSOs vary, I bifurcated the public as the majority- the AKP supporters, and minorities- opposition party supporters as well as civil society as the state-aligned and secular CSOs.

This thesis shows that since securitization stems from the interaction between a securitizing actor and its audience, it does not necessarily have to happen at the state level. It also proves that neither the state nor the military has to involve the securitization processes. Even though Wæver implies the state by saying that a successful securitization can be done by the securitizing actors who have to be in a position of authority, this thesis demonstrates that the host society can also securitize a subject successfully with its own power.

I have attempted to answer the question of why the Turkish public has securitized the issue, even though the Turkish government has followed liberal policies towards the refugees. Moreover, I have tried to understand why the level of securitization has been higher among the minorities compared to the majority as well as why certain CSOs avoided helping the refugees in contrast to state-aligned CSOs' fieldwork since the beginning of the crisis. Conversely the traditional security analysis, it is proven in this thesis that host societies stratified with majority and minorities which cause the different levels of securitization of the refugees among the host population. Alternatively, power relationships in host populations may catalyze the insecurity of some groups than others.

The public perception section corroborates that states' policies cannot always shape the public's mind about new coming minorities. Ironically, the government's liberal policies can create a backlash against the new coming minorities among the host society where the purpose of the liberal policies questioned. In Turkey's case, the Turkish

government's policies towards the refugees are perceived as an attempt to change their identities by minorities who have long felt marginalized. Besides, Turkish public discourse about Syrian refugees has become more 'securitized' as the overall Turkish society perceived the refugees as the reason for the security and economic problems, and particularly, the minorities question the government's liberal policies toward the refugees.

In addition to public perception, this thesis also examined secular CSOs' attitude towards the refugees. First, I examined the definition of modern civil society in Western literature and compared it to the understanding of the civil society in Turkey. My findings of historical research showed that Turkish civil society has been more passive, depended on the state institutions, oppressed by the state or military depending on their ideologies, and used as a tool by the state to extend its official ideology in contrast to the Western definition of the concept. I have determined time periods since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 when the Turkish civil society attempted to extend the civic space and become more diverse: first years of the DP administration where the transition to the multiple political party period started, post-1960 coup *d'etat*, the post-1980 period, 1999 Marmara Earthquake, the EU accession process, and finally the refugee crisis. However, my findings showed that each time when Turkish civil society becomes more diverse and autonomous from the state institutions, it has followed by a strike from the state or military.

This thesis proves that the dominant ideology during the refugee crisis has been the AKP governments' Islamist ideology. Hence, I examined three secular CSOs to demonstrate that as relief work for the refugees by non-state aligned CSOs has increased,

civic space has become more diverse during the refugee crisis. This thesis has shown that secular CSOs' attitude towards the refugees has changed as a result of realization of the government's insufficiency in the refugee crisis, the dramatic increase in the number of the refugees living outside of the camps, and the increase in international funds on the projects related to the refugees. In order to answer the research question, I argued that depending on CSOs' position in regards to the state and the rest of the civil society, some CSOs stepped up to counter the hostility towards the refugees by providing them services and assistance. Besides, with the help of the increase in international funding for the refugee relief works, secular CSOs had to opportunity not to rely on the state funding.

This thesis has proved that although CSOs have diversified and grown during the refugee crisis, the state tradition of pressuring civil society has stymied the growth once again. This thesis demonstrates that the host societies are not monolithic entities in the securitization processes. The level of securitization may fluctuate as well as completely contradict depending on the group of people's already existing threat perception to their identities.

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Appendices

Name of the project	Financier/Supporters
Suspended Lives, Perceived Lives Project *(Askidaki Yasamlar, Algidaki Yasamlar)*	EU
Dialogue for Suspended Lives *(Askidaki Yasamlar icin Diyalog)*	EU
Refugee Assistance Project *(Multeci Destek Projesi)*	International Medical Corps (IMC)
Vulnerability Assessment Mobile Teams *(Mobil Ekipler)*	UNHCR
Multi-Service Support Centers *(Cok Yonlu Destek Merkezleri)*	UNHCR, The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), EU
Emergency Response Project *(Acil Mudahale Programi)*	UNHCR
I Know My Rights and I Want You to Know Them Too. *(Haklarimi Biliyorum Sizin de Bilmenizi Istiyorum)*	EU

Supporting Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Turkey Through Special Needs Fund *(Ozel Ihtiyac Fonu Araciligiyla Hassas Durumdaki Multecilere Yardim Projesi)*	International Organization for Migrants (IOM)
Refwork	British Embassy Ankara
Cash for Work	GIZ
Legal Clinic *(Hukuk Klinigi)*	UNHCR
Peace and Art Center *(Baris ve Sanat Merkezi)*	GIZ
Nutrition and Protection Activities For Refugee Children *(Suriyeli Multeci Cocuklara Yonelik Koruma ve Beslenme Projesi)*	UNICEF
Winterization Project *(Kis Yardimi Projesi)*	UNHCR
Life Skills Development Center *(Yasam Becerilerini Gelistirme Merkezi)*	PRM
Migration Network in Europe and Turkey Project *(Avrupa ve Turkiye'de Goc Agi)*	EU
Mediterranean Bridge 2015: Linking Italy and Turkey for Migrants Proection	EU

(Akdeniz Koprusu 2015: Turkiye ve Italya'daki Sivil Toplumlar Arasinda Bag Kurulmasi)	
Assessment of Livelihood Opportunities of Syrian Refugees *(Suriyelilerin Gecim Kaynaklari Imkanlarinin Belirlenmesi projesi)*	World Bank
Support Men	IOM
Protection Programs for Urban Refugees *(Kent Multecilerine Yonelik Koruma Projesi)*	EU
Enhancing the Protection Mechanisms for International Protection Applicants in Turkey (Turkiye'deki Koruma Mekanizmalarinin Guclendirilmesi Projesi)	EU
Migrant Health Training Centers *(Gocmen Sagligi Egitim Merkezleri)*	World Health Organization (WHO)
Al Farah Child and Family Support Centers *(Al Farah Cocuk ve Aile Destek Merkezleri)*	Only SGDD
UNHCR-ASAM Counselling Line	UNHCR

(UNHCR-ASAM Danismanlik Hatti)	
Ensuring Access to Formal Education, Livelihoods and Protection Through Bridging Programs, Technical Education and Legal Assistance *(Destekleyici Programlar, Teknik Egitim ve Hukuki Destek Yoluyla Orgun Egitim, Gecim Kaynaklari ve Koruma Hizmetlerine Erisimi Saglamak)*	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
Nevsehir Women's Rights Project *(Nevsehir Kadin Haklari Projesi)*	EU
Refugee Assistance Project in Nevsehir and Kayseri *(Multeci Destek projesi: Nevsehir ve Kayseri)*	IMC
The Project of Needs Assessment for Syrian Women Under Temporary Protection in Turkey *(Suriyeli Kadinlara Yonelik Ihtiyac Belirleme Projesi)*	UNHCR
(Siginmaci Kadin ve Kiz Cocuklarinin Saglik Hizmetlerine Erisimlerinin Guclendirilmesi Projesi)	MSD for Mothers

We are Strong Together *(Birlikte Gucluyuz)*	GIZ
SADA- Women Strengthening and Cooperative Center Project *(SADA-Kadin Guclendirme ve Dayanisma* *Merkezi Projesi)*	EU, Japanese government, UNWomen, International Labor Organization, Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality
Improved Support Fund for the Refugees Have Been Affected by Iraq and Syrian War in Turkey Project *(Turkiye'de Suriye ve Irak Krizinden* *Etkilenen Multeciler icin Gelistirilmis* *Destek Projesi-AB MADAD)*	EU
Women and Girls Safe Space *(Kadinlar ve Kiz Cocuklari icin Guvenli* *Alan)*	United Nation Population Fund (UNFPA)

Appendices B   The List of IGAM Projects and Their Financiers

Name of the Projects	Financiers/Supporters
Regional Integration Accelerators *(Bölgesel Entegrasyon Hızlandırıcıları* *Projesi)*	EU
Refugee Consultation and Support Hub *(Mülteci Bilgilendirme ve Destekleme Noktası* *Projesi)*	EU
Champions Work for Girls Education Project *(Multeci Kiz Cocuklarinin Okullastirilmasi* *Projesi)*	Malala Fund
I'MAPPY A Strengthened Network and an Integration Map for Refugees *(Genc Multeciler icin Guclendirilmis Ag ve* *Entegrasyon Haritasi Projesi)*	Turkish National Agency
Harmonization of Refugees Project *(Multecilerin Uyumu Projesi)*	EU and Turkish state
Our Choir Project *(Bizim Koro Projesi)*	US Embassy
Strengthening of Civil Society Organizations That Have Founded by Refugees in Turkey Project	British Embassy

(Türkiye'deki Mültecilerin Kurdukları Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Güçlendirilmesi Projesi)	
My First Day On Campus Is The Best Day At My University *(Üniversitedeki En İyi Günüm, İlk Günüm Projesi)*	EU-the HOPES Project
Media and Civil Society Cooperation for Rights of Refugees *(Multeci Haklari Icin Medya ve Sivil Toplum Is Birligi Projesi)*	EU