

SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY

20
24

Volume 43

**INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
JOURNAL**

A Yearly Publication of the International Relations Department
College of Liberal and Creative Arts

International Relations Journal 2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- i Dedication
 - ii Journal Staff
 - iii Editorial Policy
 - iv Acknowledgements
 - v Author Biographies
 - 1 *Hind Oukbija*
“Leadership Style and Foreign Policy: Xi Jinping’s
Foreign Policy of Taiwan”
 - 13 *Andrew Killigrew*
“The Thorn in Ireland’s Side: A Look into the
Irish Response to Brexit Mayhem”
 - 21 *Elena Berdnikova*
“Analysis of the Protests Movement in Russia in
2011-2013”
 - 31 *Troy Michael Alexander*
“Mapping the Core-Periphery Nuclear Energy
Landscape: Dependency, Nuclear Energy, and
Non-proliferation”
-

A warm welcome to
Dean Ifeoma Nwankwo
Whose proud Jamaican and Nigerian heritage
inspires our IR students

Journal Staff

MANAGING EDITORS

Zen Lewis
Hind Oukhija
Ahmad Faisal Safi
Tara Shafie

DESIGNERS

Dylan Bockholt
Ashley Guan
Brandon Wong-Delizo

PARTICIPANTS

Troy Alexander
Layla Alfakhry
Omar Alkhadhari
Elena Berdnikova
Robin Callejas
Leo Daspit
Faith Donithan
Sawera Haq
Andrew Killigrew
Niall Lawlor
Stephanie Llamas
Chavelle Porchia
Mia Ruiz
Julian Serrano
Abdul Rahman Shagiwal
Tracy Velasquez Brenes
Parsa Zamani

Statements and opinions expressed in *The International Relations Journal* are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Editors, the Editorial Board, the Faculty Advisor, or the Department of International Relations at San Francisco State University

Editorial Policy

OVERVIEW

The International Relations Journal at San Francisco State University strives to exhibit the diverse range of undergraduate and graduate research interests that flourish in our department.

Each semester, the Journal is offered as a course in which students participate as writers or editors in a peer review process, or as administrative staff members who assist authors and editors as well as guide the Journal through its production.

The goal of the course is to expose students to the peer review process, focusing on academic standards of argumentation and factual accuracy, citation formatting, and collaborative editing using Microsoft Word's "track changes" feature. More broadly, the Journal's executive editors aim to help students develop writing/editing skills applicable in other courses and promote a deeper understanding of the discipline of International Relations as a whole.

SUBMISSIONS & PROCESS

The Journal encourages all students pursuing a B.A. or M.A. in International Relations to submit completed works (incomplete papers and abstracts are not accepted) at the beginning of each semester. From these submissions, the Journal's executive editors assign students to positions on the writing and editorial boards as well as a number of administrative-level appointments.

The course curriculum includes a number of informational workshops and at least three rounds of structured editing and revision. All editing is anonymous and each submission is reviewed by three different editors.

The structured peer review is as follows: [1] a submission is first edited by an undergraduate or graduate "peer expert" who has conducted prior research on topics and/or regions relevant to the paper and can thus provide fact checking and citation suggestions; [2] second round editing focuses on clarity and academic tone by paring the manuscript with an editor

unfamiliar with the paper's subject; [3] finally, the paper is edited for proper citation formatting and technical aspects.

At the end of the semester, authors participating in this process are expected to submit a final manuscript for consideration by the Journal's executive editors and the faculty advisor.

PUBLICATION OF ARTICLES

Only submissions that have gone through the peer review process and meet the content and formatting requirements will be considered for publication. The Journal is published yearly.

FOR SUBMISSIONS AND BACK ISSUES:

internationalrelations.sfsu.edu/international-relations-journal

FOR ALL OTHER INQUIRIES

Department of International Relations
1600 Holloway Avenue/HUM Room 282
San Francisco, CA 94132

Phone: 415-338-2654

Fax: 415-338-2880

Acknowledgments

The staff of The International Relations Journal is grateful for the continued funding allocated by the instructionally Related Activities and Vice President for Student Affairs and Enrollment Management at San Francisco State University for the production of this journal. The Production of this journal is a group effort and the managing editors would like to especially thank all the members of the editorial board and the contributing writers. The editorial board members edited the articles contained in this issue and both the editors and writers patiently endured the labor of multiple revisions of these articles, as well as corresponding with one another. The guidance and advice of Professor Burcu Ellis in the International Relations Department has been indispensable to the publication of the Journal. We would like to thank Professor Lee Friedman and his team of talented student designers for the new look of our journal.

Author Biographies

HIND OUKHIJA

As a final-year graduate student at San Francisco State University undertaking a Master's in International Relations and concurrently pursuing a Master's in Project Management at Harvard University, Hind's academic journey is guided by a passion for understanding and addressing complex global issues. With a primary focus on human rights and security dynamics in the Middle East and Africa, Hind's research interests seek to unravel the intricate interplay of political, economic, and social factors shaping these regions.

In addition, Hind's academic interests include delving into Chinese foreign policy and the dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including the adaptive measures authoritarian states employ in response to evolving challenges. This academic pursuit aims to provide a holistic perspective on addressing multifaceted global challenges.

ANDREW KILLIGREW

Andrew is a fourth-year San Francisco State University student and is set to graduate with a BA in International Relations in December 2023. Born and raised in the Bay Area, Andrew's interest in international relations was sparked by his travels to Ireland as a child and teen, where he visited his mother's and father's families during the summertime. These visits provided him with a rich and diverse cultural upbringing, complementing his experiences growing up in the Bay Area. During his travels, Andrew's immersion in Irish culture also ignited his curiosity about the country's history and politics, which solidified his passion for international relations. Andrew's interest in the complex political situation between Northern Ireland and The Republic of Ireland began from the stories both sides of his family would share during his summer visits. These experiences eventually led him to take courses in ethnic conflict and global peace here at SF State. He is passionate about using his education and experience to pursue a career in related fields, such as international security, where he hopes for a more peaceful and just world.

ELENA BERDNIKOVA

Elena Berdnikova is a current third-year student at San Francisco State University. She is pursuing a Bachelor's degree in International Relations with a minor in Political Science. She is also working on completing a certificate program in Migration and Refugees Studies. Elena was born in Russia; when she was four, she moved to South Korea where she grew up and lived for nine years; after that she moved to the United States. Due to her background, her primary focus in research is on the topics of Russia-US relations, security, and displacement of refugees due to conflict and wars.

TROY MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Troy Alexander is an International Relations and Global Peace Studies senior at San Francisco State University. He has focused his studies on nuclear non-proliferation, enabling him to participate in the John Hopkins Kissinger Summer Academy and an internship with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in Washington DC. Expecting to graduate at the end of the Spring 2024 semester, Troy will continue his career in foreign affairs in DC as an intern in the summer for the NNSA.

Leadership Style and Foreign Policy: Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy of Taiwan

HIND OUKHIJA

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the Chinese foreign policy of Taiwan under President Xi Jinping, focusing on leadership style analysis. As China rose to a global power status, President Xi Jinping's pursuit of global influence has redefined the country's approach to international relations. Securing an unprecedented third term as President, Xi Jinping departs significantly from his predecessors' cooperative leadership style, establishing himself as the predominant decision-maker. Drawing on the policies of previous Chinese leaders that have defined the relationship between China and Taiwan, this paper explores how Xi Jinping has successfully crafted a foreign policy approach that aligns with his conviction in China's historical centrality. Delving into the dynamics between China and Taiwan that have shaped their relationship for decades, this paper highlights Xi's distinctive approach by tracing his departure from established norms and charting a new course in cross-strait relationships.

INTRODUCTION

China today has emerged as a superpower and a prospective hegemon in Asia-Pacific. It strives to put its immense ambitions into practice and holds key positions in several international organizations as its permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. It has been the creator of multilateral organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The concept of *zhongguo*, the central state or the Middle Kingdom, implicates China's cultural, political, and economic centrality. This has shaped how the leaders of the People's Republic of China envision global governance, including current Chinese President Xi Jinping. Securing a historic third term as President of China, Xi Jinping has demonstrated an eagerness to regain China's historical glory and put China back on the map as a world player. This could be evidenced by Xi Jinping's foreign policy toward Taiwan. This paper will cover the significance of leadership style analysis in foreign policy. President Xi Jinping has set precedence by departing entirely from his predecessors' traditional cooperative and consensual leadership style. Instead, he has been able to mold a foreign policy approach that is distinctively his, rejecting decades-old Communist Party practice of collective decision-making and setting an entirely new archetype with him as the predominant leader. This has affected the power dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party, the priorities set for the government, and ultimately, the relationship with Taiwan as Xi's grand vision of China reunites both.

This paper will provide Chinese President Xi Jinping's foreign policy as a case study in leadership style analysis. An entire section will be dedicated to covering the shifts Xi has undertaken that distinguish him from his counterparts and ultimately provide the consolidation of his power. Chinese foreign policy of Taiwan will be used as a case study, as well as the historical developments that define the relationship between the two throughout the years. Although it can be noticed that Xi has yet to entirely depart from the decades-long Chinese discourse of seeking peaceful reunification with the island, he has demonstrated a subtle ability to frame the issue uniquely to his leadership style.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Until recently, leadership style was not considered a branch of study in foreign policy analysis. Traditionally, the rationalist approach dominated foreign policy analysis: "The state advances their national interests, and national leaders intend to maximize these interests."¹ However, in the late nineteenth century, scholars raised concerns about the psychological aspects that define the foreign policy decision-making process. The foundation of such an approach came from Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, who convincingly argued the importance of the process in foreign policy decision-making and its outcomes in international relations. The prevailing thought that international politics is ultimately the product of actions from rational and self-interested political entities has thus been shattered as the debate brought a dimension that was previously entirely ignored. The central focus thus became that the behaviour of the state is driven by decision-makers and how they understand the situation "as well as the reasons for actions."² The breakthrough development on the importance of studying the decision unit was advanced further by Rosenau with his work on pre-theory levels of analysis in foreign policy that introduces the individual, societal, and systemic levels as units of analysis.³

Similarly, Robert Jervis in his book *Perception and Misperceptions in International Politics* suggests the importance of concentrating on the "level one" of analysis as it is "the product of beliefs about the nature of the variables that influence the phenomena that concern one."⁴ Indeed, Jervis observes that individuals who ignore decision-making cannot detect patterns in state behavior, as this could only be obtained from the knowledge gained by studying people's perceptions of the world and how they process information.⁵

Furthermore, Harold and Margaret Sprout observe that the "environmental milieu" sets the stage for a country's foreign policy.⁶ The German diplomat, Richard von Kuhlmann states that:

Geographical position and historical development are so largely determining factors of foreign policy that, regardless of the kaleidoscopic change of contemporary events, and no matter what form of government has been instituted

1. Praneet Khandal, "Leadership Trait Analysis, Foreign Policy & Emerging Powers: A Case of Modi's India," *Leiden University* (2018): 10.

2. Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, & Burton Spain, "Foreign Policy-Decision Making," *Palgrave Macmillian* (2022).

3. Khandal, "Leadership Trait Analysis, Foreign Policy & Emerging Powers," 16.

4. Robert Jervis, "Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition," *Princeton University Press* (1976): 33.

5. Jervis, "Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics," 33.

6. Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Affairs," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 4 (December 1957): 309, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/172942>.

or what political party may be in power, the foreign policy of a country has a natural tendency to return again and again to the same general and fundamental alignment.⁷

In this respect, Sprouts and von Kuhlmann observed that the individual foresees all possible outcomes that may either be beneficial or detrimental in the current decision-making process.

Similarly, David Winter states that “political structures and actions are shaped and channeled by people’s personalities—their individually patterned integration of processes of perception, memory, judgment, goal-seeking, and emotional expression and regulation.”⁸ This is relevant to the purpose of the study as it suggests individual personalities influence processes and political configurations.

Finally, literature has undertaken the examination of leaders and political figures by analyzing their speeches, interviews, and statements to comprehend the underlying factors that drive and inspire them. Hermann has offered a breakthrough work by studying foreign policy decisions as the result of a “single, powerful individual [as] the decision unit.”⁹ Her work leadership trait analysis (LTA) offers tremendous clarification and understanding of the relevance of the decision-making process of individuals in positions of power, and how they come to understand foreign policy through their “different ways of dealing with political constraints, processing information, and assuming authority” in what could be “the same decision-making environment.”¹⁰ Hermann et al. introduced different categories that leaders can fall under depending on the circumstances they rose to power, the challenges they face particular to their setting, and how personal beliefs, ideas, and ideology play a definitive role in influencing the decisions taken.¹¹

It is noteworthy that most of the studies around LTA have been done primarily on leaders of Western countries. There exists a clear lack of leadership style analysis in the developing world. By focusing our research on Chinese President Xi Jinping, it is hoped that this paper will shed light on the dynamics that exist in the foreign policy decision-making process of emerging powers and non-democratic countries.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This paper focuses entirely on the field of political psychology in international politics. The data selected will primarily consist of official statements, public speeches, and press conferences gathered over the years from President Xi Jinping and PRC leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Jintao. Hermann’s Leadership Style Analysis will be used to categorize the type of leader Xi exhibits and the broad policy goals Xi has envisioned for China.

7. Sprouts, “Environmental Factors in the Study of International Affairs,” 312.

8. Michael Montemalo, “Assessing the Leadership of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” *The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research* 16, no. 15 (2015): 1.

9. Margaret C. Hermann et al., “Who Leads Matter: The Effects of Powerful Individuals,” *International Studies Review* 3, no. 2 (2001): 84, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3186566>.

10. Hermann et al., “Who Leads Matter,” 84.

11. Jonathan W. Keller, “Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace?” *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (June 2005): 209, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3693512>.

XI JINPING PROFILE ANALYSIS

According to Hermann, “leadership style is defined as how leaders relate to those around them and how they structure interactions, norms, rules, and the principles they use to guide themselves.”¹² President Xi Jinping grew up in one of the Chinese Communist Party’s founding families, and this has shaped his general views on politics and foreign policy. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a well-known revolutionary haut grade and a strong supporter of former leader Deng Xiaoping. This provided entry to Xi into “internationally minded and economically progressive areas.”¹³ As he worked his way up the echelon in the 1980s, Xi came to describe himself as “always a son of the Yellow Earth” which entails an individual among the masses and standing in stark contrast with the corrupt political elite.¹⁴ Throughout his career, he understood the importance of a strong Communist Party that would govern all of China with an iron fist and which would resolve the constant political uncertainty of dissent.

In 2012, Xi Jinping assumed leadership in a state that had amassed substantial wealth. Indeed, China at the time of his ascension was and remains the second-largest economy in the world. This provided him with the financial ability to advance the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army. Xi was also able to adapt leadership style cues from previous leaders, notably Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong, and “use authoritarian powers to cut through multiple levels of party and government bureaucracies to force change.”¹⁵ He understood that autocracy could be a useful tool to stimulate the Chinese Communist Party while influencing the distant bureaucracy. The term “first among equals” leadership style of former leaders Hu Jintao and Wen was perceived as ineffective as it provided the space for powerful interest groups in their quest for power, reducing governance to a weak and dependent state.¹⁶ As such, one of the first decisions Xi undertook as he entered office was to reduce the number of members of the Politburo Standing Committee. As Economy mentions, “Within the first years of his tenure, he assumed leadership of all the most important committees overseeing policy.”¹⁷ This was an attempt to centralize and consolidate the power of the executive branch from the rest of the CCP and reduce the influence of adjacent bureaucracies in the decision-making process.¹⁸

XI'S GRAND FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF CHINA

Xi Jinping has demonstrated a notably distinctive approach to the exercise of leadership within the nation. He is the sole leader since Mao Zedong to embark on incremental yet significant measures in formulating a comprehensive grand strategy for China. His strategy’s terms vary depending on the audience he addresses himself to. The “China Dream” is addressed to the people of China, the “Asia-Pacific Dream” at the Beijing-hosted annual meeting with Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, as well as the “One

12. Hermann et al., “Who Leads Matter,” 99.

13. Jeffrey A. Bader, “How Xi Jinping Sees the World...and Why,” *Asia Working Group 2* (February 2016):8.

14. Montemalo, “Assessing the Leadership of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” 4.

15. Richard McGregor, “Xi Jinping’s moment,” *Lowy Institute for International Policy* (2017): 5, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10198>.

16. McGregor, “Xi Jinping’s moment,” 9.

17. Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping,” *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 3 (May 2018): 62, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643634>.

18. Montemalo, “Assessing the Leadership of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” 8.

Belt, One Road". Overall, the key element is the development of a grand strategy that provides "state prosperity, collective pride and collective happiness, and national rejuvenation."¹⁹

The first grand strategy of China dates to the founder of the People's Republic of China and the leader of the Communist Party, Mao Zedong. In 1948, Mao proclaimed that the strategy the country would adopt would be one of "leaning to one side" led by the Soviet Union and standing in stark contrast to the "imperialist camp of the United States."²⁰ This policy was specified in the Common Program, which initially served as the country's interim constitution. Mao's national strategy could be resumed as follows: "The People's Republic of China shall unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries throughout the world, first with the USSR [...] It shall take its stand in the camp of international peace and democracy, to oppose imperialist aggression and to defend lasting world peace."²¹ China's foreign strategies were directed entirely by Mao who exhorted no interest in being involved in international politics as it considered "the international order illegitimate" as it "represented the triumph of the imperialists."²² The policy was only abandoned a few years later due to the subsequent split of Sino-Soviet relations.

As Deng Xiaoping took the reign of power in the late 1970s, he set the precedence for all leaders that will follow as he adopted informally a policy of *tao guang yang hui*, "developing capabilities while keeping a low profile."²³ Deng is considered the engineer of China's restructuring reforms and opening policies and has always opted for a consultative approach. Often termed "radical pragmatism", his policies improved China's waning economic system.

The periods of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were characterized by the acquiescence of Deng's approach as it facilitated China's entrance into the world stage. Jiang's Three Represents and Hu's harmonious society were the terms that came to define their leadership era, but none had enough traction to develop an articulated vision for China. As Bader explains, "both Jiang and Hu were consensus leaders in periods of collective leadership, [however] neither was in a strong position to lay out a new foreign policy vision."²⁴ Consequently, their leadership style predominantly stemmed from the acknowledgment that China lacked sufficient hard power to efficiently project its strategic interests. Similarly, the political system was characterized "for more than three decades by a process of collective leadership, whereby decision-making authority was shared among officials in the Politburo Standing Committee"²⁵

This situation experienced a substantial transformation when Xi came to power. The Chinese President demonstrated his capacity to be a far more strategist and political visionary than many of his predecessors. As he ascended to the Dragon Throne with a state that was vastly different from his predecessors as holding "the world's largest trading" capacity, "biggest target of foreign direct investment outside the United States

19. Stig Stenslie & Gang Chen, "China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges," Georgetown University Press: 122, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1c2crg2.9>.

20. Stenslie & Chen, "China in the Era of Xi Jinping," 123.

21. Stenslie & Chen, "China in the Era of Xi Jinping," 120.

22. Bader, "How Xi Jinping Sees the World," 2.

23. Bader, "How Xi Jinping Sees the World," 7.

24. Bader, "How Xi Jinping Sees the World," 4.

25. Elizabeth C. Economy, "China's Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 6 (November 2014): 62. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483923>.

and the fastest growing source of outward direct investment,”²⁶ Xi is undeniably eager to demonstrate the political and economic capabilities of China and its ambitions as an alternative model of governance. The Chinese President laid out his visions primarily with the “China Dream”, “Asia Pacific Dream”, “One Belt One Road” as well as “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”²⁷

THE CHINA DREAM

Only a few days after his appointment as the Party's general secretary and supreme leader of China at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the Chinese President coined for the first time the term China Dream. The *China Dream* contains China's grand strategy as it rises to superpower status. In his own words:

The Chinese dream of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation means that we will make China prosperous and strong [...] and we should be guided by the strategic thinking that only development will make a difference.²⁸

The term *dream* is significant to note. Xi traces commonalities and traditions in contemporary Chinese culture from Confucian philosophical concepts of *li* and *yue*, rigid and fluid, entailing “the self and self's interdependence with society.”²⁹ These linguistic terms were virtually absent from PRC's previous leaders' speeches. Indeed, Mao never utilized the “Chinese dream” and his doctrine rested primarily on following the strict guiding principles of Marxist Leninism in Mao Zedong's Thought. Similarly, as Deng became the supreme leader of China in the late 1970s, the state's ideology was changed to “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”³⁰ Hence, the word ‘dream’ in this context signifies not only the cessation of Mao's era of relentless self-sacrifice but also the empowerment of Chinese individuals to envision possibilities beyond conventional limits.

President Xi has constantly enunciated since a 2014 speech at the party's foreign policy conference that China's foreign policy priorities and strategic guidelines are about its continuing presence on the world stage. This entails its undue commitment to persist in active diplomacy to pressure existing international organizations to safeguard and promote Chinese interests and create alternative models of global governance that will provide Chinese representation. As previously mentioned, President Xi Jinping's grand strategy for China marks a complete departure from Deng Xiaoping's low-profile diplomatic ideals as Deng “warned China against becoming a world leader.” Xi's vision relies excessively on the country's active commitment abroad and translating its capital, technological, and industrial capacities to the rest of the world. Hence, Xi has fundamentally shifted China's strategic gravity from a three-decades-long focus on domestic economic development to an outward expansion of its influence. By transferring his vision or “dream” from mainland China to the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world, the President is essentially capitalizing on the country's economic prosperity and using it as leverage for regional and global hegemony. In some other

26. Bader, “How Xi Jinping Sees the World,” 6.

27. Stenslie & Chen, “China in the Era of Xi Jinping,” 125.

28. Stenslie & Chen, “China in the Era of Xi Jinping,” 122.

29. Winberg Chai & May-Lee Chai, “The Meaning of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream,” *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 20, no. 2 (October 2013): 96, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44289022>.

30. Chai & Chai, “The Meaning of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream,” 97.

respects, the *China Dream* entails delivering the “promise of national restoration” that provides “the people a more important role in the rise of China.”³¹

Hence, Xi understands that China has now risen to the status of being a much bigger player. It holds today different needs and realities from the international system than its predecessors had inherited. The *China Dream* essentially consists of a national renaissance and encapsulates national symbolism that previous leaders carefully avoided. It can be dangerous as it can be the cause of national feelings as they were in many uprisings in China's recent history. Similarly, the current leadership style comes at a disadvantage as “institutional fragmentation complicates coordination”³² of decision-making. Hence, Xi is faced with the dilemma of delegating his foreign policy objectives as it can reduce his influence while increasing the impact of institutions and pluralism. What seems to remain as well is the persistent corruption that thrives in the entire military apparatus. President Xi Jinping has made considerable improvements in cleaning the apparatus by leading efficient anti-corruption campaigns.³³

XI JINPING'S THOUGHTS ON SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

When President Xi Jinping rose to power in 2012, he accomplished the extraordinary task of centralizing authority on all levels of power. This was accomplished as he reinforced the ideological grip of the CCP, obtained full control over political opponents and different competing factions, and appointed long-standing allies to the Politburo. More than anything else, his unshakeable political might set the stage for his vision of China in the party's constitution. *Xi Jinping's Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*.³⁴ This has been one of the many instances of Xi's ideological campaigns in seeking hegemony. The official document is the marker of China's foreign and domestic policy for the years to come. The report states “the party's prevailing doctrinal principles and new ideological orientation: the first [...] established the CCP's historic mission in a new era; the second, on the Thought on Social with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the Basic Policy.”³⁵ This entails that Xi Jinping has effectively shifted the party's concurrent ideology from the focus on government issues to the establishment of a new historical period. This new era represents today the period of “getting strong (2012 onwards)” where previous ones provided the accumulation of wealth (1978-2012) and stability (1949-1976).³⁶

Furthermore, the new principles enshrined honor the old-age thought of China's centrality in the world by stressing its importance as a global power and its contribution to the advancement of humanity. As Stanzel et al explain, “the new era concept provides the ontological foundation and terminological starting point for the Chinese polity.”³⁷ The implications for China's governance, security, and domestic and foreign policy are now reassessed as it sets the stage for a new foundation. In the case of Taiwan, the report reaffirms the principle of “one country, two systems”. It discusses

31. Stenslie & Chen, “China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges,” 123.

32. Stenslie & Chen, “China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges,” 130.

33. Montemalo, “Assessing the Leadership of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” 5.

34. Angela Stanzel et al., “China's 'New Era' with Xi Jinping Characteristics,” European Council on Foreign Relations (2017): 3, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21567>.

35. Stanzel et al., “China's 'New Era' with Xi Jinping Characteristics,” 5.

36. Stanzel et al., “China's 'New Era' with Xi Jinping Characteristics,” 4.

37. Stanzel et al., “China's 'New Era' with Xi Jinping Characteristics,” 5.

also the importance of advancing the Chinese military, exercising its role as a global player in international politics, and “taking an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system and Chinese [...] strength to global governance.”³⁸ Some of the elements have already been fulfilled as Xi devoted time and resources to modernizing the People’s Liberation Army. Xi believes that doing so translates China’s economic and military might globally.

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY OF TAIWAN THROUGHOUT THE YEARS

The relations between Taiwan and China remained constant throughout the years. This comes at odds as both governments want to resolve the question of identity and feel that “one is oneself.”³⁹ Throughout the years, Taiwan kept an “insistence that it represents not just Taiwan”⁴⁰ but all of mainland China. It was always understood that eventually, Taiwan would seek reunification with mainland China. Despite the change of leadership throughout the years in China, one thing was understood unilaterally: Taiwan would inevitably come back to the motherland. What remains for debate are however the means utilized to reach the end. This section will cover how the foreign policy of Taiwan was understood throughout the years, its historical developments, and China’s foreign policy of Taiwan under Xi Jinping’s leadership.

An inevitable concern followed Mao Zedong with the founding of the Republic of China: a search for a peaceful settlement regarding Taiwan’s question. In 1960, Mao Zedong set the stage for the policy guideline of “Two Chinas – one China, one Taiwan”. In his speech, Mao discusses the relationship with Taiwan as being an indivisible part of mainland China. He mentions: “Taiwan is to return to the motherland, except foreign affairs which must be handled by the national authorities, all the military and political power of appointing officials may be delegated to the Taiwan authorities. Mao concedes that some forms of delegation and autonomy ought to be given to Taiwanese authorities to effectively complete the project of reunification. Similarly, Mao has constantly advocated for “the liberation of Taiwan” by all means necessary.⁴¹ His reign was thus brushed by a period of increasing cross-Strait military confrontations and armaments.

With the ascent of Deng Xiaoping to power, China’s foreign policy toward Taiwan changed from “the position of “fight” to that of “negotiation in 1978.”⁴⁰ The reunification by peaceful means became the ultimate priority for China and discussions for a more conciliatory approach gained traction. On January 1, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued a “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan”. This became the landmark of China’s foreign policy strategy for Taiwan. The message included a series of major policies as it sought to achieve reunification and “a return of Taiwan to the embrace of the motherland”⁴² by peaceful means. Policies included preserving the one-China policy all the while advancing a mutual political basis, developing and improving direct contact through mail and transport, and increasing economic integration. The approach stressed the importance of “emphasizing

38. Stanzel et al., “China’s ‘New Era’ with Xi Jinping Characteristics,” 3.

39. Paul M. A. Linebarger, “The Two Chinas,” *Current History* 47, no. 277 (September 1964): 163, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45311173>.

40. Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace,” University of California Press (October 2017): 45.

41. Frank S. T. Hsiao & Lawrence Sullivan, “The Politics of Reunification: Beijing’s Initiative on Taiwan,” *Asian Survey* 20, no. 8 (August 1980): 695, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643634>.

42. Hsiao & Sullivan, “The Politics of Reunification,” 703.

traditional concepts of the Chinese state and nationality” while “downplaying Marxist analysis of Taiwan society” as it would eventually “create a political atmosphere conducive to the start of negotiations.” This facilitated substantial economic interchange between the two, leading to increased reliance of Taiwan on China

1992 CONSENSUS

The 1992 Consensus consists of an agreement that was accepted by both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China in 1992. China sees the Consensus as the basis for its cross-strait relations with Taiwan and crucial for its one-China principle. The Consensus is understood “that there is only one China in the world” but both sides have debated on the meaning of the terms.⁴³ The 1992 Consensus is considerable for Xi Jinping as he espouses the one-China principle and views essentially the agreement as “both sides [...] belonging to one China and working together toward national reunification.”⁴⁴ At the 19th Congress of the party, the Chinese President stated: “The 1992 Consensus embodies the One-China principle and defines the fundamental nature of cross-strait relations.”⁴⁵ Xi's statements further added a clause in the Consensus that states the one-China principle indivisible from reunification. Similarly, over 23 cross-strait agreements were signed between China and Taiwan aimed to ease cooperation in several spheres from 2008 and 2015. It has enabled a flow of commercial, shipping, and postal services, thus further deepening the economic ties between the two.⁴⁶

China's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council offered a statement in May 2004 considered a landmark for cross-strait relations.⁴⁷ This statement has definitive implications as it “made it clear that prevention of Taiwan's de jure independence was the top priority of Beijing's Taiwan policy.”⁴⁸ However, the former leader Hu Jintao understood the peculiar situation that has put China internationally. It contravenes the ideals of China exhuming the image of a peaceful emerging power. In response, the Anti-Secession Law was implemented, criminalizing any move by Taiwan to declare independence.

When it comes to the United States, it espouses the one-China policy as it perceives Taiwan's independence as serving neither the interests of China nor itself. Although some fundamental differences exist in the interpretation of the one-China policy between the two countries, the United States accepted the “policy of peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait adopted by Hu Jintao.”⁴⁹ It is understood that the United States considered a “peaceful resolution” and “not necessarily reunification as the marker of the U.S. foreign policy goal in the Taiwan Strait. This progress granted the capability to transition the narrative from one of reunification to one of opposition against independence.

Under the leadership of the current president, the status quo has essentially remained the same. However, Xi Jinping has been adamant about safeguarding

43. Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome A. Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-examined: The ‘1992 Consensus’ and Cross-Strait Agreements,” *Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository* 14 (2016): 6.

44. Hsiao-chuan Liao, “An Interpretation of Xi's Taiwan Policy- and Taiwan's Response,” 26.

45. Chen & Cohen, “China-Taiwan Relations Re-examined,” 8.

46. Dittmer, “Taiwan and China,” 52.

47. Dittmer, “Taiwan and China,” 63.

48. Dittmer, “Taiwan and China,” 57.

49. Dittmer, “Taiwan and China,” 67.

China's policy interests of reunification. As the Chinese President is increasingly involved elsewhere with the Belt Road Initiative, it seems that the 1992 Consensus, for now, is favored as he mentioned in his 2015 speech at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Xi also views the United States as an essential player to oppose Taiwan's independence. In one of his speeches given in 2010 considered noteworthy in terms of bilateral relations with Taiwan, he insisted that the "solidarity and unity of the Chinese nation constituted their common root, and Chinese culture their soul [...] for Chinese people inside and outside of China" and it is the aspiration for all to work in the making of the *Chinese Dream*.⁵⁰ Xi Jinping essentially sees the continuation of his predecessor's foreign policy of Taiwan Hu as the basis for his and that the "prevention of de jure independence" is the immediate objective rather than "promoting immediate reunification."⁵¹ Xi believes that both share the same fate and continuously claims that both sides are indispensable to one another. Furthermore, President Xi firmly maintains that the issue must be conclusively resolved rather than allowed to persist as a multi-generational challenge. It thus indicates that Xi will eventually advance the issue and bring clarity under his term. Similarly, Xi hopes "the two sides across the Strait to consolidate the basis for adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence and to foster a common understanding of One China."⁵²

Hence, following the trajectory of Hu Jintao's policy, Xi has increasingly shifted the narrative to the one-China policy to pressure Taiwan eventually to acquiesce to reunification. It has done so by increasing economic integration between the two, hoping that it would eventually translate into political cooperation. Xi Jinping's "peaceful reunification: One Country, Two Systems" stems from his experiences with the Taiwanese Sunflower Movement, several protests led by civic organizations and students that aim to reconsider the numerous cross-Strait pacts, and Hong Kong protests. As Xi strongly believes that "Taiwan's independence is unfeasible" and "no secessionist act will be tolerated", he understands that reassessment is necessary and the need to convey some forms of concessions.⁵³ Additionally, as Deng understood the centrality of the United States when it comes to China's foreign policy toward Taiwan, Xi crafted a new strategy when undergoing Sino-U.S. bilateral relations that consisted of his insistence on non-interference in the Taiwanese question from the United States. As Dittmer states, "The aim is to isolate the Taiwan issue from the Sino-US bilateral relationship and cut out any US involvement in cross- Strait relations [...] to decrease US leverage on the issue."⁵⁴ This has been successful in some ways as the United States "no longer plays a decisive role" in the question and Taiwan's international presence has diminished as Xi sought to actively pressure countries to cease ties with the island and block its entry access into international organizations.⁵⁵

50. Dittmer, "Taiwan and China," 64.

51. Dittmer, "Taiwan and China," 65.

52. Dittmer, "Taiwan and China," 71.

53. Dittmer, "Taiwan and China," 73.

54. Dittmer, "Taiwan and China," 79.

55. Liao, "An Interpretation of Xi's Taiwan Policy- and Taiwan's Response," 28.

CONCLUSION

At a moment of exceptional prosperity and capabilities in China, the question of leadership relevancy becomes more important than ever. As every former president in the PRC has sought to establish a leadership style unique to the country's realities, the world today witnesses the rise of a global power with security and political implications. Chinese President Xi Jinping has successfully distinguished himself, apart from previous leaderships, with the strategic priorities and objectives he has set for the country. As he resumed office in a country that amassed tremendous economic wealth, Xi saw the opportunity to translate it into military might and adopt a more assertive foreign policy approach. It has done so by modernizing the People's Liberation Army, introducing the highly ambitious project of the BRI, and founding several international organizations that are central to Chinese interests. His grand vision of China and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is in full play. However, the security implications remain as Xi is adamant about achieving his ends. In the case of Taiwan, he has demonstrated a willingness to concede some autonomy as the experiences of Hong Kong still linger near. Ultimately, Xi holds the belief that Taiwan will eventually join mainland China. In a moment where the PRC government is plagued by corruption, implications of privacy rights with the introduction of technology and online crackdown campaigns are resurfacing, as the suppression of dissidents in Tibet, Hong Kong, and the implication of possible concentration camps in the Xinjiang region, Xi understands that the cards need to be played right when it comes to China's foreign policy of Taiwan. The leadership style cues received from the past decade provide ample evidence of the direction China will take with its foreign policy toward Taiwan.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bader, Jeremy A. "How Xi Jinping Sees the World...and Why." *Asia Working Group 2* (February 2016): 1-17.
- Chai, Winberg & Chai, May-Lee. "The Meaning of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream." *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 20, no. 2: 95-97. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44289022>.
- Chen, Yu-Jie & Cohen, Jerome A. "China-Taiwan relations re-examined: The "1992 Consensus" and Cross-Strait Agreements." *Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository* 14 (2019): 1-40.
- Deyi, Lee. "40th anniversary of 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan': Closer than ever to national rejuvenation." *CGTN* (2019).
- Dittmer, Lowell. "Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace." *University of California Press* (2017).
- Economy, Elizabeth C. "China's Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 6 (November 2014): 80-91. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483923>.
- Economy, Elizabeth C. "China's New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping." *Foreign Affairs* 97, no 3 (May 2018): 60-74. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643634>.
- Hsiao, Frank S. T. & Sullivan, Lawrence R. "The Politics of Reunification: Beijing's Initiative on Taiwan." *Asian Survey* 20, no.8 (August 1980): 789-802. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643634>.
- Hermann, Margaret C., Preston, Thomas, Korany, Baghat & Shaw, Timothy M. "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals." *International Studies Review* 2, no. 3 (2001): 81- 131. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3186566>.
- Khandal, Praneet. "Leadership Trait Analysis, Foreign Policy & Emerging Powers: A Case of Modi's India." *Leiden University* (May 2018).
- Keller, Jonathan W. "Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace?" *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (June 2005): 205-231. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3693512>.
- Lee, T. C. (2018). "Can Xi Jinping be the next Mao Zedong? Using the Big Five Model to Study Political Leadership." *Journal of Chinese Political Science*.
- Liao, Hsiao-chuan. "An Interpretation of Xi's Taiwan Policy – and Taiwan's Response." *Indo- Pacific Perspective* (2020): 25-29.
- Linebarger, Paul M. A. "The Two Chinas." *Current History* 47, no. 277 (September 1964): 152- 165. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45311173>.
- McGregor, Richard. "Xi Jinping's moment." *Lowy Institute for International Policy* (2017): 1-15. <https://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep10198>.
- Montemalo, Michael. "Assessing the Leadership of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Xi Jinping." *The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research* 16, no. 5 (2015): 12-20.
- Snyder, Richard C., Sapin, Burton M. & Bruck, H. W. "Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)." Springer (2003).
- Jervis, Robert. "Perception and Misperception in International Politics." Princeton University Press (1976).
- Sprout, Harold & Sprout, Margaret. "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1, no. 4 (December 1957): 309-328. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/172942>.
- Stanzel, Angela, et al. "China's 'New Era' with Xi Jinping Characteristics." *European Council on Foreign Relations* (2017): 1-16. <https://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep21567>.
- Stenslie, Stig & Gang, Chen. "China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges." Georgetown University Press: 116-136. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1c2crg2.9>.
- Thompson, Drew. "The Rise of Xi Jinping and China's New Era: Implications for the United States and Taiwan." *Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs* 56, no. 1 (March 2020): 2-25.

The Thorn in Ireland's Side: A Look into the Irish Response to Brexit Mayhem

ANDREW KILLIGREW

ABSTRACT

The United Kingdom's (UK) decision to leave the European Union (EU) has caused immediate and long-term challenges between the UK and Ireland. In particular, the Irish border has become an issue of great concern, as it is the only land border between the EU and the UK. Since the UK is no longer part of the EU's single market and customs union, the border between the UK's Northern Ireland and the independent Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland have led to major sources of challenges faced by Britain ever since the passage of the Brexit referendum in 2016. To prevent a hard border between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, the Northern Ireland Protocol was agreed upon by Ireland, the EU, and the UK. A hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland in a post-Brexit world would mean the reintroduction of strict border controls, which could have significant political, economic, and social consequences, potentially undermining the peace and stability established by the Good Friday Agreement. This Protocol allows Northern Ireland to remain a part of the UK's customs union and single market while also allowing goods to move freely between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The protocol works to "avoid a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland and protect the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) agreement, which aims to promote cross-community exchanges and ensure the absence of physical borders between Northern Ireland and Ireland."¹ The implementation of the Protocol ensures that the Irish-British border remains open and free-flowing while also allowing the UK to maintain its sovereignty. The Protocol has been largely successful in preventing a hard border; however, there have been major difficulties in its implementation.

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Ireland has faced several severe consequences due to the United Kingdom's 2016 decision to pass the Brexit referendum, in which it would withdraw the UK from the European Union. Politically, the passing of Brexit has brought forth a heap of complex challenges that Europe must work together to overcome.

1. "The Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland Explained." 2023a. European Council. June 2, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-relations-with-the-united-kingdom/the-eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement/the-protocol-on-ireland-and-northern-ireland-explained/>.

These challenges include renegotiating trade agreements, maintaining the integrity of the EU's single market, and addressing the unique situation of the UK's Northern Ireland border with the independent Ireland border. However, in Republic of Ireland, we see that the many issues that Brexit poses go beyond politics due to the complex and historical relations that bind Ireland and the UK. Due to the problem of Brexit, the ties between the two are again being tested two decades after the Good Friday Agreement, which sought to end The Troubles and restore good faith between the two governments. Brexit has significantly impacted Ireland financially, with the economy exposed to new volatility due to trade relationship changes. This impact is particularly pronounced given Ireland's geographic separation from the EU mainland, necessitating more intricate logistics and supply chain management to maintain its European and global trade. In addition, Brexit has forced Ireland and the United Kingdom to reckon with their long, complex, and shared history as both countries must navigate the effects of the UK leaving the European Union. In response to these issues, the Irish government has implemented several strategies to mitigate the impact of Brexit, including establishing a new trading relationship with the EU and taking steps to ensure the Northern Irish border remains open for both trade and the free movement of people, thereby preserving the essence of the Good Friday Agreement. This essay will examine the complexities of the deep political, social, and economic issues brought on by Brexit and the Irish government's response to resolve these problems.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Brexit has significantly altered the political landscape between the UK and Ireland, especially regarding Northern Ireland's sovereignty and status. In the article, "The British-Irish Border in the Context of Brexit," Grzegorz Balawajder investigates the unexpected consequences that arose from the changed political circumstances following the referendum and how they relate to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998, which redefined the boundaries between Ireland, the UK, and Northern Ireland.²

Balawajder explores the changing perspectives on sovereignty over Northern Ireland, focusing on the UK's sovereign power and the rights granted to the Irish government and Northern Ireland citizens under the GFA. His analysis of the Brexit negotiations highlights the significance of the Irish land border issue and illustrates a change in international recognition of sovereignty concerning Northern Ireland. The article delves into potential solutions for maintaining an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland while respecting the UK's sovereignty over the latter. Balawajder discusses the complexities and feasibility of the two primary options: the UK remaining in the EU single market for a limited time or Northern Ireland alone staying in the single market, creating a de facto customs and regulatory border in the Irish Sea. The latter option, known as the 'Irish Sea' solution, is examined in detail, noting its implications for Northern Ireland's unique economic status within the EU, distinct from the rest of the UK, without altering its sovereignty.

Furthermore, Balawajder examines the challenges surrounding the Irish border, focusing on the EU's support for the Irish government and the provisions of the GFA. He delves deeper into the dynamics of the EU's refusal to negotiate a land border on the island and how this stance significantly shaped the UK's negotiation strategy,

2. Balawajder, Grzegorz. "The British-Irish Border in the Context of Brexit." *Przegląd Strategiczny*, no. 13 (December 31, 2020): 229–42. <https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2020.1.14>.

leading to the adoption of the 'Irish Sea' solution. While preserving the open border per the GFA, this solution introduced new complexities in the UK-Ireland relationship. Lastly, the article assesses the broader impact of Brexit on Irish politics, society, and culture. Balawajder's discussion extends to the increased polarization within Irish politics and heightened community tensions in Northern Ireland, attributing these developments to Brexit's profound social and cultural ramifications. He also emphasizes the economic repercussions, notably regarding trade disruptions and the reconfiguration of Ireland's economic ties with the UK and the EU, with impacts on key sectors such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and technology.

In conclusion, Balawajder's article comprehensively analyzes the complex issues surrounding the British-Irish border in the context of Brexit, examining the implications for sovereignty, politics, society, and the economy. By systematically unpacking the various challenges and potential solutions, the article offers critical insights into the ongoing effects of Brexit on the intricate relationship between the UK, Ireland, and Northern Ireland, providing a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted impacts of this significant geopolitical event.

IMPACT ON THE IRISH-BRITISH BORDER

The UK's decision to leave the EU has presented both immediate and long-term challenges in the relationship between the UK and Ireland. In particular, the Irish border issue is of great concern, as it is now the only land border shared between the EU and the UK following Brexit. As the UK is no longer part of the EU's single market and customs union, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has been a source of great contention since the passage of the Brexit referendum in 2016. As a result, Ireland, the EU, and the UK agreed to the Northern Ireland Protocol to prevent a hard border between Ireland and the UK. This Protocol allows Northern Ireland to remain a part of the UK's customs union and single market while also allowing goods to move freely between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Embedded within the Protocol is a commitment to "avoid a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland and protect the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) agreement, which aims to promote cross-community exchanges and ensure the absence of physical borders between Northern Ireland and Ireland."³ The implementation of the Protocol ensures that the Irish-British border remains open and free-flowing while also allowing the UK to maintain its sovereignty. Overall, the Northern Ireland Protocol has been successful in its objective of preventing the emergence of a hard border.

However, there have been some difficulties in its implementation. As noted in a recent Bloomberg article, "Issues surrounding the Northern Ireland Protocol — the part of the Brexit treaty which Varadkar negotiated in 2019 to keep the region within the European Union's customs block — remain unresolved, though there have been reports of positive progress and talks have recently intensified."⁴ Additionally, to this, "In the first weeks of 2021, some of the practical consequences of Brexit, including the Protocol, became apparent - in Britain, in Northern Ireland, in the Republic,

3. "The Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland Explained." 2023a. European Council. June 2, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-relations-with-the-united-kingdom/the-eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement/the-protocol-on-ireland-and-northern-ireland-explained/>.

4. Coniam, Morwenna. 2022. "Leo Varadkar Returns as Ireland Prime Minister to Tackle Housing and Brexit." *Bloomberg.Com*, December 17, 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-16/varadkar-returns-as-irish-premier-to-tackle-housing-and-brexit>.

and across the European Union.”⁵The main issue, which has been a source of major contention, has been the need to introduce customs checks for goods entering Northern Ireland from the UK. This has been a significant source of dispute between the UK and the EU and has caused significant political tensions between the two sides.

POLITICAL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON IRELAND

The United Kingdom’s decision to allow for the passage of Brexit has brought on a number of significant effects on the Irish economy. Firstly, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has amounted to a considerable decrease in trade between the EU and the UK while also creating obstacles for Irish businesses. The European Commission states, “Businesses importing or exporting goods to the UK (apart from Northern Ireland) now need to register for Customs. VAT rules of trade with a third country now apply to trade with the UK.”⁶ This has directly impacted the Irish economy, as many businesses in Ireland rely heavily on trade with the UK.

Secondly, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has caused an increase in the cost of imports from the UK, as new tariffs and trade regulations have been introduced. This has directly impacted the cost of goods in Ireland and the cost of doing business. One research firm found that “Many companies in Ireland or the UK will face some tariffs because their supply chains involve producing or manufacturing goods or components in non-EU, non-UK countries.”⁶ The Irish economy has also faced several challenges due to the uncertainty caused by Brexit. The lack of clarity on the future trade relationship between the UK and the EU has meant that businesses have been unable to plan and prepare for the future. This has caused a great deal of uncertainty among the citizens of Ireland regarding the future of their economy. Data collected from a study in 2017 found that 77% of Irish citizens are worried that Brexit will negatively impact Ireland’s economy.⁷

The overall impact of Brexit on the Irish economy has been significant. The disruption caused by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has caused a decrease in trade, an increase in the cost of imports, and a great deal of uncertainty in the Irish economy. As recently as January of this year, a report from Reuters stated, “The UK landbridge that offered traders the fastest route between Ireland and the European continent before Brexit will not re-emerge as a preferred option for moving goods, the head of Dublin Port was quoted as saying on Friday.”⁸ The Irish government has taken measures to mitigate the economic impact of Brexit, such as introducing new tariffs and trade regulations and providing support to those affected by Brexit.⁹ However, the long-term impact of Brexit on the Irish economy is still uncertain, and the Irish economy will likely continue to experience disruption and uncertainty in the years to come. In addition, the future relationship between the UK and the EU is still uncertain, and any changes to the trade relationship between the two could cause further disruption for Ireland as well.

5. Montgomery, Rory. 2021. “Protocol Problems for Both Parts of Ireland.” *Fortnight*, no. 481: 2– 5. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27007574>.

6. “The Impact of Brexit on Ireland.” 2023. Representation in Ireland. October 18, 2023. https://ireland.representation.ec.europa.eu/strategy-and-priorities/key-eu-policies-ireland/impact-brexit-ireland_en.

7. G-p. 2022. “How Has Brexit Affected Business in Ireland?” G-P. May 25, 2022. <https://www.globalization-partners.com/blog/how-has-brexit-affected-business-in-ireland/>.

8. Reuters. 2022. “Brexit Ends UK ‘landbridge’ for Irish/EU Trade, Port Boss Says.” *Reuters*, January 21, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/brexit-ends-uk-landbridge-irish-eu-trade-port-boss-says-2022-01-21/>.

9. Cox, Bryan. 2017. “Brexit Drives Down Irish Consumer Confidence & Spend – RedC Research & Marketing.” RedC Research & Marketing. February 13, 2017. <https://www.redcresearch.com/consumer-mood-monitor-january-2017/>.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON IRELAND

The impact of Brexit on Irish society and culture has been far-reaching. Irish citizens have experienced great uncertainty and insecurity due to the threat of EU privileges being taken away. This has caused a great deal of anxiety and fear among Irish citizens, as they are unsure of their future. The cultural impact of Brexit has been significant, as it has caused great resentment and uncertainty among Irish citizens. Many Irish citizens view Brexit as a return to a time when the UK dominated Ireland, and this has caused a great deal of tension and distrust between the two countries. The Irish government has responded to the social and cultural impact of Brexit by attempting to protect the rights of Irish citizens. This includes the introduction of the Common Travel Area, which allows Irish citizens to travel freely between Ireland and the UK,

Additionally, Ireland has sought efforts to protect the rights of Irish its citizens living in the UK by ensuring that they are not discriminated against on the basis of their nationality. The primary reason why a hard border is so threatening to Irish culture and identity is due to its symbolic reminder of Ireland's history of conflict. Many in Ireland and the UK see any hard border as a step back into the violence that occurred before the Good Friday Agreement, which claimed the lives of 3,568 people between 1969 and 2010.¹⁰ This agreement was instrumental in allowing people to live in peace, and a hard border would bring back memories of a painful past.

The freedom of movement between both countries has allowed for cultural exchanges and collaboration, which has been extremely beneficial in uniting people from both sides of the border; a hard border would make it more difficult for people to travel back and forth as well as communicate and work with one another, drastically reducing the achieved cultural integration between Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the broader UK.

Furthermore, Brexit has also been seen as a threat to Irish identity because it has allowed for increased anti-immigrant sentiment in both countries. Immigration has been an important part of Irish culture for centuries, and many people are concerned that Brexit will lead to reduced rights for immigrants, who are seen as an important part of Irish society. This could lead to further divisions between people living in both countries, which is seen as a direct threat to Irish identity. Brexit poses a major threat to Irish culture and identity because it could disrupt the existing social and economic ties between both countries and lead to increased divisions between people living in both countries. While Brexit is not inevitable, any attempt to impose a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland would devastate the country's culture and its identity.

In conclusion, Brexit's social and cultural impact on Ireland has been significant. Irish citizens have experienced great uncertainty and insecurity due to the threat of their rights being taken away. Additionally, the cultural impact of Brexit has caused resentment and distrust between the two countries. The Irish government has responded to the social and cultural impact of Brexit by attempting to protect the rights and identity of Irish citizens while pursuing peace.

10. Lyttle, Cara. 2022. "How Much Has Ireland Benefitted from Brexit?" *Investment Monitor*, May 5, 2022. <https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/features/ireland-benefitted-brexite-dublin-financial-services/>.

IRELAND'S STRATEGY AND RESPONSE AGAINST BREXIT

As a small, open economy, Ireland is particularly exposed to the economic consequences of the UK's departure from the EU. To safeguard itself against these impacts, Ireland has implemented a range of strategies aimed at mitigating the risks of Brexit. As soon as the reality of Brexit settled in 2020, a number of companies relocated from the UK to other cities within the EU, as stated in a May 2022 article from *Investment Monitor*, "Dublin welcomed 135 new financial companies between mid-2016 and early 2021, equating to one-quarter of all Brexit-related moves."¹¹ From the outset, the Irish government prioritized securing an all-island economy, meaning that trade, investment, and business could remain largely unencumbered in the event of a hard Brexit. This goal was achieved through the Northern Ireland Protocol, which forms part of the Withdrawal Agreement and seeks to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In addition to the Northern Ireland Protocol, the Irish government has been working closely with businesses and industry associations that demonstrate vulnerability to Brexit's impacts. This has included providing advice and guidance on how to best prepare for changes in trading conditions and regulations while helping businesses develop new markets outside of the UK. Irish businesses have taken proactive steps to protect their interest. Many companies have adjusted their supply chains to reduce the risk of disruption during a disorderly Brexit and to ensure they remain competitive in the face of Brexit-related uncertainty. This has included diversifying their sourcing and product lines while establishing new contacts and partnerships in other European countries with the help of the Irish government. The Irish government has also sought to strengthen and increase its ties with other EU countries, particularly France and Germany, to ensure that Ireland is not left isolated during a no-deal Brexit. As Taoiseach Leo Varadkar stated during a talk at the Brookings Institute in 2018, "The European project... is all about free enterprise, all about trade, all about economic development."¹² This has included strengthening economic and trade links between Ireland and these countries as well as participating in joint initiatives such as the European Investment Plan and the European Stability Mechanism. Furthermore, the Irish government has engaged in active diplomacy with the UK government to protect its interests during negotiations while also seeking to build bridges with pro-Brexit groups in the UK to ensure that any future relationship between Ireland and the UK is based on mutual understanding and respect. The Irish people have done their part in defending and protecting against Brexit's impact on Ireland as well. For example, they have responded to the social and cultural impacts of Brexit by coming together to support each other and further strengthen Irish identity. This has included forming grassroots organizations such as the Irish in Britain, which provides support and advice to Irish citizens living in the UK. Additionally, there have been numerous protests and campaigns in Ireland and the UK to oppose Brexit and protect the rights of Irish citizens.

Looking ahead, Ireland plans to continue working closely with both EU and UK governments to protect its interests. This includes working towards a comprehensive trade agreement between the UK and EU that will ensure that trade remains

11. Lyttle, Cara. 2022. "How Much Has Ireland Benefitted from Brexit?" *Investment Monitor*, May 5, 2022. <https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/features/ireland-benefited-brexit-dublin-financial-services/>.

12. Letsas, Filippou, and Ted Reinert. 2022. "Ireland's Taoiseach on the Challenge of Brexit and the Power of Small Countries | Brookings." Brookings. March 9, 2022. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/irelands-taoiseach-on-the-challenge-of-brexit-and-the-power-of-small-countries/>.

frictionless and that any changes to trading conditions do not disadvantage Irish businesses or farmers. The Irish government also plans to continue strengthening ties with other EU countries to continue to benefit from their collective strength. Finally, the Irish government will continue its efforts to engage in active diplomacy with UK politicians to ensure that any future relationship between Ireland and the UK is based on shared values and mutual understanding.

CONCLUSION

Brexit has had a major impact on Ireland, and as a result, the Irish people, businesses, and government have had to take steps to minimize its consequences. The economic effects were immediate, with trade and sterling depreciation leading to significant losses for the Irish economy and a sharp decline in consumer and business confidence. Additionally, the increased uncertainty has resulted in an increased cost of goods due to tariffs and an overall decline in consumer and business confidence. To combat the effects of Brexit, the Irish government has taken steps to prepare the country for the future. A variety of support and stabilization programs have been introduced, as well as increased investment in infrastructure and research and development. The business community has welcomed these efforts as they provide stability and certainty and help create a more conducive environment for investment.

Furthermore, the Irish government has been actively engaged in negotiations with the UK and the EU to ensure that Ireland's interests are considered and that the country is adequately represented in all discussions relating to Brexit. With the proper measures in place, Ireland can continue to navigate the Brexit landscape with confidence and hope.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Armstrong, Martin. 2023. "Northern Ireland's Violent History." *Statista Daily Data*, April 6, 2023. <https://www.statista.com/chart/17215/deaths-during-the-troubles-by-year/>.
- Balawajder, Grzegorz. 2020. "The British-Irish Border in the Context of Brexit." *Przegląd Strategiczny*, no. 13 (December): 229–42. <https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2020.1.14>.
- Coniam, Morwenna. 2022. "Leo Varadkar Returns as Ireland Prime Minister to Tackle Housing and Brexit." *Bloomberg Com*, December 17, 2022. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-16/varadkar-returns-as-irish-premier-to-tackle-housing-and-brexite>.
- Cox, Bryan. 2017. "Brexit Drives Down Irish Consumer Confidence & Spend - RedC Research & Marketing." RedC Research & Marketing. February 13, 2017. <https://www.redcresearch.com/consumer-mood-monitor-january-2017/>.
- European Council. June 2, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-relations-with-the-united-kingdom/the-eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement/the-protocol-on-ireland-and-northern-ireland-explained/>.
- G-p. 2022. "How Has Brexit Affected Business in Ireland?" G-P. May 25, 2022. <https://www.globalization-partners.com/blog/how-has-brexite-affected-business-in-ireland/>.
- "Ireland's Brexit Position Is Facing Growing Pressure." 2019. *Emerald Expert Briefings*, July. <https://doi.org/10.1108/oxan-ga245412>.
- Letsas, Filippos, and Ted Reinert. 2022. "Ireland's Taoiseach on the Challenge of Brexit and the Power of Small Countries | Brookings." Brookings. March 9, 2022. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/irelands-taoiseach-on-the-challenge-of-brexite-and-the-power-of-small-countries/>.
- Lyttle, Cara. 2022. "How Much Has Ireland Benefitted from Brexit?" *Investment Monitor*, May 5, 2022. <https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/features/ireland-benefitted-brexite-dublin-financial-services/>.
- Montgomery, Rory. 2021. "Protocol Problems for Both Parts of Ireland." *Fortnight*, no. 481: 2–5. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27007574>.
- Murphy, Mary C., and John O'Brennan. 2019. "Ireland and Crisis Governance: Continuity and Change in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis and Brexit." *Irish Political Studies* 34 (4): 471–89. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2019.1687621>.
- Reuters. 2022. "Brexit Ends UK 'landbridge' for Irish/EU Trade, Port Boss Says." *Reuters*, January 21, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/brexite-ends-uk-landbridge-irisheu-trade-port-boss-says-2022-01-21/>.
- "The Impact of Brexit on Ireland." 2023. Representation in Ireland. October 18, 2023. https://ireland.representation.ec.europa.eu/strategy-and-priorities/key-eu-policies-ireland/impact-brexite-ireland_en.
- "The Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland Explained." 2023a. European Council. June 2, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-relations-with-the-united-kingdom/the-eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement/the-protocol-on-ireland-and-northern-ireland-explained/>.

Analysis of the Protests Movement in Russia in 2011–2013

ELENA BERDNIKOVA

ABSTRACT

This article explores the topic of protests and opposition in Russia, specifically focusing on analyzing the 2011–2013 protest movement. To further understand these protests, the paper compares two perspectives – Mischa Gabowitsch’s and Artemy Magun. Magun argues that the 2011–2013 protests in Russia were mainly held by the middle-class and only focused on elections. Gabowitsch argues against such perspective, which is common in the Western media, saying that these movements were held by different people, not limited to the middle class, and for a variety of reasons, not limited to fair elections. This paper will present both perspectives and provide my own argument on this topic.

INTRODUCTION

The protests in Russia in 2011–2013 were arguably one of the biggest protest movements in Russia. They came as a surprise to many, as they began unexpectedly after a fraudulent Duma Election in 2011.¹ The Guardian estimates one of the larger protests in 2012 to have had approximately 120,000 people.² While many people have argued and have been aware of Russia’s government’s history of fraudulent elections, the reason why the Duma election sparked such an outrage was because of an increased interest in election monitoring. Many volunteers and people interested in elections would spend time monitoring the elections and declare when the results came out that the elections were indeed fraudulent. According to a data set presented by Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde – the results of the Duma 2011 indicated that the political party supported by Putin – United Russia gained 49.32% votes.³ They obtained this data from the official records of the Russian government. Such numbers sparked outrage across the country and people have come out in protests. However, those first protests grew bigger and gained more traction across the country to become a bigger movement. It no longer was restricted to simply “fair elections” protests – it was now a movement that inspired and encouraged people from different parts of Russia, from different backgrounds to protest for individual causes. For the purpose of this paper, the established timeline of 2011–2013 protests in Russia will begin on December 5, 2011 – with the Duma elections in 2011 and end on January 13, 2013 – with the March Against Scoundrels. March Against Scoundrels was a protest

1. Jim Nicole. Russia’s December 2011 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications. Congressional Research Service, December 13, 2011 <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42118.pdf>

2. Tom Parfitt. “Anti-Putin protesters march through Moscow” The Guardian (2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/04/anti-putin-protests-moscow-russia>

3. Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde (2011) https://www.russiavotes.org//duma/duma_today.php

against the newly established Anti-Magnitsky Law that restricted American people from adopting Russian orphan children.⁴

LITERATURE REVIEW

The protest movement in Russia started following the fraudulent 2011 Duma elections and ended sometime in 2013. It has been considered as a protest specifically focused on a political agenda and limited to a small group of middle-class highly educated people in Moscow. The rest of the Russian people were dismissed as “apathetic” and “apolitical” by the Western media, the Russian government, and even individuals who were constantly persuaded to believe the media’s propaganda that followed a specific narrative. Mischa Gabowitsch provides a perspective different to the one being spread by the Western media.⁵ This paper will analyze the 2011-2013 protest movement in Russia, by comparing two opposing perspectives on whether the movement was limited to the middle-class.

In his book *Protest in Putin’s Russia*, Mischa Gabowitsch conducts an empirical analysis of the protest movement in Russia in 2011-2013. He challenges the widely accepted narrative that those movements were limited to Moscow and led by a middle-class highly educated group of people. To do so, Mischa Gabowitsch constructs a new framework at viewing and analyzing the protests in Russia – he urges the audience to avoid simply applying existing frameworks for protests worldwide to the 2011-2013 Russian protests and to instead consider them from a new, sociological perspective – while also being careful not to alienate the Russian population.⁶ The counterargument selected for this paper is an article by Artemy Magun – *The Russian Protest Movement of 2011-2012: A New Middle Class Populism*. Artemy Magun takes into consideration some of Gabowitsch’s arguments, however, bases his arguments on the data that he found and argues that indeed the protests in Russia were mainly centered in Moscow and bigger cities like Saint Petersburg and were politically motivated. He argues that a new middle-class populism has emerged, under the leadership of select opposition leaders such as Alexei Navalny; hence why the protests’ decline was also tied closely to the government restricting opposition leaders and dissolving the protests from above.⁷

Mischa Gabowitsch’s assertion that the protest movement in Russia from 2011-2013 defies simplistic categorization as solely representing the middle-class or highly educated demographic, and cannot be confined to Moscow-centric dynamics, finds support in the diverse array of individuals and organizations engaged in the protests. There was no specific central goal tying the movement together. There had been large protests specifically focused on fair elections or politically motivated that did occur in bigger cities like Moscow, since a lot of people agreed to meet up there – but the people participating in those movements were not of a single identifiable group, since Russians from all across the country would carpool and come to bigger cities to participate in bigger protests such as the 2012 May 6 “March of the Millions” in Moscow.⁸ However,

4. Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 332 pp.

5. Tom Junes. Review of *Protest in Putin’s Russia*, by Mischa Gabowitsch. *Ab Imperio* 2017, no. 4 (2017): 346-350. <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2017.0094>.

6. Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 332 pp.

7. Artemy Magun. “The Russian Protest Movement of 2011-2012: A New Middle-Class Populism” *Stasis Journal* Vol 2. <https://stasisjournal.net/index.php/journal/article/view/67/108>

8. Anna Derinova. “March of Millions demands ‘Russia without Putin’” *Waging Nonviolence People Powered News and Analysis*. June 14, 2012 <https://wagingnonviolence.org/2012/06/march-of-millions-demands-russia-without-putin/>

there were also many protests going on in cities across Russia, including cases of individuals protesting the local government, against the police, against their workplace, and more. There were many LGBT organizations and grassroots organizations as well as artistic protests, such as the musical group Pussy Riot going on as well.⁹ Another “March of the Millions” occurred on June 12, 2012.¹⁰ As these protests are spread out throughout the 2011-2013 timeline, it would be impossible to put those protest movements under one label.¹¹ However, because there was a lack of central goal or direction with the protests, they led to the government creating stricter laws around protests and for Putin’s government to limit the freedom of expression, speech, and protest for Russians in the future. If this movement was exclusively confined to a middle-class demographic seeking governmental change, or if there existed a singular central objective, its prospects for success might have been higher. However, the complexity of the situation requires further examination.

MISCHA GABOWITSCH’S ARGUMENT AND EVIDENCE:

Mischa Gabowitsch provides a sociological approach to understanding the Russian protest movement of 2011-2013. He argues primarily as a response to ideas proposed and widely accepted, such as the ones limiting the narrative of these protests to a select highly educated middle-class group of people protesting the government as part of the political opposition movement and centered in Moscow. Gabowitsch argues that in fact, this is not the full picture of the events occurring in that time. He provides evidence within his writing of protests occurring around Russia demonstrating how people of different backgrounds are protesting for different reasons.

There are three key arguments made by Mischa Gabowitsch in his book. First, the protest movement was not only politically motivated, it consisted of many different protests – such as economic, environmental, feminist, LGBT+ and more. There was no central goal holding all these protesters together, but rather a collective atmosphere of protests inspired more people to speak up on different reasons.¹² Second, Gabowitsch argues that it is crucial to construct a new framework for understanding the protest movement in Russia, instead of just comparing it to existing frameworks for protests in the West. He also urges to be careful not to isolate the Russian people. He believes that the widely accepted narrative that hyper-fixates on Moscow and the label of protesters as “middle-class” ignores the rest of Russia. And third point – the government puts heavy restrictions on the protestors which leads to a decline in protests, but the main reason for why their numbers declined was because of divisions from within the movement.¹³

Mischa Gabowitsch identifies three biases that have set up the narrative of the Russian protests being limited to a certain group of people in the larger cities of Russia: “In broader terms, much of the confusion surrounding the 2011-2013 protests [...] can be traced to the mutually reinforcing effects of three interconnected biases: Nasreddin’s

9. RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty “Putin Detractors Kick Off ‘March of Millions’ in Moscow, Other Cities” September 15, 2012 <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-critics-march-of-millions-moscow-russia/24709282.html>

10. Human Rights Watch “Russia: The March of Millions” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/13/russia-march-millions>

11. Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 332 pp.

12. Aburamoto Mari, “Book Review on Protest in Putin’s Russia” *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Tomus 39, pp. 91-128 <https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicn/acta/39/pp.%2091-92.pdf>

13. Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 332 pp.

Fallacy, the Black Box Perspective, and the Opposition Primacy Principle.”¹⁴ The Black Box Perspective refers to the tendency of simply accepting the narrative set up by the media or certain leaders as the truth, without questioning any alternatives. The Opposition Primacy Principle is the tendency to put more weight to the words of opposition leaders or protest organizers over other protestors. Nasreddin’s Fallacy, also known as the Streetlight Effect, has its origin in a folk story of a person who lost a key and instead of searching for it in the place where he lost it – he looked for it in a place where the light was brighter. Gabowitsch argues that in the case of the protests of 2011-2013, most journalists and people interested in analyzing the protests were drawn towards the central cities like Moscow, whilst simultaneously ignoring the rest of Russia which ultimately led to a lack of data or surveys in regions other than Moscow.¹⁵ This will then lead to more people believing that Moscow has more people interested in the protest. It can be connected to the data collecting bias – location bias. Mischa argues that out of the 83 cities in Russia – 80 of them had held protest movements by the end of December 2011, which was only the beginning of the 2011-2013 protest movements.

It is important to take into consideration how Russian society is being described as and which category it is put in, for it to fit the narrative of the Western scholars. Samuel A. Greene in his book *Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia* discusses Russian society under Putin. While he does not agree with the narrative that Russian people are “apathetic” to politics, he does believe that Russian people feel content with the government until some action affects them personally and leads to them reaching a ‘turning point’ when they can no longer accept the actions of the government. Greene defines the phenomenon of civil society when describing the Russian population: “Civil society is the nonviolent means by which individuals collectively seek sovereignty vis-à-vis the state.”¹⁶ Mischa Gabowitsch argues against the idea of classifying the Russian society under the term of “civil society”. He argues that the notion of civil society leaves out a lot of important parts of Russian society when it comes to protests, he questions whether the notion would leave out parts of society such as trade unions, and ethnic groups. Mischa writes: “A civil society-style analysis of protest [...] potentially leaves out or diminishes types or forms of protest that do not fit this model.”¹⁷

ARTEMY MAGUN’S COUNTERARGUMENT AND EVIDENCE:

Artemy Magun in his article “The Russian Protest Movement of 2011-2012: A New Middle-Class Populism” discusses the Protest Movement in Russia in 2011-2012 from a more politically centered approach. Magun refers to Gabowitsch and the data collected by Gabowitsch as well as references the data his own team collects, but he is critical of the ideas that Mischa proposes.

There are three key arguments made by Artemy in his article. First, Artemy Magun argues that the protest movement of 2011-2012 was clearly politically motivated as it was primarily focused around the “fair elections” slogan and from his view led and heavily relied on the leadership of opposition leaders, specifically Alexei Navalny. He argues that the people participating in these protests could be identified as a

14. Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 31

15. Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017, 32

16. Samuel A. Greene, *Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia* (2014), 54

17. Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017, 17

group of “middle-class” people who were highly educated and viewed anyone who disagreed with them and supported the government as “bydlo” – a derogatory term. He would describe them as: “...Intellectuals [who] see themselves as its organic and most oppressed part, such that they do not know why they are revolting.”¹⁸ Third, Artemy identifies this protest movement as an emergence of a new type of “middle-class” populism, specifically tying it to Navalny.

The reason why Artemy Magun believes that the movement was heavily influenced by and centered around Navalny is because Navalny used the terminology of “the people” a lot in his speeches, which would later reappear in interviews where protestors would self-identify themselves with “the people” or “middle-class”, often without being able to define those terms. Magun uses the terms “new” and “new new” movements to describe the protests in Russia, by finding connections between them and the mentioned classifications of new kind of protests occurring in the West. These “new” and “new new” movements refer to an emergence of protests in the West against the authoritarian regimes, it is focused on social movements of the recent years, and he provides the emerging Occupy movements as examples of such. Magun writes: “Given that the recent Russian protests featured mostly political and moral slogans (‘fair elections’ [...]), with very little focus on social inequality, poverty, and direct oppression, and that they proved to fall into the same category as the ‘new’ and ‘new new’ social movements in the developed (core) countries [...]”¹⁹ So, in Magun’s perspective while the government’s restrictions played a role in why protests have gone down over time – the main reason for their decline is due to the lowering numbers of the opposition leaders. From the 18 original opposition leaders prevalent during the 2011-2013 movements, 4 were killed, 3 – fled, some were poisoned, imprisoned, or simply removed from the political scene. Alexei Navalny was imprisoned in early 2021, upon returning to Russia after recovering from the assassination attempt.²⁰ On February 16, 2024, Alexei Navalny died in prison.²¹

A popular narrative describing the Russian society is the term “apathetic” or “apolitical”. It is a terminology that Mischa Gabowitsch is very critical of, however Artemy Magun does not entirely disqualify such explanations. He believes that there is only a select group of highly educated middle-class people who are interested in protesting for fair elections, and that the rest of the public that is apolitical watches them on the news, and as Magun references Volkov – sees them as a “gathering of the rich (Volkov 2012b: 20).”²² Alfred B. Evans, in his article *Protests and civil society in Russia: The Struggle for the Khmiki Forest* discusses the idea that Russian people are apathetic about politics, until a certain issue personally affects them. He writes: “Evgeniia Chirikova has described herself as having been a passive citizen ‘until they touched my forest.’ She admits that she has a favorable view of any political forces

18. Artemy Magun. “The Russian Protest Movement of 2011-2012: A New Middle-Class Populism” ESPN, 2014. Stasis Journal Vol 2. 185. <https://stasisjournal.net/index.php/journal/article/view/67/108>

19. Artemy Magun. “The Russian Protest Movement of 2011-2012: A New Middle-Class Populism” ESPN, 2014. Stasis Journal Vol 2. 168. <https://stasisjournal.net/index.php/journal/article/view/67/108>

20. Vitaly Shevchenko. “Ukraine war: Where are Russia’s opposition leaders now?” 17 April 2023 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65113186>

21. Jim Heintz. “Alexei Navalny, galvanizing opposition leader and Putin’s fiercest foe, died in prison, Russia says” AP News, February 16, 2024. <https://apnews.com/article/russia-navalny-dead-opposition-leader-2d11644f7ae5332587b39150f1fd1738>

22. Artemy Magun. “The Russian Protest Movement of 2011-2012: A New Middle-Class Populism” ESPN, 2014. Stasis Journal Vol 2. 166. <https://stasisjournal.net/index.php/journal/article/view/67/108>

that protect ‘the environment in which my children and I live’.”²³ This is an example of a woman self-identifying as apolitical. However, as Evans explains – because of the government plans on the Khimki forest, she felt personally involved and could no longer be apolitical. Evans continues to write: “The explosion of emotion in the protests that followed the parliamentary elections of December 2011 reflected a perception that the political regime had crossed a boundary that was implicit in its relationship with the citizens.”²⁴ This narrative of Russian people being apathetic or apolitical is very widespread, and often misused in different contexts when describing the lack of visibility of Russian protests – without acknowledging all the restrictions put by the government on protests and free speech, or without acknowledging the fact that there are a lot of protests going on in Russia – they are simply overlooked, dismissed, or overshadowed by the media and government. In 2014, the government put restrictions on protests held without authorities’ permission. The punishment could vary from a fine to imprisonment up to 15 days. David White, in his article “Taking It to the Streets: Raising the Costs of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia” also discusses this narrative of Russian passivity when it comes to politics and protests. He writes: “Through the mobilization of large numbers, the ‘For Free Elections’ campaign has clearly encouraged formerly passive supporters of the opposition to become more active [...] However, whilst support for the regime may have declined, Vladimir Putin still retains high levels of support.”²⁵ He argues that the protests of 2011-2013 sparked an interest in many formerly apathetic people who were supportive of the opposition to actively participate in the movement, and he believes that the opposition could achieve its goals of changing the government by creating an incentive for apolitical people who aren’t supportive of the opposition to feel urged to participate as well.

ARGUMENTS COMPARISON TABLE

	Mischa Gabowitsch	Artemy Magun - Counterargument
Middle Class?	No	Yes
Moscow-centered?	No	Yes
Purpose and outcomes of protests	A movement of people discovering their voice and coming together; Fighting for different causes – no central goal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failed • Politically motivated • Relied on opposition leaders

23. Alfred B. Evans. “Protests and Civil Society in Russia: The Struggle for the Khimki Forest.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45, no. 3/4 (2012): 233–42, 238. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48610345>.

24. Alfred B. Evans. “Protests and Civil Society in Russia: The Struggle for the Khimki Forest.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45, no. 3/4 (2012): 233–42, 238. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48610345>.

25. David White. “Taking It to the Streets: Raising the Costs of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia.” *Perspectives on European politics and society* 14.4 (2013): 582–598, 595. <https://web-p-ebshost-com.jpplnet.sfsu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=5fd58b36-8eae-4ca5-b1fd-9e6e2cc99076%40redis>

EVIDENCE COMPARISON TABLE

	Mischa Gabowitsch	Artemy Magun - Counterargument
Middle Class?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wide variety of protests across Russia for different reasons • Example includes prisoners burning themselves due to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-identification as “middle-class” or “the people” • Emergence of Populism • “new” and “new new” movements
Moscow-centered?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-harm individual protests in different cities • Local governments restrictions were stricter outside of Moscow 	There were protests outside of Moscow, but their numbers were not big enough or were not much different to be considered significant; so, it was centered in Moscow
Purpose and outcomes of protests	Not limited to politics; artist protests by musicians like Pussy Riot, LGBT protests, ecological protests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slogans such as “fair elections” were prominent • Out of 18 opposition leaders – 4 were killed, 3 fled, others were imprisoned or left politics - without them, the protests ended

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROTESTS

The biggest protests that occurred in Russia in 2011–2013 were in Moscow and primarily focused on issues like elections, Putin’s regime, and were led by opposition leaders. However, they were not the only protests in Russia at this time. There were also artists performing on stages in protest of issues including political, but not limited – as there were also feminist groups such as Pussy Riot. Pussy Riot were famous for their protest performance in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ, where they protested the close relationship between the church and the government. Media played an important role in coordinating and spreading information on protests during this time.²⁶ VK and Facebook were very popular in Russia and many people would find information on when and where protests would be held locally. It also allowed for information on smaller-scale protests of self-harm and even suicide protests to spread online. In December of 2013 a group of prisoners sewed their mouths shut, some cut their veins open, and went on hunger strikes to protest unfair treatment in prison in Kaliningrad. There are a few examples of old pensioners setting themselves on fire in protest to unfair treatment, for example in May of 2011 – an older man in Novosibirsk set himself on fire and later hung himself to protest the unjust reduction of his pension. In July of 2012 an older woman set herself on fire in one of the United Russia’s offices. These examples represent only a small fraction of the diverse range of reasons that inspired people from various regions across Russia to protest.²⁷

The government’s response to protests was to attempt to limit them as much as possible. Arrests and brutal beatings followed mass demonstrations around the

26. Michelle Geslani. “Watch: Pussy Riot’s historic ‘A Punk Prayer’ performance on its 2-year anniversary” Consequence. February 21, 2014. <https://consequence.net/2014/02/watch-pussy-riots-historic-a-punk-prayer-performance-on-2-year-anniversary/>

27. Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 332 pp.

country, and the national government continues to implement new restrictions to limit the freedom of speech, expression, and gathering to this day. However, the local governments in cities other than Moscow would often put even stricter limitations than those in bigger cities – making it harder for people to show their disapproval. For example, in Nizhny Novgorod the city administration did not approve of a single protest march for fair elections. In October of 2012 – a set of restrictions was passed across Russia, including Barnaul, Siberia where maximum density was limited to one person per square meter. Such limitations made it harder for protestors to participate locally, so for many that meant having to travel to protest to a bigger city, such as Moscow – or to participate in another way, such as online. Tomila Lankina and Alisa Voznaya conducted research into the statistics of protests in different parts of Russia. To do that, they used Zubarevitch’s framework of “four Russia’s” to divide the population into four different regions, based on location as well as average economic levels for the purpose of collecting and analyzing data. They write: “Four out of ten regions [...] are located in the North Caucasus division, confirming our hypothesis that regions with entrenched subnational authoritarian regimes are less likely to tolerate any form of protest [...] Dagestan, on the other hand, has experienced a higher number of protests, with a 41% suppression rate.”²⁸ This data points out that local governments outside of Moscow are stricter with their laws suppressing protests. This leads to those regions having lower numbers of protestors compared to bigger cities – and ultimately leads to those protests being dismissed by analysts and scholars when discussing protests in Russia in 2011-2013.

One of Mischa’s key points refers to division within the protest movement, and that is tied to the fact that there were different kinds of protests going on. On the surface – the biggest and most discussed protests were the ones led by political opposition leaders, such as Navalny in big cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg. However, numerous individuals and smaller organizations participated in protests advocating for different causes. Non-government organizations (NGOs) would come into some tensions with some of the newer protest groups emerging from the 2011-2013 movement. And NGOs were heavily controlled by the Kremlin through laws and restrictions. According to Gabowitsch, in July of 2012 – Duma passed a law which requires organizations that receive foreign funding and also engage in political activities to be registered as foreign agents, which then places them into a new category of restrictions and regulations – and by early 2016, 115 organizations (including LGBT, human rights groups, and other NGOs) were registered as foreign agents and their activities undermined.²⁹ Sarah Henderson discusses the relationship between the government and NGOs and how it shifts over time. On the topic of Putin’s administration and NGOs she writes: “The administration’s legislative policy also gives the government the capability to punish [...] NGOs that pursue issues about which it is less than enthusiastic - [...] pertaining to political rights and liberties”³⁰. NGOs were heavily controlled and restricted through passage of laws such as the one registering them as foreign agents, and that made it harder for them to be able to participate in the 2011-2013 movement without risking losing their organization.

28. Tomila Lankina and Alisa Voznaya. “New Data on Protest Trends in Russia’s Regions.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 67, no. 2 (2015): 327–42. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24537042>.

29 Mischa Gabowitsch. *Protest in Putin’s Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017.

30 Sarah L. Henderson. “Civil Society in Russia: State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin Era.” *Problems of post-communism* 58.3 (2011): 11–27. Web p. 24–25 <https://web-p-ebshost-com.jpallnet.sfsu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=1a83ea2f-657e-4fc2-9faa-6f12b1bdcbc4%40redis>

CONCLUSION

The protests of the 2011-2013 period in Russia are heavily debated on. However, there is a widely accepted narrative following the events of that time – that the movement was limited to Moscow and bigger cities and led by politically motivated oppositionists who were part of the “urban” highly-educated “middle-class” minority of the rest of the “apolitical” Russian population. Artemy Magun agrees with this narrative and defends it using the theory of Populism when describing this protest movement. Mischa Gabowitsch, on the other hand, provides a different framework to analyzing the protest movement of 2011-2013 and provides examples and data to disprove this narrative – arguing that the protest movement was very diverse and wide-spread, and cannot be classified under one label of “middle-class” people.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Centre for the Study of Public Policy Policy, University of Strathclyde (2011) https://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_today.php
- Derinova, Anna. "March of Millions demands 'Russia without Putin'" Waging Nonviolence People Powered News and Analysis. June 14, 2012 <https://wagingnonviolence.org/2012/06/march-of-millions-demands-russia-without-putin/>
- Evans, Alfred B. "Protests and Civil Society in Russia: The Struggle for the Khimki Forest." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45, no. 3/4 (2012): 233–42. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48610345>.
- Gabowitsch, Mischa *Protest in Putin's Russia* Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press, (2017), 332 pp.
- Geslani, Michelle. "Watch: Pussy Riot's historic 'A Punk Prayer' performance on its 2-year anniversary" Consequence. February 21, 2014. <https://consequence.net/2014/02/watch-pussy-riots-historic-a-punk-prayer-performance-on-2-year-anniversary/>
- Greene, Samuel A. *Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin's Russia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014. 296p.
- Heintz, Jim. "Alexei Navalny, galvanizing opposition leader and Putin's fiercest foe, died in prison, Russia says" AP News, February 16, 2024. <https://apnews.com/article/russia-navalny-dead-opposition-leader-2d11644f7ae5332587b39150f1fd1738>
- Henderson, Sarah L. "Civil Society in Russia: State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin Era." *Problems of post-communism* 58.3 (2011): 11–27. Web. <https://web-p-ebshost-com.jp11net.sfsu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=1a83ea2f-657e-4fc2-9faa-6f12b1bdcbc4%40redis>
- Human Rights Watch "Russia: The March of Millions" <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/13/russia-march-millions>
- Junes, Tom. Review of *Protest in Putin's Russia*, by Mischa Gabowitsch. *Ab Imperio* 2017, no. 4 (2017): 346–350. <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2017.0094>.
- Kolstø, Pål. (2017). Review: Protest in Putin's Russia by Gabowitsch, Mischa. *The Slavonic and East European Review*. 95. 10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.95.3.0591.
- Lankina, Tomila, and Alisa Voznaya. "New Data on Protest Trends in Russia's Regions." *Europe-Asia Studies* 67, no. 2 (2015): 327–42. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24537042>.
- Magun, Artemy. "The Russian Protest Movement of 2011-2012: A New Middle-Class Populism" ESPN, 2014. *Stasis Journal* Vol 2. <https://stasisjournal.net/index.php/journal/article/view/67/108>
- Mari, Aburamoto. "Book Review on *Protest in Putin's Russia*" *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, *Tomus* 39, pp. 91-128 <https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicn/acta/39/pp.%2091-92.pdf>
- Nicole, Jim. *Russia's December 2011 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications*. Congressional Research Service. December 13, 2011 <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42118.pdf>
- Parfitt, Tom "Anti-Putin protesters march through Moscow" *The Guardian* (2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/04/anti-putin-protests-moscow-russia>
- RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty "Putin Detractors Kick Off 'March of Millions' in Moscow, Other Cities" September 15, 2012 <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-critics-march-of-millions-moscow-russia/24709282.html>
- Shevchenko, Vitaly "Ukraine war: Where are Russia's opposition leaders now?" 17 April 2023 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65113186>
- White, David. "Taking It to the Streets: Raising the Costs of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia." *Perspectives on European politics and society* 14.4 (2013): 582–598. Web. <https://web-p-ebshost-com.jp11net.sfsu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=5fd58b36-8eae-4ca5-b1fd-9e6e2cc99076%40redis>

Mapping the Core-Periphery Nuclear Energy Landscape: Dependency, Nuclear Energy, and Non-proliferation

TROY MICHAEL ALEXANDER

ABSTRACT

Currently, the discussion surrounding the effects of climate change on energy sources is contentious. Periphery nations struggle to find justification for alternative energy sources due to the cost of renewable energy. This causes tension between the global North, who continue to utilize fossil fuels for their development, and the global South. Without finding a compromise, the effects this would have on the environment would affect every nation. This paper takes a deeper dive into the conditions surrounding the nuclear energy landscape and analyzes avenues that could allow developing nations to use nuclear energy through the application of advanced or small modular reactors.

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear energy can be utilized to assist periphery nations with their development. In advancing peaceful nuclear technology internationally its use can assist with providing a source of alternative energy for developing nations to use for their economic development. Atomic power, in contrast to other forms of energy that is used, is distinct in its operational and bureaucratic relevance due to the various applications and employment. States cooperate to manage the possible catastrophic destructive power fission, yet also take advantage of the attractive means to generate electricity through the utilization of peaceful nuclear technologies. Actively working towards developing and applying international agreements formed to constrain horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries), this paper investigates the extent to which underutilization of institutions built around nuclear fission has restricted periphery nations' development and economic performance. In addition, it asks under what conditions does nuclear energy promote development for periphery states?

International Relations theory is a lens of analysis that answers these questions used to frame our understanding of interactions between states. The theories of neoliberalism and social constructivism will be used to effectively frame these inequities, aiding the understanding of the roots of underdevelopment and the formulation of perspectives conducive to finding a solution. In doing so it will assist us with understanding the origins of underdevelopment and to construct perspectives that can lead to solutions. I will provide an overview of the theoretical lens used in this essay to frame perspectives on these questions.

To promote a more cooperative and sustainable national nuclear security regime (NNSR), this paper characterizes the instances in which nuclear technology has assisted with states' development and the extent to which peripheral nations' positions in the NNSR have restricted their growth. In seeking to answer these questions, this essay will advocate for peripheral nation states to take advantage of emerging nuclear technologies if their individual conditions make it possible. Claiming that leaders of states in the NNSR in core and periphery nations should take the necessary steps to utilize nuclear energy. I will start by reviewing literature introducing various perspectives on the research questions, followed by my argument and research design, leading to the preliminary findings, and then into the broader contributions of this project.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The theoretical schools of thought, neoliberalism, and social constructivism will be used to provide a lens for understanding why states join regimes. Along with providing a perspective which attempts to explain underdevelopment. These schools of thought are needed to frame our understanding of why states would join institutions which directly affect energy policies.

Neoliberalism will frame the role of institutions, as well as the material incentives for joining regimes, followed by constructivism, which will provide a perspective on the non-material incentives which benefit a state for collaborating with regimes on top of norms, and a source for discerning why this underutilization exists. Integrating each approach and using a combination of these theories will assist me the most, as understanding each state's motives regarding non-proliferation is constricted if analyzed from one viewpoint. However, various authors' interpretations can lead to a more concrete evaluation of the motivations actors would have for their association in such regimes.

It is important to note that in this essay, nation states that will be referred to as peripheral nation states in this analysis, refers to the 134 states classified to be 'global South' nations by the Finance Center for South-South Cooperation (FCSSC), while the global North refers to the remaining 61 recognized countries.¹ Further, this paper assumes that institutions such as those built around the NNSR entangle these nations into treaties which may constrain their growth, causing these nations to become dependent on the more developed nations.

NEOLIBERALISM: MATERIAL BENEFITS AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS

Neoliberal theorists view states as rational actors, and institutions as a venue for diplomacy to occur between states, conceived in this paper to be "economic and political ideologies which aim to subject social and ecological affairs to capitalist market dynamics."² By developing norms built around cooperation, human rights, democracy, and international law, the theory suggests states' use of this formula will result in them prospering in what has come to be known as the neoliberal economic agenda.³

1. The Finance center for South-South Cooperation "Global South Countries (Group of 77 and China) - Partnership Program," The Finance Center for South-South Cooperation, (2023)

2. Murat Arsel and Bram Buscher "Changes and continuities in neoliberal conservation and market based environmental policy." *Development and Change*, (2012). 43, 53-78.

3. Jesse Craig Ribot, Antonio Magalhaes, and Stahis Panagides "Climate variability, climate change and social vulnerability in the semi-arid tropics." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1996); Neil Adger, Mick Kelly, and Nguyen Ninh "Living with environmental change: Social vulnerability, adaptation and resilience in Vietnam". London: Routledge (2001); T. Downing "Toward a vulnerability/adaptation science: lessons from famine early" (2003).

Norms that develop from the perspective of neoliberalism are based on the idea that institutions provide a means for this rule of law to be carried out. These norms are the consequences of the order they strive to implement.⁴

These norms develop from this “punishment and reward” apparatus these institutions implement. The NNSR is an example of a regime which was formed around a landmark treaty that institutions have used as scaffolding for providing or restricting states access to nuclear technology (Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons--NPT). Yet states are deterred from leaving it due to the threat of sanctions, which has been the international community’s reaction to withdrawal or opacity as is the cases of North Korea and India.⁵ Sanctions are a form of material punishment that the international community has used to punish non-compliance. These same actors use material rewards to ensure states remain a part of this regime with the understanding that they could potentially receive nuclear technology to be used for peaceful purposes.

The neoliberal economic agenda results in a need for compliance based on the verdict of the predominant actors establishing regimes. Because neoliberals capitulate under the realist assumption that the world is anarchic, and these rules and regulations are needed, it is important to understand who makes those rules and regulations. These ideologies of the neoliberal economic agenda are often based on the ways of thinking that resulted in the “winners” of the international community prospering. Even though there are material incentives to participating in regimes, institutional neoliberalism cannot assist us with explaining why states would join regimes and *not* utilize them to their fullest potential. Thus, a constructivist approach can assist us with discerning the reasons nation states would underutilize such treaties, along with provide us with a perspective on the non-material incentives states would have for participation in regimes and institutions.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: NORMS AND NON-MATERIAL INCENTIVES

Constructivism, in contrast to neo-liberalism, assumes that our understanding of the world is not objectively derived, and instead, is the result of socially defined concepts. According to Alexander Wendt, constructivism is a structural theory based on the assumption that actors are socially constructed. What came to be referred to as a state or national interest was the result of social identities of the actors.⁶ Constructivists understand the role of regimes and institutions as being entities which are the aggregate of rules and norms arising out of a shared need, knowledge, and interest.⁷

Regarding the underutilization of regimes, I am using social constructivism to discern what would entice a state to not take advantage of the incentives they were offered for joining a regime. It is evident that there are non-material incentives for complying with social norms to not take advantage of what is offered for participation with joining regimes. In the case of the NNSR, one example of a non-material

4. Joseph Stiglitz “Globalization and its discontents. New York” (2003); Diana Liverman & Silvan Vilas “Neoliberalism and the environment in Latin America.” *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, (2006). 31, 327–363; David Harvey “A brief history of neoliberalism” Oxford University Press (2007); D. Reed “Structural adjustment, the environment, and sustainable development.” London: Earthscan. (2009)

5. Dan Drollette, “Is It Time to Ditch the NPT?” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 8, 2019,

6. Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *American Political Science Review*, 88(2) (June 1994), 384-396.

7. Peter M. Hass, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Countries and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” *International Organizations*, 43(3) (Summer 1989), 378.

incentive would be the majority of states acting in favor of participation in this regime in order to credibly reduce the number of nuclear weapons. Thus, nations' compliance allows them to gain soft power benefits for their participation. This aspect of the treaty is also the reason actors are incentivized not to withdraw from this regime, even though there has been a lack of nuclear weapon states (NWS) provisions of peaceful nuclear technology being provided to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

Constructivism fills in the gap for understanding why states remain in regimes that may restrict their access to development opportunities in a lens which underscores the non-material incentives states have for continued participation in regimes. In the case of the NNSR, the non-material incentives that entice states to remain in this regime come from soft power gained through compliance. The act of remaining in a regime, and as a signatory of the NPT, overrides the immediate economic benefits they could possibly receive if they did not participate in this regime.

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

Overall, the literature introduced authors' perspectives that frame the research questions using the international relations theories of neo-liberalism and social constructivism to guide our understanding of the material and non-material incentives states would have for participating in regimes and institutions along with norms. Social constructivism, in particular, highlights reasons for states' continued participation in the NNSR.

By integrating these various theoretical schools of thought, one can reach a synthesis that explains underutilization of institutions built around nuclear fission and restrictions on periphery nations' development. The next step will be combining each theory's framework to support our comprehension of how and if nuclear energy can promote periphery nations' development and the conditions required for this to occur. From there, I will incorporate these perspectives to back my claim that nation states should develop long-term plans to cooperate and take advantage of emerging peaceful nuclear technologies to support periphery nations' growth.

ARGUMENT

The extent to which an underutilization of institutions has restricted periphery nations' development originates from the limitations to employ forms of energy that could assist with their development. Nuclear energy use is heavily constrained by the NNSR, and the institutions constructed around this regime, primarily through the material and non-material incentives that entice nation states to remain in this regime and its corresponding institutions. I argue that rather than a withdrawal from the NNSR due to these restrictions, NNWS states instead take advantage of the benefits offered as a part of their participation in this regime. States should cooperate to construct long-term plans prioritizing the development of emerging technologies, overcoming infrastructural and economic barriers which have prevented periphery nations from using peaceful nuclear energy. Next, I will identify the conditions underdevelopment which have made it difficult to utilize nuclear energy in the past. Then I will discuss possible avenues towards overcoming those difficulties through the implementation of emerging technologies such as small or advanced modular reactors (SMRs).

First, development is conceptualized in this essay as nations that fall under the identification criteria and indicators which the FCSSC use to classify developing nations. This is because they are an organization in special consultative status with the United Nations, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which does not have a specified list of core and periphery nations like the FCSSC does. However, it does have

a credible application of indicators which can be used to measure development through the observation of a nation's positions in relation to their gross national income (GNI), and Human assets index (HAI).⁸ I will be using GNI, poverty rates, political stability, and the absence of violence or terrorism to measure development.

There are tangible effects that international agreements and peaceful nuclear proliferation have on development. By approaching them based on the key technologies, agreements, and policies surrounding peaceful nuclear proliferation that directly affect development, their effects are observed through the implementation of empirical observations.

I propose that emerging technologies, and a utilization of international agreements will lead towards development because the emerging technologies being analyzed provide more flexibility. This can overcome various obstacles which deterred the implementation of peaceful nuclear technologies in periphery nations due to the difficulties their applications entailed, such as difficulties stemming from infrastructural risk, weapon proliferation risk, and economic barriers. My hypothesis is that the more these independent variables (peaceful nuclear emerging technologies, and a utilization of international agreements) increase, so, too, will the level of development increase for a nation state, through the use of pre-existing institutional frameworks to safely implement these emerging technologies.

RESEARCH DESIGN

I will be comparing periphery nations with similar backgrounds, based on geographical and cultural similarities. However, due to the small case study size because of the small experimental group of periphery nations which use nuclear energy, there are limitations. The four nations which fit most closely into these categories based on these similarities are the following—Angola and South Africa, and Georgia and Armenia. Two periphery nations who have implemented nuclear energy to assist with their development have been chosen. They will be compared to two periphery nations who have not, in spite of cultural and geographical similarities. South Africa and Armenia, which have proliferated towards developing peaceful nuclear technologies share these similarities with their counterparts Angola and Georgia.

The time periods we will be evaluating using comparative case studies will be a twenty-year period starting from the year (2000) and ending in the year (2020). This period is the duration in which these nations had reached a period of general sustainability in comparison to other time periods, which provides a more accurate data set to survey. By observing these states' political stability rates, and GNI between this temporal period, I seek to prove that key emerging nuclear technologies can be beneficial to periphery states. Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) may help overcome infrastructural, security, transportation, and economic barriers associated with the previous implementation of nuclear technologies to assist periphery nations. I will use data sets from the World Bank which have measured these differences between these time periods. Then, I will make an observation based on the data by investigating the rate of increase or decrease using the collected data.

8. Department of Economic and Social Affairs "Economic Analysis- LDC Identification Criteria & Indicators" The United Nations (2024).

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

GROSS NATIONAL INCOME (GNI)

For the data sets, the rate of increase and decrease was compared along with an observation of the general change over time during these time periods. Beginning with GNI, the South Africa case proved that South Africa was better off with nuclear energy based on this measurement, significantly. Although Angola had a significantly better rate of increase in comparison, South Africa is significantly better off when comparing the two based on their gross national income. South Africa had retrieved their nuclear energy prior to the start of this temporal period, having had received it in 1984.⁹ On the contrary, in the case of Armenia in comparison to Georgia, Armenia had a better rate of increase yet only a minuscule overall advantage. The two nation states between this period had been extremely adjacent. However, Armenia by the year 2020 had been better off than Georgia. Armenia achieved nuclear energy in 1976.¹⁰ In the case of GNI, periphery nations that do use nuclear energy are better off. As both nation states which proliferated towards utilizing peaceful nuclear technologies were better off than their counterparts at the end of the chosen period.¹¹

GNI PER CAPITA, ATLAS METHOD (CURRENT USD)

Country	Year		GNI % Rate of Increase/Decrease
	2000	2020	
South Africa	-3,380	-6,090	(+85,67%)
Angola	-360	-1,740	(+383,3%)
Armenia	-640	-4,420	(+590,62%)
Georgia	-790	-6,090	(+429,24%)

POLITICAL STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE/TERRORISM

Political stability had provided evidence for South Africa having higher levels of political stability in comparison to their counterpart Angola. While Angola had a significantly higher rate of increase between this period, South Africa has consistently been better off within this chosen temporal time frame than Angola. In the comparison between Armenia and Georgia, while Georgia had a lower rate of stability in comparison to Armenia between this period by the year 2020, the results showed Georgia being better off than Armenia, both by their rate of increase and their placement of the scale measuring political stability. In using political stability as a measurement, while South Africa proved to support the use of nuclear energy for

9. Nkosi Nomsa Phindile. "South African attitudes about nuclear power: The case of the nuclear energy expansion." International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy (2021).

10. World Nuclear Association. "Review of Armenia." World Nuclear Association. 2016.

11. World Bank "GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)" The world bank group (2024) <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2020&locations=ZA-AO&start=2000>

peripheral nations, Armenia is an outlier because Georgia is better off in both their rates of increase and overall rates.¹²

POLITICAL STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE/TERRORISM

Country	Year		% Rate of Increase/Decrease
	2000	2020	
South Africa	-37,57	-39,62	(+3,4%)
Angola	-1,59	-26,89	(+1591,39%)
Armenia	-25,93	-20,28	(-21,78%)
Georgia	-20,63	-22,02	(+60,05%)

OVERVIEW

In comparing GNI and political stability rates as indicators to measure peripheral development, there are several limitations. The nation states analyzed had limited amounts of MWE (megawatt electric) energy received from the reactors, causing it to be difficult to gauge how beneficial its application of these peaceful nuclear technologies truly affected the chosen indicators analyzed. Further, each nation has other factors which affect the indicators besides nuclear energy such as the nation’s individual history affecting these chosen indicators.

Yet, a strength of this method was allowing us to contextualize how peripheral states benefit from the utilization of nuclear technology to assist with their development with implications as to how nuclear technology may lead to improvements in certain sectors. As it was evident, for most indicators, peripheral nations which utilized nuclear energy had been better off than their counterparts who did not in nearly every circumstance.

CONCLUSION

With nation states internationally seeking alternatives to fossil fuels, nuclear energy should be prioritized as an alternative for periphery nations. Its use and implementation in these states gradually could serve as a transition which would also strengthen the NNSR and reduce the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, reassuring NNWS that their guarantees under article IV and V of the NPT would be met. Article IV states that it is the inalienable right of each nation to “develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” Article V states that the charge to such parties for the devices would be “as low as possible” and “exclude any charge for research and development.” Even though this article was ultimately ignored due to peaceful nuclear experiments being economically unrealistic, its implementation into

12. Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project,” The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, 2021, <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>.

the treaty was used to incentivize nations into joining. Yet ultimately, underutilization of this article means that most nations do not see any of the benefits offered by article V.¹³ This further shows why nations in the NNWS need assurances which would occur through a collaborative process of cooperating with the NNSR nations permitted to distribute peaceful nuclear technologies.¹⁴ SMR technology is a key example of emerging technologies that can overcome limitations, making nuclear energy an unrealistic option for most developing nations. There must be a construction of long-term plans that make use of them to possibly provide periphery nations with this alternative option of energy. Prioritization of developing SMRs, envisioned to require limited on-site preparation, could substantially reduce the lengthy construction times that are typical of the larger units.

Furthermore, SMRs provide simplicity of design, enhanced safety features, the economics and quality afforded by factory production, and more flexibility (financing, siting, sizing, and end use applications) compared to larger nuclear power plants. Additional modules can be added incrementally as demand for energy increases. Some models only require 1/10th of the materials used in comparison to traditional reactors. Other benefits of these models stem from their ability to use a reduced amount of uranium (reducing the security risk of proliferation) and being able to be employed where pre-existing energy infrastructures existed.¹⁵

Overall, the shift of periphery nation states' use of nuclear energy cannot nor should be an immediate one. However, it is one that, with cooperation and a utilization of previous institutions, can lead towards a shift which delivers energy where it is needed and strengthens the NNSR. In doing so, these long-term plans can assist the day-to-day lives of thousands of individuals within these developing nations while simultaneously assisting with efforts of non-proliferation. Thus, it is up to leaders of all nations to cooperate towards making a world where more nations are better off due to the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

13. In the original development of this research, the interpretation of Article V assumed that "peaceful nuclear explosions," referred to the reactions which occurred within nuclear reactors. However, it was discovered that this was alternatively referring to a proposed application of the NPT when the treaty was originally being ratified in 1970 that sought to utilize nuclear explosions for construction and other peaceful means. This is not indicated in the treaty itself. This was ultimately never taken into serious consideration because of radiation, cost, and proliferation risk associated. It has remained as, from my perspective, it is still an applicable means of offering material incentives to participate in the NNSR, one which is often overlooked and scrutinized even though it was originally intended to act towards incentivizing NNWS into joining the NNSR.

14. United Nations "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA." United Nations, July 1, 1968.

15. World Bank. "GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (current US\$)." The World Bank Group (2024). <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2020&locations=ZA AO&start=2000>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adger, W. Neil, Kelly P., and Nguyen N., "Living with Environmental Change: Social Vulnerability, Adaptation and Resilience in Vietnam." *Routledge*, (2001).
- Murat A., and Büscher B. "Nature™ Inc.: Changes and Continuities in Neoliberal Conservation and Market-based Environmental Policy." *Development and Change* 43 (2012): 53–78.
- James A. "Dependence Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities in Development Studies." *International Organization, International Political Economy*, pp. 49–64.
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "Economic Analysis- LDC Identification Criteria & Indicators." *The United Nations* (2024).
- Dougherty, J., and Pfaltzgraff R. "Contending Theories of International Relations: Fifth Edition." *Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.*, (2001).
- Downing, T. "Toward a Vulnerability/Adaptation Science: Lessons from Famine Early Warning and Food Security." *In Climate Change Adaptive Capacity and Development. Imperial College Press*, (2003).
- Drollette, D. "Is It Time to Ditch the NPT?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (September 8, 2019).
- Haas, P. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Countries and Mediterranean Pollution Control." *International Organizations* 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 378.
- Harvey, D. "A Brief History of Neoliberalism." *Oxford University Press*, (2007).
- Liverman, D., and Vilas S. "Neoliberalism and the Environment in Latin America." *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 31 (2006): 327–363.
- Nkosi, N. "South African Attitudes about Nuclear Power: The Case of the Nuclear Energy Expansion." *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy* (2021).
- Murat A., and Büscher B. "Nature™ Inc.: Changes and Continuities in Neoliberal Conservation and Market-based Environmental Policy." *Development and Change* 43 (2012): 53–78.
- Reed, D. "Structural Adjustment, the Environment, and Sustainable Development." *Earthscan*, (2009).
- Ribot, J., Magalhaes A., and Panagides S. "Climate Variability, Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the Semi-arid Tropics." *Cambridge University Press*, (1996).
- Rowinski, Karol M., White T., and Zhao J. "Small and Medium-sized Reactors (SMR): A Review of Technology." *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 44 (2015): 643–656.
- Stiglitz, J. "Globalization and Its Discontents." *W. W. Norton*, (2003).
- Streeck, W. "How to Study Contemporary Capitalism?" *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes De Sociologie* 53, no. 1 (2012): 1–28. doi:10.1017/S000397561200001X.
- United Nations Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA. *United Nations*, (July 1, 1968).
- Wendt, A. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384–396.
- World Bank. "GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (current US\$)." *The World Bank Group*. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2020&locations=ZA>
- World Bank. "Poverty Headcount Ratio at \$2.15 a Day (2017 PPP) (% of Population)." *The World Bank Group*. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?end=2020&locations=AM GE&start=2000>.
- World Bank. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project." *The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project*, 2021. <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>.
- World Nuclear Association. "Nuclear Power in Armenia" - *World Nuclear Association*.
- World Bank. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project." *The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project*, 2021. <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>.