South America's identity: a new path of development?

A thesis submitted to the faculty of

San Francisco State University in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in

International Relations

by

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# CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read South America's identity: a new path of development? by Marcos Sebastian Scauso, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Arts in International Relations at San Francisco State University.

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# Abstract:

This research sought to analyze the characteristics of the current processes of regional formation in South America. The guiding hypothesis was that, since the beginning of the 2000s, regional integration in South America has been promoted most successfully by the states that have the political involvement of the government, sovereignty, and autonomy as central features of their identity. This hypothesis was controlled during a rigorous process of observation that provided an understanding of the main characteristics of the current South American politics of identity and their institutionalization around the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). In order to achieve this goal, the research described the emerging process of regional integration through the analysis of the data obtained with the ontological combination of different constructivist methodologies. These results described empirically the interaction between indigenous, moderate, socialist, and open regional practices throughout the first decade of the 2000s in South America.

I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis

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Chair, Thesis Committee Date

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

* ABC……………...Tratado Regional de Argentina, Brasil, y Chile (Regional treaty of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile)
* ALADI…………...Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (Latin American Association of Integration)
* ALALC………….. Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (Latin American Association of Free Trade)
* ALBA…………….Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance of the People for our America)
* APEC……………...Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
* CAIO……………... Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas (Andean Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations)
* CAN………………Comunidad Andina de Naciones (Andean Community of Nations)
* CELAC……………Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States)
* CEPAL…………… Comisión Económica Para América Latina (Economic Commission for Latin America)
* CLOC…………….. Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo (Latin American Coordinator of Peasant Organizations)
* CONAIE…………. Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Ecuadorian Confederation of Indigenous Nations)
* ECUARUNARI….. Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador (Ecuadorian Confederation of the people of Kichwa nationality)
* EU…………………European Union
* FARC…………….. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Army of Colombia)
* FTA’s…………….. Free Trade Areas
* FTAA…………….. Free Trade Area of the Americas
* IMF………………. International Monetary Fund
* MAS……………… Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism)
* MERCOSUR……... Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South)
* MST……………… Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Worker’s Movement)
* OAS……………… Organization of American States
* ONIC……………... Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (National Organization of the Indigenous people of Colombia)
* PT……………….... Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado do Brasil (Socialist Party of United Workers of Brazil)
* SACU…………….. Southern Africa Costumes Union
* TIPNIS…………… Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isidoro Secure (Indigenous Territory, National Park Isidoro Secure)
* UNASUR………… Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas (South American Union of Nations)
* WB……………….. World Bank
* WTO……………... World Trade Organization

# Chapter I

## Introduction

The last three decades have witnessed a resurgence of regionalism in different parts of the world. Its importance rises as more countries view it as a platform of negotiation in international fora or as a tool for global insertion. In South America, many new institutions and treaties started emerging since the early 2000s. Their characteristics seemed different than past projects and their ambitions went beyond sub-regional liberalization. In many cases, this phenomenon was observed through institutionalist lenses of regionalism, which tended to share a pessimistic bias that emerged from the objective imposition of traditional structures to new formations. In other cases, regionalism was analyzed within the theoretical inertia of concepts that belonged to the 1990s. Here, authors viewed the region as still dominated by open regionalism. This led their observations away from the new post-liberal emergences. Finally, other research reconstructed the processes of constitution through historical analyses of regionalism in South America. These approaches understood many of the endogenous characteristics of the new form of integration. The methodology utilized in most historical cases, however, was not systematic. Thus, social, peasant, and indigenous movements were ignored. In contrast, this research sought to understand the new formations accounting for all the main subjects interacting in the process of emergence of UNASUR. It also sought to construct a systematic methodology to analyze the symbolic practices that defined the region. This approach thus adapted the theoretical tools necessary to cope with the internal characteristics of the different regional projects and their relationship at the same time. As a result, the research answered the following questions: Was there a new regional identity emerging in South America since the early 2000s? What were its characteristics and how did it emerge?

In the description of this emergence of a new South American identity in UNASUR, the research provided important information about the different definitions of the region, the diverse boundaries established by subjects, the regional perception of situations that increased the distance with the United States in the first decade of the 2000s, the weaknesses and strengths of regional projects, and an overall understanding of the endogenous logic of development under the new regional ideas of integration. This was achieved by the analysis of the identity politics of the region as the basis for the creation of new institutions. Thus, regionalism was understood as a result of interactions amongst new emerging identities that defined South America. Additionally, identity was understood through the concept of narratives, which were stories about the region; autobiographies that defined boundaries for a particular territory based on a notion of the “self” that went from a past genesis to a future of prosperity. This definition of the “self” separated the region from “others,” which could be in relationships of cooperation, competition, opposition, similarity, etc. This concept was the theoretical basis that guided the observation in the construction of symbolic practices, which were accounted as fluxes of actions subjectively connected by their insertion into the overall narrative. This process of connection was called emplotment and it was the empirical component that created the regional practices. Additionally, the actors that engaged within one practice formed a subject of regionalism. Moreover, as a result of this interaction of subjects, the research was able to re-construct the matrix of practices that constituted the regional structure. This accounted for both a master narrative that included all the subjects participating in the contests for regionalism and the complex matrix of practices.

Overall, the study entailed an analysis of perceptions and actions of regionalism, in which the former appeared as the reason sine qua non for the latter. However, the idea of emplotment established an empirical connection for this assumption and allowed the research to understand the subjective insertion of actions into the definition of identities through narratives. The main limitations of this approach emerged from the complexity of the phenomenon researched. For example, even though the guided-inductive steps of observation sought to synthesize all the narratives defining the region, which were the basis of the reconstruction of the main subjects interacting, not all actors were included in the empirical processes of observation. Within each subject, many actors could have been observed and the level of complexity could have driven the observation all the way down to the individual. I chose, however, to concentrate in key actors that shaped the interaction of practices that created UNASUR. All in all, I consider that all the subjects of regionalism were included, but much of the internal complexity of each subject was left for future research. Another limitation for this research was the timeframe chosen for the empirical observation, which went from 1999 to 2011. This selection of years was based, on the one hand, on the preliminary observation of speeches and treaties for the region and, on the other hand, on the discussion established with other authors. The main goal of this selection was to observe the transformation of the regional conception in South America and the constitution of UNASUR within this notion.

In order to achieve the aforementioned goals, the research first defined regionalism and discussed some of the current approaches of this phenomenon in South America. This section accounted for Latin American, European, and North American Literature. Second, Chapter III included a discussion of the different definitions of identity and practices. It then defined the concepts and the ontology that framed the methodology utilized to approach the research question posited earlier. This methodology included the guided-inductive observation of narratives, the re-construction of practices, and the analysis of regional structures. Third, Chapter IV illustrated the findings of the analysis of data, which described each existing narrative for South America, traced the engagement of several actors within the different subjects that contested the definition of the region, tracked the flux of actions emplotted within each practice, and described the matrix of practices that constituted the structures of regionalism in 2011. Finally, Chapter V discussed some of the conclusions of the research and described some of its limitations in more detail.

# Chapter II

## Different approaches of regionalism and identity politics

In this chapter, I intended to define regionalism and analyze some of the most salient approaches of this phenomenon in South America. Alongside this discussion, I considered some of the characteristics of regional formations in South America, the different methodological perspectives chosen by authors to observe this phenomenon and the voids in current literature from South American, European, and North American scholars. In order to achieve these goals, I separated the chapter into six sections that briefly discussed the history of regionalism in South America since the 1800s, the definition of regionalism, the South American context of the 1990s, the institutional view of regionalism, historical approaches of these formations, and the emerging discussions of identity, respectively.

## Regionalism in South America before the 1990s

Unionism and regionalism are not new phenomena in Latin America. Many projects emerged in different periods since the declaration of independence. Some of these formations were present as antecedents or parts of the regional genesis in the narratives interacting around UNASUR. It was thus important to provide a brief historic summary of regionalism in South America to understand in more depth the practices that shaped this institution.

Since the early 1800s, the dream of a South America united has been present in the discourses of presidents and politicians.[[1]](#footnote-1) The political projects proposed for the region throughout time, however, had diverse goals and worldviews. In this sense, César Augusto Bermúdez Torres asserted, “Since the period of independence, two different concepts have framed the struggle for integration. On the one hand, ‘Pan Americanism,’ which derives from the term Pan America, forged in the United States in 1889. On the other hand, integration is framed by the idea of ‘Latin Americanism,’ which derives from the term "Latin American" and was forged in 1836 in France.”[[2]](#footnote-2) According to the author, these terms described the two dominant tendencies in the proposals of regional integration in Latin America. The former entailed the influence of the United States in the region, which utilized its military and political control ultimately to favor its economic expansion.[[3]](#footnote-3) The latter included projects that promoted a deeper form of integration and created boundaries within the Southern region, thus excluding the United States.[[4]](#footnote-4) This type of integration had as a main goal the autonomy of the region, which was considered a key tool for development.[[5]](#footnote-5)

One of the first projects of integration in South America was the *Gran Colombia*, which was created in 1819 and included present day Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. This formation was followed by Simón Bolívar’s proposal to build the *Antifictiónico* Congress of Panama in 1826. The latter sought to create a federation, which included all the new nations of South America.[[6]](#footnote-6) In both cases, the members sought to increase their autonomy by creating stronger states *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. For example, “Simón Bolívar promoted the emergence of an extended nationality, united by a strong, overarching and centralized power for the region. (…) Meanwhile the United States started advocating the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ in 1823,”[[7]](#footnote-7) which entailed a focus in Latin America as an area of interest for market expansion. According to Lucila Melendi, Simón Bolívar saw the union of all nations in South America as the only feasible path for development, but all the civil wars and domestic conflicts impeded further integration.[[8]](#footnote-8) At the same time, San Martín was fighting the Spanish in South America in order to allow the nascent nations to achieve their sovereignty and independence. “In South America, San Martín commanded the Andes army with a clear view of the geopolitical conflict. His legacy is the South American boundary, which excludes the rest of Latin America and North America. He also thought that the most important element for development was liberty and sovereignty, which implied the importance of union among neighbor countries.”[[9]](#footnote-9) The aforementioned authors considered these as some of the roots of the ‘Latin Americanist’ idea of integration.

In 1847, the countries of South America agreed to sign the Confederation Treaty in the First Summit of Lima (Primer Congreso de Lima), which was urged by the Spanish and British threat of invasion in Ecuador.[[10]](#footnote-10) The nations of the Southern region then singed the Treaty of Peace and Union in the Second Summit of Lima in 1864. Notwithstanding, neither one of these initiatives achieved the goals that the members were hoping to reach.[[11]](#footnote-11) Later, in 1904, the United States began expanding as a new world player. This translated into the promotion of the Pan-American Union in the continent.[[12]](#footnote-12) Based on the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt proclaimed that “America was for the Americans and; therefore, any European intervention was considered from thereon as a hostile act towards the United States.”[[13]](#footnote-13) This declaration gave the United States the role of protector and guarantor of security in the region, which promoted the Pan-American ideology of regionalism. This initiative failed due to “the differences in the criteria of integration among the most important countries of the Americas and the apogee of Imperialism by the United States (reflected by the artificial creation of Panama).”[[14]](#footnote-14) However, in 1948, the United States successfully promoted the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in order to protect the continent from a new enemy, namely communism. This new formation nourished the idea of “Inter Americanism,” which was intended to replace the older and now delegitimized term of Pan-Americanism.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Nevertheless, in that same year, the United Nations created the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), which sought again to promote the idea of Latin Americanism and autonomy for the region. This organization saw integration as a key tool for development, which would be reached with autonomy and industrialization.[[16]](#footnote-16) In this sense, “… Raúl Prebisch, the great founder of CEPAL’s economic theory, thought that planned industrialization was the path to leave underdevelopment. (…) After a few years, however, Prebisch realized that industrialization had exhausted its possibilities under import substitution for internal markets in the most developed countries of Latin America. He therefore thought it was necessary to promote a more complex form of industrialization with intermediate goods, capital, and domestic consumption, which entailed expanded regional markets.”[[17]](#footnote-17) This was the theoretical basis that contributed to the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (Asociación Latino Americana de Libre Comercio –ALALC), in 1960. “The Treaty of Montevideo in 1960 originated this South American Free Trade Area. Its main goals were incrementing trade in the region and finding ways of cooperation without the United States presence.”[[18]](#footnote-18)

Before the ALALC, Juán Domingo Perón also proposed in 1953 the ABC treaty (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), which was the “basic condition for a dynamic union in South America.”[[19]](#footnote-19) This project also sought to protect the region and its autonomy. Nonetheless, this project did not fulfill its goals and the ALALC expanded more rapidly. According to María Esther Morales Fajardo, the latter had many internal problems such as “… the lack of mechanisms to agree on common external tariffs; there were no policies encouraging the creation of common macro-economic policies; etc.”[[20]](#footnote-20) In 1967, the members of ALALC tried to fix some of these issues and allowed the creation of sub-regional integration. Consequently, the Andean Pact (Pacto Andino) was signed in 1969 between Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela also signed the treaty in 1973. This regional formation was able to achieve many goals such as a common external tariff and more coordination in trade, industry, culture, and education programs. They also shaped a clear protectionist policy for regional investors and industrialization programs.[[21]](#footnote-21) Similar to ALALC, the Andean Pact had a very developmental program, but in the 1970s these projects started to have several problems.[[22]](#footnote-22) According to Pizarro, national interests started to dominate and regional projects were not successful.[[23]](#footnote-23) On the other hand, Torres affirmed that most of the dictatorships that took place in South America during the 1970s and 1980s had neoliberal ideologies that opposed the developmental agenda.[[24]](#footnote-24) Additionally, Fajardo asseverated that the internal problems of ALALC led to the creation of the Latin American Association of Integration (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración – ALADI) in 1980. This initiative promoted the creation of bilateral treaties and was able to increase inter-regional trade.[[25]](#footnote-25)

Many external and internal problems arose for these strategies of integration, weakening the developmental projects that were in the center of these regional views. However, one of the strongest factors, according to these authors, was the emergence of neoliberalism in the region. By the 1970s, many countries in Latin America had problems of hyperinflation and increasing debts, which pushed most states to seek loans from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “Most countries were forced to apply anti-inflation adjustments and structural reforms, which transformed the model of development radically.”[[26]](#footnote-26) In this context, liberalization and multilateralism dominated the agenda of the region. This created a new form of integration that was going to be applied most successfully in the 1990s, namely open regionalism.[[27]](#footnote-27) This type of regional formation was described in one of the next sections of this chapter, but it was important here to notice a few of the key components of regionalism in South America since the independence period. First, it was important for this research to notice that integration and unionism appeared since the early stages of the South American nations as tools that reinforced autonomy and sovereignty. In the 1950s and 1960s, autonomy also appeared as a key element for development under protectionist and developmental strategies. Second, two of the fathers of South American independence (San Martín and Simón Bolívar) left a legacy of ideas of unionism and boundaries that defined South America within one identity. This was important to understand the notions of regional genesis present in the current narratives of regionalism around UNASUR. Third, the foreign policy of the United States seemed to promote a continental definition, which established this country as the protector of the region. On the contrary, the ‘Latin Americanist’ forms of integration opposed this influence and sought to develop autonomously. This classification of integration delineated by César Augusto Bermúdez Torres was helpful understanding the relationship between the narratives of the United States and UNASUR.

## Regionalism as a multidimensional phenomenon

According to Andrew Hurrell,[[28]](#footnote-28) regionalism takes many different shapes around the world and it has become increasingly complex since the expansion of globalization in the 1990s. In order to define this phenomenon Hurrell delineated five salient characteristics, which I utilized to describe different authors who have particular lenses while approaching regionalism in South America. This characterization of the different approaches of South American regionalism defined systematically the concentrations of current research and the voids in the literature, which, in exchange, demonstrated the importance of further research of regional identity.

According to Hurrell, the first type of phenomena understood as regionalism was called regionalization, which implied “...autonomous economic processes which lead to higher levels of economic interdependence within a geographical area and the rest of the world. Although seldom unaffected by state policy, the most important driving forces for economic regionalization come from markets, from private trade and investment flows, and from the policies and decisions of companies.”[[29]](#footnote-29) The second type of regionalist strategy included state-promoted economic integration. In this case, states enact policies that decrease trade barriers and increase economic liberalization. Third, “A great deal of regionalist activity involves the negotiation and construction of inter-state or inter-governmental agreements or regimes. Such cooperation can be formal or informal, and high levels of institutionalization are no guarantee of either effectiveness or political importance.”[[30]](#footnote-30) This particular type of integration included a great variety of agreements for cooperation, solidarity, and coordination of foreign policy. Fourth, Hurrell argues that in different areas of the world, there was an emerging awareness of “belonging to a particular community, (which) can rest on internal factors, often defined in terms of common culture, history, religious traditions.”[[31]](#footnote-31) This particular element of regionalism was the center of my focus and was defined more in detail below. Finally, the fifth characteristic of regionalism was the level of cohesion between different members of a formation with any of the previously mentioned traits. The author asserted, “Cohesion can be understood in two senses: (a) when a region plays a defining role in the relations between the states (and other major actors) of that region and of the rest of the world; and (b) when the region forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues.”[[32]](#footnote-32)

When studying the cases of regional formation in South America, authors have concentrated in either one of these elements or in particular combinations. As Adrián Bonilla mentioned, “The texts published about regionalism are heterogeneous, given that the subject of new regionalism in South America has not yet been consolidated theoretically, or as a specific field of empirical research.”[[33]](#footnote-33) Different contexts and focuses thus broach diverse conclusions about regionalism in South America. The following chapters showed some of these approaches and their differences.

The first group of studies concentrated on the context of the 1990s. They tended to focus on regionalization and state-driven economic integration in South America. The second group of authors could be called institutionalists given their focus on the objectives, characteristics, and strengths and weaknesses of regional institutions during the 2000s. Specifically, institutionalism tended to focus mostly on inter-state cooperation, state-driven economic integration, and the level of cohesion of the region. The third group of authors analyzed here, accounted for the historical processes of formation of these institutions. These scholars focused their observations mostly on the official agreements of different countries in South America and their shared diplomatic history. They thus analyzed inter-state cooperation, state driven economic integration, and their level of cohesion in the historical path of emergence. Finally, the fourth orientation included authors that addressed identity as a key component of regional formations.

In the following paragraphs, I described the characteristics of each one of these tendencies in the study of South American regionalism. This shined light on the main aspects of the phenomenon in question and the voids in current literature, which delineated the requirements for this research.

## 1990s open regionalism: state-driven economic integration or market-led regionalization

According to key authors, South America was dominated by strategies of open regionalism during the 1990s. “Open Regionalism inspired the creation and redefinition of sub-regional integration schemes such as the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Group of Three, the System of Central American Integration, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).”[[34]](#footnote-34) This type of regionalism involved economic processes of integration, where trade barriers were decreased under different institutions or agreements. Nicola Phillips, for example, asserted the following: “Latin America has conformed broadly with a model of open regionalism, predicated on a perception of the merits of unilateral trade liberalization for increased and more effective participation in the global economy.”[[35]](#footnote-35) These perspectives and analyses were very important to understand the antecedents of current regional strategies as well as the continuous foreign policy tendency of the United States in the region. Many authors, however, affirmed that in the first decade of the 2000s, new regional strategies started to emerge. Some of the analyses focusing exclusively in state-driven economic integration and market-led regionalization ignored these phenomena. Gián Luca Gardini, for example, focused on MERCOSUR and observed the weaknesses of regional strategies in South America. At the same time, he did not observe all the presidential summits that took place in the region since 2000, leading eventually to the ratification of UNASUR.[[36]](#footnote-36) Nicola Phillips took it a step further and in 2003, while describing the United States-led FTAA, claimed that “the only feasible counterweight to this dominance is collective action, and the only feasible alternative pole is that represented by MERCOSUR (or, more specifically, by Brazil) given that Venezuela and Canada are, as we have seen, constrained by a far greater economic dependence on the US. What this has meant is that progressively the FTAA process has crystallized as a negotiation among blocs.”[[37]](#footnote-37) By that year, two important summits had taken place in South America: the First Presidential Summit of South America in 2000 and the Second South American Presidential Summit in 2002. In both cases there were official statements opposing United States policy. One of the most controversial cases could be observed in the South American critique of subsidies for farming sectors in the United States.[[38]](#footnote-38) In that same year, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez affirmed the following: “A little while ago, in our continent, there was terrible news that froze our blood: the proposal of finishing the FTAA by 2003. But Venezuela said: No, impossible! Brazil said no, impossible! And we were able to defeat this project.”[[39]](#footnote-39) Paulo Vizentini and Marianne Wiesebron seemed to follow this view as well. Their book “Free Trade for the Americas?” analyzed the FTAA, its regional and global implications, and the possible characteristics that it would acquire in the near future.[[40]](#footnote-40) When approaching this regional formation, they observed that it was a United States-led strategy for world hegemony and only Brazil (with MERCOSUR) appeared as a possible pole of resistance. Overall, these authors described a very important phenomenon that was dominant in the 1990s. Nonetheless, it was necessary to observe whether it was still just as dominant in the 2000s. Furthermore, it was important to understand whether MERCOSUR was the only project resisting the FTAA or acting as a bloc of negotiation in the international fora. Overall, what characteristics did regionalism attain during the 2000s?

Many studies have already answered these questions. It appears most agree that the first decade of the 2000s saw the emergence of a new type of regional project and the partial decline of open regionalism. In this sense, José Antonio Sanahuja stated the following: “The decade of the 1990s brought the model of open regionalism to South America, which was compatible with the policies of free trade promoted by the Washington Consensus. This model was in place until the first decade of the 2000s and it defined a relatively coherent form of integration in the region. However, this era entered a crisis around the first decade of the 2000s because of its inherent limitations as a strategy of only trade liberalization and the explicit rejection by the leftish governments.”[[41]](#footnote-41) Furthermore, “...another form of regionalism has been flourishing since 2004, described by some as post-liberal.”[[42]](#footnote-42) In this research, I described the new emergence of integration as the chapters developed. It was important to note, however, that Nicola Philips, Gián Luca Gardini, Paulo Vizentini, and Marianne Wiesebron fell into a theoretical and methodological inertia that pushed them to focus almost exclusively on the regional formations of the 1990s. In this extrapolation of 1990s characteristics of regionalism to the 2000s, the authors viewed the post-liberal forms of integration as unimportant.

One of the characteristics imposed theoretically to the 2000s by Nicola Phillips, for example, was the market-led rationale of regionalism.[[43]](#footnote-43) In this sense, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarāes affirmed the following: “the FTAA will create one single market and economic space in the Western hemisphere in which the largest multinational corporations of the world and the relatively modest local companies will compete under the same rules.”[[44]](#footnote-44) Overall, regionalism seemed to emphasize in the 1990s and early 2000s the goal of trade liberalization. Nonetheless, in the first decade of the 2000s, the political scenario of South America seemed to change and the state was located in the center of regional discussions again.[[45]](#footnote-45) The re-appearance of the state in South American regionalism was one of the phenomena, which these authors missed while focusing still on the FTAA and MERCOSUR. Even Gián Luca Gardini, who argued that MERCOSUR was originally oriented to the protection of the democracies of the region, did not observe that this institution started to become part of a bigger project led by Brazil to consolidate the region under UNASUR. In contrast, Eric Joseph Crosbie noticed, “By 2003 MERCOSUR began to recover and more importantly began to deepen its integration in more areas than just economic trade. MERCOSUR began to incorporate and progressively expand the integration project to include more areas including energy, security, infrastructure, and most importantly social advancements to the integration process requiring integration theorists to reevaluate the situation in MERCOSUR.”[[46]](#footnote-46) This idea of the return of the state was further analyzed in other chapters, but it was important to notice here the relevance of open observation to comprehend the new characteristics of emerging phenomena.

In general, these analyses of open regionalism had excellent descriptions of the strategy of regional liberalization for global insertion. It was necessary, nevertheless, to observe the modifications in the political scenario that started to rise in the early 2000s and became stronger a few years later. In this sense, José Sanahuja stated that one of the main characteristics of the new post-liberal regional formations was that state actors tended to have a much bigger role *vis-à-vis* private firms and market forces.[[47]](#footnote-47) Analogously, Adrián Bonilla asserted, “A third factor for the emergence of UNASUR, and for the more general redefinition of the South American view on regionalism has been the return of the state...”[[48]](#footnote-48) This was easily observable in the regional idea of sustainable development, which placed the state in this position.[[49]](#footnote-49) This notion connected the solution of many regional issues - such as inequality, poverty, and asymmetry of development - to the strengthening of the state's sovereignty. It was thus no longer the market the one that needed autonomy. Instead, states faced these problems and needed sovereignty to gain the strength necessary to solve issues. In addition, among many plans of action to regulate different economic sectors, UNASUR also signed the protocol of democracy in the region. This agreement supported the constitutional governments of the region and allowed UNASUR to apply sanctions in the case of a breach against democracy.[[50]](#footnote-50)

In summary, the characteristics of regional strategies in South America during the first decade of the 2000s needed to be described in detail, accounting for the innovative qualities that were emerging. On the contrary, the aforementioned view under the market-led rationale of regionalism was related to the neoliberal character, which this phenomenon took during the 1990s.[[51]](#footnote-51) In this sense, Carlos Alberto Chavez García observed, “South America is going through a period of intense political, ideological, economic and social transformations, which is favored by the decline of the neoliberal agenda and the emergence of governments with progressive platforms.”[[52]](#footnote-52) Additionally, José Antonio Sanahuja mentioned, “Many of these aspects (of new regionalism) express the Latin American rejection of the Washington Consensus' neoliberal politics, which some of the leaders of the region explicitly identify with open regionalism, MERCOSUR, and CAN.”[[53]](#footnote-53) These new characteristics of regionalism had to be observed empirically, while trying to avoid theoretical inertia from previous periods, but not ignoring the possibility of their weaker existence.

Another element of the 1990s approach of South American regionalism was the influence of the United States. In this sense, Nicola Phillips asserted, “Unquestionably, the structurally hegemonic power of the United States molds the parameters of the regional political economy and defines, to a very significant extend, the contours of the regional agenda.”[[54]](#footnote-54) Correspondingly, Paulo Vizentini claimed, “... in a context of toughened competition between capitalist power, due to globalization and scientific technological revolution, Latin America once again occupied a privileged place in US strategy.”[[55]](#footnote-55) In the first decade of the 2000s this was again one of the characteristics that appeared to change. As I already mentioned in previous paragraphs, by 2002 there were already nascent oppositional statements and agreements in the region. For example, the Second Presidential Summit of South America had elements of opposition to the Farm Bill, which the United States was domestically discussing and signed into law during 2002.[[56]](#footnote-56) Another case of opposition could be analyzed in the negotiations during 2005 for the FTAA. Additionally, the 2009 statements concerning what some South American Presidents considered a coup d’état in Honduras could also be taken into consideration as evidence of this regional tendency. Both of these cases were accounted in the empirical observation of this research.

Many authors focusing on the new post-liberal context of South America in the 2000s viewed regionalism as a strategy aimed to gain autonomy and protection for the sovereignty of the member states. They argued that this enabled the states to develop with more self-determination. Leonardo Granato and Nahuel Oddone, for example, affirmed, “Integration is again the convergent element of all South American desires of autonomy. It represents the alternative to the other projects of integration via free trade agreements favored by the USA as the hegemonic power of the system.”[[57]](#footnote-57) Similarly, Carlos Alberto García wrote that the new forms of integration “are framed in a context of increasing enquiries and doubts about the unrestricted United States foreign policy for the region...”[[58]](#footnote-58) Some of the authors claimed that the United States had turned its attention to the Middle East since the events of September 11, 2001, thus decreasing its influence on South America.[[59]](#footnote-59) Countries consequently gained more room for self-determination and regional cohesion. In this respect, Eric Crosbie affirmed that MERCOSUR recovered during the early 2000s and changed its direction towards policies that included infrastructure, security, social areas, and energy.[[60]](#footnote-60) This separation from the neoliberal project of open regionalism was caused, according to Crosbie, by external factors. The author asserted that in the early 2000s, there was an increase in South American regional integration caused by the failure of the United States’ neoliberal agenda, the unilateralism of the war on terrorism, Latin America’s turn to the left, the failure of the FTAA, and the decline of public opinion about the United States in the region.[[61]](#footnote-61) On the contrary, other authors focused on the emerging leadership of Brazil and/or Venezuela in the region.[[62]](#footnote-62) This leadership entailed the “...South American return to the constitution of one region.”[[63]](#footnote-63) José Sanahuja agreed with this view, “For the future of regionalism and South American integration, the Brazilian leadership is very important.”[[64]](#footnote-64) Others also observed the competition between Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela for this leadership shaping regionalism in South America.[[65]](#footnote-65) In general, for most of these scholars who concentrated in the post-liberal projects, the United States appeared as an “other” or at least as an actor from which countries sought autonomy. This discussion thus led this research to the necessity of empirical observation of the interaction of actors in the formation of regional structures. Indeed, I needed to answer the question about who were shaping regionalism in South America. Observing these aspects of South American regionalism, I was able to understand the influence from different actors and their places in the new post-liberal regional strategies. Further, while observing the influence of different practices in the formation of UNASUR, I accounted for all the previously mentioned actors of integration. This was possible because practices reinforced, weakened, and created the diverse narratives that were in regional competition. The United States, Brazil, Venezuela, and other actors thus appeared to be interacting within different practices in order to shape the dominant regional project. These theoretical concepts were discussed in detail in the next chapter to facilitate a comprehensive construction of a methodology based on a constructivist ontology.

Lastly, approaches concentrating on the 1990s observed that the region did not have a common identity defining boundaries in South America. In this respect, Nicola Phillips asseverated, “In contrast with the East Asian region, the definition of South America 'region' has not been approached in cultural terms; indeed, one of the notable features of South America regionalism has been the absence of the sort of underlying regional 'identity'.”[[66]](#footnote-66) Once more, her focus on traditional open-regional formations and their neoliberal characteristics during the 1990s discouraged her from observing that the politics of identity in the region started changing even as she wrote. Even more, as I mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the ideas of unionism and Southern boundaries were not new. They instead seemed to have old roots in projects that even though unsuccessful, left in the region an important notion of Latin Americanism and autonomy. Additionally, some of the previously mentioned authors observed that identity started to re-appear in some of the official agreements of the South American Community of Nations, statements of social movements, presidential speeches, etc. In this sense, José Sanahuja asserted, “There is a Latin American multilateralism rooted in identity and values that have traditionally defined the region.”[[67]](#footnote-67) Moreover, in the official agreements of the aforementioned presidential summits, the Community of South American Nations, and UNASUR, it was possible to observe preliminarily common definitions of history, present obstacles of development, and future strategies shared.[[68]](#footnote-68) Many examples can be cited in this respect.[[69]](#footnote-69) The current approaches of regional South American identity were discussed below, but it was necessary to understand that this characteristic appeared as an important element of regionalism in the first decade of the 2000s.

In conclusion, from this discussion regarding South American regionalism in the 1990s, it was possible to comprehend that this research needed to observe the new structures emerging in the region and their characteristics. In addition, I had to consider empirically the different actors playing and shaping these structures in order to understand the role of the countries inside and outside the region. I thus was able to account for the influence of the United States and the endogenous strategies of South American actors at the same time. In order to reach this goal, I began this research focusing neither on inter-state economic integration nor regionalization processes. Instead, I concentrated first in identity and the study of narratives, which allowed me to observe the inherent characteristics of the emerging regional formations and the interaction of actors that led to the current structures.

## Institutionalism: current analyses of UNASUR

Unlike the research focusing on the 1990s, current approaches of South American regionalism tended to concentrate mostly on two aspects of these structures, namely institutions and their historical process of formation. In this section, I described the institutional analyses of UNASUR, which viewed regionalism under the lenses of inter-state cooperation and levels of cohesion. Within these dimensions, they mostly observed policies and agreements to understand the characteristics, weaknesses, and strengths of certain regional institutions. John E. Griffiths provided a good example of this approach in his study of the Security Council of the UNASUR.[[70]](#footnote-70) Griffiths examined the strength of UNASUR in security matters. He mentioned that one of the major challenges for the region was the lack of, on the one hand, infrastructure and, on the other hand, consolidation of individual states.[[71]](#footnote-71) He also mentioned that these challenges were the basis for further regional cohesion. Notwithstanding, in his observation of UNASUR, the author analyzed the characteristics of the institution only focusing on some of the more traditional aspects of this formation. He thus asserted that some of the more important objectives were to increase infrastructure and energy integration, as well as to define a common approach of security problems. These were undoubtedly very important objectives, but it was necessary to understand these objectives within the aforementioned search of autonomy. In this sense, security was also related to the idea of the protection of national sovereignties. These unanswered questions partly showed the difficulties that institutional approaches had when focusing only on particular aspects of the emerging structures.

Another author that took this approach was Mercedes Hoffay, who studied the level of cohesion of UNASUR in its interaction with the United States. In her study, she observed the policies and agreements of UNASUR around the issue of the United States military bases in Colombia and the Honduran conflict in 2009.[[72]](#footnote-72) She then concluded that the low level of institutional structure in UNASUR allowed for the internal actors to enact policies quickly and effectively when they had previous consensus, but if the issue was more complicated the institution appeared weak and the level of regional cohesion was low. Overall, she claimed, “The forecast for the regional formation is discrete. Even though UNASUR has achieved the solution of certain inter-regional conflicts, it continues to have a very low level of institutionalization and it has not been able to impose a unified voice in important problems that affect the regional agenda and its relationship with the United States.”[[73]](#footnote-73) However, despite the fact that UNASUR has not been able to effectively have a common voice in important issues such as the Honduran conflict, the idea of a common identity represents a common definition of a regional strategy. In addition, since UNASUR was recently ratified in 2008 and its institutional characteristics are not yet fully defined, it is still too early to judge its institutional capability.[[74]](#footnote-74)

Overall, the institutional approach seemed to judge the new formations of post-liberal regionalism with traditional lenses of integration. This can also be detected in the definition of security problems by Francisco Verdes, who pointed out, “In the last decade, Latin America is the region in the world with the least amount of armed conflicts and tensions, but the insecurity sensation and the mortality data are becoming ever more important.”[[75]](#footnote-75) Verdes analyzed the security approaches of UNASUR and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), but in his study, he defined security in traditional terms: around problems of international tension, drug trafficking, and international illicit markets.[[76]](#footnote-76) Then, he added that in ALBA there was repeated mention of the United States as a threat to sovereignty.[[77]](#footnote-77) He similarly observed that UNASUR sought to protect the autonomy of its members. Nonetheless, since he was concentrating in traditional security threats, he did not view these agreements and statements as part of a new post-liberal approach of security for the sovereignty of the states. The school of dignity and sovereignty designed and put in place by ALBA thus did not count as a common strategy of security within the region even though it had as its main goal “the guarantee of sovereignty and dignity of the people and the promotion of peace and cooperation.”[[78]](#footnote-78) In addition, the protocol of democracy signed by all members of UNASUR to protect the constitutional sovereignty of the members was not considered as a strategy of security either.[[79]](#footnote-79) The author concluded, “In general, post-liberal regionalism has considered these international threats (referring to traditional security issues) in its discourse, but has not yet adopted measures to counter them.”[[80]](#footnote-80) In summary, the analysis went back and forth between the traditional threats that regional formations must face and the current discourses of autonomy, without connecting them both under a new idea of security.

In conclusion, the institutional approach of post-liberal regional formations accounted for the weaknesses and strengths of the existing institutions by analyzing the extent to which they reached some of their goals and objectives. These goals and objectives, however, were often understood with traditional lenses that did not shine light on the more innovative characteristics of new regional formations. Institutionalists thus analyzed what regionalism did and should do, but tended to miss the endogenous characteristics and logics that emerged in particular contexts. Moreover, their theoretical tools created in many cases a pessimistic bias towards the weaknesses of these formations.[[81]](#footnote-81) Thus, in the study of the emerging identities and the interaction of different narratives within the projects of regionalism in South America, I intended to observe these internal logics and definitions. Is security defined as a protection of internal projects of development within sovereignty? Does the United States appear as a threat? Are there common definitions and agreements about these issues? These were all questions answered in the description of the identity politics in South America, which defined the structures of regionalism accounting for the members' views of the “self” and the “other” in the past, the present, and the future. However, this study did not pretend by any means to say that regionalism was consolidated and strong in new terms. On the contrary, the study aimed to observe the interaction of narratives in the formation of UNASUR, which entailed diverse types of relationships among actors. Moreover, these conflicts and interactions had new logics that needed to be observed to understand the characteristics of the new regional formations. This was achieved with a systematic empirical observation of the identity politics in the region.

## Historical approach: processes of emergence

Given the early stages of UNASUR and its innovative characteristics, many authors chose historical methodologies to understand its processes of formation and new structures. In most cases, researchers focused on the history of inter-state cooperation and the level of cohesion, but a few have also started accounting for identity. Their empirical observations considered mostly the diplomatic history of some important actors, together with official agreements, and historic events. The advantage of this approach was that it allowed authors to consider a greater number of factors and actors. These wider lenses broached a more complex description of the emerging structures and their process of formation. Moreover, authors described the regional formations accounting for many of their innovative qualities and internal logics.

An example of this approach was found in one of the most complete and profound studies of UNASUR, written by José Antonio Sanahuja.[[82]](#footnote-82) He described UNASUR accounting for its history, the actors that participated in this process of formation, and some of the characteristics of its identity. One of the most interesting aspects of his research was the description of UNASUR and ALBA, which were viewed as post-liberal projects.[[83]](#footnote-83) This definition of UNASUR and ALBA was achieved by analyzing their process of formation, together with the separation of regionalism in South America from the model of open regionalism, which was dominant in the 1990s. In this differentiation, Sanahuja also asserted that UNASUR and ALBA viewed the role of the state as a key component of development, thus sovereignty was an important element that needed to be protected within regionalism.[[84]](#footnote-84) By no means did Sanahuja argue that ALBA and UNASUR were identical, but he observed that they shared commonalities that brought them closer together.[[85]](#footnote-85) This was particularly interesting because Sanahuja did not describe the relationship between the two regional structures as a clear-cut competition, but as a complex relationship of influence and competition at the same time. In another article, Sanahuja mentioned that ALBA had pushed a more political and progressive agenda for the region, which had entered in UNASUR and influenced its structures.[[86]](#footnote-86) This showed the importance of a deep comprehension of the relationship between the different actors shaping a particular structure. Sanahuja accomplished this by analyzing the main regional players and their interests in regionalism.[[87]](#footnote-87) Overall, the author reached a great level of understanding and described UNASUR and ALBA accounting for their endogenous logics. However, his approach did not count with a systematic and methodological definition of identity, which led him to select actors arbitrarily. He also described some traits of the regional identity, while leaving others relegated (such as common views of history and clear definition of the “other”). In both of the aforementioned articles, identity appeared to entail the characteristics of UNASUR,[[88]](#footnote-88) the interests of some of the actors,[[89]](#footnote-89) and a regional view of unionism and nationalism[[90]](#footnote-90) at the same time. This broad utilization of identity allowed the author to cope with many different factors and elements at the same time. However, this displayed a shallow description of the identity of UNASUR and the narratives in dispute or cooperation. Was there a common understanding of the past emerging in UNASUR? What were the different narratives trying to shape UNASUR? Who were the actors playing in the politics of identity in the region? These questions needed to be considered to avoid implicit arbitrary selection of actors and identity traits. Carlos García, for example, intended to describe more in detail the different national perspectives of regionalism playing in the process of formation of UNASUR.[[91]](#footnote-91) The author started by sketching the overall main characteristics of UNASUR, which he delineated around the idea of sovereignty.[[92]](#footnote-92) Here, regionalism entailed a strategy aimed to protect and increase governmental autonomy. This would allow states to shape their own path of development. In the emergence of this structure, the author pointed out, “Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela act as the countries orienting and promoting the possible constitution of a South American political bloc in the current regional conjuncture.”[[93]](#footnote-93) Carlos García did not attribute homogeneity to this bloc; on the contrary, he asserted that the three states had differences and competed in the constitution of UNASUR. However, the interesting aspect of this understanding was that the actors shaping regionalism in South America competed and shared commonalities at the same time. Unlike José Sanahuja, Carlos García took the analysis a step further and observed the crossroads within UNASUR in more detail. He understood that Peru, Chile, and Colombia “view the region as a complement, but not as a priority for their model of international insertion.”[[94]](#footnote-94) Additionally, the author considered that the United States still played an important role in South America and intended to “divide the region to favor its geopolitical interests...”[[95]](#footnote-95) Overall, Carlos García achieved a deeper understanding of the different actors interacting in the constitution of the regional project. His approach, however, also utilized a historical account, which did not define an explicit methodology of observation. Hence, the selection of actors and characteristics of regionalism described were again arbitrary and implicit. There were a few problems with this methodological void: First, the arbitrary relegation of, for example, social and indigenous movements. Second, the utilization of an unclear definition of identity, which became a synonym of ontologically disconnected elements such as interests, common strategies, and characteristics of the structure emerging. Third, the observation of the different actors within this arbitrary selection of traits tended to view the relationship of different projects as oppositional and competing only. Both, José Sanahuja and Carlos García managed to avoid the third problem. However, other authors taking the historical approach concluded that the relationship between, for example, ALBA and UNASUR was a clear-cut competition.[[96]](#footnote-96) On the contrary, Andrés Serbín claimed that the different projects competed and influenced each other at the same time. Moreover, the author showed that the United States still intended to shape the region with the model of open regionalism, which was no longer pushing the FTAA, but still sought bilateral agreements with particular countries.[[97]](#footnote-97) In opposition to this project, UNASUR appeared as a continuation of MERCOSUR with an increasing developmental character, which put the state back in the center.[[98]](#footnote-98) Finally, ALBA was described as a more ideological project that influenced UNASUR by promoting a progressive view of development.[[99]](#footnote-99)

In this research, I intended to understand this complex relationship between the different projects of regionalism in South America by observing systematically the interaction of different narratives and practices within a historic process that led to the structures of UNASUR in 2011. This methodological approach combined historical and sociological tools of analysis, which provided an objective strategy for the selection of actors involved in the dispute. The methodology began the observation with an inductive construction of narratives, and then observed the actors playing within each narrative. This way, the research was able to include not only states, but also social movements, which were ignored by every author considered here within the historical approach. On the contrary, the importance of social movements in the region was observed by Ximena de la Barra and Richard Dello Buono, who pointed out that the “... upsurge of social movement offensives effectively slammed the brakes on the advancing consolidation of neoliberalism in Latin America. Indeed, the renewed presence of social movements throughout the region points to new possibilities that a process of progressive social transformation can take place.”[[100]](#footnote-100) The authors showed that in the Cochabamba Social Forum and in the World Social Forum, many social movements came together and influenced the political scenario of the region.[[101]](#footnote-101) Their effective opposition of the FTAA, the United States bilateral free trade agreements, and open regionalism in all its shapes achieved this.[[102]](#footnote-102) Moreover, these social movements promoted a particular view of regionalism, which I described more in detail below.[[103]](#footnote-103)

Overall, the historical approach seemed to have the most complete analysis of post-liberal regionalism in South America. However, its methodological ambiguity prevented the authors from focusing systematically in regional identity and its process of emergence. I sought, instead, to delineate a systematic methodological criterion based on the definition of identity within narratives, which facilitated the understanding of the new characteristics of regionalism, the actors involved in the process of emergence, and their relationship.

## Notions of identity in the study of South American regionalism

The study of regionalism within constructivist definitions of identity can have its own disadvantages. One of them, as mentioned in previous paragraphs, is that identity is seldom clearly defined in the study of South American regionalism. Other studies of South East Asian regionalism have interrogated further in this area.[[104]](#footnote-104) Another problem arises when identity is understood within essentialist perspectives that analyze only the characteristics of representations in particular points of history. In this case, identity tends to be viewed as a solid structure and authors lose sight of identity politics. Leonardo Granato and Nahuel Oddone, for example, described UNASUR as a result of the convergence of regional values among the states of South America.[[105]](#footnote-105) Although they understood that there were different national views, the authors attributed a more consolidated status to UNASUR and the region. Unlike the institutional approach, these authors fell on the other end of the spectrum and viewed UNASUR as a strong regional structure. Granato and Oddone in general achieved a description of the characteristics of UNASUR that included most of the aforementioned innovative traits of post-liberal regionalism. They mentioned, for example, that there was a new identity emerging, which included autonomy and sovereignty as key factors of development.[[106]](#footnote-106) However, the relationship between actors and different identities was not observed. This seemed to be a void in the literature of regionalism in South America. Most authors concentrated in institutional or historical approaches and the few that accounted for identity did not consider the historical processes of interaction between different narratives.

In summary, identity had to be theoretically defined to organize the inductive observation of narratives. This definition had to delineate the potential elements of identity, the methods of observation, and the tools with which I re-constructed the interaction of actors. An excellent example of an identity research was found in Benedict Anderson's book called *Imagined Communities*. The author observed that nationality involved boundaries and a definition of the “self.”[[107]](#footnote-107) Different communities thus imagined their “self” within a particular boundary and their “other” as outsiders. These elements of nationalism were extrapolated to regionalism, which helped me define the different perspectives about the region and its “others.” Another element that appeared in Anderson's notion of identity was time. When the author described the official view of nationalism in communist Vietnam, he asserted that history was re-defined in consistency with their vision of the future.[[108]](#footnote-108) The definition of regional identity in this instance included this emplotment of history by certain actors shaping the official notion of regionalism. Lastly, the author explicitly affirmed that identity was a product of interaction among different actors.[[109]](#footnote-109) This idea of identity as a result of human agency was particularly important in the study of new regional identities because it showed the importance of identity politics, which avoided essentialist views of this phenomenon.

In conclusion, the review of the current literature on South American regionalism showed the following: First, this research had to define a systematic criterion of selection of actors and the elements of regionalism. Second, the approach had to include the study of the different identities promoted by the salient actors shaping regionalism in South America. Third, the description of each identity had to include the empirical view of the “self” and the “other” within a plot that went from the past to the future. Fourth, the observation of the interaction between these narratives had to be open to include different types of relationships among them. Fifth, the inductive reconstruction of narratives had to determine who were the salient subjects shaping regionalism. Finally, the description of this interaction of narratives needed to focus on the emergence of the regional identity that led to the structure of UNASUR as a historic result. This empirical reconstruction of practices sought to answer the previously mentioned research questions: Was there a new regional identity emerging in South America since the early 2000s? What were its characteristics and how did it emerge?

# Chapter III

## Narratives and Practices: a constructivist ontology for identity

According to some sociologists, all the processes of empirical observation accomplished by researchers are guided.[[110]](#footnote-110) Sometimes the criteria utilized to select the important actors and objects for the research are made explicit. Other times, authors leave these methodological decisions tacit or implicit. However, the social world of interaction is far too complex to observe everything at the same time and then neutrally reconstruct theoretical conclusions through induction. In this chapter, I thus intended to make my methodological criteria of observation explicit. This methodological framework was built with a dialogue between different constructivist authors, together with preliminary observations of presidential speeches and official agreements in the South American region. As a result, I re-constructed a methodology based on an ontology that guided my observations of the narratives about regionalism and the practices in interaction. This methodology did not pretend closure in the debates about regional identity politics. On the contrary, it sought to explicit the empirical implications of the concept to allow deeper epistemological and methodological discussions within the constructivist paradigm. In order to achieve this goal, I decided to include in this chapter part of the literature review about the definition of identity.

In general, the chapter has six sections. The first part of the chapter discussed some of the different definitions of identity and the important requirements for this research. In the second section, identity was defined within the concept of narratives. Moreover, the main elements of identity were delineated in order to make explicit the methodology required to reconstruct the regional narratives that existed in South America. The third section analyzed the connection between narratives and practices according to different authors. From this discussion, the fourth section showed the ontological connection between narratives, practices, and structures. The fifth section described the hypotheses of this research. Finally, the sixth section characterized the methodological steps followed during the process of observation and some of the criteria utilized during the analysis of data.

## Regional Identity: definitions and discussions

The debate about regional identity seemed to be most prominent in the cases of East Asian regionalism and the European Union. For example, Sunhyuk Kim and Yong Wook Lee asserted that there has been a South East Asian identity emerging since the 1997 crisis that shook the region.[[111]](#footnote-111) In this approach, the authors conceived identity as a regional definition of the “self” in direct opposition to an external “other.”[[112]](#footnote-112) The South East Asian region therefore viewed the United States as an “other” that partly caused the crisis due to the promotion of economic liberalization, which increased financial volatility. In this construction of an “other,” the region began to promote boundaries for the “self,” which excluded the United States. Hence, identity appeared as an increase in the sense of “we-ness,” which established boundaries in direct opposition to the “other.”[[113]](#footnote-113) However, this view did not include the identity politics of the region itself. Furthermore, the authors excluded from their observation the possibility of other types of relationships with other external actors. In the case of the South American identity emerging in the 2000s, this definition would have prevented the observation of the complexity of identities, for example, in the relationship between ALBA and UNASUR, which was not a direct opposition, but still included different narratives. On the contrary, Bahar Rumelili took into account the European Union (EU) and asked: “How is it that with respect to certain states, the EU constructs firm lines of boundary between the ‘self’ and the ‘others,’ and with regards to others, fluid and ambiguous frontiers? Scholars have failed to develop a theoretical account that can explain how and why these different modes of differentiation coexist in the context of the EU.”[[114]](#footnote-114) In his approach, the author defined the relationship between the EU and the “others” as complex. This perspective showed the importance of a dynamic definition of identity that included interaction and complexity. Notwithstanding, the author still limited the relationship between the “self” and the “other” within the idea of levels of distinction.[[115]](#footnote-115) This might have been a valid observation about the EU, but in the case of South America, there were identities that had relationships of similarity. For example, in the previous chapter I mentioned the actions of social movements in the determination of a new identity in South America. These actors seemed to appear with a relationship of similarity with ALBA. Thus, the relationship between the “self” and the “other” must stay open to empirical determination.

 In order to determine empirically the relationship between the actors shaping UNASUR and avoid some of the problems mentioned in the previous chapter, identity was defined here through the idea of narratives. In this sense, Margaret Somers affirmed, “… It is through narrativity that we know the social world, and it is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities.”[[116]](#footnote-116) Narratives entailed a construction of meaning for the region through a story that explained who they are. This story can be shared through public speeches and promoted among different actors. The advantage of understanding identity through this concept was that it added relationality. Moreover, it included the dynamic politics of identity. These traits helped the research to avoid some of the methodological problems of institutional approaches and essentialist views of identity.[[117]](#footnote-117) First, through narratives, the research was able to observe empirically the relationship established between the actors contesting to establish the regional identity. This was possible because the story told by the actors was not only contextual (with meaning within the text), but also intertextual (establishing a relationship with other texts).[[118]](#footnote-118) Second, this empirical connection avoided an *a priori* definition of the relationship between the “self” and the “others.” In this connection between concepts, the author achieved an ontological understanding of identity that avoided the problems of studying this phenomenon as a mere representation.

In order to achieve a more clear definition of these concepts, I utilized Anne Kane’s article “Reconstructing Culture in Historic Explanations: Narratives as Cultural Structure and Practice.” Consistent with Margaret Somers’ characterization of identity, Anne Kane studied the emergence of common meanings in the Irish land conflict with England between 1879-1882. In her work, narratives were also the basis of identities and meaning construction. She explained that different actors could redefine, within a common narrative, a particular event, situation, or other. This created cohesive practices that shaped history.[[119]](#footnote-119) Similarly, the creation of a regional identity could be understood as a process in which different actors redefined, reproduced, and created diverse narratives about the region in order to promote a common master narrative. Kane’s theory here connected identity with practices and, with this formula; she provided a methodological tool to guide the observation of events and actions in the emergence of a historical structure. UNASUR’s emergence thus could be studied as a result of an interaction of symbolic practices that promoted particular narratives about the region. In this operation, it was possible to observe the interaction of different actors, their relationships, and the historic structural results.

It is nevertheless necessary here to define the concept of narratives more clearly before proceeding with further discussions about practices. According to Anne Kane, “narratives are stories that embody symbolic meaning and codes of understanding; through story telling meaning is publicly shared, contested, and reconstructed. The historian can, through the analysis of narratives, thus access the causal power of culture, both as structure and as practice.”[[120]](#footnote-120) These symbolic structures called narratives are in constant interactions and, through emplotment; they constitute, reinforce, and transform each other.[[121]](#footnote-121) Each narrative was thus considered a story, which went from the past to the future and explained the “self,” the relationship with the “others,” and the consistently valid course of action.

In summary, identities were observed through the concept of narratives, which provided a dynamic and relational perspective of the phenomenon. This built a guide for the process of observation to avoid some of the problems that other approaches had when researching UNASUR and post-liberal regional formations.

## The components of narratives: open, but guided observation

Now that the concept of narratives was defined, it is necessary to elucidate some of its theoretical components. This task was extremely difficult due to the importance given here to the idea of an open ontology that included more complex relationships between narratives. Indeed, any narrative component delineated *a priori* represented a limit to observation. However, as I mentioned before, the researcher always has limited lenses of observation and it is thus epistemologically important to make these criteria explicit.

The concept of narratives here was built in a dialectical relationship between the empirical world and other research in the subject. The conceptual guides of observation were described in the following paragraphs as potential components of the narratives. None of these components was considered as necessary *per se*, but they guided the observation as part of the symbolic structure that shaped the story in the narrative. With the help of these authors, I constructed the theoretical framework that guided the process of observation and allowed for ontological openness at the same time.

One of the authors taken into consideration for the definition of this theoretical framework was, as I mentioned previously, Anne Kane. In her study, she took into account three empirical elements of narratives. First, she considered the myth of the past.[[122]](#footnote-122) In this element, she found a definition of the “self” and the “others” in relationship to an interpretation of history constructed and shared by a particular actor. This element conducted the analysis to comprehend, for example, the myth of the 200-years-old shared struggle against colonialism and the other projects of unionism. This also apprehended human agency over the construction of history, which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was an important aspect of identity for Benedict Anderson. Second, Anne Kane observed the definition of the “other” and the “self” within the narratives in interaction.[[123]](#footnote-123) In her findings, she described the views that the different Irish movements had about English rule over land. In the construction of a master narrative, the author established a relationship of opposition between both subjects, while uniting the diverse Irish movements under one identity. The author then proceeded to observe the actions that each actor took to reinforce or transform these narratives. In the case of UNASUR, the empirical definition of the “self,” the “other,” and the relationship among them avoided impositions of assumptions. At the same time, this component provided an empirical tool to observe the different relationships between the narratives shaping the identity of the region. Third, the author asserted that the narrative determined the course of action of each actor.[[124]](#footnote-124) This meant that the actor’s story determined what future path was acceptable to him/her. With all three of these elements, actors input direction to the narrative and established the potential relationship with the others as allies or opposites.[[125]](#footnote-125) All these components were not separate parts of the narrative. Indeed, they were parts of the story told by the actors; they constituted the symbolic structure of the narrative.

Correspondingly, Ted Hopf reconstructed the different identities contesting in Russia by observing and synthesizing the narratives present in two separate time periods.[[126]](#footnote-126) This approach was consistent with Anne Kane’s study in that they both determined the characteristics of identities and their interaction with empirical observation through narratives. Hopf intended, however, to analyze the Russian identities of 1955 and 1999 with an inductive approach that left more room for ontological openness. His study thus did not limit the narrative to a definition of the “self” in relationship to an “other.” In fact, the “self” could be defined without another and self-reproducing a particular notion of identity.[[127]](#footnote-127) The important element that needed to be taken into account from this approach was that the narrative itself established its characteristics. Some components of the narrative were thus delineated in the following sentences, but in the analysis of public speeches, it was necessary to allow the possibility of new elements and relationships.

Along with Kane, Hopf took into account different components that could be understood as the myth of the past, the relationship between the “self” and the “other,” and the determination of a course of action. He included the first and third elements of narratives with the concept of “thinkability,” which entailed an origin myth constructed with past experiences and determining the possible course of action.[[128]](#footnote-128) Within this logic, the author understood the interest of an actor as part of his/her identity. Narratives thus set and truncated the possible options of action for an actor *vis-à-vis* others. Despite the author’s epistemological desire to leave the second component of narratives as theoretically undetermined, he mentioned different possibilities of relationships with the “other,” which guided him in the construction of the network of narratives. First, he asserted that this relationship could evoke opposition.[[129]](#footnote-129) Second, Hopf affirmed that the other could appear with a relationship of similarity.[[130]](#footnote-130) Third, Hopf observed relationships of assimilation, which entailed the understanding of a narrative as included within another.[[131]](#footnote-131) These relationships depended on the characteristics of the other attributed by the narratives in their network of intertextuality. This meant that each narrative had its own understanding of the others. It was consequently possible to analyze how the different narratives modified, reproduced, or crated new ideas about each other in the interaction of practices. However, at the level of narrative analysis, the definition of the “other” remained subjective.[[132]](#footnote-132) In the analysis of public speeches, I thus left the relationship between the “self” and the “other” to empirical determination with different possibilities that were not enclosed within conflict and opposition. This helped me avoid some of the aforementioned simplifications. In addition, I avoided the exclusion of anomalies by utilizing Hopf’s methodological suggestions and including new traits within the rest of the findings as they emerged.[[133]](#footnote-133) Nonetheless, despite the room for ontological openness in the observation of the “self,” the “other,” their relationship, and the notion of the past, these elements appeared as basic components of the narratives. Each component was thus determined by empirical observation, but they were also considered as the basis of the narrative’s symbolic structure.

Overall, the aforementioned authors seemed to account, with different concepts, for the three key components of narratives delineated by Sanjoy Banerjee. The first elements of a narrative were the definitions of the “self” and the “other.” This was included, in Banerjee’s approach, in a story that portrayed the historical heritage and the future destiny of the “self” *vis-à-vis* the “others.” Thus, identity appeared as an autobiography that determined the paths of action in consistency with the actor’s notion of his/her past and future.[[134]](#footnote-134) In this sense, Banerjee “emphasizes time and its effects. (He) attends to how identities portray the past, present, and future and also the dynamics of narrations.”[[135]](#footnote-135) Analogously, Consuelo Cruz considered time as a key component of narratives in her observation of national identities. She asserted that identities emerged from collective memory through a selection of events and historical accidents. This shaped the understanding of the permissible and the forbidden.[[136]](#footnote-136) In both cases, the notion of time within narratives provided an ontological connection between identity and action, which I described in detail in the next section of this chapter. Identity was here not only an ideological story, but it also entailed consistency with action. This was the basis of practice analysis and the core of the conceptualization utilized in this research to comprehend identity.

In conclusion, identity was understood here as an autobiography; a story about the “self” in relationship to the “others,” which went from the past to the future. The complete symbolic structure of narratives was, however, not found in direct empirical form. The researcher needed to synthesize the narratives from public speeches and empirical observations. In order to achieve this goal, Banerjee described an ontology connecting different components and guiding the observation of public speeches. In his case, narratives were about national identities, but the elements described in his theory facilitated the analysis of narratives about regionalism. Moreover, they sustained consistency with the open ontology required by Hopf. Finally, they included the elements described above as key parts of the conceptualization of identity by different authors.

Overall, I utilized Banerjee’s definition of identity as an equivalent of regional narratives and an ontological basis to guide my observation. The first component was heritage, which was a “selective account of the nation’s origins and essential nature. The logic of heritage is that the nation is separated from all other nations by virtue of its genesis.”[[137]](#footnote-137) In this research, “nation” was supplanted by region and each different narrative delineated a notion of the genesis of the region. This was consistent with the other previously mentioned definitions of identity, which accounted for the past. The second element of the symbolic structure was the notion of the future. In Banerjee’s approach, this was defined by the idea of “destiny” and “danger.” The former “…entails some determination and optimism. Destinies define the future direction of history, given the right action. They preserve some boundaries proclaimed in the heritage and herald the dissolution of others.”[[138]](#footnote-138) The latter included the “other” as “a wrong action recapitulating disfavored tendencies of the past.”[[139]](#footnote-139) In both of these elements, the “self” defined boundaries and accommodated “others,” events, and situations as part of its story. However, as it was possible to notice above, Banerjee accounted for the relationship between the “self” and the “other” as established by a dual notion of the future within either danger or destiny. Conversely, in this research, I intended to leave more room for complex relationships between the “self” and the “other.” Ergo, the teleological position of the “other” was determined empirically. The notion of heritage and future designated empirically the teleological position of the “other” as a character of the story. Furthermore, historic events were also included in this story with the actor’s interpretation. Thus, in the construction of the heritage of the actor and his/her notion of the future, the researcher synthesized the description of the “self” and the “other” from empirical observation.

In conclusion, the definition of identity delineated here still fit the previously mentioned requirement of open ontology posited by Hopf’s study of Russia. It guided the observation within the components of the symbolic structures of narratives (heritage, future, “self,” “other,” and the relationship between “self” and “other”), but it also allowed for the empirical observation of each element. Moreover, it included all the important elements of narratives considered by diverse authors and contained in previous discussions about UNASUR.

## The methodological approach to identity

The methodology utilized in this research to re-construct the topography of narratives about the region was borrowed from Hopf’s research. At the same time, it was combined with some of the aforementioned guides of observation in order to adjust it to regionalism. This was the first step of data analysis. Once the narratives were reconstructed, the research moved forward with the observation of practices and structures. The next section of this chapter described the methodological steps required to trace practices, but it is necessary first to illustrate the methodology utilized in the reconstruction of narratives about the region.

The first step involved an inductive construction of the identity topography.[[140]](#footnote-140) In this step, public speeches and official regional agreements were analyzed contextually and intertextually. The former examined the narrative present within the text and the latter traced the relationship established by the narrative with other texts. In each public speech about the region, I thus sought to observe different elements of the autobiography and the perceived relationship with other public speeches. The second step was “a synthetic creation of discursive formations that brought various identities together in a more coherent structure than pure induction can supply.”[[141]](#footnote-141) In this research, this step synthesized the different regional autobiographies and relationships within the symbolic structure of particular narratives. Moreover, with the relationship between different speeches observed in the first step, I sought to establish the relationships between general narratives about the region. Each narrative thus included different actors who viewed each other in different ways. As Hopf mentioned, this step entailed some theorizing due to the researcher’s imposition of parameters to the diverse fragments of narratives observed in public speeches. In this part of the observation, I utilized the previously mentioned guides, but I also allowed the inductive section to control some of those parameters. This methodology was called here guided-inductivism in order to avoid confusion with other approaches that pretend to capture the empirical world “as it is” and without *a priori* lenses. The guides of observation were utilized as tables in which segments of the different speeches were connected within the symbolic structure of a narrative. This technique involved an interpretativist analysis of the speeches selected. In order to achieve this goal systematically, I borrowed Banerjee’s ontology from his study of national identity.[[142]](#footnote-142) I then adapted it considering the specificities of South American regionalism and the previous discussions.

This reconstruction of narratives took place at the beginning of the observation in order to set the start point of the interaction of practices. As I showed in the next section, practices were sequences of actions and emplotment within a narrative. The starting point thus needed to be empirically constructed at some historical date. This was the reason why I used Hopf approach to start. This way, the narratives within which actions and emplotments took place, were not assumed. Instead, they were re-constructed empirically. Once the narratives were constructed, the research followed the sequence of actions that reinforced, transformed, or created these narratives alongside time. The period of observation consisted in the years 1999-2011. This time limitation intended to include the years in which the open regional project started to decline and post-liberal regionalism flourished. In general, the selection of years was arbitrary, but research resources are always limited, whereas the interaction of practices is limitless.

## The emergence of regional identity: a discussion about the definition of practices

The step of the methodology that followed the construction of narratives facilitated a systematic construction of practices and structures. The data collected and analyzed for this phase of the research traced the transformation of narratives and their interaction between 1999 and 2011. This was possible due to the connection between narratives and actions through the observation of emplotment. In this sense, Margaret Somers stated, “The connectivity of parts is precisely why narrativity turns ‘events’ into episodes, whether the sequence of episodes is presented or experiences in any resembling chronological order. This is done through emplotment. It is emplotment that gives significance to independent instances, not their chronological or categorical order. And it is emplotment that translates events into episodes.”[[143]](#footnote-143) Actors thus included in their stories their interpretation of events and “others.” Then, they acted accordingly in order to reinforce, adapt, or transform the regional narrative in which they have engaged.

This connection between narratives and actions was ontological and it could not be observed inductively, or with total ontological openness. As a result, I discussed several definitions of symbolic practices and adapted these theoretical tools to the previously mentioned idea of narratives. I consequently obtained a systematic methodology that traced structures from the relationship between narratives and actions established by emplotment, which was empirically observable.

First, I reviewed Anne Kane’s definition of practices and structures. This study provided great inside for the re-construction of practices based on narratives because she located meaning as the nexus between actions and structures.[[144]](#footnote-144) The meanings observed and structured within narratives thus constituted the basis of actions. Additionally, these actions re-shaped narratives that converged, reproduced, or transformed historic structures.[[145]](#footnote-145) I consequently considered narratives (symbolic structures) as the basis for the empirical re-construction of practices. Along with Somers, Kane specified that the key component of the empirical connection between narratives and actions was emplotment.[[146]](#footnote-146) In her study, Kane stated that the narratives found in public discourses were connected with actions because actors interpreted the world before acting.[[147]](#footnote-147) This interpretation of new events and other actions entailed their inclusion within the symbolic structure of narratives. Thus, as new events and actions demanded attention from a narrative, the actors engaged in this story interpreted the situation and reinforced, transformed, or adapted their narrative through emplotment.

Adversely, Hopf constructed the connection between identity and action through three assumptions. First, he asserted that individuals acted within the logic of “intelligibility.”[[148]](#footnote-148) This logic assumed that individuals acted in a way that was understood by others. The second logic was called “thinkability” and it assumed that identity shaped what was “thinkable” for the individual. Thus, individuals had a truncated set of possibilities based on their memories and identity.[[149]](#footnote-149) Finally, the third logic was called “imaginability.” Here, the author asserted that individuals were not completely bound by their past memories because they had creativity and could imagine other paths of action. Despite the methodologically rigorous approach that the author utilized to observe the different identities contesting in Russia, the comprehension of the association between narratives and actions was not observed empirically. The three assumptions that the author used were very reasonable, but the analysis of practices should be able to connect actions and narratives empirically. Objectively attributed consistency between identity and foreign policy was not methodological enough to re-construct practices. Here, this empirical connection was achieved through the idea of emplotment.

Along the lines of Kane, Consuelo Cruz designed another important account of identity and practices with the study of the emergence of national identities in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. In her article “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Past and Make their Future,” the author sought an empirical link between identities and practices with the observation of rhetoric practices.[[150]](#footnote-150) According to Cruz, national identities emerged from the contest between different rhetorical practices in each country.[[151]](#footnote-151) Individuals made statements of particular events and situations, which defined the possible route of action for the future.[[152]](#footnote-152) The identity that emerged for the nation thus shaped the development of the country. This notion of identity was consistent with the idea of emplotment due to the interpretation done by individuals about the events and actions of “others.” In this sense, Cruz posited meaning and emplotment as the empirical basis of the analysis of practices. In addition, when actors interpreted new events and casted a new balance between the known and the unknown, they modified the story of the nation and established what acts were likely to be accepted as just.[[153]](#footnote-153) Hence, in the interaction between actors themselves, and with historic events, identity changed because of the interpretation of new situations.[[154]](#footnote-154) Costa Rica, for example, seemed to have, according to the author, two different narratives in competition to shape national identity.[[155]](#footnote-155)

A different approach to re-construct practices was delineated by Banerjee in his article “Actions, Practices and historical Structures: the Partition of India.” Here, the author shaped a testable theory of international structures with a methodology based on an ontological connection between actors, public speeches, and historic events.[[156]](#footnote-156) According to Banerjee, “… a self-reproducing collection of subjects and practices is called a historical structure.”[[157]](#footnote-157) This approach has two important notions that were consistent with this research. First, historical structures were understood as the results of the interaction of practices in particular periods. This interaction included uneven growth for different practices. Historical structures could be thus transformed or endure alongside time.[[158]](#footnote-158) Moreover, practices did not only interact with one another, but were also self-reinforced.[[159]](#footnote-159) This was a very important notion when understanding regionalism. Second, the author described the group of actors engaged within one practice as “subjects.”[[160]](#footnote-160) In this sense, the different actors that participated shaping a narrative can be accounted as a subject interacting with other subjects. When studying complex phenomena, such as regionalism, it is important to consider many actors at the same time. By comprehending the actors engaged within one practice as one subject, the author provided an important methodological tool to simplify empirical complexity and make the phenomenon intelligible. Despite the importance of these theoretical notions, Banerjee mentioned the following: “when each action in a subsequence was conceived on the successful example of predecessors, we can say that actions formed a practice.”[[161]](#footnote-161) The author thus understood that practices were to be re-constructed by the empirical connection found in the utilization of previous action as a precedent of another action. This approach also emphasized the importance of observing empirical connections between actions in order to analyze practices. However, the empirical nexus was not emplotment and translation; it was just the successful antecedent utilized by the subject. This criterion allowed the author to build a very rigorous methodology of observation in the emergence of practices. Nonetheless, in the case of regionalism, antecedents alone were not always present. Thus, many actions and events that shaped regionalism significantly in South America would have been excluded from the interaction. Therefore, the research utilized a concept that included more ontological openness and a broader scope, namely emplotment. This notion provided an empirical connection not only within the practice, but also with other practices and events. Hence, actors emplotted their actions within a particular narrative, but they also established an empirical relationship with other practices by emploting the “other’s” actions. Additionally, certain historic events were empirically connected to the practice when the subject emplotted their conjuncture.

Overall, the notion of emplotment provided a tool of empirical observation, but it also allowed for more ontological openness in the analysis of the interaction of practices. It even allowed the research to include successful antecedents as part of the overall story told by the subject. Conversely, successful antecedents alone were not always present due to, for example, the required diplomacy of international relations, where actors might not refer to past actions, but might be still emploting actions within the narrative. In summary, the notion of emplotment included antecedents, translation, and other empirical elements that allowed for a more open observation of the nexuses of actions.

This notion of practices can be observed not only in the works of Margaret Somers and Anne Kane, but also in the article called “The International Structuration of National Identities, 1989-2002.”[[162]](#footnote-162) At variance with the previously mentioned article, Banerjee studied here the reinforcement and transformation of national identities in processes of international interaction. Once identity appeared as the main object of analysis, the author constructed sequences of actions and translation that acted upon identity. Similarly, in the study of regional identities, it was necessary to analyze the processes with which identity was shaped. Thus, translation was located at the center of the empirical connection between actions because the practices examined were symbolic in nature. This process of translation was called here emplotment.

This empirical nexus connected not only practices, but also their interactions. When subjects targeted and emplotted each other in their actions, the “other” could answer. In order to answer, the subject would have to emplot the previous action and then act. As a result, the subject’s practice could be reinforced if the action fit its narrative, or weakened if the response could not be emplotted.[[163]](#footnote-163) Overall, “a national identity narration must, (…) configure new actions, by ‘others’ and the ‘self,’ into an established dialectical plot of progression and reversal. Successful emplotment is not assured, and national identity narrations can break down under certain circumstances. Narration, emplotment of new action, and positioning of subjects are interdependent. Emplotment of another’s action takes in knowledge of the action, its demand, and how it has responded to earlier demands (…), and combines it with teleological subject positions from the narration to direct the ‘self’ and ‘others’ towards destiny or danger.”[[164]](#footnote-164) This approach brought a rigorous methodology for the observation of regional identities and the different narratives contesting in South America because each narrative was treated as a national identity. Thus, each practice (i.e., actions connected to each other by emplotment within a particular narrative) interacted with other practices and historic events. In this interaction, practices emerged or declined according to their capabilities to emplot situations throughout time and engage more actors.

In conclusion, “a narrative identity approach assumes that social action can only be intelligible if we recognize that people are guided to act by structural and cultural relationships in which they are embedded and by stories through which they constitute their identities – and less because of the interests we impute to them.”[[165]](#footnote-165) Therefore, the analysis of practices was a processual study of the flux of actions and narratives connected by emplotment.[[166]](#footnote-166)

## Narratives, practices, and structures: a methodology based on ontology

In this section, I described systematically the ontological approach that resulted from the previous discussion and acted as a methodology of observation for regionalism in South America. In order to achieve this goal, I defined the theoretical concepts mentioned above and connected them with each other.

The first concept guiding this mode of observation was narrative. As mentioned previously, narrative was the concept with which this research observed identity and structured the public speeches gathered as data. This was possible because narratives included the symbolic structures with which actors constituted their autobiography of the region. These structures included the definition of the “self,” the “other”, and particular events within a plot that went from the past genesis to the future of the region. In order to avoid the essentialist notion of identity, this concept was associated with the idea of practices through emplotment. Thus, identity was understood ontologically and not as mere representations.[[167]](#footnote-167) Indeed, symbolic practices (narrative-practices from hereon) entailed a dynamic understanding of regional identity politics and constituted the second level of data analysis. Each practice was a sequence of actions connected within a narrative through emplotment. They were, thus empirically true but constructed by the researcher.[[168]](#footnote-168) In each practice, there were different actors engaging with the narrative, and they constituted a singular subject within the practice (narrative-subject from hereon). The notion of subject did not necessarily include actors that behaved together in explicit and subjective cohesion, but that reinforced the same narrative-practice with their actions. They were thus true empirically but not subjectively. In time, this subject intended to reinforce its narrative-practice about the region by including other actions, events, or situations within its own narrative. This was the third level of data analysis, which included the interaction of practices. In general, in an interaction of two practices, the subject acted based on its narrative and attributing a teleological position to the “other.” Once the “other” answered, the subject tried to emplot the action and fit the “other” within its notion of teleological position. Additionally, whenever a salient event took place in relationship to the region, each subject intended to include it in its story. In this process, when the subject successfully emplotted the situation or the action, the narrative-practice reinforced itself. Moreover, whenever new actors engaged with their actions adapting or reinforcing this narrative-subject, the practice itself gained strength *vis-à-vis* other practices. Finally, a subject could target actors within itself and seek to reinforce the practice narrative by emploting their inclusion and the boundaries created for the region. This type of micro-practice was called self-reinforcement.[[169]](#footnote-169)

In the observation of the sequences of practices, some subjects did not respond to other practices. At other times, they did not successfully emplot the “other’s” practice. In this case, it was important to observe the reaction of the actors engaged in these practices and whether ignoring the demand entailed a decline of the subject. Overall, this matrix of practices was empirically based and it included a variety of interactions.[[170]](#footnote-170) This was possible because the teleological position of the “other” and the emplotment of situations were traced empirically within the notion of narratives together with practices. Different subjects could thus cooperate, assimilate one another, compete as opposites, and even ignore each other. The determination of this character within each interaction depended on the actions and emplotments that constituted part of the practice.

The fourth level of data analysis entailed the description of the historical structure that emerged from the interaction mentioned before. As previously discussed, a historic structure was the collection of practices present in a particular historical context.[[171]](#footnote-171) However, each practice gained different levels of strength and influence while intending to shape the narrative for the entire region. Hence, different definitions of the region contested and cooperated.[[172]](#footnote-172) Subjects grew unevenly by including new actors and successfully emploting different situations.[[173]](#footnote-173) When a practice established regional institutions that included other subjects and spoke for the whole region, it was possible to say that the subject had created a “master narrative.”[[174]](#footnote-174) Consequently, a historical structure was both a collection of different practices in a particular time-period and a master narrative that dominated the region. At first glance, it seemed contradictory to include both notions of structures within one analysis. However, the notion of the master narrative was included in the matrix of practice interaction. Thus, it was possible to observe that this master narrative could coexist with actors that were engaged in other practices at the same time. This dual understanding of structures allowed this research to analyze UNASUR as an emerging master narrative for the region and, simultaneously, as a set of different subjects that created internal conflicts and weaknesses for the institution. Additionally, this notion evoked the complexity of the interaction between ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC. For that reason, the theory was adapted dialectically with the preliminary empirical observations of speeches and official agreements about UNASUR. Furthermore, this notion avoided the problem of self-contained structures. According to García Canclini, regional cultures in Latin America are constructed by processes of hybridization, which account for the underlying diversity of cultures at a particular time.[[175]](#footnote-175) In this research, I accounted for diversity and dynamic identities through the concept of narratives and its ontological connection to practices.

## Hypothesis: the emergence of UNASUR

The hypotheses of this research derived from preliminary observations, the discussions in previous chapters, and the first level of analysis with the guided-inductive construction of narratives. The first and most important hypothesis was that the narrative, with which Brazil was engaged in 1999, would grow unevenly and become the master narrative that defined the region within UNASUR. This growth would take place because more actors would engage as time passed and the subject would successfully emplot different situations. This narrative was called here “moderate regionalism.”

The second hypothesis was that the narrative promoted in 1999 by President Chávez would become the regional project called ALBA. The important aspects of this narrative were the opposition to the United States, its support to the indigenous narrative, and its influence on the moderate narrative.

The third hypothesis was that the narrative advocated by the United States in 1999 and 2000 would lose strength in the region, but not disappear. This narrative received the name of “open-regionalism” because it sought to build free trade areas and liberalize the region, thus keeping the tendency that supposedly existed in the 1990s.

The forth hypothesis was that peasant and indigenous movements would gain strength and create a regional narrative-practice of their own. This practice was called “indigenous regionalism.” The most important aspects of this narrative included their direct opposition to the open-regional narrative and their support of ALBA and UNASUR in certain situations.

In general, these four regional identities would interact during the 2000s as narrative-practices. Different actors would thus engage within each one of these narrative-practices to form narrative-subjects. During the first decade of the 2000s, the narrative spearheaded by Brazil would then rise and become the master narrative of UNASUR. This entailed that it would become institutionalized and include other actors that were still engaged in other practices. However, the idea of UNASUR becoming the master narrative also entailed that other practices would be still contesting the definition of the region. These hypotheses were controlled in the empirical reconstruction of the practices.

## Methodological specifications

In this chapter, I intended to describe some of the methodological decisions made alongside the analysis of data. In previous chapters, I tried to make explicit some of the guiding lenses of this research; here, I clarified the last necessary aspects of the observation.

First and foremost, the data collected here included public speeches, policies, and historic events.[[176]](#footnote-176) These public speeches were analyzed as texts in order to observe the narratives and the emplotment of actions and events.[[177]](#footnote-177) Furthermore, the methodology proposed here did not seek to interpret the author’s secrete or ideological meaning, but the discursively explicit narrative.[[178]](#footnote-178) Overall, speeches were selected when they referred directly or indirectly to the region and to integration between 1999 and 2011. Some of these speeches referred to other events and speeches; when this happened, the observation expanded and I collected more data until no new subjects emerged. This criterion shaped the selection of speeches within the actors interacting in the formation of the region. The sources of these data were official websites, opinion blogs, newspapers from different countries, videos of statements by politicians, and interviews in different formats. The universe of data in this case could have been endless. Thus, the sample was as big as possible according to the resources and time limits of this research. However, in the guided-inductive part of the observation, I sought to collect data until at least no new narratives emerged in 1999 and 2000. Then, the observation of emplotments and actions was guided by the notion of practices mentioned before. The details of the data collected were described in appendix 1.

The epistemological basis of this methodology was clearly interpretativist and constructivist.[[179]](#footnote-179) However, I sacrificed some of the inductively rigorous requirements of Hopf’s methodology in order to observe practices and interaction systematically. The problem with this decision was that the possibility of interpretativist slippage increased with the theorization of data.[[180]](#footnote-180) In order to trace the narrative-practices, actors and narratives were simplified. Thus, the research lost details and specificities in the process. However, the methodology included two of the basic requirements by Hopf’s approach. First, I purposely intended to avoid the pitfall of anomalies. When speeches and actions did not fit a particular symbolic structure, the narratives observed were revised and new structures were included. Second, I started with the guided-inductive method, which prevented an *a priori* start point for the observation of practices. Thus, empirical complexity shaped the beginning of the interaction. Actions and emplotment then followed their transformation. In this process, a great level of complexity was sacrificed, but this was a necessary synthetization to make social phenomena intelligible.[[181]](#footnote-181) Moreover, phenomena such as regionalism include hundreds of actors, narratives, and actions. It would be impossible and undesirable to observe and re-construct all the historical events that happened in these 11 years. Therefore, this research sought to utilize the previously mentioned ontology to systematically choose the main events, subjects, and narratives that shaped UNASUR.

# Chapter IV

## Narratives, Practices, and Structures

When embarking in historical-sociological research, scholars soon realize that the amount of data related to the subject matter is often potentially limitless. The case of the methodology proposed here did not escape this situation. The number of speeches, texts, news, and meaningful actions that could have been considered to determine the narratives and practices interacting in 1999-2011 was infinite. I therefore sought to collect data and analyze texts until no more major narratives emerged. In the re-construction of the practices, I then followed the events and actions emplotted by the main actors within each subject. As previously mentioned, the methodology followed three steps: guided-inductive synthetization of narratives; re-construction of practices and subjects; and analysis of structures. Consequently, in order to illustrate the findings from the analysis of data, this chapter proceeded in the following order: first, each regional narrative was described individually; second, the chapter characterized each practice and its interaction alongside the period that went from 1999 to 2011. Finally, the results of the interaction showed the structures present in 2011.

## Regional Narratives in 1999 and 2000

As I mentioned in other chapters, a narrative is a story that contains an auto-biography of the region and establishes different relationships with “others,” which can be other regions, other notions of the region, a past “other”, and whatever else was empirically established outside the boundaries delineated by the narrative. With the help and guide of this symbolic structure, four major regional narratives were observed contextually and intertextually between 1999 and 2000. These narratives established empirically the starting point for the analysis of practices. The following paragraphs described some of the characteristics and key component of each notion. These key elements were the basis of internal consistency for each narrative; the parts of the story that, if changed, created internal crises that could fracture the narrative. This section also showed a few examples from the texts analyzed in order to illustrate the concepts that structured the narratives and the relationship among them.

## Open Regionalism

The first narrative observed here was called international open-regionalism and it defined the region not with boundaries, but as inserted in the global market. Actors promoted this notion from several institutions in South America and the hemisphere, but the Free Trade Area of the Americas was, between 1999 and 2000, one of the most prominent platforms. Additionally, the same actors that signed the declarations of the FTAA included the World Trade Organization (WTO) in their agreements. Almost all countries in South America participated within these institutions and narrative. For example, the official declaration of the Ministerial meeting of Toronto in 1999 was signed by representatives of all the states of the Americas, except for Cuba, which was excluded from the agreement because it did not have a “democratic system.” Despite the agreement between almost all the governments of the Americas, the analysis of other texts and speeches showed different groups of countries with particular positions in the negotiations. For example, the United States was trying to push for a sooner finish date for the treaty. Additionally, the executive power of this country sought at the time to achieve a domestic “fast-track” that would allow the president to negotiate without the influence of the legislative power.[[182]](#footnote-182) Similarly, the governments of Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador were openly in support of the project. However, as the analysis of practices mentioned in the next section, the governments of Ecuador and Bolivia disengaged from this narrative in the first decade of the 2000s. On the other hand, Venezuela participated in the meetings and signed the agreements, but had several reservations. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay were also seeking to implement the treaty, but demanded more time to adjust. They also utilized MERCOSUR as a platform of negotiations. These positions were discussed more in detail in the following paragraphs, but it is important to notice here that, at this point, the open regional narrative included most states from South America and the United States. Since the analysis of data was limited to South America, I decided to exclude the Central American and Caribbean states from the individual analysis of positions *vis-à-vis* the narratives. On the contrary, the United States was included due to the importance that it acquired in the emplotment of its actions by all the practices present in the regional interaction.

The main characteristic of the open-regionalist definition of the region was that market liberalization was considered the root and basis of prosperity. Thus, as long as the law was respected and democracy protected, the nations of South America could find the solution of most problems in free commercial trade. The prosperous future of the region lay in the open connection of trade with the rest of the world.[[183]](#footnote-183) This notion, observed in several of the texts and speeches analyzed for this research, showed that the region was defined within globalization. Thus, liberalization was the path to prosperity, and it did not matter if it entailed bilateral, unilateral, hemispheric, or regional treaties.[[184]](#footnote-184) This underlying notion of a prosperous future for the region within the global market created permeable boundaries that sometimes appeared as delineating a “self” within the hemisphere. Other times, the narrative only delineated the hemisphere as a step towards global interdependence and openness, which left the region without boundaries. This ambiguity also derived from the close relationship between the institutions and agreements in which the actors promoted this narrative. As previously mentioned, the main agreement in which this narrative was found was the FTAA. However, the actors who were engaged in open regionalism connected this agreement with the WTO and other international institutions such as the IMF and the WB. This connection was established in the FTAA because the hemispheric treaty intended to shape the continent in tight consistency with the accords reached in the WTO.[[185]](#footnote-185) An example of these connections could be found in the official declaration of the FTAA in 1999.[[186]](#footnote-186) It is particularly interesting to note that this declaration intended to establish a difference between the FTAA and the WTO only by applying the WTO principles within a particular region in a different period. Thus, there was no boundary separating the region from the rest of the world; instead, the open regional narrative viewed the hemisphere as a place in which liberalization could happen with a different speed than in the WTO.[[187]](#footnote-187) Many other articles stressed the importance of liberalization and market access for the prosperity of the region. Many of them were speeches from governmental representatives of different countries in South America.[[188]](#footnote-188) These speeches showed that protectionism appeared as a past “other” in direct opposition to the prosperous future that free trade promoted. Additionally, this kind of policy appeared as the cause of most economic and social problems in developing countries.[[189]](#footnote-189) Thus, restrictions and intervention appeared as a dangerous “other” that prevented development because it contradicted the key element of this narrative, namely, open borders for commercial interactions. In this sense, the President of Venezuela Chávez was considered dangerous for his country because investors would not go into unfriendly states. This appeared in several statements by United States officers and representatives. They also delineated protectionism as part of the past of unsuccessful states that applied import substitution models during earlier decades.[[190]](#footnote-190)

The story told by this narrative also included a special position for the United States government as the guarantor of democratic order in the hemisphere. This was most clearly observable in some of the bilateral agreements that the United States government achieved with a few of the states of the region. For example, the President of Colombia and the Clinton administration negotiated a project in September, 1999, that would earmark 1.5 billion dollars towards the fight against drug cartels and guerrilla movements in Colombia. These problems were viewed by both administrations as weakening democracy in the region. Thus, the United States appeared as the solution of the problem and the guarantor of security.[[191]](#footnote-191) Overall, democracy and the respect of constitutional law appeared as important elements for prosperity in the region, and the United States was located as the guarantor of this order.[[192]](#footnote-192)

Another interesting characteristic of this narrative was that technical economic tools were understood as superior than politics. This characteristic, present in the speeches of the Ministers of Trade from different countries and the representatives of the WTO, showed that technical economic terms were viewed almost as politically neutral. On the contrary, politics involved a complicated and confrontational area in which representatives did not want to enter.[[193]](#footnote-193) This was also related to the importance given to the business sector, which was considered the main actor of development. On the contrary, the government just needed to create friendly environments where democracy and the rule of law promoted the work of entrepreneurs in different countries.

The notion of “others” built within this definition of the region included not only protectionist narratives, but also those who sought to build sub-regional projects. These projects appeared as an “other” that could cooperate and participate with open regionalism as long as they sought liberalization. However, they were considered an “other” because, unlike open regionalism in the FTAA or the WTO, they sought their own interests and could potentially fall into more protectionist policies. For example, United States Trade Representative reacted when MERCOSUR achieved more strength in 1999 and started working towards sub-regional relations with the European Union.[[194]](#footnote-194) Then, The United States representative affirmed that the FTAA and the WTO deserved full attention.[[195]](#footnote-195)

The notion of the past in this narrative included the aforementioned protectionist “other” and also the perception of a successful process of development for the nations that applied free trade to develop. The former applied to the unsuccessful past of the region and was viewed as the cause of poverty in South America. The later was applied more generally to the world, but it also included the experience of Chile as a country that started liberalizing its economy in the 1970s. When democracy returned, however, the benefits of liberalization started to become more prominent and development took off.

Another characteristic present in this narrative was the relationship that it established with the indigenous narrative. This narrative appeared as an additional opposing “other.” However, in this case the dangerous aspects of this narrative emerged from their opposition to liberalization and their actions of protests and “subversion.” During 1999 and 2000, the governments of the countries in the region mainly built a notion of an indigenous “other” that acted outside constitutional and institutional order to prevent progress. There were two salient examples of this perception of the indigenous narrative. The first example was found in the Ecuadorian conflict between the government of President Mahuad and the indigenous movement led by Antonio Vargas in September, 2000. In this conflict, Vargas led a massive protest against the dollarization of the economy, the privatization of public companies, and for the rights of the indigenous people of Ecuador. In this context, the United States and the Organization of the American States rejected the movement as intent of a coup d’état. They affirmed that they would apply sanctions and even isolate Ecuador.[[196]](#footnote-196) The other event that showed this understanding of the indigenous narrative as an opposing “other” was the protest in Bolivia against water privatization in April, 2000. In these events, the President of the nation, Hugo Banzer Suárez, declared state of siege because the indigenous movements were subverting the democratic order.[[197]](#footnote-197)

Finally, the last “other” that open regionalism had, was the socialist narrative. In this case, the narrative also understood its “other” as a teleological opposition and a danger to development. According to the data collected in the first step of the analysis, the open regional narrative understood socialism as a protectionist policy and a danger for democracy.[[198]](#footnote-198)

In summary, this narrative viewed the prosperous future for the region within liberalization and an open connection with the rest of the world through trade, which would lead to modern development. The story told by the actors engaged in open regionalism understood that successful countries took this path in the past and were now benefiting their people with more opportunities and welfare. The “others” that this narrative emplotted were those who represented protectionism or a danger to democratic order as understood within representative systems. This included the socialist and indigenous narratives, but it also entailed a past “other” within the model of import substitution in the 1960s. Thus, the key component of this narrative was the notion of liberalization as the basis of prosperity. This element was non-negotiable for the open regional definition of the world because it connected all the pieces of the story together inside the idea of modern progress through liberalization. Appendix 2 compiled the results from the data analysis about the open-regional narrative in South America.

## Moderate regionalism

The second narrative that emerged in the inductive step of the data analysis was called South American moderate regionalism.[[199]](#footnote-199) At first, the texts that were showing the story told by this narrative in 1999 and 2000 were blending together with open- regionalism. As more data was gathered and more texts analyzed, some of the characteristics that emerged defined the region differently, which separated both narratives. Notwithstanding, the ambiguous borders between both narratives remained until the practice interaction showed the influence of other subjects in the first decade of the 2000s.[[200]](#footnote-200) I broached this subject in later sections; here I described the close connection between both narratives and some of their differences.

The proximity that these narratives had was found in some of the developmental ideas that they shared in 1999 and 2000. The underlying idea for the future was, for both narratives, the modern notion of development. Additionally, in both cases, liberalization seemed to be part of that path to prosperity, but there were differences in the degree of openness they sought and, in the case of the moderate narrative, there were important boundaries within South America, which separated the region from the rest of the world. On the one hand, the open regional narrative viewed the region as one territory with the entire hemisphere and even this boundary was only related to the time-line of the treaty, rather than specific qualities. Thus, the hemisphere was understood as a step towards an openly connected world. On the other hand, the moderate narrative viewed South America region as a platform of negotiation to preserve and protect the perceived interests of its members. Thus, liberalization was an important tool for prosperity, but was not the defining characteristic of the region. Notwithstanding, the idea of liberalization was present in the notion of the future for the region and, even though the moderate narrative promoted cooperation first within South America, the connection with the rest of the world remained present as an element that weakened the boundaries of the “self.”[[201]](#footnote-201)

Some of the most important differences between the narratives can be best understood by describing the characteristics and actors of the moderate narrative. First, the actors most engaged in this narrative were Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. The governments of these countries sought to promote the idea of a region with boundaries in South America and possible future connections to the rest of Latin America. The Government of Brazil, for example, organized the First Presidential Summit of South America, which started delineating boundaries within South America and included many elements of integration that went beyond liberalization. Likewise, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay promoted - together with Brazil - this idea of regionalism within MERCOSUR. They also sought to integrate the region by connecting MERCOSUR and CAN. Overall, this idea of the region was most observable within MERCOSUR, the First Presidential Summit of South America, ALADI, and CEPAL. However, CAN appeared to shape the region within this narrative as well. Despite the close engagement of the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia with the open regional narrative, the institution of CAN sought to delineate boundaries within the South American Cone. This phenomenon was related to the contest between the moderate narrative and the open regional narrative in South America, as well as the ambiguity that the idea of liberalization created during these years for the region.

In these institutions and summits, the governments of the countries of South America sought to promote the moderate regional story, which delineated boundaries that were observed in the idea of a region that cooperated in several aspects because it had a common past and future. The shared past was understood within the notion of a common genesis in the struggle of several heroes for independence and integration. One of the most commonly shared images was the struggle of Simón Bolívar and his project of a united South America within the *Antifictiónico* Congress of Panama in 1826.[[202]](#footnote-202) Several documents from MERCOSUR, CAN, the First Presidential Summit of South America, ALADI, and CEPAL showed this idea of a shared past. In this notion, other heroes such as San Martín, José Gervasio Artigas, and Mariscal Sucre, were included within the same idea of regional patriotism, independence, and integration. This common past also connected South America to the rest of Latin America, but at his time, the narrative observed in MERCOSUR, CAN, and the First Presidential Summit of South America limited the region to the area south of Panama. The connection with the rest of Latin America appeared, at this time, within the idea of a possible future articulation. Hence, South American boundaries were prioritized first as an immediate project and possibility, especially in the context of the First Presidential Summit of South America.

Within this notion of a region limited inside the Southern part of the Americas, the characteristics of the perception of the future also delineated an excluding “self,” but it was in this area that the boundaries became more permeable and ambiguous. The first characteristic was the importance of several elements of regional cooperation that went beyond liberalization. Even though the project stressed the necessity to connect CAN and MERCOSUR within a South American Free Trade Area, the narrative considered many elements of integration that were perceived to protect the region’s future. These ideas were accounted as part of the story that went from the common past of the heroes of independence to the future of regional development.[[203]](#footnote-203) Thus, the future was conceived within a region that cooperated in several areas to create a platform in order to reach modern development. In general, the regional moderate narrative understood its future as a platform that cooperated in areas such as education, economy, health, consolidation of democracy, traditional security matters, political dialogue, human rights, environmental care of natural resources, technology, infrastructure, and energy. This notion of a common future as a platform that allowed the region to integrate the globalized world with negotiating power to protect its development was perceived through the connection of MERCOSUR and CAN. For example, in the Presidential Summit of CAN, the presidents of the member countries addressed this issue and mentioned that the articulation with MERCOSUR was a key component of development.[[204]](#footnote-204)

Some of these elements of cooperation for a common region deserve individual treatment. For example, in the official declaration of the Presidential Summit of South America, it was possible to observe the importance of a common strategy to fight poverty.[[205]](#footnote-205) This statement, also illustrated that the market did not appear as the only solution of economic problems. Instead, the responsibility was adjudicated to the governments of South America. This did not mean that more protectionist policies were viewed at this time as a solution for regional problems. Nonetheless, the statement partially illustrated the different degrees of trust in liberalization in the region. In addition, MERCOSUR and CAN sought to strengthen democracy in the region. Politics still had an important role in this goal. Another example of cooperation in the region was the environmental proposals. In this sense, the region sought to establish common positions to solve the problem.[[206]](#footnote-206) Other propositions were included as well.[[207]](#footnote-207) All these areas of cooperation delineated a common future for South America with approaches for shared problems and development. Conversely, the open regional narrative viewed the solution of all these problems in the hemisphere within the benefits of economic growth brought by liberalization.

One of the other differences between this narrative and the open regional narrative was the conception of its “others.” For those actors engaged in the moderate narrative, the open regional definition of the region appeared as an “other” with which cooperation was possible as long as their idea of development was respected.[[208]](#footnote-208) Part of this construction of open regionalism as an “other” with which South America could cooperate under certain conditions was related also to the separation that the moderate narrative established between themselves and developed nations. They viewed the developed nations as promoting open regionalism, but then applying different policies domestically.[[209]](#footnote-209) Thus, while the open regional narrative asseverated that liberalization under any form was beneficial, the moderate narrative understood that this process had to be taken in balance, fairness, and under certain conditions. Furthermore, while open regionalism understood sub-regionalism as potentially dangerous when applying protectionist policies, the moderates understood that liberalization was potentially dangerous when it was unbalanced and against regional development. These critiques, mostly related to the subsidies in developed countries for agricultural products, appeared in several declarations of MERCOSUR, CAN, and the Presidential Summit of South America. The importance of these critiques lay in the separation of the region and the understanding of the possible dangers of open regionalism. Another area in which open regionalism appeared as dangerous to the moderate narrative was the financial world.[[210]](#footnote-210) All in all, it was possible to observe that South America had its own boundaries as a platform of integration for modern development inside of globalization. The following segment illustrated this relationship between the South American moderate narrative and open regionalism: “Within a framework of fairness and equilibrium, that assures access of South American exports to other markets, the presidents of South America decided to intensify their coordination of common negotiating positions in other international fora and agreements.”[[211]](#footnote-211) CAN expressed something similar in its Presidential Meeting of 1999.[[212]](#footnote-212) Finally, the Presidents of MERCOSUR “…point out that MERCOSUR is a fundamental tool for the economic and social development of its members. It also constitutes a successful answer to globalization and its challenges for the future.[[213]](#footnote-213)

The other interesting characteristic of this narrative was that, since democracy appeared as a foundational principle for the region, neither the socialist nor the indigenous narrative appeared as “others.” Due to the goal of uniting the region within democracy, the narrative of the moderates avoided differentiating itself based on the political projects of particular countries or social sectors of the region.[[214]](#footnote-214) This did not mean that there were no differences between the narratives, nor did it entail that the socialist and indigenous narratives saw the moderates as a similar “other.” It simply meant that the moderates viewed the region as one within democracy and cooperation in several areas. Thus, they included all national political projects and social sectors as participating of a common past and future. In the next section, I showed that in particular occasions, this ambiguous assimilation of the indigenous and socialist narratives had tensions that were sometimes unsolvable. This was observed, for example, in the interaction of the moderate states with the indigenous movements of Bolivia supporting the ancestral rights of chewing coca leaves.

In general, the ambiguous limits of the “self” in the moderate narrative still established boundaries in South America, but left room for connections with globalization under certain circumstances. The ideational basis for this close relationship and the ambiguity of the moderate narrative was the underlying notion of modern progress. This notion was shared by both definitions of the region, but the moderate narrative did not necessarily understand liberalization as the key tool to achieve this path. This tension in the center of the moderate narrative was one of the most interesting aspects of this regional perception, which allowed for transformation to happen in its near future and in the interaction with other practices. Moreover, the key element of the moderate narrative was modern progress and development. The tools utilized to reach this future could be modified, but the idea of an ascending line of progress was non-negotiable. Appendix 4 summarized the characteristics of the moderate narrative.

## Socialist Regionalism

The third narrative that defined the story of the region was called Latin American Socialism.[[215]](#footnote-215) The actor most engaged in this narrative during 1999 and 2000 was President Hugo Chávez from Venezuela. Other actors, such as Lula Da Silva from Brazil, unions, students’ movements, and workers’ organizations throughout the South also opposed open regionalism with certain similarities to this narrative. However, they saw the future solution of these problems within the limits of their nations. In later years, several of these actors started engaging in this narrative.

Similar to the other narratives, there are internal differences within the socialist narrative. However, in order to trace the interaction of the major narratives shaping the region, I decided to concentrate on a more broad characterization of the narrative to include most factions. Additionally, the internal divisions of the socialist practice did not appear in the empirical observation as relevant elements of the interaction of practices. For example, unlike the indigenous subject, there were no major fractures within the socialist subject that would show a weakening process due to internal tensions in the definition of the region. Moreover, during 1999 and 2000, the socialist narrative for the region appeared most represented by the government of Venezuela and, as previously mentioned; most of the similar notions of the past perceived the future within each national reality. Thus, the complexity of the socialist narrative of South America increased in later years of the 2000s, but at the time, it was most clearly advocated by Chávez and his government.

One of the most interesting elements of this narrative was the notion of the past that it delineated for the region. Similar to the moderate narrative, the socialist past included the two hundred years that passed since the first struggles for independence and integration within the region. However, the moderate narrative focused first in South America as a platform and then included possibilities of articulation with the rest of Latin America. On the contrary, the boundary of the region in the socialist notion was expanded to include all the nations of South America, Central America, and the Caribbean.[[216]](#footnote-216) In this sense, President Chávez connected the past struggle for “true” integration and independence with the necessity of a united future in Latin America and the Caribbean.[[217]](#footnote-217) These observations showed the notion of a common past for the entire region of Latin America, but they also showed another element that appeared in several texts and speeches. Unlike the moderate narrative, the socialist story of the region emphasized the continuous struggle against colonialism and exploitation. The past of the region was not only a sequence of efforts to integrate and seek autonomy; it was also a direct struggle for independence from exploiting “others.”[[218]](#footnote-218) This notion of exploitation entailed the extraction of surplus from the region by developed countries, which included not only Europe, but also the United States. The latter appeared most clearly defined as an exploiting “other” in the past struggles of Cuba and the examples of José Martí as another hero of independence for Latin America.

 Another element of this notion of the past connected with the future of the region was the idea of a “true” integration. In this sense, integration took a different shape that sought cooperation in several areas, which did not focus only on free trade agreements. Furthermore, autonomy and sovereignty were much more prominent elements in this narrative than in the moderate narrative. Thus, the exclusion and opposition of open regionalism was explicit. It was unambiguously included in every aspect of the narrative. Conversely, the moderate narrative viewed the open regional narrative as an “other” with which it was possible to cooperate.[[219]](#footnote-219) Overall, the statements collected as data connected the dangers of the Latin American exploited past to the necessity of a new future with an integration based on a geopolitical platform that defended sovereignty in the region. This perception of the future in the region had several characteristics, which fit within the notions of modernization, transformation, development, and progress.[[220]](#footnote-220)

Another characteristic of this narrative’s notion of the future was the importance of regional identity. Regionalism was not understood only by its economic benefits, it also entailed an idea of regional passion and sense of belonging. This created a notion of regionalism with a strong boundary for Latin America, not only as a strategic geopolitical zone, but also as a cultural area of affinity.[[221]](#footnote-221) Similarly, the socialist narrative for the region sought to go beyond the technical terms of open regionalism. Thus, it promoted an idea of deep political, cultural, and economic integration.

In this notion of a “self” that went from its past genesis to its prosperous modern future, the narrative located “others” in different teleological positions. As previously mentioned, the open regional story appeared as an opposing “other” and an obstacle for regional transformation. Thus, economic liberalization was only conceived as beneficial when applied within the region and under other social principles such as equality and welfare. Otherwise, when integration focused only on liberalization and within open regionalism, the narrative understood that only the rich sectors of society benefited, while poverty increased for most of the people of the region. This aspect of the narrative showed the construction of open regionalism as an opposing “other” in the past as well. Within the socialist narrative, open regionalism appeared as the cause of poverty and inequality in the region during the 1990s. Furthermore, the economic model advocated by this understanding seemed to be a continuation of the exploitation that the region had been struggling against since the early 1800s. Thus, regional socialism emerged as a solution to the present and past dangers of open regionalism. This opposition to the open regional story was the most easily observable aspect of the narrative in 1999 and 2000. Furthermore, this critique was the connecting point between the regional socialist narrative and the national critiques of open regionalism. This connection and similarity was important in order to understand the engagement of other actors in the socialist narrative in the later years of the 2000s. During 1999 and 2000 several social movements, unions, worker’s organizations, and activist were protesting in many countries against structural adjustments, the FTAA, and the United States intervention in the region. Their critiques towards open regionalism and United States’ intervention included a perception of the region in trouble and a common past of struggle against exploitation. When, however, they started talking about solutions and future projects, in most cases, they focused on the national level. Lula Da Silva, for example, participated in protests against neoliberalism and structural adjustments, but his propositions were directly oriented towards President Cardoso and Brazil.[[222]](#footnote-222) Another example of this critique was the coordinated protests against neoliberalism in eleven countries of South America. These protests were first organized in 1995, but they continued to mobilize people every year around October 12, which was the date that Columbus first stepped on American soil.[[223]](#footnote-223) Other expressions that included similar critiques were the protests in Colombia against the visit of the United States President Clinton and the promotion of the FTAA.[[224]](#footnote-224) Unlike the national orientation of these protests and expressions, the regional socialist narrative focused on the shape of integration and the common future of all the countries of Latin America. Within the specificity of this narrative, the open regional narrative was understood as a threat due to two main reasons. First, liberalization appeared as a strategy of exploitation and the cause of poverty in the region.[[225]](#footnote-225) Second, autonomy and self-determination for the region were important to sustain the process of transformation towards a socially fair form of modern development. From this perspective, the actions by the United States in the region were viewed as interferences and domination. For example, the aid given to Colombia to fight the guerrilla movement called “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” (FARC) was conceived as a strategy of militarization in South America. In this sense, Chávez stated that the work in Colombia implied the “Vietnamization” of the region.[[226]](#footnote-226) This idea of intervention was connected in the narrative to the need of autonomy for the region. However, the President also connected it to a worldwide perspective of pluri-polarity and international democracy.[[227]](#footnote-227)

The second “other” constructed by the socialist regional narrative was the moderate story of South America. In this case, cooperation was possible as long as integration sought to go beyond the ideas of free trade agreements. Thus, the already existing mechanisms of MERCOSUR, ALADI, and CAN were important for the future of the region, but they needed to include more elements and political issues.[[228]](#footnote-228) Overall, the opposing elements that the socialist notion had in relationship to the moderate narrative were centered in the closeness that the latter shared at that time with the open regional narrative. On the other hand, both narratives shared a notion of a deeper form of integration for modern development and a common past, which brought them closer together. This allowed for cooperation in particular circumstances. Additionally, their underlying notion of the future included, in both cases, the perception of the path of development within modernist terms. Thus, the future desired within their programs entailed an ascending line of progress and development. However, despite these similarities, the degrees of critical notions in each narrative were different. For example, the ambiguity of the moderate narrative about the boundaries of the region was not present in the socialist narrative.

The third “other” that this notion of the region built was the indigenous narrative. In this case, socialist regionalism located the indigenous narrative as an “other” with whom cooperation was necessary. In this sense, the indigenous view of the region had to be included and understood to define the region. However, the most important aspect of this teleological position was related not so much to the definition of the future, but to a perception of a shared past of struggle against exploitation. On the other hand, the notion of the future in relationship to this narrative was viewed as a connection through the respect of their nationality inside of modernization and development. Venezuela, for example, redefined the nation as a “pluri-ethnic and pluri-cultural society.”[[229]](#footnote-229) At the same time, the Government sought to promote industrialization and modernization.[[230]](#footnote-230)

In summary, the socialist narrative for the region defined South America as part of the shared story of Latin America. This story, understood the nations of the region within a path of struggle against exploitation and towards a deeply political integration that could reinforce autonomy and development for modern transformation. Thus, this narrative’s key component was the notion of a future within modern and fair progress, which would be reached through a transformation away from past exploitation. Appendix 4 summarized the characteristics of this narrative.

## Indigenous regionalism

Finally, the fourth narrative was the indigenous notion of the region. This was one of the most difficult narratives to observe in 1999 and 2000. One of the reasons for this difficulty was the sheer lack of indigenous texts in the Internet before 2005.[[231]](#footnote-231) Another reason was that, at first, most of the speeches by indigenous leaders appeared mixed with the critique of structural adjustment programs and privatization processes in different states of South America. Additionally, many of the texts that had fragments of indigenous notions were located in the same declarations of organization and protests in different countries. Therefore, many of the texts seemed to be part of the nationalist approaches of the problems of open regionalism. Notwithstanding, there were several elements that separated this narrative from the socialist perspective and created a different understanding of the region. One of the most important elements was the notion of affinity between different indigenous communities in the entire region. Underlying the critique of the problems of different countries by indigenous leaders, there was a perception of a supra-national common future and past for all the indigenous communities of Latin America. The notion of the past included the idea of oppression and segregation. This was similar to the notion of the socialist narrative. However, for the indigenous story of the region, the history of oppression and struggle did not begin in the 1800s. Instead, it had its origin in October 12, 1492, when Christopher Columbus and other Europeans stepped into the Americas for the first time. Additionally, the past of the region, according to the indigenous narrative, included more than exploitation. The socialist narrative understood the domination of the region mostly through the idea of the extraction of surplus and political interference. Adversely, the indigenous narrative viewed the past as a continuous process that included not only exploitation, but also oppression and annihilation of their people. Furthermore, the nations that reached independence in the 1800s were also considered as part of these mechanisms of oppression used by European descendants.[[232]](#footnote-232) One example of this understanding of the past can be observed in the following statement: “Latin America is going to explode at any moment. Not right now, but if national governments do not start recapitulating and thinking about what is happening… We are sick and tired of being treated like trash. We no longer want to beg. We no longer want to be humiliated. We want respect and dignity. If Governments do not listen there will be an indigenous rising because when the wheel starts to role, it means that something is starting.”[[233]](#footnote-233) Similarly to other texts and speeches, this fragment showed some of the elements that were previously mentioned. One of these elements was the notion of a past of oppression within nations. Another element was the notion of a common rising in the future of the indigenous people of Latin America. Finally, together with other texts and statements, these segments showed another important quality of this narrative. The indigenous understanding of Latin America viewed the future of the region not so much as part of a modernist ascending line of progress and development, but as a future of respect and dignity within their ancestral ways of life. These elements of the narrative were called here indigenism. In other words, the indigenous narrative did not appear as seeking industrialization or modern economic development. Instead, they sought to find dignity and respect for their costumes, traditions, and cultures. This separated the narrative from the other three definitions of Latin America, which had as their key components the underlying idea of modern progress. It is important to notice here that this notion was not observed as a pure anti-modern narrative. On the contrary, this differentiation appeared as a matter of emphasis. Hence, the indigenous notion did not always oppose development; they viewed it as beneficial as long as it was comprehended within their ancestral traditions and towards non-exploiting relationships. This became clearer in the analysis of practices that was described below.[[234]](#footnote-234)

Another aspect of this narrative, often misunderstood, was that this emphasis of ancestral traditions over development did not mean, in 1999 and 2000, that the indigenous narrative was opposing material welfare. On the contrary, material welfare was understood also within this idea of dignity and tradition. Thus, the indigenous narrative sought to achieve land reform and access to the natural resources that were stolen from them in their past of oppression. This was most clearly present in the protests that indigenous movements organized against the process of privatization of water in Bolivia. In this sense, the indigenous leader Quispe, from El Alto, Bolivia, stated in support of Evo Morales, that they were fighting for “traditions, water, land, and coca leaves.”[[235]](#footnote-235)

This notion of a future struggle for indigenous respect and dignity in Latin America included also the goal of national autonomy for each ethnic group. At the time, for example, many indigenous groups of Brazil, organized protests around April 22, 2000, which was when Portuguese colonizers first entered their territory in 1500. In this occasion, the indigenous groups demanded that the Government of President Cardoso grant them territorial rights. This entailed the right to rule their territory based on different laws and traditions.[[236]](#footnote-236) The same demand was observed around the indigenous protests of Ecuador in 2000, when indigenous leader José Vargas organized massive protests mainly against the privatization of natural resources and the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy. However, one of his demands included the territorial autonomy rights of indigenous communities.[[237]](#footnote-237)

In the analysis of data, there were two more characteristics that were parts of the indigenous story for the region. First, it was relevant to notice that the indigenous narrative had during 1999 and 2000 a very special notion of environmentalism.[[238]](#footnote-238) In their statements, the importance of equilibrium with earth in the utilization of natural resources appeared as part of a religious figure. This indigenous notion of environmentalism was part of the story for the region because it was an important aspect of the religious tradition of most indigenous communities in South America. An example of this view was observed in many of the Andean indigenous groups that talked about the respect to *Pachamama* (Mother Earth) and the necessity to live in balance with her. In both cases, environmentalism entailed a notion of deep respect for the natural resources that the indigenous groups sought to keep or recuperate and it was understood within the equilibrium of the relationship among humans and Mother Earth. These aspects of indigenous environmentalism created a conflict with, not only the open regional notion of the future, but also with the idea of modern development by the moderate and socialist narratives. The care of Mother Earth and the notions of equilibrium opposed in several occasions the utilization of factors of production under the economic growth logic.[[239]](#footnote-239) Moreover, in this narrative, the notions of traditions, costumes, dignity, and environmentalism were all prioritized over modernist development. This was a key difference between the indigenous definition of Latin America and the other narratives, which brought tension in several occasions in the process of interaction.

The second element that distinguished this narrative in 1999 and 2000 was the form of the struggles for the re-definition of Latin America. Unlike all the other narratives of regionalism in South America, the indigenous narrative sought to reach its prosperous future through paths that were, in many cases, outside the constitutionally legal or institutionally plausible realm. For example, José Vargas mentioned the following in an interview during the protests in Ecuador: “We are willing to do anything, this struggle is definitive. We know the government’s strategy. They will imprison leaders or kill them. We are willing to do anything at this point.”[[240]](#footnote-240) Another example of the characteristic of the indigenous struggle for their prosperous future could be found in several statements by Morales in the context of the protests against the eradication of Coca leaves in Bolivia in 2000.[[241]](#footnote-241) Additionally, the following example illustrates the connection of these forms of struggle with the past story of oppression: “We've had enough of oppression. We want change in our lives. And some of us are prepared to die for this because death is better than tyranny.”[[242]](#footnote-242) These tools of protest were perceived as necessary due to the level of oppression suffered by the indigenous people of Latin America for 500 years.

Overall, one of the best examples of texts connecting several of the previously mentioned elements can be observed in some of the segments of the Indigenous Declaration of Santiago de Chile. The following segment, for example, showed the connection between racism, occidental ideologies, colonialism, and slavery in the past and present story of the indigenous people of South America: “We declare that racism, discrimination, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance have structured the societal relationship between the occidental society of America and the indigenous people. This is a historic problem with deep roots in the colonialism and slavery that started with the invasion of 1492 and continues today. This structure negates the rights to self-determination for the indigenous people of America.”[[243]](#footnote-243) This statement also illustrated the importance of a future of self-determination for this narrative.[[244]](#footnote-244)

Similar to the three aforementioned narratives of the region, the indigenous story also constructed different teleological positions for its “others.” The first “other” for the indigenous narrative was open regionalism. This narrative appeared as an opposing “other” with the United States as its main promoter. The dangerous aspect of this narrative was the privatization of natural resources and the notion of invasion. The aforementioned water war in Bolivia exemplified this understanding. There, the right to access Pachamama was taken away with laws by the governments and the privatization of natural resources. During 1999 and 2000, most of the expressions of this aspect had more national notions of the future, but they also connected most of their national situations to other similar events in the countries of the region.[[245]](#footnote-245) This connection became clearer when Morales was elected president of Bolivia and started promoting the idea of “good life” inside of regional institutions. Notwithstanding, as one of the previously cited statement expressed, the notion of a common Latin American past and future was still present in the struggle for indigenism. Another example of this notion about open regionalism was found in the previously mentioned case of the Ecuadorian protests against privatization and the dollarization of the economy. Additionally, unlike the other narratives, the indigenous story of the region located the moderate narrative as part of the open regional narrative.[[246]](#footnote-246) In this sense, the moderate regional understanding appeared as part of the history of oppression and the future of privatization or liberalization. Both narratives were thus considered part of the same process, in which modern development had excluded the indigenous people of Latin America.[[247]](#footnote-247)

The last “other” created by the indigenous story of the region was the socialist narrative. As previously mentioned, these narratives shared many elements in the idea of the past of exploitation and colonialism. Although there were differences in the definition of oppression, both narratives viewed the past as unfair. This notion brought them together for a “different” future. The indigenous notion sought respect and autonomy in their ancestral ways, whereas the socialist narrative sought more socially just and industrialist development for the region. Nonetheless, during most of the protests for land reform and against the open regional actions, these narratives acted together focusing on the idea of the unfair past. The protests organized against Cardoso by the Landless Movement in Brazil served as an example of this cooperation and notion of similarity. Another example could be seen in the aforementioned work of Morales, Quispe, and miner’s unions of Bolivia in 2000.

In summary, the indigenous narrative viewed the region as part of a process of oppression that continued in 1999 and 2000. The prosperous future of the region would be reached through any tools necessary and it entailed autonomy for the indigenous communities. This right of self-determination for the indigenous groups was understood within the respect of their ancestral traditions, territories, natural resources, languages, and religion. These were the key components of the indigenous narrative (indigenism), which connected the past of oppression and the future of transformation. However, this regional metamorphosis did not emphasize the modernization of society; instead, it prioritized the recuperation of their ancestral ways of life and dignity. Within this notion, cooperation was only possible, at the time, with the socialist narrative, which shared the idea of an unfair past of oppression and a necessary future of transformation. In later years, the change of the moderate narrative brought the indigenous and socialist narratives partially under the umbrella of moderate regionalism. This close relationship between the indigenous narrative and other notions that emphasized modernization created internal tensions for the indigenous subject. Now, they had to decide whether to continue prioritizing tradition and autonomy, or to give modernist development supremacy. This was described in more detail in the next section. Appendix 5 summarized the main characteristics of the indigenous narrative.

## Symbolic regional practices in South America in the years 1999-2011

The definition of practices is still an open discussion within social sciences. As the previous chapter showed, some authors trace practices empirically with the subjective consideration of previous events as successful antecedents of another action. Others construct practices with the objective interpretation of actions. In the case of this research, I utilized the concept of emplotment. This definition entailed the subjective and empirical inclusion of actions within a narrative. This idea of emplotment allowed for a more open re-construction of practices. For example, actors could emplot not only their actions and speeches, but also institutions, historic events, or even past actions. Thus, the introduction of all these elements into the narrative alongside time constituted the practices of regionalism in South America and showed its processes of reinforcement or transformation. In this section of the chapter, I described the four main practices of regionalism in South America and their interaction between 1999 and 2011.

## Open regionalism: a declining practice and a major “other”

In order to delineate each practice systematically, I first described their process of emplotment and the elements of the practice that were included in the narrative. Second, I displayed the characteristics of the practice alongside time, which included the actors forming the subject, different qualities, actions, events, and interactions with other practices.

Overall, the practice of open regionalism in South America included events and actions mainly through three connected types of subjective emplotment. The first type of empirical connection entailed the introduction of different elements into the overall narrative. The second type of emplotment incorporated new elements by viewing them as connected to successful antecedents. In other words, present actions became parts of the practice because they were conceived as connected to the subject’s past. Finally, the third connection of the sequence of actions in this practice was the emplotment of the FTAA and other free trade agreements as key tools for the construction of a prosperous future. This subjective introduction of elements constituted the empirical glue that re-constructed the flux of open regional actions between 1999 and 2011. Moreover, in most of the cases where this emplotment was observed, all three elements were present at the same time connecting the events with the entire open regional story.

This process of emplotment was mostly observed in the official declarations of the FTAA, bilateral agreements, and governmental statements. For example, the United States official statement about the bilateral free trade agreement signed with Colombia mentioned the following: “An agreement with Colombia is an essential component of our regional strategy to advance free trade within our hemisphere, combat narco-trafficking, build democratic institutions, and promote economic development. In addition to eliminating tariffs, Colombia will remove barriers to trade in services, provide a secure, predictable legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Colombia…”[[248]](#footnote-248) In this fragment of the statement, the United States Representative of Trade connected the bilateral agreement with a broader regional strategy that included the fight against drug trafficking and the bolstering of democratic institutions. In another part of the same statement, the United States representative emplotted this particular treaty within the story of every other bilateral, multilateral, and hemispheric free trade agreement in which they participated.[[249]](#footnote-249) This statement represents a good example of emplotment within the practice of open regionalism. In the context of this bilateral treaty, in 2006, both governments connected the FTAA, the WTO, and all other bilateral agreements inside an overall project of liberalization and globalization. Together, these two fragments of the statement partly illustrated the existence of the open regionalist practice with all three of the previously mentioned types of emplotment. Another good example of the emplotment of the FTAA and bilateral agreements could be observed in the joint statement by the governments of United States and Peru about their free trade agreement.[[250]](#footnote-250) Similar to the other declarations, this press release illustrated the connection of the FTAA, bilateral agreements, and globalization, together with the broader strategy of liberalization. Overall, important cases of emplotment were observed in all the individual ministerial and presidential declarations of the FTAA, which did not only include their agreements in the open regional narrative, but also mentioned past actions as successful antecedents.[[251]](#footnote-251) Overall, the institutionalized nature of the actors participating in this agreement made the observation of emplotment easier than, for example, the indigenous practice.

One of the most interesting characteristics of the practice of open regionalism was that it acted as a partial master narrative in the early years of the 2000s. During this time, all the states of South America were partially engaged in this practice. Moreover, other practices promoted this narrative as well. For example, the moderate practice supported the FTAA under particular ideas of development. Notwithstanding, the actors most engaged in the promotion and reinforcement of the open regional practice were the governments of the United States, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador. These actors formed the subject of the open regional practice. This was observable in their individual actions towards the promotion of this practice in several areas. For example, the United States advocated open regionalism not only within the FTAA, but also with bilateral agreements of security and liberalization in the region. Colombia sought to deepen open regionalism in 1999 by requiring help form the United States in the struggle against drug cartels and guerrilla movements that weakened democracy.[[252]](#footnote-252) The government of this country also signed a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States in 2006.[[253]](#footnote-253) The government of Hugo Suárez Banzer in Bolivia was also working in 1999 and 2000 with the support of the United States for the eradication of coca leaves and the elimination of drug cartels. This was conceived as a key tool of institutional strengthening for the democratic system of Bolivia.[[254]](#footnote-254) They were also working towards a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States.[[255]](#footnote-255) The Government of Chile signed a bilateral free trade agreement in 2004 with the United States and supported the 2003 finish date for the FTAA in several occasions.[[256]](#footnote-256) The government of Peru signed a free trade promotion agreement in 2006 and also supported the free trade agreement between the United States and CAN.[[257]](#footnote-257) Finally, the government of Ecuador was, at the time, also negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States and supporting the 2003 deadline for the FTAA.[[258]](#footnote-258) Unlike these actors, the other governments and social movements of the region were most engaged in other practices. This was described in detail below, but it is important to note here that the overall situation for the open regional narrative in the early 2000s showed that most of the governments of South America were shaping the region within the FTAA. All the states of South America, for example, signed the agreements of the FTAA until later years, when Chávez started to resist the agreement alone.

In 1999, this practice promoted open regionalism in at least three important occasions. The first action of this practice in the region entailed a critical interaction with the moderate practice. In the context of the negotiations between the MERCOSUR and the EU to increase bilateral ties among the two sub-regional organization, the United States emplotted the event and stated that Brazil was getting distracted from what was really important: the FTAA and the WTO.[[259]](#footnote-259) Moreover, the United States mentioned: “globalization was a system from which no nation would be able to hide behind trade barriers.”[[260]](#footnote-260) This action of emplotment and critique showed the underlying contests between some of the aspects of both practices. The second action reinforcing this practice in 1999 was the aforementioned negotiations between the United States and Colombia to fight drug cartels and increase security in the region.[[261]](#footnote-261) The interesting aspect of this action was that both countries reinforced the notion of the United States as the protector of democratic order in the region. Thus, the open regionalist practice saw this agreement as part of the United States right to protect democracy and trade in the region.

The third action emplotted within this practice in 1999 was the FTAA ministerial meeting of November in Toronto. The official declaration of this meeting reinforced the open regional notion and sought to promote this narrative in the hemisphere. All the governments of the South American countries signed this declaration, where liberalization and openness appeared as the key component of the prosperous future of the region.[[262]](#footnote-262) In the second article of this declaration, it was possible to observe the emplotment of previous meetings of the FTAA and the consistency with the WTO as parts of the practice.[[263]](#footnote-263) As the analysis of narratives showed, the practice of open regionalism viewed trade as the underlying solution of most problems and the main component of the definition of the “self.”[[264]](#footnote-264) However, the previously mentioned security policies were emplotted as the institutional basis that was necessary for trade to have a “friendly” environment.

In the following year, the Government of the United States convoked the Government of Chile to sign a bilateral free trade agreement.[[265]](#footnote-265) The moderate subject, who was a few days away from signing Chile’s full membership into MERCOSUR, did not take this action positively. Notwithstanding, the United States initiative began to create a stronger engagement of Chile with the open regional practice. Later that same year, for example, Chile supported the United States proposal to shorten the time of negotiations and change the FTAA’s finish date from 2005 to 2003. On the contrary, Brazil and Argentina criticized this initiative and mentioned that they needed more time to adapt.[[266]](#footnote-266)

In the following year, there were two major actions of reinforcement for the open regionalist practice. First, in April, 2001, the open regionalist subject had its Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Trade of the Hemisphere and reached several agreements that were again signed by all the governmental representatives of South America.[[267]](#footnote-267) This ministerial declaration also recognized the other summits and agreements fulfilled previously. Additionally, it repeated their commitment to more open trade in the hemisphere and the globe. Within this context, President George W. Bush emplotted Brazil’s strong push within the moderate practice and called President Cardoso “to remind him of the importance of the FTAA.”[[268]](#footnote-268) He also appointed Robert Zoellick as the new United States Trade Representative in order to fight more aggressively for the fast track in congress. This would allow President Bush to negotiate the FTAA without the resistance of the Democrat part of the legislative power. Finally, he emplotted the growing resistance of some countries in South America and mentioned, “If some Latin American countries are not ready to liberalize, the US will negotiate deals with other countries that are more eager. By negotiating bilateral and regional trade deals wherever possible, the US would also increase its leverage in talks on a new global trade round.”[[269]](#footnote-269) Thus, instead of seeking cooperation between the different narratives and emploting the differences with new ideas within the open regional story, the Government of the United States decided to reiterate the same story. Notwithstanding, the ministerial declaration included the possibility of negotiations within sub-regional groups as blocs in the summits and meetings.[[270]](#footnote-270) This was in response to the petitions made by MERCOSUR and CAN. The second action that sought to reinforce the open regional practice was the negotiation that took place in the Third Summit of the Americas in April, 2001.[[271]](#footnote-271) The official declaration of this summit, in which almost all the states of South America participated, mentioned the previous agreements and the need of liberalization.[[272]](#footnote-272) Once again, the idea of trade openness was understood as the key component of a prosperous future for the region; the right path towards modern development. However, in this summit the President of Venezuela, Chávez, decided not to sign the declaration due to differences in philosophy and understandings.[[273]](#footnote-273) This meant that one of the actors previously engaged in this narrative was now explicitly in opposition of the practice.

By 2002, the practice suffered another hit with the Argentine crisis. On this occasion, the practice of open regionalism acted by emploting the economic crisis within the notion of liberalization. This meant that the solution of the crisis was still understood within more liberalization and free trade.[[274]](#footnote-274) At this point, the other practices of the region were successfully starting to emplot some of the regional problems through different ideas, but the open regional practice continued with the same notion and did not adapt according to the events. The only two elements of critique that it acknowledged from other practices were the application of agricultural subsidies and the necessity of fair treatment of minor partners. In relationship to the former, the FTAA promised to decrease all barriers of trade and guarantee market access for the countries of South America.[[275]](#footnote-275) The latter was included in the declaration in the form of a promise of fair treatment for the states with different degrees of development. They were assured to have equal “opportunities.”[[276]](#footnote-276) In the context of this summit, the President of Venezuela decided again to abstain its position and not sign the declaration.

By 2003, the FTAA had another Ministerial meeting to further negotiate some of the details of the treaty. At this point, the idea of finishing the FTAA by 2003 was defeated and the subject of open regionalism was struggling to define the schedule necessary to finish the agreement by 2005. Notwithstanding, the practice managed to push two new conjoint declarations during 2003 and 2004. In both cases, the practice reinforced the notion of liberalization and open regionalism without significant changes or adaptations. For example, the declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of 2003 stated that the ministers of trade reaffirmed their commitment with liberalization.[[277]](#footnote-277) Similarly, the declaration of Nuevo León stated their responsibilities on several economic areas in order to deepen open connections in trade.[[278]](#footnote-278) The interesting aspect of the last declaration was that it illustrated the economic policies that were important to liberalize the region’s economy. At the same time, it showed a small adaptation of the open regional practice, which considered not only trade liberalization, but also the quality of institutions. This adaptation was related to the critiques that connected the recent crises and economic problems of the late 1990s and early 2000s with the economic model underlying the open regional practice. In this context, the subject of the open regional practice perceived the crises as caused by bad administrations, lack of transparency, corruption, instability, and unfriendly investment environments.

Additionally, during 2004, the governments of the United States and Chile signed the free trade agreements that they started negotiating in 2000. In this treaty, both parties sought to promote and reinforce the open regional practice in South America.[[279]](#footnote-279) Similar to other free trade agreements, this treaty included the liberalization of the industrial, agricultural, and service economic sectors. It also included the controversial protection of investors and copyrights.[[280]](#footnote-280) The former entailed dispute settlements that protected investors in the case of unfair competition or governmental intervention. The controversial aspect of this mechanism was the capability that companies acquired to dispute with the government any area of services or industry that could be considered an investment. Due to the broad definition of investment under this and other treaties, the other practices criticized this mechanism. They argued that private companies could now dispute, through the idea of unfair competition, some of the services provided by their governments as rights. This characteristic of the Chile-United States free trade agreement was also included in the FTAA and other bilateral agreements. The other controversial side of this treaty, namely copyrights, was also included in the FTAA and other bilateral agreements.[[281]](#footnote-281) This protection of intellectual rights in services and goods was controversial in delicate areas of production, such as medicine. As the following sections of this chapter will show, the other practices of regionalism in South America thought that this protection should be relative to the situation and necessity of the service or good. For example, if medicines were required to avoid epidemics in a country, then intellectual rights would not be fully respected as health was considered a right and not a service.[[282]](#footnote-282) Overall, the treaty’s main goal was to “contributeto the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation.”[[283]](#footnote-283)

Despite the efforts made by the open regional subject, in 2005, many of the actors that were engaged in this practice, but were part of other subjects at the same time, left the open regional master narrative. As previously mentioned in other chapters, a master narrative entailed that different actors from diverse subjects partially engaged in one narrative that defined the entire region. The open regional practice reached this status during the early years of the 2000s due to the partial engagement of all the governments of South America. Nonetheless, in 2005 the actors of the moderate practice disengaged from the open regional narrative. Following paragraphs showed the perspectives of other practices in this year, but it is interesting to observe here the crisis of this practice in the last FTAA summit in Mar del Plata, 2005. By that year, Venezuela was not the only country that had elected progressive presidents in South America. In Argentina, Nestor Kirchner was elected president in 2003. Additionally, Lula Da Silva won the presidential elections of Brazil in October, 2002. The governments of these countries were the most powerful actors of the moderate practice and by this year, they were promoting a different narrative for the region. By 2005, they brought this narrative into the summit of the FTAA, which created unsolvable contradictions and disagreements. At first, the declaration appeared to include the same elements as previous actions of reinforcement.[[284]](#footnote-284) Liberalization seemed to be still the path towards the prosperous future of the region and the solution of most problems. Nonetheless, in later paragraphs of the declaration this underlying notion was now put into question. The basic idea that connected trade liberalization to economic growth and welfare was no longer enough.[[285]](#footnote-285) Additionally, governmental economic policy was now considered as a major factor of economic growth in the first decade of the 2000s.[[286]](#footnote-286) This tension between the two notions was most visible in section number nine of the official declaration: "Some member states maintain that we take into account the difficulties that the process of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations has encountered,"[[287]](#footnote-287) These member states were Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, who were now abandoning the open regional master narrative to promote their own practice outside of the framework of liberalization and globalization. Additionally, Chávez continued his resistance of the practice, did not sign the declaration, and called for a parallel summit against the FTAA. These actions were described more in detailed within the other practices, but it is important to notice here that many of the actors of the region left the open regional practice, which allowed it to lose its status of master narrative in 2005. Overall, the actors that participated in the last summit of the FTAA decided to agree to disagree. Thus, the official declaration included both perspectives and no future meetings were scheduled.

Despite the decline of the open regional practice in 2005, the main actors that constituted the subject did not abandon this perspective. They actually continued to promote it in the region. Indeed, in 2005 the Government of Peru negotiated a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States. Later, in 2006, the parties signed and sealed the agreement. The interesting aspect of this action of self-reinforcement was that in the joint statement of the agreement, the actors emplotted all bilateral agreements and security treaties together with the FTAA, the WTO, globalization, and the protection of democracy.[[288]](#footnote-288) As I mentioned in previous sections, this agreement glued together all the previously mentioned actions and connected empirically the practice of open regionalism. All in all, the story of the region promoted by this practice continued to entail a prosperous future within the protection of democratic order for the development of trade and economic growth with liberalization. Unlike protectionism, terrorism, and narco-terrorism, this would bring welfare and modern development for the region.

During that same year, Colombia and the United States signed a similar treaty of bilateral trade liberalization. This occasion also connected all the aforementioned elements in the open regional practice.[[289]](#footnote-289) Notwithstanding, despite these actions of bilateral liberalization and self-reinforcement, the open regional practice lost in these years two of the members of the subject. In 2005, coca leaf indigenous leader Morales was elected president of Bolivia in 2006. He rejected the free trade agreement promoted by the United States.[[290]](#footnote-290) Similarly, in November, 2006, Rafael Correa was elected president of Ecuador and, in that same year, he rejected the United States previous proposal of a bilateral free trade agreement.[[291]](#footnote-291) Both of these actors left the open regional practice and engaged with the socialist and indigenous practices. Lastly, Michelle Bachelet, from the socialist party of Chile, was elected president of the republic in 2006.[[292]](#footnote-292) Even though she did not leave the open regional practice and continued to work in the bilateral relations with the United States in the free trade agreement, her international policy reoriented the government in support of the moderate practice. In that year, Chile started working more intensively in the region.

In summary, this practice acted as a master narrative for the region in the early 2000s, but as time passed, other practices started to gain actors and emplotted the crises of the region more successfully. This weakened the open regional practice, but did not make it disappear. One of the last significant actions by this subject was the treaty signed between Colombia and the United States in 2010 to allow the latter to utilize military bases in South American territory. This action intended to increase security in the region and reinforce democracy in Colombia, but it also created tension within the moderate practice.[[293]](#footnote-293)

## The Indigenous Practice: from protests to the region

Unlike the other three practices of regionalism in South America, the indigenous practice did not create a regional institution to unite all governments under its project. On the contrary, this practice sought to promote its notion of the region in and against other regional institutions. The main tools utilized were protests, social fora, indigenous movements, and eventually the Government of Bolivia. The empirical emplotment that glued this practice together was observed through the inclusion of events and actions as parts of the overall story of struggle against the 500 years of oppression of indigenous people. These actions and events were understood as fragments of the path towards a future in which indigenous people achieved autonomy and “live well.” In these processes of emplotment, the practice also included past events as antecedents of present actions, related their struggle to particular regional institutions; and, finally, it embraced Morales as its leader not only in Bolivia, but also in the entire region.

The social and political nature of this practice made the process of empirical observation very difficult. Thus, I included in the practice some of its main events and actions between 1999 and 2011. Prior research accounted for the indigenous risings and movements that took place before 1999.[[294]](#footnote-294) However, future research will have to account for the more complex nature of the indigenous practice and other actors that played within this subject in different ways. Meanwhile, this section of the chapter showed some of the salient aspects of this practice and its interaction with the other regional subjects.

One of the first major actions of the indigenous practice between 1999 and 2011 was the protests organized in Cochabamba in the context of the so called “water wars.” In this event, many organizations and indigenous communities of Cochabamba gathered to protest the increase of prices in the newly privatized water service.[[295]](#footnote-295) In this context, many of the indigenous leaders of the protest blamed the problem on the neoliberal agenda of the WB and the government of Hugo Banzer in Bolivia.[[296]](#footnote-296) In this context, Morales, who was at the time a representative in the legislative power of Bolivia, was supporting the coca leaf movements and the organizations of Cochabamba.[[297]](#footnote-297) The following year, Felipe Quispe and Morales, who marched 199 kilometers from Caracollo, organized a massive protest in La Paz against the program of coca leaf eradication.[[298]](#footnote-298) As the previous section showed, the open regional subject considered that this program would increase security for the region and bolster democratic institutions. On the contrary, the indigenous subject saw it as an intervention of the United States against the ancestral rights of the indigenous communities of Bolivia. That same year, Morales called the indigenous organizations of Bolivia and other progressive groups to unite under the wing of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS). They were to stop colonialism and neoliberalism, not only in the country, but also in the entire region.[[299]](#footnote-299) The center of this protest was the eradication of coca leaves, which was leaving indigenous people without crops and means of survival. In that occasion, Morales stated, "Coca is more than just a symbol of resistance. It is a symbol of our dignity, identity, and sovereignty. And we want to protect that. It's a fight between two greens - the coca leaf or the US dollar."[[300]](#footnote-300) These protests continued against the government’s plans of liberalization and the eradication of coca leaves. In 2003, the so called “gas wars” started. These protests against the United States-supported privatization of gas resulted in 70 people dead and 400 wounded.[[301]](#footnote-301) President Sanchez de Lozada was blamed for the massacre due to the repressive strategy taken by the government to deal with the conflict. In October 17, 2003, President Lozada resigned and Vice President Carlos Mesa assumed the position. This President continued the previous policy and called in 2004 for a referendum to approve the project to export gas through Chile. The referendum won by 75%, but the social conflict and political protests led by Quispe, Morales, and Jaime Solares made the project of the government impossible to implement. Later in 2005, President Mesa could not resist the protests and demands of gas nationalization. He resigned in June and the new interim President Eduardo Rodriguez called for early presidential elections.[[302]](#footnote-302)

By 2006, Morales was elected President of Bolivia.[[303]](#footnote-303) In his first presidential speech, Morales emplotted all the previously mentioned events within the regional indigenous story. His presidency appeared as a result of the social and political struggles of the indigenous movements of Bolivia against the neoliberal politics of previous governments, which were just an episode of the 500 years of oppression. Now, his presidency and government were going to promote the prosperous future of the indigenous people of Bolivia and Latin America with autonomy and “good life.” He was the new leader of the indigenous people in search of their prosperous future in Bolivia and the region. In the first part of his speech, Morales asked for a minute of silences for those who fell in the 500-year-old struggle for indigenous emancipation.[[304]](#footnote-304) He then connected their struggle and past history with the new horizon that the movement had ahead.[[305]](#footnote-305) Parts of his speech showed the connection of his presidency with the indigenous notion of the region. It also emplotted the past struggles of coca leaf, water, and gas.[[306]](#footnote-306) Additionally, the speech mentioned the search of indigenous autonomy as a key aspect of the regional prosperous future.[[307]](#footnote-307) This autonomy appeared as connected to the rest of the region through the redistribution of wealth and solidarity. Moreover, this notion of self-determination was also understood as part of the 500-year-old struggle of the indigenous people of America. Another important element emplotted in this speech was the recuperation of natural resources. This entailed the nationalization of Bolivian natural resources, but this project was included in the story of the indigenous region as the recuperation of the territory lost many years back with colonialism in America.[[308]](#footnote-308) Finally, the President of Bolivia asked the presidents of other South American nations to support him in this process of transformation for Bolivia and the region. He specially referred to Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina.[[309]](#footnote-309) Overall, the election of Morales represented a big step by many of the indigenous movements of Bolivia towards their country and the region. This action reinforced the indigenous practice and connected previous struggles with the tangible possibility of a more prosperous future. Moreover, it enabled the indigenous practice to enter institutional paths of transformation for the region. Previously, some indigenous movements had participated in international fora as guests. Now, they viewed Morales as their leader and representative in the region. For example, the peasant movement Vía Campesina congratulated Morales on his elections and gave him their support because he was a *compañero* in the struggle against neoliberalism.[[310]](#footnote-310)

Later that same year, the government of Morales decided to join the socialist practice and participate inside of the ALBA. This action did not entail the abandonment of the indigenous practice. On the contrary, he emplotted this action within the struggle for a prosperous indigenous future and the recuperation of natural resources.[[311]](#footnote-311) The integration of Bolivia in ALBA was viewed as consistent due to the similarities in the interpretation of the past of oppression and exploitation.[[312]](#footnote-312) Additionally, both practices criticized the open regional practice and sought to constitute a different type of regional project, which would entail a deeper political integration. This definition of the region included the internal cooperation between countries in order to reach social justice and self-determination.[[313]](#footnote-313) With this action, the indigenous practice began to influence the other regional practices that were now separated from open regionalism, but it also started receiving an important dose of modernist notions that started increasing internal tensions in the indigenous subject. The close interaction of Morales with ALBA strengthened the indigenous subject in several ways, but it also started imposing the supremacy of development over ancestral traditions and autonomy. For example, the idea of sustainable development was now part of the notion of the prosperous future by Morales.[[314]](#footnote-314) This strategy of interaction, which reinforced the indigenous subject and increased internal tension at the same time, also started bringing the indigenous subject closer to the moderate narrative. As an illustration, later that same year, Morales participated in the Second Presidential Summit of South America, which was promoted by the moderate practice, but included all the states of the region. On this occasion, Morales signed the agreement under the moderate narrative, but he also added another official declaration of his own. The former included the idea of sustainable development as the key factor of regional prosperity. On the contrary, the latter asked for the process of integration to go beyond mere economic goals and ideas of limitless development. Morales asked instead to introduce the indigenous notion for the region called *Sumak Kawsay*, which translates as “good life.”[[315]](#footnote-315) Overall, with the socialist and the moderate practices, Morales promoted the indigenous notion through cooperation and articulation. To the indigenous practice, the region had to be shaped within the idea of dignity, harmony with Mother Earth, social justice, acknowledgement of ancestral rights, the end of oppression, and the recognition of the value of the indigenous communities of America. However, as I showed more in detail in the description of the other practices, the key element of prosperity, according to the other subjects of regionalism, emphasized modern development. Morales thus adapted the indigenous narrative in order to integrate regional institutions. There, he advocated the ideas of autonomy, respect of ancestral traditions, and welfare at the same time. This interaction had started before the Third Presidential Summits and the inclusion of Bolivia into ALBA. As previously mentioned in the construction of the narrative, the indigenous notion of the region utilized tools of protests and transformation that were, in many cases, outside of the institutional frameworks of the region and the country. However, in 2004, the President of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner, and the President of Brazil, Lula Da Silva, met with Morales and asked him to “be patient and win power through elections.”[[316]](#footnote-316) In response, Morales said, "He explained to me how important it is to be patient to reach the government and win power. Then, Lula invited me to learn about the experience of his party, the Workers Party (PT), at a date that has yet to be set.”[[317]](#footnote-317) This case also showed the important influence of other actors on the indigenous subject.

Within these interactions, the indigenous practice sought to reinforce itself by introducing the important aspects of its narrative into other practices, but it also received exogenous influences that changed the acceptable path of action and increased its articulation with the moderate and socialist subjects of the region. On the one hand, the notion of a regional balance with Mother Earth, the autonomy of the indigenous communities of America, the respect of ancestral rights, Sumak Kawsay, and other elements of the indigenous story were thus promoted inside of the other practices. An example of these actions of self-reinforcement within interaction could be observed in the official signature of the constitutive treaty of the Bank of the South in 2007. On this occasion, Morales mentioned that the Bank of the South should be created to promote projects that helped the region in a path towards harmony with Pachamama.[[318]](#footnote-318) On the other hand, the tension brought in by the modernist notion of development was starting to fracture the regional indigenous subject, whom was criticized by actors that emplotted their actions within this narrative, but separated themselves from the projects of, for example, ALBA. A good example of this tension between the emphasis of modernist development and indigenism was observed in the case of the Wayuu communities in Colombia and Venezuela. As the description of the socialist practice showed in the next section, energy and infrastructure integration were considered very important elements for the development of the region. Colombia and Venezuela thus started negotiating a gas and oil pipeline that would increase trade among these countries. One of the problems of these projects was it crossed indigenous territory, which would be expropriated for development’s sake. This project could also cause environmental problems for the people who lived close to the path of construction. In the midst of this context, the Government of Chávez emplotted the pipe line as part of the process of regional transformation for fair development and progress. Moreover, he stated that this project would increase the energy independence of the region from the United States.[[319]](#footnote-319) On the contrary, the Wayuu community emplotted this project as a continuation of the supremacy of transnational corporations over indigenous people.[[320]](#footnote-320) Above this, they considered that these projects of development continued the oppression against which they had been struggling for 500 years.[[321]](#footnote-321) They thus saw the modern strategy of ALBA as part of the same strategy of the open regional practice, which emphasized development over the rights of the indigenous people of the continent.[[322]](#footnote-322) Simultaneously, Morales signed treaties in ALBA that funded projects of excavations and energy infrastructure, which were similar and supported energy integration in the region.[[323]](#footnote-323)

Besides the tension created in these interactions, the government of Morales had to face in 2008 a domestic political conflict that nearly broke the country in two. During the month of August, the national government of Bolivia resisted violent protests of conservative movements in several of its states. The center of the problem was the separatist movement of the “Media Luna,” which included the Governors of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando.[[324]](#footnote-324) In the context of these events, Morales called on the help of all indigenous movements and regional organization with which he had been working previously. In his statement, the President of Bolivia emplotted these events as actions against the indigenous practice. He then sought support to reinforce the practice and continue on the process of regional transformation, which had started with the protests of the early 2000s and gained strength with his presidency. In this context, several indigenous and peasant organizations expressed their support to the indigenous project.[[325]](#footnote-325) Many of them emplotted their actions within the indigenous notion of regionalism and the antecedents of previous struggles.[[326]](#footnote-326) Other regional actors emplotted these events and offered support to Morales as well. For example, the subject of the moderate practice managed to agree within UNASUR and issued a joint statement in support of the democratic government of Bolivia as early as September. They emplotted the early manifestations of the event as a violation of the sovereignty of the state and supported President Morales in his struggle for “development.”[[327]](#footnote-327) Similarly, the Governments of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba published a joint statement in ALBA to support the “democratic and sovereign process of transformation led by Morales.”[[328]](#footnote-328) It is interesting to note how each narrative emplotted the events differently. The former understood the problem within the idea of a violation of sovereignty and democracy, which was an obstacle for the development of Bolivia and the region. The latter viewed the issue not only thorough the idea of democracy and sovereignty, but also as an obstacle for a process of transformation.

Later that same year, Vía Campesina had another summit and reiterated their support for Morales against “international imperialism and national oligarchies.”[[329]](#footnote-329) They also published a statement where they reviewed their history and connected this support to the past struggles of coca leaves, the birth of Vía Campesina including Morales as one of its funders, the importance of Pachamama’s rights, and the struggle against the FTAA.[[330]](#footnote-330)

Another important action of self-reinforcement took place during 2009, when many of the indigenous movements of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru organized the Regional Summit of representatives of indigenous peoples. During this event, the indigenous movements that participated declared Morales the leader of *Abya Yala* (America) and reaffirmed their support to the regional struggle of the president of Bolivia to establish Sumak Kawsay. They also praised Morales’ decision to support ALBA’s opposition against the United States military bases in Colombia. Most importantly, they stated the importance of the rights of Pachamama and the recuperation of ancestral territories by the indigenous peoples of America.[[331]](#footnote-331)

As the Indigenous practice continued to gain strength, in 2009, ALBA published a statement about the International Summit of Climate Change in Copenhagen. In this joint statement, the subject of the socialist practice made the indigenous notion of harmony with nature part of its own story of the region. First, the statement criticized developed nations for avoiding their responsibility in the problem of greenhouse gas emissions. They also claimed that the developed world had created a model of consumption that excluded 80% of the world from welfare. The main responsibility for a balanced and environmentally friendly world thus fell on the developed world.[[332]](#footnote-332) These elements were shared by both practices and consistent within both notions. However, in later paragraphs of the statement, ALBA declared, “We reaffirm that the countries of ALBA have a notion of development which does not include the mercantilization of nature. Instead, our notion of development is guided by the idea of ‘living well,’ which entails a relationship of harmony and respect with nature and others.”[[333]](#footnote-333) Additionally, another paragraph mentioned that the developed nations of the world were violating the “rights of Mother Earth.”[[334]](#footnote-334) These fragments of the statement showed the emplotment of environmental issues in the socialist practice with an indigenous notion. This was a result of the interaction and cooperation between both practices.

In 2010, the indigenous practice realized other actions of self-reinforcement. The first relevant action emplotted in this year was the union pact signed by five of the most important indigenous organizations of Bolivia.[[335]](#footnote-335) Their goal was to fight for Sumak Kawsay and the return to Mother Earth.[[336]](#footnote-336) The second action entailed the Parliamentary meeting of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America. In this occasion, many indigenous representatives from different countries, including some of the representatives of the previously mentioned organizations and Noble prize awarded Rigoberta Menchú, gathered in La Paz to discuss several regional issues. Among those issues, the indigenous, peasant, and women organizations of Latin America reiterated their position about Morales. They celebrated his second presidency and declared him, through an ancestral ceremony led by the *amautas* (Aimara wise men), the spiritual leader of the indigenous peoples of the Abya Yala.[[337]](#footnote-337) The third important action of this practice during 2010 was the meeting between Vía Campesina and Morales in April. During this meeting, the representatives of the organization and the President of Bolivia, remembered their past struggles in the late 1990s and early 2000s to resist neoliberalism and start living in harmony with Mother Earth within the notion of “living well.”[[338]](#footnote-338) Additionally, during that same month, Vía Campesina and Morales, together with many other indigenous and peasant organization, organized the Meeting of the People for Climate Change and Mother Earth’s rights in Cochabamba. In this occasion, they celebrated the 10 years that passed since the water wars and the struggles against privatization.[[339]](#footnote-339)

Finally, in 2010 there were two other actions emplotted within this practice that deserve mentioning. First, Vía Campesina organized the V Conference of the “Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo” (CLOC), in which Morales and the President of Ecuador Rafael Correa participated. In this event, the organization reiterated their support to Morales and their responsibility in the re-establishment of Sumak Kawsay. They also remembered the past struggles against the FTAA and privatization in 2000 and 2003.[[340]](#footnote-340) Second, several indigenous, peasant, and women’s movements organized the Global Forum for Life, Social, and Environmental Justice. In this forum, Morales reiterated his engagement with Sumak Kawsay and called for the region to deepen their responsibilities with the rights of Pachamama. In this sense, Morales emplotted his past actions in coordination with UNASUR and the Bank of the South as part of the regional strategy to create tools to finance projects that would protect Pachamama. He also included the past Conference of Cochabamba as part of the success of this practice in promoting Pachamama’s rights in the region and the world.[[341]](#footnote-341)

Notwithstanding, despite the growth of the practice and the cooperation that it had achieved with other subjects, the tension between the emphasis of modernist development and the key indigenous elements of the narrative grew with time. Morales tried to consolidate them within the idea of Sumak Kawsay that he promoted as the leader of the indigenous practice. In the aforementioned actions, the President of Bolivia thus sought to include different moderate and socialist projects as part of the transformation against past exploitation. Conversely, other indigenous actors began to increase their resistance against some of these projects. One of the most significant examples of the fracture of the indigenous subject due to this internal tension was observed in the case of the project that sought to build a road through the “Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isidoro Secure” (TIPNIS). This project was emplotted by Morales as part of a better future that would be reached by furthering the connection of the areas of Bolivia. Moreover, it was also connected to the cooperation with other practices due to the financial involvement of Brazil in the project.[[342]](#footnote-342) On the contrary, some of the indigenous communities that lived in the area, emplotted the idea of this construction as detrimental to Pachamama and their ancestral ways of life. Thus, in August 15, 2011, they started protesting against the government of Bolivia and the financial involvement of Brazil. Amidst these events, the indigenous representatives of TIPNIS stated that their rights, dignity, and life were not being respected in the construction of the road.[[343]](#footnote-343) In addition, the President of the organization mentioned in an interview that, even though they supported Morales, this was contradictory to the indigenism of Latin America because it violated their communal rights.[[344]](#footnote-344) The leader of the movement also criticized Morales for the prioritization of development over their ancestral rights and ways of life.[[345]](#footnote-345)

Protests continued and many of the communities of TIPNIS marched to La Paz in order to try to stop the construction. This fracture and internal critique weakened the indigenous subject because it was now showing the tension between development and indigenism. However, the tension increased even more when Morales emplotted the event as part of a strategy of conservative groups, which were utilizing the indigenous communities to stop the process of transformation.[[346]](#footnote-346) Simultaneously, after 40 days of protests and mobilization, police officers moved in and violently demobilized the indigenous people that had been opposing the project.[[347]](#footnote-347) Even though Morales rejected the accusations that connected him with these events, many groups that had previously supported the President now doubted his leadership and actions. A very important example of this doubts and internal tensions were observed in the letter sent to Morales by CONAIE.[[348]](#footnote-348) This organization had previously endorsed Morales as their leader in the region, but in the midst of these events, they wrote to express their concerns about the governmental repression and the lack of communication with the indigenous people of the region.[[349]](#footnote-349) They also added that in the struggle against colonialism and neoliberalism, the protection of Mother Earth was always the priority of the indigenous practice. This illustrated the contradiction that some viewed in the strategies of Morales and the supremacy of development. During October, Morales canceled the project and the indigenous people, who had marched 360 miles from Beni to La Paz in order to protect their territory, declared themselves victorious.[[350]](#footnote-350) Notwithstanding, the subject could not emplot the police action within its narrative of indigenous transformation. They also lost some of the indigenous communities that were previously engaged in support of Morales and the main indigenous regional subject.

In general, the observation of this practice showed that the sequence of emplotted actions led to the articulation of the indigenous subject with the moderate and socialist practice. This articulation, together with the engagement of several social movements throughout time, reinforced the practice, which obtained the strength necessary to influence the other notions of the region that separated from open regionalism. Moreover, even though Morales was considered the leader of the indigenous practice in the region, the social movements, and the regional conferences organized by them appeared as the basis of strength for this practice. Nonetheless, the mixture of the indigenous and developmental elements of the different practices in cooperation created an internal tension for the indigenous subject. This weakened and fractured the latter around actions that were viewed by certain sectors of the subject as contradictions. The interesting aspect of this contradiction and tension was that, in the some of the cases studied here, the mobilization of indigenous groups against the contradiction brought in by modernist development was successful and put Morales back on the indigenous track. This did not mean that the tension was solved, but it showed that the democratic basis of this subject remained strong even with the figure of a strong regional leader.

## The Socialist Practice: from Chávez to ALBA

Contrary to the previous subject, the socialist regional practice of Latin America had dozens of documents and speeches that were considered in the process of observation. The institution of ALBA alone published 73 documents between 2004 and 2011. Moreover, most of these documents referenced each other, emplotted past actions as antecedents, and included past projects to show the success of the practice at different times. In the following chapters, I thus summarized some of the most significant actions and characteristics of the socialist practice and its interactions.

In this case, the empirical emplotment of actions took place with the inclusion of different elements into the story of the past exploitation in neoliberalism and the future of sovereign regional collaboration for development with social justice and equality. The opposing past of the story included the actions of national governments and the United States to promote neoliberalism in the region. This entailed the implementation of the FTAA, the WTO, or other bilateral treaties. The notion of the future considered a perception of the “self” delineated in Latin America and with the cooperation of all nations to promote independence, equality, environmentalism, democratic communication, food security, and redistribution of wealth. All these elements of the future were perceived as parts of the process of regional transformation that went from exploitation to emancipation and development. The other empirical element that glued the practice together was the constant reference of past actions as successful antecedents of present actions.

The first actions of this practice sought, on the one hand, to resist the open regional project in Latin America and, on the other hand, self-reinforce by interacting with the moderate practice. Later, after the creation of ALBA in 2004, the practice started contesting the definition of the region and expansion of its own project, but the interaction with the moderate practice was never abandoned. They also started interacting closely with the indigenous practice in 2006, when Morales was elected.

During 1999 and 2000, Chávez repeatedly criticized and resisted the overall open regional practice. One of the best examples of these actions was the aforementioned speech of the President in the meeting of ALADI in February, 2000. In this occasion, the President of Venezuela defined his project of regionalism within the idea of a transformation *vis-à-vis* the past of exploitation. This entailed a deeply political process of integration for Latin America.[[351]](#footnote-351) One of the interesting characteristics of this action was that it entailed a close interaction with the moderate practice and it sought to influence this subject towards a more critical story for the region. Then, later that same year, Venezuela assigned a new representative in ALADI. As previous citations of his speech showed, the new ambassador of Venezuela was also engaged with the socialist practice of regionalism.[[352]](#footnote-352) Another example of an important critique towards the open regional practice emplotted within the socialist practice took place around the Plan Colombia to fight FARC. The socialist practice criticized the plan Colombia as an intervention in regional affairs. Moreover, when the United States intended to expand the struggle against drug cartels onto Venezuela, the government of Chávez denied them entrance for the airplanes flying the zone.[[353]](#footnote-353) The socialist practice viewed this action as part of the United States interference in the region, which was a danger to autonomy and transformation. Similarly, the moderate practice emplotted this action as an unnecessary intervention.[[354]](#footnote-354) The Governments of Brazil and Venezuela then started working together in a regional approach for security, which excluded the United States’ influence.[[355]](#footnote-355) Later that same year, Chávez emplotted the First Presidential Summit of South America and asked again to deepen integration in the region in order to increase autonomy.[[356]](#footnote-356)

In the following years, the socialist practice continued the same path. For example, in 2001 Chávez decided not to sign the FTAA declaration because it was promoting a “different philosophy for the region.”[[357]](#footnote-357) Moreover, he mentioned that regional integration should start including social aspects and solutions for poverty.[[358]](#footnote-358) At the same time, he turned to MERCOSUR and formally asked to be integrated in the regional project.[[359]](#footnote-359) Nonetheless, that same year he proposed, for the first time, to create a different project for the region that would exclude the United States and North America. In the Third Summit of the Heads of State and Governments of the Caribbean Association, on Margarita Island, Venezuela, Chávez proposed to create ALBA.[[360]](#footnote-360) This did not happen until 2004.

In 2002, Venezuela reiterated its reservations about the declaration of the FTAA in Quito and mentioned that the region was not ready for hemispheric integration to take place in 2005.[[361]](#footnote-361) Similarly, in 2003, Venezuela started participating in MERCOSUR meetings trying to increase proximity with other nations in order to receive support and reinforce the socialist notion of the region.[[362]](#footnote-362) Finally, in 2004 the socialist practice did not only intend to increase cooperation with the moderate practice and resist the open regional subject, but it also self-reinforced by creating ALBA. This regional institution originally included the states of Venezuela and Cuba, which emplotted, in their joint declaration, this action as the result of their continuous resistance against neoliberalism. The main goal of ALBA was to resist the open regional practice and constitute a different region.[[363]](#footnote-363) Additionally, this new type of integration was considered as part of a process of transformation from the past of exploitation that the region had been suffering since its independency.[[364]](#footnote-364) This future transformation was part of the dreams of common regional heroes that had fought for independence in the 1800s.[[365]](#footnote-365) Additionally, in the second document of the creation of ALBA, Cuba and Venezuela described in detail some of the strategies they would start taking in the following years to achieve their goals. Among other ideas, they included plans to regulate investments, increase complementarity between the members of the region, provide free health care and education, start promoting the protection of the environment, work towards the creation of a Latin American Fund, Bank of ALBA, TELESUR, etc.[[366]](#footnote-366) All these strategies were understood as part of the process of transformation that had been frustrated for 180 years, the resistance of neoliberalism, and the Bolivarian Revolution of Venezuela.[[367]](#footnote-367) Thus, the subject of the socialist practice emplotted this regional creation with the events in Venezuela and the previous actions of open regionalism resistance.

In the following years, the socialist practice continued to grow in different ways. First, the practice reinforced itself by successfully emploting events. For example, in 2005, the practice emplotted the Presidential Summit of the FTAA in Argentina and called for the realization of the Parallel Summit of the People. In this summit, Presidents Fidel Castro and Chávez participated together with several social movements of the region. Moreover, the event was included as part of the World Social Forum and the Global movement against Globalization. In their official statement, they understood the FTAA as part of the neoliberal model of regionalism, which was the cause of poverty, inequality, increase of corporation power, and other problems.[[368]](#footnote-368) They also emplotted Venezuela’s resistance as successful antecedents of the socialist practice.[[369]](#footnote-369) Overall, they mentioned the resistance towards the WTO, the militarization of the continent, the privatization of natural resources, and bilateral treaties as part of the actions toward a different future.[[370]](#footnote-370) That same year, the FTAA had their last meeting and the Moderate subject left the open regional narrative. Another important example of emplotment of events took place in 2009 when the President of Honduras Manuel Zelaya was removed from his position. Amidst this event, ALBA called a special meeting, which resulted in the publication of a joint statement in support of President Zelaya and in opposition of the coup d’état. They also called all other regional organizations, including specifically UNASUR, to do the same.[[371]](#footnote-371)

The second type of reinforcement involved the increase of the number of actors directly engaged in the subject. First, the government of Morales integrated ALBA in 2006.[[372]](#footnote-372) Second, Nicaragua entered in 2007.[[373]](#footnote-373) Third, Dominica adhered in 2008.[[374]](#footnote-374) Fourth, Honduras signed into ALBA in 2008.[[375]](#footnote-375) Fifth, the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa rejected the bilateral free trade agreement with the United States and adhered to ALBA in 2009.[[376]](#footnote-376) Sixth, Antigua y Barbuda singed in that same year.[[377]](#footnote-377) Finally, San Vicente and the Grenadines entered in 2009.[[378]](#footnote-378) One of the most interesting elements of the official declarations cited above, was that in every one of them, the governments of the entering states understood their actions not only for a better future of transformation towards more fair forms of modern development, but also against the previous problems caused by neoliberalism and the open regional practice.[[379]](#footnote-379) Notwithstanding, the process of reinforcement was not always an ascending line of growth. In January 13, 2010, the Congress of Honduras voted the country out of ALBA.[[380]](#footnote-380) This weakened the socialist subject as they lost one of its members.

The third set of actions that reinforced this practice alongside the period chosen for this research was the inclusion of new projects into the institution of ALBA and the overall socialist practice of Latin America. For example, in the joint declaration of ALBA in April, 2006, the subject of the socialist practice mentioned several projects “…in order to deepen the integration process that started in the joint Declaration of 2004.”[[381]](#footnote-381) Some of the propositions included free ophthalmological services from Cuba for Bolivian citizens, free Cuban medical training for doctors of other states, free medical books and material from Cuba, free training and professional development for Bolivian energy-engineers in Venezuela, an increase in oil supply from Venezuela to Bolivia, financial subsidies for infrastructure in Bolivia, the cancelation of taxes for Bolivian mixed companies in Venezuela, 5000 scholarships for Bolivian professionals in Venezuela, donations of cement for Bolivia to build roads, an increase in the exports of Bolivian agricultural products to other members, Bolivian free scholarships in indigenous studies, the cancelation of all trade barriers among members, etc.[[382]](#footnote-382) In 2007, Cuba and Venezuela also started creating mixed regional companies, which were called “grannational” companies.[[383]](#footnote-383) One of the first mixed grannational companies was a shipyard, which was destined to increase transportation among the members of ALBA. Nonetheless, they also built during that same year an insurance company, a stainless steel factory, an electric power plant in Cuba, a company of tourism, an agricultural company to produce and export rice, and a company of tele-communications.[[384]](#footnote-384) Many other grannational companies were built in the following years, but one of the most important initiatives was PetroAlba, which was a mixed company of oil. This company was created in the framework of the energy treaty of ALBA to “consolidate the process of Latin American integration that started in 2004” and “…to seek complementarity, solidarity, cooperation, and mutual welfare.”[[385]](#footnote-385) During that same summit, the member states of ALBA proposed to create a Television channel for the region as well. This project was launched in June, 2007, because “in different international cases, the media power of different corporations distort reality, establish censorship, and lie to sustain the international United States-led order based on force, coercion, and terror.”[[386]](#footnote-386) Another important project by the socialist practice was the Bank of ALBA, which began to consolidate itself by 2008 in order to deepen integration and develop Latin America with more independence from the unfairness of capitalism.[[387]](#footnote-387) That same year, in the context of the economic recession of the United States, the countries of ALBA met in November and proposed another mechanism. In this case, ALBA proposed a common currency for the region, which would allow its nations to trade without depending on the United States dollar. Once again, the basic idea of the project was to increase independence from the exploiting capitalist system promoted by the open regional practice. They also sought to continue the process of transformation that started in the early 2000s.[[388]](#footnote-388) All these projects, together with other grannational companies and agreements, were framed within the socialist practice as part of the process of transformation towards fair development for the region.

Finally, the fourth type of actions, which increased the strength of the socialist practice, was the interactions with other practices. In the case of the open regional practice, the socialist interaction entailed constant critique and opposition. However, the open regional practice answered in most cases with a dismissive tone and not always carefully emploting the socialist actions. For example, in the early 2000s Chávez started acting as a mediator between the government of Colombia and FARC. These actions were emplotted as part of the regional aid for autonomy, showing that the United States was not necessary in the region. Notwithstanding, Colombia signed the Plan Colombia with the United States and accused Chávez of intervention in national affairs.[[389]](#footnote-389) At the same time, many other countries of the region were considering regional help to avoid United States’ security plans in South America. For example, Brazil had previously offered its own air force to help Colombia in its struggle against the guerrilla movement.[[390]](#footnote-390) Later on, in 2008, ALBA included these events as a successful antecedent of actions for regional autonomy and a proof of the failure of the United States intervention in the region.[[391]](#footnote-391) Similarly, the events that took place in Honduras, when Manuel Zelaya was removed from his position in 2009 were emplotted by all four of the practices of the region. In all cases, the events were taken as a coup d’état. However, once elections were called, the government of the United States and Colombia emplotted this as the return of democracy. They then endorsed the new President Roberto Michelleti.[[392]](#footnote-392) On the contrary, the socialist subject emplotted these events and the United States actions as another intervention in the region against democratic processes of transformation.[[393]](#footnote-393) The same happened with the agreement between Colombia and the United States to allow the former to use military bases in Colombian territory.[[394]](#footnote-394)

In contrast to the interaction with the open regional practice, the socialist interaction with the indigenous practice entailed cooperation. As previously described, the indigenous practices introduced important ideas of environmentalism and Pachamama’s rights into the socialist practice. In this sense, ALBA emplotted the extraction of natural resources as part of the old process of exploitation. ALBA now had included the protection of its resources and the environment as part of their process of transformation for the regional future. For example, in 2009 ALBA declared that the patterns of consumption in developed nations within capitalism were destroying Mother Earth. Thus, ALBA recognized Mother Earth’s rights and started implementing the Ecuadorian initiative called Yasuni-ITT, which sought to research different ways to find alternatives to natural resources.[[395]](#footnote-395) ALBA also supported the utilization of coca leaves as an ancestral right of the indigenous people of the Andean region.[[396]](#footnote-396) Finally, as previously mentioned, ALBA gave support to Morales in the separatist conflict with the “Media Luna” and with the petition of extradition of Sanchez de Lozada from the United States. This extradition had special symbolic importance because ex-President Lozada was accused of terrorism in Bolivia.[[397]](#footnote-397) The indigenous practice also manifested support towards ALBA and the socialist practice in several occasions, not only with the engagement of Morales, but also with public statements about the institution.[[398]](#footnote-398) Thus, the practices reinforced each other through cooperation and support. However, within this interaction, the socialist practice also promoted the supremacy of modern development over the indigenous notions of environmentalism and tradition. This increased the tension within the indigenous practice.[[399]](#footnote-399)

Finally, the interaction between the moderate and the socialist practice was described in the following section in order to first account for the characteristics of the moderate practice.

In summary, the socialist practice, between 1999 and 2011, went through a process of reinforcement that included actions of self-reinforcement, engagement of new actors, and interaction with other practices. Overall, the notion of the region promoted by this practice did not change in time and most of its key elements stayed intact. This subject saw the history of Latin America through the idea of exploitation and the extraction of surplus by developed nations. Thus, the future of the region entailed autonomy and self-determination in order to promote development, justice, and equality. This story emplotted many events, actions, and projects in most of the official declarations by ALBA.

## The Moderate Practice: from moderate neoliberalism to UNASUR

Similar to the Socialist practice, the moderate practice emplotted several events and actions in the period between 1999 and 2011. The highly institutional nature of this practice allowed for the process of emplotment to connect many actions, events, and institutions. This process was observed through the inclusion of elements into the overall narrative of the region, the continuation of projects alongside time, the inclusion of institutions into the practice, and the emplotment of past actions as antecedents of present regional policies. Nonetheless, the data analysis for this practice included 42 documents from MERCOSUR, 18 from CAN, 13 from UNASUR, and many more from CEPAL, ALADI, CELAC, and other organization. Thus, this section summarized the main characteristics of this practice, its transformation throughout time, and some of its interactions with the other three practices.

The main characteristics of the actions emplotted in the first years of observation corresponded with the previous description of the moderate narrative. Thus, in 1999 Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, together with CAN, were promoting a Southern integration as a platform to enter the FTAA and, more generally, globalization. For example, CAN organized, in May, 1999, a summit to deepen its integration and reach new agreements. During this meeting, they agreed that MERCOSUR and CAN should work together inside of the negotiations of the FTAA in order to reach results that are more favorable.[[400]](#footnote-400) Additionally, they considered their regional project as a process of liberalization that included other areas of work, such as circulation of people, technology exchange, mechanisms of control for cases of corruption in companies, and the reinforcement of democracy.[[401]](#footnote-401) Similarly, the President of ALADI mentioned in August, 1999, that MERCOSUR and CAN should work together towards their union in the region.[[402]](#footnote-402) Thus, even though liberalization remained as an important part of their notion of a prosperous future, they were already viewing the sub-region as a boundary where collaboration could bring better possibilities. Moreover, unlike the actors of the open regional subject, the states engaged in the moderate practice did not comprehend the United States as the guarantor of democratic order in the region. For example, the aforementioned “Plan Colombia” to fight the guerrilla movement was emplotted as an unnecessary intervention in the region. In this case, Brazil interacted with the socialist practice to propose other solutions to Colombia, which did not include the United States.[[403]](#footnote-403) Furthermore, the President of Uruguay Julio Sanguinetti stated in the ALADI meeting of February, 2000, that there were other possibilities of security for the region that did not include the United States.[[404]](#footnote-404) Nonetheless, all the states engaged in the moderate practice, participated in the Ministerial Meeting of the FTAA in 1999, and signed its official declaration. They were all convinced that the FTAA could bring economic benefits to the region if implemented in a balanced manner by 2005.

In the following year, Brazil called the First Presidential Summit of South America. Similar to previous critiques towards the United States, it was possible to observe in this declaration the first seeds of the future transformation of this practice. This action connected the institutions of MERCOSUR, ALADI, and CAN as successful past antecedents of the Presidential Summit and a possible future union in South America.[[405]](#footnote-405) They also emplotted other actions of the past as antecedents of possibilities for the entire region. Some of them included the treaties of peace within MERCOSUR and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons agreements.[[406]](#footnote-406) In this declaration, the states of South America also delineated boundaries for the region due to their “… common values and geographic contiguity.”[[407]](#footnote-407) Additionally, the presidents mentioned that globalization was a process that could bring economic benefits to the region as long as it was balanced and fair. Thus, open regionalism was a possible tool for a prosperous future for the region, but it also brought challenges that needed to be faced in sub-regional cooperation.[[408]](#footnote-408) Lastly, they emplotted MERCOSUR and CAN as part of the prosperous future of the region. This was done with the idea of a union among the institutions to foment the South American sub-regionalism that was necessary as the aforementioned platform.[[409]](#footnote-409) Overall, this strong action of self-reinforcement fulfilled a joint statement by all the governments of the southern states (including those engaged in other practices) and projected an idea of boundaries only delineating South America.

Alongside the following years, the critical aspects of these practices *vis-à-vis* the open regional notion started increasing, and the tension between the subjects started to be more apparent. In 2000, for example, Chile decided to prioritize bilateral relations with the United States over the full entrance to MERCOSUR.[[410]](#footnote-410) This action of open regional enforcement was emplotted by the moderate subject as prioritizing foreign interests. They momentarily cancelled the negotiations of Chile’s entrance to MERCOSUR and considered an international demand of compensation for the damages that the bilateral free trade agreement would cause.[[411]](#footnote-411) In that same year, the presidents participating in the Summit of MERCOSUR in December consequently criticized the inconsistency of the United States in the negotiations of the FTAA. One the one hand, the Government of the United States promoted liberalization for the region. On the other hand, its Congress discussed farm subsidies and had problems passing the fast track for the FTAA. This was emplotted by the moderates as an inconsistency and an open regional danger for the region.[[412]](#footnote-412) Similarly, in 2001, Brazil emplotted the proposal of moving the finish date of the FTAA to 2003 as an imposition by the United States, which went against the interests of the region to carefully adapt before entering the agreement.[[413]](#footnote-413) Another critical aspect that started to increase in the moderate practice was the influence of Chávez in MERCOSUR, the Presidential Summits, CAN, and ALADI. As previously mentioned in the description of the socialist practice, this influence entailed the transmission of the idea of a “true” integration for the entire Latin American region and the notion of a common past of struggle against exploitation.

Despite these critiques, in some of their actions of self-reinforcement in 2000 and 2001, the moderate practice reiterated their cooperation with the open regional practice through their responsibility in deepening the implementation of the FTAA. For example, in the XIII Presidential Summit of the CAN, the official declaration stated that they would work towards the FTAA, but in balance and fairness. They emplotted these actions within the union of MERCOSUR and CAN.[[414]](#footnote-414) Another example was observed in the MERCOSUR Presidential Summit of June, 2001, where the state members ratified their responsibility towards the FTAA. It was interesting to note that this declaration also emplotted previous efforts and the union of MERCOSUR with CAN. Moreover, this was the meeting that accepted Chávez’s formal petition to enter MERCOSUR.[[415]](#footnote-415) Another interesting relationship of cooperation with the open regional practice was observed in the previously mentioned summits. In both cases, the state members of CAN and MERCOSUR asseverated their support to the Government of Bolivia in the eradication of coca leaves as a tool to fight drug trafficking in the region. This open regional action did not only entail the United States as the protector of democratic order and security, but it was also a direct opposition to the indigenous practice and Morales.

Other actions of self-reinforcement took place through regional meetings in 2000 and 2001. In every case, the official declarations of the summits included past events, institutions, and policies as part of the moderate story and as antecedents of the possible future for the region. One of the most relevant actions of self-reinforcement in these years was the declaration of La Paz, in which the dialogue between MERCOSUR and the CAN for their articulation was institutionalized. This articulation was oriented towards the integration of South America, the reinforcement of democracy, and to create a free trade area of South America.[[416]](#footnote-416)

During 2002, other MERCOSUR and CAN summits took place to deepen integration and solve regional problems. For example, the treaty of Olivos was signed to solve controversies between members of MERCOSUR. This was a result of the issues that flourished between Brazil and Argentina in the midst of their financial crises.[[417]](#footnote-417) However, the most important action of self-reinforcement was the Second Presidential Summit of South America. During this meeting, the moderate subject achieved another joint statement signed by all the governments of South America and, in this occasion, the statement went further into the idea of a boundary in South America, which excluded the United States. In the declaration, the presidents connected the Summit to the previous Presidential Summits of South America and the work of MERCOSUR, CAN, ALADI, and CEPAL. They also mentioned the importance of all these forms of sub-regional integration for the development of the South American region.[[418]](#footnote-418) During this event, the governments of South America emplotted not only regionalism, but also the economic crises that Argentina and Brazil were going through. Unlike the open regional practice, these events were understood as results of imbalances in globalization and the financial world.[[419]](#footnote-419) Simultaneously, among the proposals of integration in areas such as infrastructure, energy, education, declaration of a zone of peace and non-proliferation, and the idea of a regional fund for development, the presidents critiqued again the agricultural subsidies applied by the United States and the developed world.[[420]](#footnote-420) This was again an emplotment of the United States’ actions as a contradiction within the open regional practice, which was gradually separating the moderate subject from the FTAA. They also specifically criticized the FTAA for its imbalances in ministerial negotiations.[[421]](#footnote-421) This overall tendency to deepen sub-regional integration continued in MERCOSUR and CAN meetings in 2002 and 2003. In each occasion, the member states emplotted their actions with antecedents and the narrative of the moderate practice. Notwithstanding, the region started integrating in their agenda more social and political issues. For example, in the meeting of MERCOSUR in June, 2003, President Lula Da Silva proposed a project called “Plan 2006” to deepen integration in social issues such as the fomentation of employment and the eradication of poverty.[[422]](#footnote-422) Additionally, Ecuador presented its formal application to enter the treaty and Venezuela reiterated its desires to become a full member.[[423]](#footnote-423) The latter became an associate member of MERCOSUR in July, 2004.[[424]](#footnote-424) Peru was also included as an associate member in December, 2003.[[425]](#footnote-425) In all these meetings, the critiques of the application of subsidies and the imbalances of the negotiations of the FTAA kept growing within the moderate narrative. These problems were viewed as obstacles for the development of the region.[[426]](#footnote-426) Additionally, the importance of social and political areas started to grow in the practice of the moderates. As a result of the perception of the unfairness of globalization, which had caused different regional crises and the increase of poverty, the members of the moderate subject started viewing the role of the government as more important in their path of development. This was also related to the aforementioned change of presidencies in South American countries and the emergence of progressive movements that overtook a great part of the political scenario of the region. The declaration of the Presidential meeting of MERCOSUR in July, 2004, illustrated these emerging qualities in the moderate practice.[[427]](#footnote-427) They also emplotted the previously mentioned Brazilian initiative, “Plan 2006,” to increase social elements in MERCOSUR’s agenda.

That same year, in November, the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina interacted with then-indigenous activist Morales. They asked him to be patient and utilize the available institutional paths to power. Unlike previous years, the moderate narrative started to articulate itself with the indigenous subject. Due to the United States-supported strategy of coca eradication, this articulation entailed another critical element introduced into the moderate narrative, which was now giving tacit support to the main actor of the indigenous opposition.

During the following month, the moderate practice took another big step towards self-reinforcement and called the Third Presidential Summit of South America. During this summit, the presidents of South America created the South American Community of Nations.[[428]](#footnote-428) This action was emplotted within the previous efforts in the other Presidential Summits and the work towards the articulation of MERCOSUR and CAN. They also included ALADI as a successful antecedent of articulation in the region. Nevertheless, the most interesting aspect of this declaration was the deeper inclusion of a notion of South Americanism and boundaries. For example, the introduction of the declaration mentioned that the presidents of South America had gathered to create this regional integration interpreting the legacy left by Simón Bolívar, San Martín, and Mariscal José Sucre.[[429]](#footnote-429) This notion of a common regional past was translated as the necessity to continue a common struggle for a better future towards modern development. This idea of development was not only through liberalization, but also with many other elements of social and political character. This statement represented the definitive break of the internal tensions of the moderate practice towards a more progressive notion. In the first years of the practice, the idea of liberalization was a big part of the prosperous future for the region. Now, liberalization was not enough.[[430]](#footnote-430) That same year, the declaration of the Presidential Summit of MERCOSUR in December emplotted the creation of the South American Community of Nation as a key component of the integration for the region and the realization of Simón Bolívar’s dream.[[431]](#footnote-431) Similarly, the CAN emplotted this event as a consequence of previous work of articulation between MERCOSUR and CAN, which would lead the region towards successful integration.[[432]](#footnote-432)

The following year, MERCOSUR started negotiations through ALADI to articulate international relations with Cuba, which was excluded from the FTAA and from other open regional treaties.[[433]](#footnote-433) Together with the continuation of social policies, the deepening process of South American integration, the critiques of imbalances and subsidies, and other elements, the inclusion of Cuba represented the further separation between the moderate and the open regional practices. Some other changes started to happen inside the moderate practice as well. For example, the CAN started discussing a different approach in relationship to the fight against drug trafficking, which distanced itself from the previous war-like programs.[[434]](#footnote-434)

During 2005, the moderate practice acted again towards self-reinforcement and organized the First Summit of the South American Community of Nations. This event was emplotted as part of the sequence of actions connected to previous summits and the work within MERCOSUR, CAN, and ALADI. During this summit, the Governments of South America agreed to reinforce their identity and work towards more integration in health care, education, science, regional security, communication, technology, transport, infrastructure, and energy. These areas of work would include all the previous efforts realized in MERCOSUR, CAN, ALADI, and other sub-regional treaties. They also asked CEPAL to help them design an economic strategy to develop the region sustainably and with more autonomy.[[435]](#footnote-435)

That same year, the separation between the moderate and the open regional subjects became official as the moderates disagreed with the FTAA, intended to include their own notion of prosperity in the project, and did not schedule another FTAA summit. As previously mentioned, this separation entailed a major hit for the open regional practice, which lost very important actors and its status of master narrative. This separation was observed in the analysis of data as the beginning of a more explicit moderate orientation towards the sub-region, which reinforced its notion of development with autonomy and endogenous cooperation. These characteristics put aside some of the elements of open regionalism that were previously included in the moderate practice, such as the idea of liberalization as the center of development and the ambiguity of boundaries.

During 2006 and 2007, this tendency continued and some of the critical aspects of South American regionalism grew deeper into the moderate practice. For example, in 2006, MERCOSUR agreed to sign a treaty of economic complementarity with Cuba.[[436]](#footnote-436) They also supported Morales by congratulating Bolivia for its democratic elections of 2006.[[437]](#footnote-437) The last two actions symbolized the closer interaction of the moderate subject with socialist and indigenous actors. The practice also increased the number of projects in social areas; they started focusing on fomenting small companies and cooperatives, and emphasized the importance of the increase of employment with dignity.[[438]](#footnote-438) Again, these actions were emplotted as part of the processes of moderate integration within MERCOSUR and oriented towards the union of South America. Another example was observed in the Third Summit of the South American Community of Nations, where the member states asseverated their responsibility towards an integrated region and “a new model of regionalism for the XXI century.”[[439]](#footnote-439) This model viewed the future of the world within the notion of multipolarity, which would increase democracy among diverse areas of the globe. Moreover, this action of self-reinforcement, which was emplotted again in connection to the other Presidential Summits and the previous work of MERCOSUR, CAN, and ALADI, called for a social forum as part of the official agenda of the Summit. This social forum published the declaration of Cochabamba, which was highly critical of neoliberalism and open regionalism. It also included the expressed participation of many actors of the indigenous movements and socialist practice.[[440]](#footnote-440) Furthermore, the official speech of Morales in the Presidential Summit, which promoted a different type of integration including the idea of “living well,” was officially published within the institution.[[441]](#footnote-441) Many notions and projects were emplotted in this summit, but one of the most emphasized ideas was the importance of sovereignty and self-determination in order to reach modern development.[[442]](#footnote-442) Similarly, in the Summit for Energy Integration, in Margarita, the presidents of South America affirmed that energy was a universal right that should be used sustainably.[[443]](#footnote-443) This notion, emplotted within the sequence of actions of the Presidential Summits and the moderate story, implied a separation from the definition of energy as a commodity that should be efficiently sold. Now, the governments had an important role in the distribution of energy as a right, not as a service. During this summit, the moderate subject also included ALBA’s initiative with its grannational oil company as an example of regional cooperation that should be articulated into future projects for South America.[[444]](#footnote-444) Lastly, during 2007, MERCOSUR published a communiqué that demanded the extradition of Luis Posada Carriles, whom was accused of terrorism by Cuba and Venezuela. This action was another sign of, on the one hand, cooperation with the socialist practice, and, on the other hand, opposition to the United States, who denied Cuba the extradition several years earlier.

Many other meetings and summits took place during these years, most of them emplotted their actions within the moderate story and the sequence of actions by the emerging regional institutions. However, the moderate subject self-reinforced during these years mainly with two very important actions. First, the presidents of South America constituted the Bank of the South. This action was emplotted as an important step towards more regional autonomy from past financial imbalances. It was also included as a key result of the subsequent actions of integration, which led to the idea of self-determination for development.[[445]](#footnote-445) In this declaration, the past was not only the vague definition of struggles since independence, but it also criticized the 1990s as part of an unjust “other” that created poverty, unemployment, and other socio-economic problems.[[446]](#footnote-446) The present of the region appeared as a different “self,” which united for a process of modern development with autonomy and sovereignty. Moreover, this action was not only emplotted within the moderate practice, but also by the socialist and indigenous subjects. The former introduced the Bank of the South as part of the struggle for independence and for a new financial structure that could help the region distance itself from the imbalances of open regionalism.[[447]](#footnote-447) The latter saw it as a result of the struggle against international financial institutions and for the development of the region in harmony with Pachamama.[[448]](#footnote-448) It is important to notice that this event of interaction also influenced the indigenous practice through the idea of development. For example, Morales mentioned in his statement that Mother Earth was the provider of raw material for development. This statement emphasized the importance of modern development over indigenous environmentalism. Additionally, the President of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner stated that Morales’ struggles in Bolivia were examples for the region. They had taught others the importance of ancestral identity and traditions.[[449]](#footnote-449) Altogether, these interactions implied support between the three practices based on the similarities they shared in the definition of the region. In all three cases, the idea of the unfair past and the united future for development with autonomy had grown with time. It was now the basis of their interactions. This entailed important strengthening relationships between all three subjects, but it also increased the internal tension of the indigenous subject around the issue of modern development and indigenism.

The second important action of self-reinforcement was the creation of UNASUR. This action was also emplotted within the sequence of previous Presidential Summits, the creation of the South American Community of Nations, and the actions of coordination between the CAN and MERCOSUR. Moreover, the creation of UNASUR was understood as a result of the common struggle for independence and regional unity that had started with Simón Bolívar, San Martín, and Mariscal José Sucre. Now, the nations of South America were seeking to reinforce this independence and create a mechanism of integration that would allow them to further develop under this notion. The integration included several political, infrastructural, educational, security, environmental, economic, and social aspects that went far beyond liberalization. It also included the indigenous idea of the respect for the multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic character of the people of the region.[[450]](#footnote-450)

During the following years, several actions of self-reinforcement were emplotted as part of this practice, in support to the other non-open regional practices, and towards the new moderate definition of the region. For example, in 2008, UNASUR published a communiqué in full support of Morales in Bolivia. At the time, the President of Bolivia was struggling with the conservative movement of the “Media Luna.”[[451]](#footnote-451) UNASUR congratulated itself later, in 2009, for the successful negotiations that led to peace in Bolivia.[[452]](#footnote-452) They also constituted the Security Council of UNASUR and had their first meeting in 2009.[[453]](#footnote-453) Later in August, UNASUR even recognized and supported Morales’ struggle to change the United Nations’ list of illegal drugs. They asseverated that coca chewing was an ancestral right of the indigenous people of South America and it should, therefore be respect.[[454]](#footnote-454) This showed the change in the moderate practice, which went from backing President Banzer in the eradication of coca leaves in Bolivia, to supporting Morales in the struggle to establish the international right of indigenous people to use this product as part of an ancestral tradition. UNASUR did not only support the indigenous practice, but it also manifested its cooperation with the socialist practice in several occasions.[[455]](#footnote-455)

Finally, the last two important actions of moderate self-reinforcement that took place were the emplotment of the events in Ecuador, which created the Protocol of Democracy, and the ratification of UNASUR by sufficient members to make the institution official in the United Nations. The former took place in 2010, when the members of the police department of Quito, who were protesting at the time, kidnapped the president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa. These events were emplotted as an attempt of a coup d’état in Ecuador. UNASUR published a communiqué that mentioned that Ecuador would be isolated and the borders would be closed if the coup d’état removed President Correa from his position. It also mentioned that due to these events, they would create the Protocol of Democracy for the region.[[456]](#footnote-456) Later that year, UNASUR signed the Protocol of Democracy to protect the region from internal and external threats.[[457]](#footnote-457) The latter, took place in March, 2010, when UNASUR presented its constitutive treaty to the United Nations.[[458]](#footnote-458)

Overall, the moderate practice transformed and reinforced itself alongside the period between 1999 and 2011. This process took place with the separation between the moderate and the open regional subject. It also entailed a close interaction between the socialist, indigenous, and moderate practices of the region. Nonetheless, this process of reinforcement cannot be interpreted as a path of evolution in which UNASUR consolidated with strong foundations. The institution was still very new and the presidential nature of its diplomacy still showed, during these years, the conflicts of the region between the actors of the different practices. This weakness was observed, for example, around the regional action towards the Honduran coup d’état. At first, UNASUR was able to agree against the coup d’état, but when the elections were called, UNASUR was not able to reach consensus in a communiqué to reject this action.[[459]](#footnote-459) Additionally, the support that this practice sought from the indigenous subject had increasing costs for the latter, which had more internal fractures as time passed.

## Regional Structures: UNASUR, ALBA, and CELAC

The definition of structures, which I utilized in this research, included both the notion of master narratives and the network of practices present at a particular time in history. Based on this concept, it was possible to observe that the structure of the region of South America in 2011 included all four of the practices still contesting for the definition of the region. However, the socialist, indigenous, and moderate practices also cooperated in order to constitute UNASUR within several of the common elements that they shared. In this sense, UNASUR was a partial master narrative for South America. It included actors from all three of the other practices and it achieved cooperation with at least the indigenous and socialist subjects. However, this cooperation did not mean the complete inclusion of the socialist and indigenous practices into UNASUR. Indeed, ALBA still contested the region by seeking to establish its own notion in Latin America. ALBA and UNASUR thus shared a relationship of competition and cooperation simultaneously. Moreover, the indigenous subject had its own key elements, which conflicted with UNASUR in the tension between development and indigenism. This tension emerged around infrastructural and energy projects in which development involved different countries of the region, but relegated the communities that had ancestral rights over the territories necessary for the projects.

The aforementioned competition between ALBA and UNASUR began to be solved in CELAC, which was viewed by both institutions as a possible articulation of several forms of integration in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, the tension of the indigenous subject remained within this project. Thus, CELAC appeared in 2010 as a more complete master narrative for the entire region. This project was viewed by all three of the non-open-regional practices as part of the prosperous future of the region. Additionally, it included several of the Latin American actors of open regionalism. It was the project that would articulate all other regional institutions. For example, ALBA declared in 2010 that they were seeking to reinforce political integration in the region to defend their sovereignty and projects of development against the empire. In this sense, they celebrated the creation of CELAC.[[460]](#footnote-460) Similarly, MERCOSUR celebrated the importance of CELAC for the articulation of all regional and sub-regional institutions.[[461]](#footnote-461) Finally, Morales stated that the region was wealthy on raw material, and this organization could help further develop and expand its markets.[[462]](#footnote-462) This was integrated as part of the process of the indigenous 500-year-old struggle against colonialism, neoliberalism, and capitalism.[[463]](#footnote-463) It was also connected to CAN, UNASUR, and MERCOSUR. Notwithstanding, in this particular interview, the idea of Sumak Kawsay was no longer part of the prosperous future for the region by Morales, the leader of the indigenous subject. Instead, development had to be reached with social justice and equality. This observation did not mean that Morales had completely abandoned the notion of Sumak Kawsay; it entailed that the tension between indigenism and development had given supremacy to the latter. Again, Pachamama was the supplier of raw material to increase trade and economic growth, which were the basis of modern development.

Despite the supremacy of the modern notion of development, the interesting aspect of this new regional project was that it included many of the critical elements of the moderate, socialist, and indigenous practices. For example, the official statements of CELAC in 2010 included the support to Argentina in its struggle for sovereignty in the Malvinas Islands, the opposition to United States’ blockade against Cuba, the necessity of respect for sovereignty, the Ecuadorian environmentalist project called Yasuni-ITT, the exclusion of the United States from the region, and the petition of extradition for Luis Posada Carriles by Cuba.[[464]](#footnote-464) The following year, CELAC met again and emphasized the common history of the region since the Antifictiónico Congress of Panama. They also defined this common past by sharing the last 200 years that has passed since the liberation of Haiti. The member states also stated that integration was a key element for sustainable development in the context of international crisis. Finally, they manifested the importance of the indigenous support in the independence of the region. This showed the “pluri-national” nature of the region and the relevance of peace.[[465]](#footnote-465)

# Chapter V

## Conclusion

The complexity of regional formations and practices should still puzzle researchers around the world. The phenomenon is growing as globalization creates tighter connections amongst different countries and regions. In this research, I tried to understand regionalism by displaying the different identities contesting the definition of South America and Latin America. Additionally, in the process of observation, I was able to re-construct the matrix of practices that constituted the politics of regional identity during the period 1999-2011. These data answered the question about the characteristics of UNASUR and its process of emergence. Such a qualitative approach allowed the research to comprehend each regional view considering their internal logic and their interaction. This analysis additionally described UNASUR without the objective imposition of traditional regional models, or leaving major subjects out of the interaction. Finally, this account of regionalism delineated an adaptation of constructivist theory that systematically observed symbolic practices, which promoted certain definitions for a particular territory. This theoretical framework was re-constructed through the dialectical discussion established between theory and preliminary empirical observation. Once the process of observation started, the theory proved useful to display the characteristics, weaknesses, and strengths of the new regionalism emerging in South America. Notwithstanding, the definitions, methodology, and ontology defined in this research are far from closure. Indeed, they pretend to open a debate about the tools necessary to understand the emergence of regional structures, considering the endogenous characteristics of each identity in contest, as well as their connections and interactions.

Some of the weaknesses of the research lay in the complexity of the chosen topic. First, the research did not include nationalist narratives. However, in the years chosen for observation, globalization was a broadly accepted reality that no subject in regional interaction negated completely. In many cases, the open regional aspects of globalization were criticized and opposed, but the rest of the increasing connections to the region were not questioned. Further, nationalism did not appear in the inductive observation as a narrative of its own. It sometimes appeared as mixed with the critiques towards open-regionalism, but then they were articulated with other narratives. For example, in the early 2000s, Lula Da Silva criticized President Cardoso’s domestic policy, which was, at the time, too close to open regionalism for the taste of the Brazilian unions. This critique was translated into a domestic transformation toward more protectionism to create more employment. However, even at that point, Lula Da Silva’s view of the “solutions” was related not only to the country, but also to the region. Moreover, it negated open regional globalization, but not South American regionalism.

Second, the research did not consider all the important actors playing in the contest to shape the region. For example, according to the socialist, moderate, and indigenous subjects, privately owned media in South America played an important role reinforcing the open regional practice and criticizing other subjects. Additionally, the socialist subject claimed to have support from a broad platform of social movements, unions, and students’ organizations that worked nationally and regionally. The same applied to the moderate subject. Overall, this is a fair critique of this research and a weakness that could be approached in future research. Indeed, none of these actors was taken into account in the empirical observation of the interaction of regional practices. However, all the subjects interacting in the empirical observation of practices were accounted and described. The problem lies in the number of actors that could be observed within each subject. It would thus be beneficial to research further the actors that played within each subject reinforcing different practices in the region. For example, even though the open regional practice seemed to decline in South America, if the media industry of the region was another actor within this subject, then its power could be even stronger than most believe. This could be observed by including the opinion segments of different newspapers, TV channels, and Internet blogs, as part of the inductive observation of the narratives. Then, they could also be traced empirically in the interaction of practices. Overall, I understand the importance of these actors and the differences within subjects, but I decided to focus on the broader scenario in order to interrelate the main regional practices. The conclusions and observations would have been otherwise similar to some of the aforementioned research, where authors concentrate in one or two actors and do not consider the importance of the entire matrix of practices. Such a research ends up either forgetting the indigenous people of South America or focusing only in social movements. Indigenous and peasant movements thus become either forgotten or the only object of analysis in relationship to the opposition towards open regionalism. On the contrary, the empirical observation that took place here sought to articulate the main subjects of regionalism in South America and start a new debate about their influence within cooperation and competition. Moreover, in the cases where internal differences strongly influenced the region, the research traced the contradictions of the subject and the weakening processes that this could broach. For example, the indigenous subject had internal tensions that increased with the cooperative interaction established with other non-open-regional practices. This tension exacerbated internal inconsistencies, which weakened the indigenous practice. This was partly a result of the interaction of practices, which could not be ignored.

Despite the previously mentioned weaknesses in this research, the analysis of data proved the hypotheses delineated by the first step of observation and the discussion with other authors. The first hypothesis asseverated that the moderate narrative would grow unevenly to become the master narrative of the region institutionalized in UNASUR. As the previous chapter displayed, the narrative promoted by the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay in 1999 self-reinforced by emploting several important events in the region. In many cases, the inclusion of events into their regional story entailed an adaptation that separated their notion from the open regional view. Moreover, this separation brought the moderate narrative closer to the indigenous and socialist definitions of Latin America as more critical notions were added into the story of the region. Hence, the moderate narrative adapted according to new events and the engagement of new actors. This process of actions, connected in the overall flux of emplotment, made the moderate perspective a partial master narrative for the region. The data thus showed that the hypothesis was pointing in the right direction, but that the complexity of the region also included other practices still contesting. This observation was possible due to the dual account of structures as matrixes of practices and master narratives at the same time. In general, UNASUR included actors from all other practices, but still had to compete in the region with other narratives, such as the socialist notion of Latin America in ALBA.

The previously mentioned development of the moderate practice cannot be understood only with the notion of self-reinforcement. Hence, the research accounted for the observation of the institutionalization and growth of the moderate practice within the interaction among the major subjects present in the years selected. In order to achieve this goal, the three remaining hypotheses of research included the other practices that emerged in the guided-inductive re-construction of narratives. Overall, the analysis of data displayed plenty of evidence to support all three of the hypotheses. Nonetheless, the most interesting aspect of this analysis was the detail description of each one of these practices and their interaction with the moderate subject. On the one hand, the open regional practice appeared at first as a master narrative, which included actors from the socialist and moderate subjects. This made the subject very powerful in the early 2000s. However, as time passed and events were not successfully emplotted, many actors started disengaging from the open regional subject. On the other hand, the socialist and indigenous practices were emploting regional events successfully and including new actors. They were also growing with this interaction and cooperation. Simultaneously, the indigenous subject intended to integrate notions of modern development and indigenism that created internal tensions in several occasions. This was observed under the leadership of Morales, who intended to articulate the idea of Sumak Kawsay with modern development. These ideas implied that, with the process of transformation led by Morales, development could take place respecting Pachamama and the ancestral rights of the indigenous people. Hence, the indigenous practice promoted a narrative that intended to find equilibrium between the two notions. However, this equilibrium was seldom reached when policies were implemented, and this situation created tension among the different groups that were engaged in this subject. Ergo, the indigenous practice reinforced in the interaction with the other non-open-regional practices, but it also risked the relegation of some of its key indigenous elements.

In general, the region started creating a common opposing “other” with the crisis of Argentina in 2002, the regional economic situation of unemployment and poverty, the general understanding of unfairness in globalization, the inconsistencies of the United States in the application of subsidies, the increasing notion of external interference, the growing notion of a common regional past of unfairness, and other critical elements that were included into the stories of South America and Latin America. This emerging perception connected the three non-open-regional practices and fomented cooperation among them. These subjects had elements of their narratives that were similar and this guided their actions in their mutual support. For example, they started sharing the notion of an unfair past that needed to be changed. The moderates saw their past of neoliberalism as an obstacle for development and social justice. They thus started promoting a new type of regionalism that protected sovereignty and autonomy. The socialist practice saw the past of 1990s and early 2000s as part of the process of surplus extraction from the region. This past was considered dangerous and therefore translated into the idea of transformation for the future, which also included the notion of sovereignty to protect the role of the state in development. Both of these practices saw their past as unfair and the prosperous future within different degrees of transformation for modern development. Finally, the indigenous practice saw the recent decades as dominated by the open regional narrative as well. This entailed another episode of the oppression that started 500 years earlier. Thus, the prosperous future for this practice lay in the notion of transformation led by Morales to reinstitute Sumak Kawsay. All in all, the three non-open-regional practices viewed their past as dominated by open regionalism and unfairness. Thus, they sought transformation in order to separate the region from their common opposing “other,” namely the open regional subject led by the United States. Moreover, even though the projects for the indigenous, socialist, and moderate futures were different, they successfully articulated those elements that were shared and could be included into the master narrative of UNASUR. For example, the indigenous narrative emplotted development as beneficial as long as it included the respect of their ancestral identity and the recuperation of natural resources. This delineated a notion of limited development in balance with the rights of Pachamama and Sumak Kawsay. As I mentioned previously, this created internal tensions that fractured the subject in conflicts around policies that prioritized development, but it also strengthened Morales in the region and allowed him to introduce indigenous notions into several institutions. For example, the socialists practice emplotted the right of the indigenous people to protect their identity as part of the struggle against cultural colonialism in ALBA. Moreover, the recuperation of natural resources was understood as part of the fight against the extraction of surplus. Finally, the moderate narrative emplotted the rights of indigenous people as part of a “true” democracy in the region, which should respect the endogenous characteristics of South America. At the same time, the importance of sovereignty for the socialist and indigenous practices was also shared by the moderate understanding of the region, which now perceived its future within a development strategy that included a stronger role for the state. UNASUR consequently institutionalized a moderate narrative that included indigenous and socialist support. Most important, it created a notion of regionalism where the protection of sovereignty and democracy were the core tools for the prosperous future. This characteristic united all three of the practices.

As previously mentioned in other chapters, however, Sanahuja viewed this aspect of the post-liberal regional formation as a contradiction between nationalism and unionism. He thought that the importance given to sovereignty was inconsistent with the idea of regional unionism. On the contrary, I think that the tension between the protection of sovereignty and the expansion towards regionalism emerges most significantly in particular situations. Since the analysis of data separated the different notions of regionalism that other authors encapsulated together within the signifier “post-liberal regionalism,” it is possible to comprehend this tension in each case. For example, the indigenous and socialist practices promoted a regional notion that easily articulated national views of prosperity with other member states. Within ALBA, these practices extended the protectionist economic policies that could create tensions onto the entire region. This was achieved, for example, with the creation of grannational mixed companies and increasing the project of economic suplementarity. In both cases, the process of integration entailed unionist ideas that connected the member states in their projects of development and decreased the aforementioned tension. Additionally, the tension inside the indigenous practice did not differentiate between the national and regional levels. Instead, they had to deal with deeper contradictions amongst traditional conceptions and modern ideas. This phenomenon was present not only in Bolivia, but in the entire region. The indigenous practice in the region thus sought to act beyond the limits of the states in order to establish its prosperous future. They had regional conferences, regional indigenous parliaments, meetings, and councils. In this sense, the protection of sovereignty did not entail a contradiction for the indigenous practice; it was a notion utilized by the subject to protect the countries that were already in a path of transformation. Sovereignty was thus a tool against imperial interference; not against regionalism. The socialist practice also viewed sovereignty within this idea of the protection of transformation.

 On the contrary, the member states of the moderate practice still tended to focus on national development first and then articulated with the region. For example, Argentina started discussing in February, 2012, the possible application of trade barriers for industrial products, which were sold and produced mostly in Uruguay. Even though President Mujica mentioned that everything could be solved regionally with discussions and talks, this represented a prioritization of national interests over regional integration.[[466]](#footnote-466) Additionally, due to the presidentialist nature of the regional projects of South America, whenever there were disagreements among the member states, the tension between nationalism and unionism increased. This was observed in the case of the Colombian decision to allow the United States to utilize its national military bases. All in all, this was not a major problem for the region in these years due to the progressive similarity of most of the governments in South America. However, if future elections were to change the political scenario and create a more heterogeneous region, this tension would increase significantly. Thus, this is something that the governments, organizations, parties, and social movements of Latin America will have to take into account. A possible solution for this issue could be the further articulation of socialist strategies into the moderate practice. For example, states could start implementing grannational mixed companies within UNASUR. This would increase the coordination of national and regional interests. Additionally, UNASUR could further institutionalize mechanisms such as the Democratic Protocol, which respects sovereignties as long as they fit within the types of models of development that are consistent with the rest of the region. This excluded, for example, the paths of development taken by the dictatorships of the 1970s. Thus, it prioritized the region over sovereignty by including in UNASUR certain exceptions in the rights of nations to build their own path of development. This was achieved by the mechanisms of regional sanctions that limited forms of governments within constitutional rights and democracy.

Finally, the empirical observation of practices in this research brought many elements that were unexpected and not directly included in the hypotheses. This was possible due to the importance given to ontological openness in different steps of the observation. One of these observations was the internal tension in the indigenous practice. Another important element was the creation of CELAC and the general emplotment of it as a master narrative. Since the project comprised the entire region of Latin America and the Caribbean, the observation of the treaties and actions of actors within CELAC was not planned. However, once the observation of practices emplotted the event, it became clear that this was an important project for the research. Overall, it is still too early to predicate about the future capability of this project. However, it was interesting to observe that CELAC was acting, during 2010-2011, as a master narrative by utilizing many of the shared notions of the indigenous, socialist, and moderate narratives of South America and Latin America. At the same time, this project shared the strength and weakness of other regional and sub-regional institutions, namely it depended on presidential diplomacy. If the domestic scenarios of the nations of the sub-continent changed, then this project could be rapidly weakened.

 The arguments put forward in this thesis did not pretend to close the discussion of regionalism in South America. They sought to introduce new elements based on the study of the different perceptions and actions shaping regional projects. With these tools, the research was able to avoid ethnocentric underestimation of different projects, as well as many of the institutionalist exogenous impositions over the particularities of UNASUR and ALBA. Now, future research can focus within each subject and practice to account for further complexity. This could bring a better understanding of regional tendencies towards the future and the weaknesses of current projects.

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# Appendix

Appendix 1

Data Detail

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Data details** |  |
|  |  |
| **Official documents and agreements** |  |
| FTAA | 6 |
| CAN | 18 |
| MERCOSUR | 42 |
| South American Presidential Summits | 2 |
| WTO | 41 |
| ALADI | 20 |
| CEPAL | 10 |
| ALBA | 73 |
| Official declarations of social fora | 2 |
| South American Community of Nations | 10 |
| US official statements about bilateral FTA | 5 |
| Official speeches | 10 |
| UNASUR | 13 |
| Vía Campesina | 18 |
| Punto Unidad  | 9 |
| CELAC | 2 |
| **Newspapers** |   |
| Clarín | 41 |
| Página 12 | 4 |
| La Nación | 52 |
| Lexis-nexis (newspapers in English) | 75 |
| Various newspapers | 15 |
|   |   |
|   |   |
| **Total** | 468 |
| Table 1 |

Appendix 2

Open Regionalism Narrative

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Open Regionalism Narrative | “Self” | Teleological position of the “Others” |
|  |  | Moderate narrative | Socialist narrative | Indigenous narrative |
| Heritage/past | Successful development through open trade and liberalization. |  | Dangerous to democracy and unsuccessful in development. |  |
| Notion of region’s future | Interdependence with the rest of the world through trade, respect of law, democracy, and globalization would promote development. The United States was the guarantor of order and security.  | Cooperative relationship as long as it promoted liberalization, but dangerous when isolationist.  | Dangerous to democracy and protectionist.  | Subversive and anti-modern progress. |
| Table 2  |

Appendix 3

South American Moderate Narrative

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| South American Moderate narrative | “Self” | Teleological position of the “Others” |
|  |  | Open regionalism |
| Heritage/past | Continuous struggle for independence and integration since the early 1800s. | Certain problems emerged with this project in the 1990s. |
| Notion of region’s future | South American cooperation to create a platform to integrate globalization under certain conditions. | Cooperation if the interaction is balanced and fair. |
| Table 3 |

Appendix 4

South American Socialist Narrative

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| South American Socialist Narrative | “Self” | Teleological position of the “Others” |
|  |  | Open Regionalism | Moderate | Indigenous narrative |
| Heritage/past | Past of colonialism and exploitation | Recent past of exploitation, underdevelopment, and poverty promoted mostly by the United States.  | Shared past since independence. | Shared Past of exploitation and exclusion. |
| Notion of region’s future | Future of deep political integration to constitute a platform of autonomy, self-determination, and development.  | Threat to development and autonomy in the region. | Possible cooperation if integration goes beyond free trade agreements. | Respect of their identity within modernization.  |
| Table 4 |

Appendix 5

South American Indigenous Narrative

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| South American Indigenous Narrative | “Self” | Teleological position of the “Others” |
|  |  | Open Regionalism and Moderate  | Socialist narrative |
| Heritage/past | Past of struggle to preserve traditions and identity in a process of oppression, colonialism, and extinction.  | Authors of the continuous 500-year-old process of oppression.  | Shared past of exploitation and exclusion. |
| Notion of region’s future | Future of respect and dignity for indigenous communities in the region. | Dangerous expropriation of natural resources and further oppression. | Possible cooperation if autonomy is respected.  |
| Table 5 |

1. César Augusto Bermúdez Torres, “Proyecto de integración en América Latina durante el siglo XX. Una Mirada a la integración regional en el siglo XXI,” Investigación y Desarrollo 19, no. 1 (2011): 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Ibid., 216, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid., 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Ibid., 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Lucila Melendi, “El Pensamiento Latinoamericano y la Integración regional,” (paper, UPMPM, I Congreso de Pensamiento Político Latinoamericano, October 8, 2011), 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. César Augusto Bermúdez Torres, 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ibid., 221, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Lucila Melendi, 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Ibid., 4, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. César Augusto Bermúdez Torres, 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Ibid., 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Ibid., 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Ibid., 222, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid., 224, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid., 225. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Lucila Melendi, 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Roberto Pizarro, “El difícil Camino de la Integración regional,” Nueva Sociedad 214, (2008): 26, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. María Esther Morales Fajardo, “Un repaso a la regionalización y el regionalismo: Los primeros procesos de integración regional en América Latina,” CONfines 3, no. 6 (2007): 72, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Lucila Melendi, 8, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. María Esther Morales Fajardo, 73, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. César Augusto Bermúdez Torres, 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. María Esther Morales Fajardo, 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Roberto Pizarro, 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. César Augusto Bermúdez Torres, 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. María Esther Morales Fajardo, 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Roberto Pizarro, 28, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid., 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics,” Review of International Studies 21, no. 4 (1995): 331-358. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid., 334. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., 336. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid., 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Ibid., 337. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Adrián Bonilla and Guillaume Long, “Un nuevo regionalismo sudamericano,” Revista de Ciencias Sociales 38, Quito, (2010): 23, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Carlos Alberto Chaves García, “La Inserción internacional de Sudamérica: la apuesta por la UNASUR,” Revista de Ciencias Sociales 38, Quito, (2010): 30, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Nicola Phillips, “The Rise and Fall of Open Regionalism? Comparative Reflections on Regional Governance in the Southern Cone of Latin America,” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2003): 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Gián Luca Gardini, The Origins of MERCOSUR, Democracy and Regionalization in South America (Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2010): 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Nicola Phillips, “Hemispheric Integration and Subregionalism in the Americas,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) 79, no. 2, (2003): 340. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. “The heads of state express their concerns about the maintenance of agricultural subsidies in developed countries, which distort the competitive conditions of the market.” Second Presidential Summit of South America, Official Statement, 27 July 2002, <http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com/historia/index.html>, accessed February 2, 2012, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. (N/A), “Presidente venezolano opuesto a políticas de EE. UU.” La Nación, May 16th, 2001, San José, Costa Rica, final edition, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Paulo Vizentini and Marianne Wiesebron, Free Trade for the Americas? (UK, London, Zed Books, 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. José Antonio Sanahuja, “Multilateralismo y regionalismo en clave sudamericana: el caso de UNASUR,” Pensamiento Propio 33, (2011): 119, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Francisco J. Verdes-Montenegro Escánez, “Una región en construcción. UNASUR y la integración en America Latina,” Revista Integración1 y Comercio 31, no. 14 (2010): 139. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. While studying the context of the 1990s and the project of MERCOSUR, she stated the following: “Our concern here, in the first instance, is with the processes of market-led regionalization, which are grounded specifically in the gradual regionalization of the strategies and structures of firms. This re-organization of capital has propelled the construction of a genuinely regional market, which crystallizes around the MERCOSUR...” Nicola Phillips, “The Rise and Fall...”, 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Samuel Pinheiro Guimarāes, “Brazil, MERCOSUR, the FTAA and Europe,” in Free Trade for the Americas? ed. Paulo Vizentini and Marianne Wiesebron (New York, 2004): 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. José Antonio Sanahuja, “La Construcción de una región: Sudamérica y el regionalismo posliberal,” in Una región en Construcción, UNASUR y la integración en America del Sur, ed. Manuel Cienfuegos and José Antonio Sanahuja, Ediciones Bellaterra, Barcelona, (2010): 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Eric Joseph Crosbie, “The effects of External Forces on Regional Integration: The decline of the U.S. Influence and Increased Regional Integration in MERCOSUR,” (master’s thesis, SFSU, 2010), 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. José Antonio Sanahuja, “La Construcción de una región …” 95, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Adrián Bonilla and G. Long, 26, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. “UNASUR has as its main objective to create, with participation and consensus, a space of integration and union in cultural, social, economic, and political areas. UNASUR prioritizes political dialogue, social policies, education, infrastructure, financing projects and the environment in order to eliminate socio-economic inequality, to reach social inclusion, to increase civil participation, to reinforce democracy, and to reduce international asymmetries. All these goals will be reached in a framework of a strengthen state sovereignty and independence.” UNASUR, Official treaty, “Additional Protocol to the constitutive treaty of UNASUR on the commitment to Democracy,” 26 November 2010, <http://opnew.op.gov.gy/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1108:additional-protocol-to-the-constitutive-treaty-of-unasur-on-commitment-to-democracy&catid=34:bulletins&Itemid=70>, accessed February 5, 2012, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. The Protocol stated the following: “...in the event of a breach or threat of breach against the democratic order, the measures outlined below will be applied for the purpose of re-establishing the democratic institutional political process.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. For example, Nicola Phillips states, “The political and economic project associated with the hemispheric agenda must be recognized, in this respect, as being fundamentally of an ideological nature, and part and parcel of the neoliberal project that underpins the global hegemonic project of the United States.” Nicola Phillips, “US power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the Americas,” Latin American Politics and Society 47, no. 4 (2005): 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Carlos Alberto Chaves García, 30, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. José Antonio Sanahuja, “La Construcción de una región...” 96, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Nicola Phillips, “US power and...” 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Paulo Vizentini and Marianne Wiesebron, 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. This can be observed in the following news paper article: “President George W. Bush signed into law a bill providing new subsidies for farmers over the next decade, and closing the book on the nation's experiment with free market policies in agriculture.” “Farm bill signed into law,” Financial Times, London, England, 14 May 2002, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed February 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Leonardo Granato and Nahuel Oddone, “Alianza Bolivariana y UNASUR a la búsqueda de autonomía, origines y objetivos,” Revista Intellector 7, no. 13 (2010): 2 (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Carlos Alberto Chaves García, 30 (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Francisco J Verdes-Montenegro Escánez, “El regionalismo Posliberal y la (In)seguridad: La respuesta del ALBA y UNASUR,” Universidad Computense de Madrid, < [www.aecpa.es/uploads/files/modules/congress/10/papers/331.pdf](http://www.aecpa.es/uploads/files/modules/congress/10/papers/331.pdf) > (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Eric Joseph Crosbie, 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Ibid., 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. For example, Adrián Bonilla affirmed, “Brazil, emerging power in the BRIC, G20 and aspiring to gain permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations, seeks to expand its increasing power and importance in the South American region.” Adrián Bonilla and G. Long, 26, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Ibid., 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. José Antonio Sanahuja, “La construcción de una región...” 123, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Carlos Alberto Chaves García, 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Nicola Phillips, “The Rise and Fall...” 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. José Antonio Sanahuja, “Multilateralismo y...” 115, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. For example, the official agreement of the Second Presidential Summit of South America in 2002 affirms that “... the Presidents highlighted the South American desire to build a common space of integration and cooperation based on their common history and cultural heritage. This goal will be achieved through the consolidation of normative frameworks, the harmonization of institutions and the reinforcement of physical connections.” Second Presidential Summit of South America, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. In the official statement of the constitution of the South American Community of Nations in 2004, the heads of state affirmed that “following the examples of Simón Bolívar, Antonio José de Sucre and San Martín, our people, our heroes of Independence that built the South American Nation without borders; and the wishes of their people favoring integration, we have decided to constitute the South American Community of Nations.” Third Presidential Summit of South America, 8 December 2004, Official agreement, introduction, <http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com/historia/index.html>, accessed February 4, 2012, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. John E. Griffiths, “Procesos de integración regional en defensa: ¿Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa – UNASUR – Un nuevo intento?” GCG George Town University 3, no. 1 (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Ibid., 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Mercedes Hoffay, “UNASUR, ¿Un interlocutor autorizado con los Estados Unidos?” Pensamiento Propio 31, < <http://www.gloobal.net/iepala/gloobal/fichas/ficha.php?entidad=Textos&id=13162&opcion=documento>> (N/A): 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Ibid., 201, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. In this sense, César Augusto Bermúdez Torres affirmed, “even though we should not confuse UNASUR with an international forum of dialogue, it is too early to judge how much UNASUR has gone forward with its goals.” César Augusto Bermúdez Torres, 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Francisco J. Verdes-Montenegro Escánez, 2, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Ibid., 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Ibid., 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Ibid., 6, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. UNASUR, Official treaty, “Additional Protocol...” [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Francisco J. Verdes-Montenegro Escánez, 16, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Roberto Pizarro provided one of the best examples of institutionalist approaches of UNASUR. According to the author, most of these new initiatives were mere rhetoric: “The rhetoric increases and the initiatives proliferate. From the Community of South American Nations, the region went to UNASUR, which emerged together with ALBA. Moreover, the Bank of the South coexists with the Andean Corporation of Foment. Even though many projects emerge and proliferate, their practical consequences are still small.” Roberto Pizarro, 31, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. José A. Sanahuja, “Multilateralismo y...” [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. “Both UNASUR and ALBA express a particular kind of view on ‘post’ or ‘anti’ liberal regionalism, but neither one of them can be considered an initiative of integration in classic terms because they do not intend to shape themselves as a traditional economic integration, nor do they seek to gain attributes of sovereignty over their members.” Ibid., 120 (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Ibid., 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Ibid., 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. José Antonio Sanahuja, “La Construcción de una región...” 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. José A. Sanahuja, “Multilateralismo y...” 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Ibid., 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Ibid., 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Ibid., 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Carlos Alberto Chaves García, 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Ibid., 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Ibid., 35, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Ibid., 38, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Ibid., 38, (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. In this sense, Josette Borbón asserted, “As a result, even though each regional project has political importance in the official statements by the heads of states, until now none of the projects has been able to articulate a global view for the region and they tend to fragment Latin America and the Caribbean into several 'Latin Americas'.” Josette Altmann Borbón, “El ALBA: Entre propuesta de integración y mecanismo de cooperación,” Pensamiento Propio 33, (2011): 193 (author's translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Ibid., 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Ibid., 191. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Ibid., 199. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Ximena de la Barra and Richard A. Dello Buono, Latin America after the neoliberal debacle another region is possible, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, United Kingdom, 2009): 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Ibid., 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Ibid., 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. “The goal is to craft an integration that can further empower alternative development models in the interests of the popular sectors. A growing consensus of regional experts and social movements alike agree that any favorable reorientation of development efforts will require a more inclusive regional integration, one that is more authentically Latin American and explicitly focused on transforming the direction of national economies towards social ends.” Ibid., 245. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Among others: Kim Sunhyuk and Yong Wook Lee (2004); and Kanishka Jayasuriya (2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Leonardo Granato and Nahuel Oddone, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Ibid., 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. “The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.” Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (Verson, London, 1983): 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Ibid., 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Ibid., 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Jean-Claude Combessie, El Método de la Sociología, (Colección Enjeux, ed. by Alicia Gutiérrez, Ferreyra, Argentina, Córdoba, 2003): 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Kim Sunhyuk and Yong Wook Lee, “New Asian Regionalism and the United States: Constructing Regional Identity and the Interest in the Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion,” Pacific Focus, Center of International Studies 19, no. 2 (2004): 195. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Ibid., 188. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Ibid., 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Bahar Rumelili, “Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU’s mode of differentiation,” Review of International Studies 30, (2004): 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Ibid., 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Margaret Somers, “The narrative Constitution of Identity,” Theory and Society 23, no. 5 (1994): 606. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. “One way to avoid the hazard of rigidifying aspects of identity into misleading categorical entity is to incorporate into the core conception of identity the categorically destabilizing dimension of time, space and rationality. We can do this by bringing to the study of identity formation the epistemological and ontological challenges of relational and network analysis. It is this effort to historicize our understanding of identity that motivates my attempt to combine studies of identity with conceptual narrativity.” Margaret Somers, 606. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1995 and 1999. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2002): 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Anne Kane. “Reconstructing Culture in Historical Explanation: Narrative as Cultural Structure and Practice,” History and Theory 39, no. 3 (2000): 313. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Ibid., 314. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Ibid., 315. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Ibid., 319. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Ibid., 319. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Ibid., 320. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Ibid., 325. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Ted Hopf, 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Ibid., 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Ibid., 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Ibid., 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. For example, “the New West Russian (narrative) understood Russia as the United States, as much through the United States. This made them already desirous of being the United States, not merely establishing a relationship with it.” Ibid., 266. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Ibid., 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. As a conclusion, Hopf asserted the following: “the self and the other need not be human, and the self and the other need not be theorized to be in a fixed relationship to one another. The idea that relationship of binary opposition, suppression and assimilation must characterize the self and the other and that therefore conflict and violence are the inevitable concomitants of identity relations is empirically refuted by the findings in this book.” Ibid., 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Ibid., 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Sanjoy Banerjee, “The International Structuration of National Identities, 1989-2002,” (working paper, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, 2010): 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Ibid., 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Consuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember their Past and Make the Future.” [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Sanjoy Banerjee, “The International…” 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Ibid., 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Ibid., 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Ted Hopf, 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Ibid., 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Sanjoy Banerjee, “The International Structuration…” 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Margaret Somers, 616. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Ibid., 311. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. “Both as pillars of symbolic structures and as vehicles for symbolic articulation and transformation, narratives are the consolidating component in the theoretical model of meaning constructing historical processes. They also provide the methodology by which to investigate the recursive relationship of action, structure and culture.” Ibid., 329. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Ibid., 315. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Ibid., 314. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Ted Hopf, 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Ibid., 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Consuelo Cruz, 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Ibid., 289. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Ibid., 277. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Ibid., 278. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Ibid., 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. In this case, the author traced the actions that reinforced one of the narratives and weakened the other. Eventually, this narrative became dominant and shaped the national identity of the country. This notion is very important because it does not only locate meaning as the nexus of the influx of actions that form the practice, but it also views structure as part of a dominant identity. In this sense, the research of regionalism should analyze not only structures as “social system,” but also as dominant narratives for the region. I further discuss the definition of structures in later paragraphs. However, it is necessary to notice here that the idea of dominant identities has to be included inside the notion of the interaction of practices and not the other way around. Conversely, Consuelo Cruz views structures as an object that actors use. This idea externalizes identity once it is dominant and makes it seem like a rigid object imposed to actors. Here, I understand historical structures within the interaction of practices. Ibid., 298. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. Sanjoy Banerjee, “Actions, practices, and historical structures,” International Relations of the Asian-Pacific 2, (2002): 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. Ibid., 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Ibid., 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Ibid., 204. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Ibid., 203. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Ibid., 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Sanjoy Banerjee, “The International Structuration of National Identities…” [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Ibid., 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Ibid., 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. Margaret Somers, 624. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Ibid., 621. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. Ibid., 614. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Sanjoy Banerjee, “Actions, Practices…” 203. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Ibid., 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. Margaret Somers, 626. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Sanjoy Banerjee, “Actions, practices and…” 200. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. Anne Kane, 326. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. Sanjoy Banerjee, “Actions, practices and…” 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. Anne Kane, 318. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Néstor García Canclini, 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. Anne Kane, 329. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Ted Hopf, 20. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. Consuelo Cruz, 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. Ted Hopf, 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. Ibid., 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Ibid., 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. The following statement by George W. Bush during his candidacy shows the importance of the open regional agenda for the United States: “My administration will foster democracy and level barriers to trade. If elected, my goal will be free trade agreements with all the nations of Latin America. We can do so in cooperation with our NAFTA partners. We should also do so with Chile, and Brazil and Argentina, the anchor states of MERCOSUR. We will also work toward free trade with the smaller nations of Central America and the Caribbean. We must be flexible because one-size-fits-all negotiations are not always the answer. But the ultimate goal will remain constant, free trade from northernmost Canada to the tip of the Cape Horn. In the near term, we will renew trade preferences with the Andean nations.” George Bush, candidacy interview, Associated Press, 31 October 2000, <http://www.issues2000.org/celeb/George_W__Bush_Free_Trade.htm>, accessed March 13, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. For example, this can be observed in the following fragment of the FTAA declaration in the Toronto Ministerial meeting of November, 1999: “We believe in the importance of trade liberalization, both globally and regionally, in generating economic growth and prosperity in the Hemisphere, and we welcome the impetus being provided by the FTAA negotiations to further liberalization. We strongly support the widening and deepening process of economic integration in our Hemisphere, including sub-regionally, bilaterally, and through the adoption of unilateral liberalization measures in some of our economies. Underlining the objective of the FTAA to eliminate progressively barriers to trade and investment and thereby stimulate world trade, we reiterate our commitment to avoid to the greatest extent possible the adoption of policies or measures that adversely affect trade and investment in the Hemisphere.” “Declaration of Ministers,” Fifth Ministerial Meeting, FTAA, Toronto, Canada, 1999, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/Toronto/Toronto_e.asp>, accessed January 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. The following fragment also illustrates the emphasis on the importance of liberalization: the FTAA “…by reducing and eliminating impediments to the free flow of goods, services and capital across our borders, will substantially improve the well-being of the citizens of all of our countries.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. These principles established by the WTO also viewed liberalization as the key component of prosperity: “Strengthening the capacity of developing countries to participate in and benefit from more open markets is critical for poverty reduction. A global trading system that enhances market access, creates opportunities for poor countries to boost exports, and adopt sound rural sector policies and institutions can provide significant gains for the poor, particularly the rural poor.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. “We reaffirm our commitment to the global, rules-based, trading system under the WTO, and our support for the launch of new, multilateral negotiations at the Third Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Seattle in December. While acknowledging that the FTAA and WTO processes are related, we stress the distinct aim of the FTAA negotiations – which is to create a Free Trade Area in a manner that is consistent with the relevant WTO provisions. We therefore reiterate our intention to pursue the FTAA negotiations with intensity and in accordance with our established timelines.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. “Annual Monitoring exercise in respect of follow-up to ministerial decision on measures concerning possible negative effects of the reform programme on least developed and net food-importing developing countries,” WTO, (2000), <http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_searchResult.asp>, accessed January 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. For example, the ambassador of Colombia expressed the following in the Latin American Association for Integration (ALADI) meeting of March 2000: “It is true that we can only increase our trade if we take our products to other places. That way we will be able to promote economic growth, development, and welfare for our countries. Nowadays, nobody defends projects that seek to keep economies closed. Not even old protectionist defend economic closure anymore because even they know that protectionism is out of place in current new times. Thus, the cause for our region and everyone else is centered in globalization, integration and openness.” (…)“Luckily, it is the private sector the one in charged of doing businesses. Our role (the government) is to help them. Through their trade and interaction, our societies will benefit because economic and social possibilities for everyone will emerge.” Minutes of meeting number 727, ALADI, March 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. This can be illustrated by the following statement of the WTO representative in the ALADI meeting of November 2000: “All the trade from all countries South of Mexico is equal to Belgium’s trade and this is not because people lack skills, because there is no products to trade, or because people have no motivation to make their country a better place. This is caused simply by a lack of opportunities and trade restrictions. This is why I am so disappointed in the failure of the negotiations in Seattle.” Minutes of meeting number 755, ALADI, November 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. The statement by former President George Bush during his candidacy in 2000 illustrates the positioning of protectionism as an “other:” “In the past there have been walls of divide between Mexico and the US. We must be committed to raise the bridges of trade & friendship & freedom. I promise to push for free trade in this hemisphere, from Alaska to the tip of the Cape Horn.” George Bush, interview by Jim Yardley, New York Times, 24 April 2000, <<http://www.issues2000.org/celeb/George_W__Bush_Free_Trade.htm> >, accessed January 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. Another representative example of this role attributed to the United States can be observed in the case of the political issue that took place in Peru in September 2000. President Fujimori faced protests all over the country and he stated that he would call for early elections. In the middle of this context, the government of the United States asked in the Organization of American States for “a peaceful and democratic transition” in the country. “Piden la Renuncia inmediata de Fujimori,” La Nación, 18 September 2000, <http://www.nacion.com/Generales/BusquedaGoogleSearch.aspx?searchtext=peru%20fujimori&cache=37408495>, accessed January 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. In this sense, when describing the United States policy in the region and articulating the characteristics of the project in Colombia, a United States Pentagon Official stated, “There remains a high potential for coups, armed rebellions, refugee crises, and social unrest extending from Bolivia all the way to the Panama Canal. All of these issues highlight the fact that the roots of democracy maybe aren't running as deeply as everyone thought.” Tod Robberson, “U.S. sees troubling sings in Andean Region,” The Record, 17 December 2000, [www.lexisnexis.com](http://www.lexisnexis.com), accessed January 2, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. The following statement can exemplify this: “We prefer sometimes to work only at technical levels to go beyond political problems. For example, what does it mean when people ask for an investment policy? Does it mean that Singapore has more benefits from investment than Africa? Would this argument benefit the more poor and marginal sectors of our societies?” “Annual Monitoring exercise in respect of follow-up to ministerial decision on measures concerning possible negative effects of the reform programme on least developed and net food-importing developing countries,” WTO, 2000, <http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_searchResult.asp>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. “US official hopes MERCOSUR-EU accord will not distract from FTAA talks,” BBC, 27 July 1999, [www.lexisnexis.com](http://www.lexisnexis.com), accessed January 2, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. Another example of the differentiation between open regionalism and sub-regionalism can be observed in the following statement made by the representative of the WTO in the meeting of ALADI when asked about sub-regionalism by the ambassador of Brazil: “there are signs that are worrisome. Japan, for example, has always been a great citizen of the WTO. They have demonstrated work in favor of multilateralism and liberalization, which is for common good. However, now the nation is also analyzing other regional agreements. This has to be analyzed carefully. Regional agreements are great as long as they are open.” “Annual Monitoring exercise in respect of follow-up to ministerial decision on measures concerning possible negative effects of the reform programme on least developed and net food-importing developing countries,” WTO, 2000, <http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_searchResult.asp>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Carlos Larreátegui, the spokes person of President Mahuad affirmed the following about the previously mentioned protests: “the indigenous proposals and demands are simply subversive and the government will not tolerate them under any circumstances.” “Los indígenas de Ecuador marchan sobre Quito,” Clarín, 15 January 2000, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html> , accessed January 7, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. Jim Shultz, “The Water wars,” The Democracy Center on-line, 4 February 2000, <http://www.aquapocalypse.com/waterwarbolivia01.html#martial>, accessed January 6, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. The following statement by the United States ambassador in Panama in 2000 can illustrate this relationship of opposition: "I always tell the Panamanians, if and when you're ready, give me a call. But in the interim period, you have picked the Venezuelans and the Cubans to be your pals. I question your judgment of friends, but there you are. I do not see anything else we can do about it.” Tod Robberson, “U.S. sees troubling signs in Andean Region,” The Record, 17 December 2000, [www.lexisnexis.com](http://www.lexisnexis.com), accessed January 2, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. The name for this narrative was chosen because the core of the notion promoted by the actors engaged in it created an ambiguous relationship with open regionalism and the socialist narrative at the same time, which located this practice between them. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. This close relationship between the moderate and open regional narrative was particularly interesting due to Brazilian government’s leadership. Despite the support of liberalization by the moderate narrative in 1999 and 2000, the president of Brazil, Henrique Cardoso, had previously written several journals that showed a different view of the Latin American situation. In most of these journals and books, Cardoso had a perspective that was closer to the socialist narrative. For example, in the journal called “Dependency and Development in Latin America,” the author described the process of economic opening that was starting to happen in Latin America in the early 1970s. In this context, he found several detrimental consequences for the countries that were opening their economies to free flows of foreign direct investment. They increased dependency and most benefits went outside of the peripheral economies. Thus, even though he was in 1999 and 2000 one of the important promoters of the moderate narrative, other consequences that he mentioned also showed some of the problems created by this type of projects. In this regard, Cardoso stated, “When a situation of development with these characteristics emerges, specific relationships of internal growth and external connections take place. Even without entering the discussion about the financial relationship established in this scenario, where dependency is increased specially by short-term debts, it is possible to notice several characteristics that illustrate a different type of under-development established by this system of industrialist and monopolist capitalism. From the perspective that accounts for the differentiation of the productive system, this situation can bring high indices of development. However, the capital flow and the control of decisions stay out of the peripheral economies’ hands. Moreover, most of the benefits increase the mass of accessible capital in central economies, even though most of the production and the commercialization take place within the limits of the dependent economy. Finally, the decisions of investments depend partially on the plans made in the central economies.” Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, “Dependency and development in Latin America,” Siglo XXI editores S.A., Buenos Aires, (1977): 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. The following fragment of the agreement signed by all the presidents of South America during the First South American Presidential Summit in 2000, shows the importance of liberalization for the region: “The Presidents emphasized the importance of the process of liberalization in the markets of South America and celebrated the initiative to start the negotiations between MERCOSUR and Chile. “Primera Cumbre Sudamericana de Presidentes,” Comunicado de Brasilia, 2000, <http://www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/CumbreSudamericanaBrasilia2000.pdf> , accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. The following statement by the president of ALADI in February 2000 can be evoked as an example: “As I mentioned at the beginning of the meeting, I share with you the idea of nationality. However, we also share common roots and traditions in a region that saw our fight for liberty forged by great heroes. In this continuous struggle for integration, you reincarnate the new hope for the accomplishment of Simón Bolívar’s dream: For us, the nation is America.” Minutes of meeting number 726, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. The following segment of the official declaration of the First Presidential Summit of the Americas shows this characteristic: “South America starts a new century strengthened by the progressive consolidation of its democratic institutions, the respect of human rights, the protection of the environment, the application of sustainable development, the decrease of social injustices, the economic growth, and increase of development for its people. All of this will be achieved within the implementation of processes of integration.” “Primera Cumbre Sudamericana de Presidentes,” Comunicado de Brasilia, 2000, <http://www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/CumbreSudamericanaBrasilia2000.pdf>, accessed January 4 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. “MERCOSUR and CAN agree in the importance of a growing articulation between both processes in political, economic, social and physical areas of integration.” (…) “The dialogue between the members of CAN and MERCOSUR about the regional and international issues of common interests has particular importance. This articulation has special relevance in the context of their articulation.” “Declaration of the Andean Presidential Council with the President of Paraguay about the relationship between CAN and MERCOSUR,” article 1, Andean Community of Nations, 26 and 27 May 1999, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/IDocumentos/c_Newdocs.asp?GruDoc=06>, accessed January 3, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. “Democracy can only be strengthen and perfected in direct relationship to economic and social development for the people of South America. Poverty and marginalization threaten institutional stability in the region. Thus, the eradication of poverty will be a priority for the governments of South America.” “Primera Cumbre Sudamericana de Presidentes,” Comunicado de Brasilia, 2000, <http://www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/CumbreSudamericanaBrasilia2000.pdf>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. For example, in the presidential meeting between Enrique Cardoso and De la Rúa, Argentina and Brazil agreed to deepen their cooperation in MERCOSUR and “develop scientific and technological knowledge that will allow the region to agree on common positions for the International Summit of Climate Change.” “De la Rua propuso ampliar el MERCOSUR,” La Nación, 4 November 1999, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 15, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. The president of Argentina proposed in 2000 to “…include a social agenda, the creation of a common currency, mechanisms of macroeconomic stability, and an agreement on a law of fiscal responsibility for the region.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. A clear example of the construction of open regionalism as an “other” can be observed in the following statement: “The presidents of South America agreed that the process of globalization can generate benefits for the region when driven by a notion of balance and fairness. Some of these benefits are the increase of trade, investment, and more access to knowledge and technology. At the same time, this process generates challenges that have to be faced with political responsibilities and concise actions by the countries of South America. Thus, Globalization can be an efficient mean to increase opportunities and development as long as it sustains fairness and social welfare.” “Primera Cumbre Sudamericana de Presidentes,” Comunicado de Brasilia, 2000, <http://www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/CumbreSudamericanaBrasilia2000.pdf> , accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. For example, in the declaration of the First Presidential Summit of South America, it is possible to observe a critique to the domestic application of barriers and protectionism by developed countries: “It is vital for multilateral negotiations to start orienting themselves towards a more balanced and symmetric level of responsibilities for developed and developing countries. The Presidents of South America agreed that they implemented strong processes of liberalization during the 1990s, while trade berries persist in developed countries for South American products.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. The following example illustrates this perception: “The unfairness of financial markets are still worrisome. The international community should prioritize these issues and look into the identification of measures to fix this unfairness, which can have enormous negative effects in South American.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. “The CAN will seek to proceed as a common voice for its members in the process of negotiations of the FTAA.” “Official declaration,” XIII Meeting of the Presidential Council of the Community of Andean Nations, Community of Andean Nations, 1999, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/IDocumentos/c_Newdocs.asp?GruDoc=06>, accessed January 3, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados de MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, 1999, [www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. A good example of this quality is found in the speech of former President Eduardo Menem about Chávez: “I am very happy to see that we have two major agreements with Chávez: our common interests in Venezuela entering MERCOSUR and the need of creating a common currency in the region.” “Menem defendió la relación con Brasil,” La Nación, 3 February 1999, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. This narrative was called Socialist due to the declaration of Chávez in the World Social Forum of 2006. In this event, Chávez mentioned that Venezuela had become the epicenter of transformation for the region and the world. This transformation would take place through what he called “21st Century Socialism.” Peter Goodspeed, “Chávez dreams of a continental shift,” National Post, Toronto, Canada, 30 January 2006, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 23, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. These differences can be observed, for example, in President Chávez’s speech in the ALADI meeting of February 2000, where he stated the following: “I think that our genesis, the birth of our republics, shows the struggle for integration, but not just any integration, a full integration. Thus, our past shows us the necessity to fight and return to the original form of integration in this scenario that you have created. I think it is necessary to truly unite ourselves. Otherwise the 21st century threatens to be worse than the 20th century for us, for this part of the Americas, for Central America, for Latin America and the Caribbean.” Minutes of meeting number 726, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. In another meeting of ALADI, the ambassador of Venezuela Rodrigo Arcaya Smith mentioned the following: “Venezuela is evidently a passionate integrationist due to its integrationist principles and origins, and to our founding liberator Simón Bolívar, who was the main integrationist of America. This makes us a very integrationist country, especially in Latin America.” Minutes of meeting number 757, ALADI, December 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. The following segment of the previously mentioned speech by President Chávez exemplifies this particular element of the story: “I was reading the book by Galeano, ‘Venas Abiertas’, I am sure you know it. In the book, the author talks about the silver of Potosi, the cane fields of Brazil, the silver mines of Guanajuato, the gold mines of Venezuela, the mines of Gerais, the coffee and cocoa plantations, and everything else. In the book the author shows how the Colony integrated us. But they integrated the region to exploit us, to obligate us to produce for them, to impose a particular economic model of colonialism, exploitation. They imposed a political model of domination and a social model of segregation.” Minutes of meeting number 726, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. The speech of President Chávez is again one of the most clear examples of this notion: “Our integration should include all the different areas, just like San Martín, Artigas, O’Higgins and Bolivar thought. Every state with its own territory and each state with its own limitations and visions. This should be a political integration. How far should we go? How do we achieve it? How do we integrate a geopolitical bloc so that they do not impose their will on us anymore? So that we can evaluate ourselves. Let us debate. Let us argue about it in the region. We do not need a world police controlling our will. We can tell the world that we are a sovereign region. We have our own laws and we can examine our own situation. We do not need them to tell us: you are behaving well or you are behaving badly, here is the baton. No more. We cannot continue to accept this in the 21st century. That was part of our sad history, which is over now.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. The following statement illustrates the importance of modernization and development for the socialist narrative: “The main challenge for our region is to go from raw material production to an industry of manufactures and more value added products. As long as we do not abandon the raw material production and start promoting more value added product, we will not leave underdevelopment.” Minutes of meeting number 757, ALADI, December 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. Once again, Chávez exemplifies most clearly the socialist narrative for the region: “If our people do not have that love, that consciousness, that feeling of necessity of integration, our union will never be possible. We will not be able to go beyond protocolar agreements and trade treaties. We will argue forever whether Uruguay’s cheese is softer, or if Venezuela’s cheese has more humidity, or whether the humidity should have 45 degrees. We can argue about these issues, but let us talk about our children, let us make our children fall in love with our region. Let us go beyond the Uruguayan cheese, the Venezuelan cheese, the Argentine meat and wine, etc. Let us make our people fall in love with integration and the region. That has to be the essence of integration. That was the idea that Simón Bolívar and Mariscal Sucre had when they came all the way to Peru and the Pampa of Aquino to command their troops to fight the last great battle of Ayacucho.” Minutes of meeting number 726, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. “We are protesting against structural adjustments. The region and Brazil are suffering. We are on the path of mobilization, and it will depend on the people’s power whether the economic model of Brazil will change. Cardoso needs to listen more to us and less to international bankers. We hope the President opens his crystal box of isolation and starts listening to the Brazilian people. We want a policy to generate employment, we want to reduce the interest rates in Brazil, we want a land reform, we want to stop privatization.” “Brasil: Cardoso enfrentó la mayor protesta contra su gobierno,” Clarín, 15 August 1999, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. “Protestas contra Cardoso en Brasil,” Clarín, 9 August 1999, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. “Las protestas en Bogota y Cartagena dejan un muerto,” Clarín, 30 August 2000, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. The following statement displays this quality: “The problem of our people is that they need to be included in our process of integration. The mechanisms of integration should include economic aspects, but as I mentioned before, not within neoliberalism. I said this in Madrid and I repeat it here, I am against neoliberalism. This economic model is the path to hell. I think that the idea of the invisible hand is in reality the project of the hairy hand that creates problems. I do not think that privatization is the path towards prosperity. We should find a balance between the market and the government. We cannot minimize the state. Instead we need to find a balance between society, the market and the government.” Minutes of meeting number 726, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. “Las protestas en Bogota y Cartagena dejan un muerto,” Clarín, 30 August 2000, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. The following statement shows the connection of these elements in the narrative of socialist regionalism: “Yesterday I received in the Miraflores Palace a delegation from the European Parliament and was able to talk to them about this problems. We need a pluri-polar world, thus globalization has to be democratic. It cannot be a tyranny in which we are forced to do as they tell us. For example, we are currently confronting a strategy of pressure to allow planes from the United States to flight in Venezuelan territory chasing drug trafficking planes.” Minutes of meeting number 726, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. The following statement exemplifies this notion within the socialist narrative: “I think we have to go far beyond the existing mechanisms of integration. We have plenty of projects of integration. Venezuela, for example, is included in the Group of Three, the Group of Fifteen, the Association of Caribbean States, CAN, and others. However, where are we right now? I have not personally been able to define where we are going with all of this. We participate in summits and agree in several protocols, but what is our direction? I think we need to define this orientation and seek it.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. Anthony Faiola, “Peruvian Candidate Reflects New Indian Pride; U.S.-Educated Toledo Stresses Native Background,” The Washington Post, 21 March 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed January 6, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. The following statement illustrates the relationship established by the narrative in the sense of a shared past: “I think that we have a lot of problems to face in the beginning of the 21st century, but I am optimistic that we will work on them together. We have inherited in our region the spirit of the Incas, the Mayans, and the Guaranís. They left us a struggle against colonialism and exploitation. They left us the love for our region and humanity. They left us faith in ourselves.” Minutes of meeting number 726, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. Once I started delimiting the indigenous narrative as separate from the socialist narrative, I began searching for indigenous declarations and speeches. Unlike the other narratives, this search was very difficult for the early 2000s. There might have been many reasons for this difficulty, but one of the issues I had during this search of indigenous speeches seems particularly interesting. While working in the website of La Vía Campesina, I received warnings about dangerous malwares and viruses. Once I contacted the website manager, he mentioned that the site had been under attack for several months and that they were having many issues created by somebody outside the organization. This remained me of the notion of the voice of the excluded by Matthias Stiefel and Marshall Wolfe. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. The following statement by an indigenous leader in Argentina illustrated the notion of the 500 years of oppression: “What we seek to transmit in this protests is that October 12 is not a day in which we should celebrate. This is the day that the extinction of our people started.” “El Día de la raza tuvo contracelebración,” Clarín, 30 August 2000, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. “Mapuche, gente de la Tierra,” La Nación, 12 November 2000, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. It is important to notice here that this complex relationship between modernism and indigenism was consistent with Canclini’s notion of hybridity, which was mentioned in previous chapters. This notion evoked the complexity of the different identities that were interacting in Latin America. Moreover, it showed that identities could not be observed in pure forms of modernism, traditionalism, or liberalism. Instead, they were observed in hybrid forms that included particularities from different notions at the same time. Similarly, the indigenous narrative included a relationship of tension in the prioritization of indigenism and modernism. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. “Banzer denuncia en Bolivia una conspiración para derrocarlo,” Clarín, 27 August 2000, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. “Un Brasil de contrastes festeja hoy sus 500 años,” La Nación, 12 November 2000, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. “Indian leader Vargas on events during attempted coup, future hopes,” BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 27 January 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed January 6, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. For example, Mapuche leader Coike, from Argentina, mentioned the following in an interview: “We know that environmentalism is a legitimate norm that belongs to our people. We respect, for example, biodiversity, because we know that our *mapu* (earth) suffers when people work too much the soil. We know we have to fight disequilibrium.” “Mapuche, gente de la Tierra,” La Nación, 12 November 2000, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. The following segment of the declaration of Quito, by several South American organizations in 2000 against the international negotiations of climate change and environmentalism, illustrates this aspect of the indigenous notion: “We, the indigenous people and organizations declare that our people have historically have an important role in the conservation of forests, biodiversity, and natural ecosystems. We declare that today our people, the environment and the climate are being threatened by extracting and destructive activities of trade, such as mines, deforestation, gas emissions, excessive consumerism, etc.” “Declaración de Quito, Recomendaciones de los Pueblos y Organizaciones Indígenas frente al Proceso de la Convención Marco del Cambio Climático,” CIEL, 6 May 2000, [http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cts=1330893718201&sqi=2&ved=0CF0QFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ciel.org%2FPublications%2FQuitoDeclaracionSpanish.pdf&ei=pbtTT6tmwpmJAoD\_2bUG&usg=AFQjCNHkFMhfaBDHnbewhDb8CaDeuQXHZA&sig2=UCrbwQXxbSo\_14sm2G15aA](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cts=1330893718201&sqi=2&ved=0CF0QFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ciel.org%2FPublications%2FQuitoDeclaracionSpanish.pdf&ei=pbtTT6tmwpmJAoD_2bUG&usg=AFQjCNHkFMhfaBDHnbewhDb8CaDeuQXHZA&sig2=UCrbwQXxbSo_), accessed March 1, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. “Temen disturbios en Ecuador por una masiva protesta,” La Nación, 04 September 2000, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. “In reality, I feel overwhelmed by the bases. In the Chapare, people are starting to leave their rocks and get rifles.If the government does not guarantee dignity, and health this will end up in a armed insurrection.” “Bolivia corre el riesgo de tener su Chiapas,” La Nación, 31 October 2000, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. Nicole Veash, “Death is better than tyranny, Ecuador’s Indians say,” The Scotsman, 13 January 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed January 6, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. “Conferencia Mundial Contra el Racismo, la discriminación racial, la xenofobia y las formas conexas de intolerancia,” Declaración de los Pueblos Indígenas de América en Santiago Chile, 4 December 2000, [http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cts=1330897629324&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nacionmulticultural.unam.mx%2Fdeclaraciones%2Fdocs%2Fdecl\_277.pdf&ei=1eJTT87ILtDMiQKM9pm0Bg&usg=AFQjCNHSILI8m1SV1b5Hk231oSSAFrAoSA&sig2=VBREXL\_JPummMBNKJ9\_iNA](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cts=1330897629324&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nacionmulticultural.unam.mx%2Fdeclaraciones%2Fdocs%2Fdecl_277.pdf&ei=1eJTT87ILtDMiQKM9pm0Bg&usg=AFQjCNHSILI8m1SV1b5Hk231oSSAFrAoSA&sig2=VBRE), accessed March 3, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. Another example can be observed in the following segment of the statement, which showed the opposition to the open regional definition of the region: “We declare that the economic globalization and the neoliberal system have updated and deepened the institutionalized discrimination against our people. They have perpetuated poverty and marginalization by denying us the right to live. This phenomenon of globalization has completely threatened the survival of the indigenous people in all sorts of ways. They threatened our land and territories, our individual and collective integrity, our cosmos-vision, our forms of organization, our cultural, spiritual and traditional values, etc. The plundering of our land and territory meant that a great part of the indigenous population was forced to emigrate to urban areas, where poverty increased everyday.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. For example, the Indigenous Declaration of Santiago de Chile mentioned the following: “We declare that The Plan Colombia and the Zero coca project in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, supported by the United States, only brings more repression, militarization and suffering for indigenous and non-indigenous people. Furthermore, this is a problem that expanded in the region and will have unpredictable consequences.” “Conferencia Mundial Contra el Racismo, la discriminación racial, la xenofobia y las formas conexas de intolerancia,” Declaración de los Pueblos Indígenas de América en Santiago Chile, 4 December 2000, [http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cts=1330897629324&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nacionmulticultural.unam.mx%2Fdeclaraciones%2Fdocs%2Fdecl\_277.pdf&ei=1eJTT87ILtDMiQKM9pm0Bg&usg=AFQjCNHSILI8m1SV1b5Hk231oSSAFrAoSA&sig2=VBREXL\_JPummMBNKJ9\_iNA](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cts=1330897629324&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nacionmulticultural.unam.mx%2Fdeclaraciones%2Fdocs%2Fdecl_277.pdf&ei=1eJTT87ILtDMiQKM9pm0Bg&usg=AFQjCNHSILI8m1SV1b5Hk231oSSAFrAoSA&sig2=VBRE), accessed March 3, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. “Yesterday it was the greedy search of gold under the excuse of civilization. Today it is the ambition for our natural resources with the excuse for development.” “Declaración final del Sexto Congreso Indígena de Antioquia,” Blog Tlahui, 22 July 2000, <http://tlahui.com/politic/politi00/politi10/co10-29.htm>, accessed March 1, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. “Latin America does not have any politics, nor any plans to include the 40 million Indians that survive every day in the region.” (…)“There are a lot of volcanoes in the region and they will irrupt and end up in violence in any moment.” “En América Latina no existe una política para las poblaciones indígenas,” Primera Cumbre Internacional Indígena de América, 31 October 2000, <http://tlahui.com/politic/politi00/politi10/mx10-39.htm>, accessed March 3, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. “United States and Colombia conclude Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2006/february/united-states-and-colombia-conclude-free>, accessed January 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. “The United States is working to open markets globally in the Doha WTO negotiations; regionally through the APEC forum and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations; and bilaterally with FTA’s (Free Trade Areas). Since 2001, FTA’s with Australia, Chile, Jordan, Morocco and Singapore have entered into force. The Bush Administration has also concluded negotiations with Bahrain, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru and now Colombia. Negotiations are under way or about to begin with ten more countries: Ecuador, the Republic of Korea, Panama, the five nations of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. New and pending FTA partners, taken together, would constitute America’s third largest export market and the third largest economy in the world.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. “Signing this agreement today confirms the strong ties between the people of Peru and the United States. This all-inclusive agreement will promote increased economic activity and commercial prosperity for both of our nations. PTPA will spur new export opportunities for U.S. businesses, manufacturers, farmers, and ranchers, expand choices for consumers and will help create jobs in the United States. For Peru, this agreement will significantly increase opportunities for economic growth and serve as a catalyst to further develop and modernize their own economy. This agreement with Peru is instrumental in our strategy to advance prosperity within our hemisphere. We hope to bring Colombia and Ecuador into this agreement as soon as they are ready so no one misses out on the benefits of trade. (…) The United States is working to open markets globally in the Doha WTO negotiations; regionally through the APEC forum and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations; and bilaterally with FTAs.” “United States and Peru signed Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2006/april/united-states-and-peru-sign-trade-promotion>, accessed January 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. For example, the ministerial declaration of the FTAA in 2003 related its agreements and actions towards hemispheric liberalization with the past summits of the FTAA. Moreover, the declaration connects all the above inside the idea of a future prosperity within globalization. “We recognize the significant contribution that economic integration, including the FTAA, will make to the attainment of the objectives established in the Summit of the Americas process: strengthening democracy, creating prosperity and realizing human potential. We reiterate that the negotiation of the FTAA will continue to take into account the broad social and economic agenda contained in the Miami, Santiago and Quebec City Declarations and Plans of Action with a view to contributing to raising living standards, increasing employment, improving the working conditions of all people in the Americas, strengthening social dialogue and social protection, improving the levels of health and education and better protecting the environment. We reaffirm the need to respect and value cultural diversity as set forth in the 2001 Summit of the Americas Declaration and Plan of Action.” “Ministerial Declaration,” Free Trade Area of the Americas Eighth Ministerial Meeting, Miami, USA, 20 November 2003, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca_e.asp>, accessed January 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. “Fuerte ayuda de EE.UU. a Colombia,” La Nación, 16 September 1999, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. “United States and Colombia conclude Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2006/february/united-states-and-colombia-conclude-free>, accessed January 6, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. “Los Campesinos, en pie de guerra en Bolivia,” Clarín, 6 February 2000, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. “United States and Peru signed Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2006/april/united-states-and-peru-sign-trade-promotion>, accessed January 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. “Chile Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, January 2004, <http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta>, accessed January 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. “Peru Trade Promotion agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, 12 April 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa>, accessed January 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. “Ecuador rejects US free trade Pact,” The Associated Press, 10 December 2006, <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article6680&lang=en>, accessed Mach 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. “USA seeks to end MERCOSUR-EU romance,” BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 31 August 1999, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. “Fuerte ayuda de EE.UU. a Colombia,” La Nación, 16 September 1999, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 6, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. “Fifth Trade Ministerial Meeting Declaration,” FTAA, Toronto, 4 November 1999, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/Toronto/Toronto_e.asp>, accessed February 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. “We welcome the considerable progress that has been made in the FTAA negotiations during the initial eighteen-month stage under Canada’s chairmanship - a goal we had set for ourselves at our last meeting in San José. We reaffirm the principles and objectives that have guided our work since Miami, including *inter alia* that the agreement will be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent, and will constitute a single undertaking.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. The following segment is an example of the underlying notion of this practice: “We believe in the importance of trade liberalization, both globally and regionally, in generating economic growth and prosperity in the Hemisphere, and we welcome the impetus being provided by the FTAA negotiations to further liberalization. We strongly support the widening and deepening process of economic integration in our Hemisphere, including sub-regionally, bilaterally and through the adoption of unilateral liberalization measures in some of our economies.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. “Chile, ALCA y MERCOSUR,” La Nación, 9 December 2000, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/>, accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. “Brazil and Chile disagree on FTAA starting date,” Gazeta Mercantil Online, 15 December 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. “Ministerial Declaration Buenos Aires,” Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Trade of the Hemisphere, FTAA, 7 April 2001, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca_e.asp>, accessed March 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. Edward Alden, “The Americas: Zoellick warns on world trade talks,”31 January 2001, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. “Ministerial Declaration Buenos Aires,” Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Trade of the Hemisphere, FTAA, 7 April 2001, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca_e.asp>, accessed March 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. “Declaration of Quebec City,” Third Summit of the Americas, 20 April 2001, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/summits/quebec/declara_e.asp>, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. “We welcome the significant progress achieved to date toward the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), including the development of a preliminary draft FTAA Agreement. As agreed at the Miami Summit, free trade, without subsidies or unfair practices, along with an increasing stream of productive investments and greater economic integration, will promote regional prosperity, thus enabling the raising of the standard of living, the improvement of working conditions of people in the Americas and better protection of the environment.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. “We note with satisfaction that the process of building the FTAA advanced in this, the third, 18-month phase, under the chairmanship of the Republic of Ecuador despite the deterioration in current global and hemispheric economic conditions and heightened international tensions in the political and social arenas that have been evidenced in recent times. We register our concern over this situation, which is characterized by a decline in international trade and investment flows. We reiterate our commitment to avoid, to the extent possible, adopting policies or measures that may adversely affect regional trade and investment. With the intent of contributing to the expansion of world trade, we reaffirm our commitment that the results of the FTAA shall not raise additional barriers to other countries.” “Ministerial Declaration Quito,” Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Trade, FTAA, 1 November 2002, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/quito/quito_e.asp>, accessed February 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. “We ratify the importance of agriculture for the economies of the region, the integral and non-discriminatory treatment of which in the FTAA negotiations will contribute to generating employment, reducing poverty and fostering social stability. We reaffirm the hemispheric commitment to the elimination of export subsidies affecting trade in agricultural products in the Hemisphere and to the development of disciplines to be adopted for the treatment of all the other practices that distort trade in agricultural products, including those which have an equivalent effect to agricultural export subsidies, and to make substantive progress in the market access negotiations.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. “We reaffirm our commitment to take into account in designing the FTAA, the differences in levels of development and size of economies in the Hemisphere, in order to ensure that these economies participate fully in the building of, and benefits resulting from, the Agreement and to create opportunities for these countries.” “Ministerial Declaration Quito,” Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Trade, FTAA, 1 November 2002, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/quito/quito_e.asp>, accessed February 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. “We, the Ministers, reaffirm our commitment to the successful conclusion of the FTAA negotiations by January 2005, with the ultimate goal of achieving an area of free trade and regional integration. The Ministers reaffirm their commitment to a comprehensive and balanced FTAA that will most effectively foster economic growth, the reduction of poverty, development, and integration through trade liberalization.” “Ministerial Declaration,” Eighth Ministerial Meeting in Miami, FTAA, 30 November 2003, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/miami/Miami_e.asp>, accessed March 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. “In the search for sustained and equitable economic growth that contributes to long-term development, reduces poverty, eliminates hunger, and raises the standard of living of the population, with special attention to the most vulnerable sectors and social groups, we commit to continue implementing sound macroeconomic policies, prudent fiscal and monetary policies, appropriate exchange rate regimes, prudent and appropriate public debt management, diversification of the economy, and the improvement of competitiveness. We also commit to the qualitative transformation of public administration through its modernization, simplification, decentralization, and transparency. Furthermore, we will redouble our efforts to improve the investment climate in our countries and promote corporate social responsibility.” “Declaration of Nuevo León,” Special Summit of the Americas, FTAA, 13 January 2004, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/summits/monterrey/nleon_e.asp>, accessed February 15, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. “Contribute to hemispheric integration and the fulfillment of the objectives of the *Free Trade Area of the Americas*.” “Chile – United States free trade agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file232_3988.pdf>, accessed February 17, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. “Free Trade with Chile: Significant U.S. Access to South America’s Most Dynamic Economy,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2643>, accessed March 6, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. “FOSTER creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods and services that are the subject of intellectual property rights,” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. “III Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo de Jefes y Jefas de estados y de Gobierno de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas,” UNASUR, 10 August 2009, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/10-8-09Dec_quito.htm>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. “Chile – United States free trade agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file232_3988.pdf>, accessed February 17, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. “In search of sustained, long-term, and equitable economic growth that creates jobs, reduces poverty, eliminates hunger, and raises the standard of living, including for the most vulnerable sectors and social groups, and in the framework of national strategies, we are committed to continuing the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies geared toward maintaining high growth rates, full employment, prudent fiscal and monetary policies, appropriate exchange rate policies, sound public debt management policies, and working to diversify economic activity and improve competitiveness.” “Declaration of Mar del Plata, Creating Jobs to fight Poverty and Strengthen Democratic Governance,” Fourth Summit of the Americas, FTAA, 5 November 2005, <http://www.summit-americas.org/Documents%20for%20Argentina%20Summit%202005/IV%20Summit/Declaracion/Declaracion%20IV%20Cumbre-eng%20nov5%209pm%20rev.1.pdf>, accessed February 2, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. “We recognize that economic growth is a basic, indispensable, but not sufficient, condition to address the high rates of unemployment, poverty, and growth of the informal economy. We recognize that only countries that have had years of sustained economic growth have successfully reduced poverty. However, in the recent past some countries of the Hemisphere have experienced periods of economic growth that did not translate into equivalent employment gains, compounding existing problems of high income concentration, poverty, and indigence.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. “Good economic policies and a favorable international commercial and economic framework are factors that have helped the region achieve, in 2004, rising incomes and the fastest growth rates in a quarter century, which boosted job creation.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. “Signing this agreement today confirms the strong ties between the people of Peru and the United States. This all-inclusive agreement will promote increased economic activity and commercial prosperity for both of our nations. PTPA will spur new export opportunities for U.S. businesses, manufacturers, farmers, and ranchers, expand choices for consumers and will help create jobs in the United States. For Peru, this agreement will significantly increase opportunities for economic growth and serve as a catalyst to further develop and modernize their own economy. This agreement with Peru is instrumental in our strategy to advance prosperity within our hemisphere. We hope to bring Colombia and Ecuador into this agreement as soon as they are ready so no one misses out on the benefits of trade. (…) The United States is working to open markets globally in the Doha WTO negotiations; regionally through the APEC forum and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations; and bilaterally with FTAs.” “United States and Peru signed Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2006/april/united-states-and-peru-sign-trade-promotion>, accessed January 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. “An agreement with Colombia is an essential component of our regional strategy to advance free trade within our hemisphere, combat narco-trafficking, build democratic institutions, and promote economic development. In addition to eliminating tariffs, Colombia will remove barriers to trade in services, provide a secure, predictable legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Colombia…” “United States and Colombia conclude Free Trade Agreement,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Archives, February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2006/february/united-states-and-colombia-conclude-free>, accessed January 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. “Morales rejects US-boosted FTA,” Bilaterals.org, 24 October 2006, <http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article6293&lang=en>, accessed March 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. Justin Vogler, “Michelle Bachelet’s Triumph,” Open Democracy, 16 January 2006, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/chile_election_3183.jsp>, accessed February 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. Michelle Bachelet’s election was partly the result of a coalition called “pragmatic socialism,” which included other parties and sought to consolidate traditional economic policy with progressive social programs. This partly explained the continuation of the Chile’s connection with the open regional practice. “Michelle Bachelet: First Female President,” South American Affairs, 28 October 2009, <http://melaniezoltan.suite101.com/michelle-bachelet-a162823>, accessed March 29, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. “US-Colombia military base pact is misunderstood,” Colombia Reports, 19 March 2010, <http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/interviews/8780-global-context-needed-to-understand-us-colombian-military-base-agreement.html>, accessed February 17, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. For example, Aníbal Quijano accounted for the Andean indigenous movement in his journal “Estado-nación y movimientos indígenas en la región Andina: cuestiones abiertas” (Analysis 7, no. 19, 2006). Also, Florencia Mallon researched, in her journal “Entre Utopía y Marginalidad: comunidades indígenas y culturas políticas en México y los Andes, 1970-1990,” (Historia Mexicana 42, no. 2, 1992) the indigenous movements of the Andean region in previous years. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. Jim Shultz, “In the Andes – Echoes of Seattle,” The Democracy Center, 23 March 2000, <http://www.aquapocalypse.com/waterwarbolivia01.html>, accessed March 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. “Bolivia Water Wars,” The Corporation Films, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTKn17uZRAE>, accessed March 5, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. “Los Campesinos, en Pie de Guerra en Bolivia,” Clarín, February 6, 2000, <http://www.clarin.com/ediciones-anteriores.html>, accessed January 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. “Bolivia: Thousands gather in capital for national peasant congress,” BBC Monitoring Latin America, April 16, 2001, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed February 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. “Bolivian news highlights,” BBC Monitoring Latin America, 11 October 2001, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. “Bolivia’s bloody October,” The Toronto Start, 2 November 2003, , <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. Simon Hooper, “Bolivia gears up for early elections,” CNN, World, 15 December 2005, <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/americas/12/15/bolivia.hooper/index.html>, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. #  “Morales toma posesión como primer presidente indio de Bolivia,” El País, Internacional, 22 January 2006, <http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2006/01/22/actualidad/1137884405_850215.html>, accessed March 7, 2012.

 [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. “To remember our ancestors I ask, Mister President of the National Congress of Bolivia, for a minute of silence. I ask for a minute of silence for Manco Inca, Tupaj Katari, Tupac Amaru, Bartolina Sisa, Zárate Villca, Atihuaiqui Tumpa, Andrés Ibañez, Ché Guevara, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, Luis Espinal, and many more of my brothers that fell in the struggle of Cochabamba, the fight for coca leaves in the tropics of Cochabamba. I also ask for those who fell in the struggle for the dignity of the people of La Paz, the miners, and the millions the fell fighting all around the Americas.” Discurso de Posesión del Presidente Juan Morales Ayma, Congreso Nacional de Bolivia, 22 January 2006, <http://www.presidencia.gob.bo/discursos1.php?cod=9>, accessed March 7, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. “We are no longer campaigning, we are no longer just remembering our history. Our history was dark and sad, full of humiliation, lies, and oppression. It is true that it still hurts, but we cannot keep on crying for another 500 years. We are no longer in that era; we are in the era of triumph and victory. We are in the era of happiness. This is why we are going to change our history, change the history of Bolivia and Latin America.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. “The fights for our water, for the coca leaf, and for natural gas have brought us here. We need to remember the erroneous politics of past governments. We need to remember those interested and selfish policies that sold our natural resources, privatized our basic services, and led us to have consciousness of our situation. Our responsibility now is to change these policies.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. “We want our autonomy. Our original indigenous people have historically struggled for self-determination. Even before the existence of the republics. Autonomy is not a new invention; it is the struggle of the indigenous people of all America for their right of self-determination. But we want autonomy with solidarity, autonomy with reciprocity, autonomy with the redistribution of wealth for the indigenous people of our region.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. “I am sure the original indigenous movement, just like our ancestors, dreamed with recuperating their territory. Now, when we talk about recuperating our territory, we also include our natural resources. We need to put our natural resources in the hands of the Bolivian people, in the hands of the Government of Bolivia.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. “Declaration of the World Social Forum in Caracas,” 28 January 2006, <http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35:declaracin-el-foro-social-mundial-de-caracas&catid=25:foro-social-mundial&Itemid=34>, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. “Declaración Conjunta de Bolivia, Cuba y Venezuela,” ALBA, 29 April 2006, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2097>, accessed March 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. “Recognizing that the application of neoliberal policies drove our countries into deeper dependency, an increase of poverty, more inequality in our region, and the extraction of our natural resources, we agree that a true form of integration is a necessary condition for sustainable development.” Ibid., (author’s translation) [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. “The heads of States affirmed that only a new and true form of integration would include the principles of cooperation and respect to self-determination. Only this regional formation can provide an adequate answer to the popular demands of social justice, cultural diversity, equality and development. This integration is conceived as a different type of economic and political relations than the ones promoted by the FTA and other treaties of free trade.” Ibid., (author’s translation) [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. “We agree that a true form of integration is a necessary condition for sustainable development.” Ibid., (author’s translation) [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. The following statement shows the Morales’ intend to influence the moderate practice to introduce the indigenous notion of the region: “Our goal should be to forge a true form of integration to ‘live well.’ We say, ‘Live well’ because we do not aspire to live better than others. We do not believe in a straight line of progress and development in detriment of others and the environment. We have to complement each other and not compete. We have to share and not take advantage of our neighbors. To ‘live well’ means to think not only in economic welfare, but also in cultural identity, community values, harmony with ourselves and with Mother Earth.” Morales Speech in the Second Presidential Summit of South America, "Construyamos una verdadera Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones para ‘Vivir bien,'" Integración Sur, Centro latinoamericano de Ecología Social, <http://www.comunidadsudamericana.com/historia/EvoMoralesPropuestaCSNCochabamba.pdf>, accessed January 3, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. “Bolivia: Brazil’s Lula, Argentina’s Kirchner tell Morales to be patient,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 November 2003, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. “Firma del Acta Constitutiva del Banco del Sur,” Casa Rosada, Buenos Aires, 9 December 2007, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2097>, accessed March 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. “Venezuela and Colombia inaugurate gas pipeline,” Ballenas, Colombia, 12 October 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/12/venezuela-colombia-pipeline-idUSN1222203020071012>, accessed March 24, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. Contrary to what the Chávez party proclaims, the Wayuu, Añu, and Bari maintained that “it is the agents of the State government who have agreed with imperialist transnationals the hand-over of native territory throughout the country for exploitation of natural resources – minerals, coal, gas, and petroleum – against the wishes and decisions of Venezuela’s indigenous communities.” “Chávez holds the controversial South Gas pipeline Project,” RedAmazon, 4 August 2007, <http://redamazon.wordpress.com/2007/08/04/chavez-holds-the-controversial-south-gas-pipeline-project/>, accessed March 24, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. They emplotted the 500-year-old struggle against oppression within their actions and together with the 1994 rising of the Zapatista Movement: “the determined show of resistance which the autonomous Zapatista communities have maintained throughout these years against the most powerful enemies, being part of the long struggle of resistance kept up by all the native peoples of the Continent for more than 500 years; however, for the first time, this resistance has led to a resolve to gain and exercise self-rule and freedom, now and forever, without asking permission. Such is the great Zapatista doctrine for every native people in the world.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. The Wayuu have awaited the call of the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandona Forest and of the other campaign: “in spite of the forces which at present occupy the government of Venezuela proclaiming themselves socialist, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist, the struggle for survival of our communities and cultures is our most urgent need. Despite Hugo Chávez’ anti-Bush and supposedly anti-neoliberal rhetoric, the economic development plans of the so-called Bolivarian revolution in fact give the go-ahead in our country to projects and programs of global transnationals, of their financial backers (the International Monetary Fund and World Bank), and of the United States government.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. ALBA-TCP Treaty, ALBA, 29 April 2006, <http://www.alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/alba-tcp-agreement-0>, accessed March 24, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. “Bolivia split in two as the wealthy aim to defy the Morales revolution,” The Observer, 23 August 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/24/bolivia>, Mach 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. For example, Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador (ECUARUNARI), Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC), Consejo de Todas las Tierras de Chile, Movimiento Sin Tierra de Brasil (MST), and Vía Campesina publicly sated their support to Morales and engaged within the indigenous regional practice. Convocatoria al Encuentro Internacional de solidaridad con Bolivia, Vía Campesina, 25 October 2008, <http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=572:convocatoria-al-encuentro-internacional-de-solidaridad-con-bolivia&catid=15:noticias-de-las-regiones&Itemid=29>, accessed March 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. “We, the inhabitants of this continent *Abya Yala* (America) have been struggling for centuries to re-establish Sumak Kawsay, which was stolen from us by invaders and colonizers in different historic times. Alongside these times, they killed our leaders, extracted our wealth and with violence violated our human and Pachamama rights. After 516 years, neo-invaders intend to do the same by stopping liberating processes in Latin America. Thus, the descendants of previous thieves return with neoliberal policies and cause new genocides. (…) Bolivia is now the target of these people who think that they are the owners of water, gas and oil in the region.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. “It is the duty of this President to reaffirm UNASUR’s predisposition to collaborate with Bolivia’s government in the identification and implementation of dialogues and understandings for its problem. With the leadership of Bolivia’s legitimate authorities, we will see that the different political forces of the country return to peaceful, institutional and democratic paths of solutions for their problems and promotion of development.” “Declaración de UNASUR,” Santiago de Chile, 18 September 2008, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/12-9-08com_bolivia.htm>, accessed March 7, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. “We reiterate our solidarity and support to the democratic and sovereign process of transformation led by Evo Morales in Bolivia. We also repeat our opposition of the destabilization plans that weakens peace and unity in Bolivia. Thus, we adhere to the international denunciation against the separatist movement that emerges in Bolivia with an illegal and unconstitutional referendum.” Declaración de solidaridad y apoyo a la Republica de Bolivia, ALBA, 22 April 2008, <http://www.alba-tcp.org/contenido/declaraci%C3%B3n-de-solidaridad-y-apoyo-la-republica-de-bolivia-0>, accessed March 7, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. “República Dominicana: Primer Congreso de la Articulación Nacional Campesina,” Vía Campesina, 26 November 2008, <http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=634:republica-dominicana-primer-congreso-de-la-articulaciacional-campesina&catid=15:noticias-de-las-regiones&Itemid=29>, accessed March 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. “Saludo de Evo Morales a Vía Campesina, a quien esta organización considera uno de los suyos,” Vía Campesina, 20 October 2008, <http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=590:saludo-de-evo-morales-a-vcampesinaa-quien-esta-organizacionsidera-uno-de-los-suyosq&catid=42:5-maputo-2008&Itemid=67>, accessed March 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. “Declaración del Encuentro Regional Andino Amazónico de los Pueblos Indígenas Origina ríos, Campesinos y Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia, Perú, Colombia y Ecuador,” Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas, - CAIO - Bolivia, Ecuador, Perú, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, 31 July 2009, <http://www.oilwatchsudamerica.org/component/content/article/1-timas/3104-declaracion-del-encuentro-regional-andino-amazonico-de-los-pueblos-indigenas-origina-rios-campesinos-y-comunidades-interculturales-de-bolivia-peru-colombia-y-ecuador.html>, accessed March 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. “Deeply worried, we have observed that the negotiations in the XV Conference have shown that the developed nations have no intention to reach balanced and fair results. They are the main causes of climate change and after three years of negotiations in Copenhague for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, under the Protocol of Kyoto, and two years of negotiations inside the group of work for cooperation in the long term, no results have been reached. We need a full, effective, and sustainable application of the convention in order to include all its principles and responsibilities.” Comunicado especial sobre el cambio climático de la VIII Cumbre del ALBA – TCP con miras a la XV Conferencia de las Partes en Copenhague,” ALBA, 14 December 2009, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=5725>, accessed March 8, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. “We alert the world that the developed nations are promoting a treaty that violates the principles of historic responsibility, fairness, and common responsibilities. They are violating the right of development that developing countries have and the rights of Mother Earth.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. In this pact, the indigenous organizations Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia Bertolina Sisa, Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia, and Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del *Qullasuyu* united to work together and support the re-establishment of Sumak Kawsay in the region. “Encuentro Regional de los Pueblos Indígenas Originarias, Campesinos, Comunidades Interculturales sobre Buen Vivir,” COINCABOL, December 2009, [http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cts=1331222802159&ved=0CCcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.coincabol.org%2Fapc-aa-files%2Fdocumentos%2Fitems%2FCONVOCATORIA\_DE\_VIVIR\_BIEN.pdf&ei=DNlYT9fcMsjRiAK0roG7Cw&usg=AFQjCNGWZGFjNGN9otz2pndKGBn3SeEVHw&sig2=zvcfYsMNqQymdS7Tg2U47Q](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cts=1331222802159&ved=0CCcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.coincabol.org%2Fapc-aa-files%2Fdocumentos%2Fitems%2FCONVOCATORIA_DE_VIVIR_BIEN.pdf&ei=DNlYT9fcMsjRiAK0roG7Cw&usg=AFQjCNGWZGFjNGN9otz2pndKGBn), accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. “This is the time of *Pachacuti*, the return to Pachamama. The time of the indigenous people, peasants, and intercultural communities in the Andean region and the entire Abia Yala. We need to end marginalization, racism and exclusion to build our *patriagrande* as Simón Bolívar dreamed it. We need o build a region without evil, with the *patiti* of the indigenous people of the Amazon and the *Sumaj Kamaña*, with the ‘good life.’” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. “Acoge Bolivia Encuentro de Parlamentarias Indígenas Latinoamericanas,” Indymedia, 19 January 2012, <http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2010/01/715908.php>, accessed March 8, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. “Vía Campesina se reúne con el Presidente Evo Morales,” Vía Campesina, 26 April 2010, <http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1003:via-campesina-se-reune-con-el-presidente-evo-morales&catid=46:cambios-climcos-y-agro-combustibles&Itemid=79>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. “La Vía Campesina participa en el acto de inauguración del I Encuentro de Pueblos por el Cambio Climático y los Derechos de la Madre Tierra,” Vía Campesina, 21 April 2010, [http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=994:la-via-campesina-participa-en-el-acto-de-inauguracion-del-i-encuentro-de-pueblos-por-el-cambio-climatico-y-los-derechos-de-la-madre-tierra&catid=46:cambios-climcos-y-agro-combustibles&Itemid=79](http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=994:la-via-campesina-participa-en-el-acto-de-inauguracion-del-i-encuentro-de-pueblos-por-el-cambio-climatico-y-los-derechos-de-la-madre-tierra&catid=46:cambios-climcos-y-agro-combustib), accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. “Evo y Correa asistieron a inauguración del evento,” Vía Campesina, 18 October 2010, <http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1078:evo-y-correa-asistieron-a-inauguracion-del-evento&catid=48:quito-8-16-de-octubre-2010&Itemid=141>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. “Evo Morales propuso un nuevo socialismo para ‘Vivir bien’,” Vía Campesina, 11 December 2010, <http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1129:evo-morales-propuso-un-nuevo-socialismo-para-vivir-bien&catid=46:cambios-climcos-y-agro-combustibles&Itemid=79>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. Tom Phillips, “Bolivian President Evo Morales suspends Amazon road project,” The Guardian, 27 September 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/27/bolivian-president-suspends-amazon-road>, accessed March 24, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. “Resolución de los Representantes del TIPNIS,” 14 September 2012, <http://clavero.derechosindigenas.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/TIPNIS-14sep2011.pdf>, accessed March 24, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. “We support the president unconditionally, but his peasant roots from Oruro, Potosi and Cochabamba are putting our communal territory in danger.” (…) “I think that, in 10 years, many small communities will disappear. I am concerned about the small and fragile Moxeño Chiman communities, which have no more than 60 families that are not used to live with other social groups. These groups are foreign to their culture. With the road crossing that area, we would take away their right to a tranquil and healthy life. We would force them to migrate to another place.” “Interview to the President of TIPNIS, Adolfo Moye,” <http://72.249.20.135/wordpress-mu/bolivia/?page_id=455>, accessed March 24, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. “We believe that we can find a solution; the construction of the road is something secondary for us. The most important element here is the guarantee of our community rights as indigenous people. The government and all other social sectors (including colonizers and dairy workers) should respect our rights. It is not right that the government seeks development without respecting the environment, animals, and the lives of our indigenous people.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. Speech of Evo Morales, 13 October 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IyqFeC5Dkhs>, accessed March 26, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. “Bolivia: Conflict deepens over dispute highway,” Green Left, <http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/48959>, accessed March 26, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. “Bolivia: Letter from mass Indigenous movement CONAIE to Evo Morales regarding TIPNIS controversy,” International Journal of Socialist Renewal, 26 September 2011, <http://links.org.au/node/2516>, accessed March 26, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. The letter expressed the following: “During these days we have paid witness to all the events that your government has had to confront in regards to the march by the brothers from the indigenous peoples of the Bolivian east in defense of TIPNIS. In the face of this, we would like to make known out deep concern regarding the events that have transpired, especially the events that occurred yesterday afternoon.

Being faithful to the principles of the struggle of the people, we reject the violent repression that the indigenous brothers from the march have suffered at the hands of the Bolivian police. For a long time, our people have shared and sought to develop our common struggle against neoliberalism, for sovereignty, for the defense of natural resources and against neo-colonial states and governments. These experiences have shaped and strengthen us in order to defeat the neoliberal model. No doubt on the way we have had multiple difficulties or even committed errors. But before anything else we firmly defend the process constructed between the people, the struggle for the DEFENCE OF MOTHER EARTH, together with the majority of the exploited men and women. We hope that these differences will be resolved through dialogue, with the aim that they not be utilized by our enemies, the national right wing and imperialism, in order for them to once again persecute our peoples, above all our children.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. “Bolivia’s TIPNIS Road cancelled but deeper conflict remain unresolved,” NACLA, 28 October 2011, [https://nacla.org/blog/2011/10/28/bolivia’s-tipnis-road-cancelled-deeper-conflicts-remain-unresolved](https://nacla.org/blog/2011/10/28/bolivia%27s-tipnis-road-cancelled-deeper-conflicts-remain-unresolved), accessed March 26, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. Minutes of meeting number 726, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. Minutes of meeting number 757, ALADI, December 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed January 5, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. Tod Robberson, “U.S. sees troubling signs in Andean Region,” The Record, 17 December 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 4, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. “Venezuelan, Brazilian leaders voice concern over Plan Colombia,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 September 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed February 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. “Venezuela's Chávez calls for South American integration at Andean meeting,” BBC Monitoring Latin America, 19 August 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. Jack Sweeney, “Chávez angles for absolute power; Venezuelan president sharpens his rhetoric, turns to Cuban advisers,” The Washington Times, 26 June 2001, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. Joseph Contreras, “Rise of the Indians,” Newsweek, 13 August 2001, , <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. “Declaración conjunta entre el Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y el Presidente del Consejo de Estado de la República de Cuba para la creación de ALBA,” ALBA, 14 December 2004, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2097>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. “Ministerial Declaration Quito,” Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Trade, FTAA, 1 November 2002, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/quito/quito_e.asp>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, 18 June 2003, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. “We highlight that the FTAA is the most complete expression of the appetite of domination over our region. If this treaty ever entered into force, it would deepen neoliberalism, increase dependency and augment subordination. (…) Thus we firmly reject the content and goals of the FTAA. We firmly believe that this model of integration would consolidate the previously mentioned scenario, where the continent would be driven into poverty, separation, denationalization of our economies, and total subordination to outsider’s demands.” “Declaración conjunta entre el Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y el Presidente del Consejo de Estado de la República de Cuba para la creación de ALBA,” ALBA, 14 December 2004, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2097>, accessed March 8, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. “ALBA has as its main goal the transformation of our Latin American societies to reach more justice, wisdom, participation and solidarity. Thus, we will seek to integrate ourselves to eliminate inequalities, increase our life standards and constitute our own destiny.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. “We affirm that our guiding principle will always be solidarity with all the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean. This solidarity emerges from the thoughts of Bolívar, Martí, Sucre, O’Higgins, San Martín, Hidalgo, Petión, Morazán, Sandino, and other heroes of independence. These heroes sought to build the “Patria Grande” without nationalisms nor selfish thoughts.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. “In this year we celebrate 180 years since the glorious victory of Ayacucho and the call for the *Antifictiónico* Congress of Panama, which intended to open the path towards integration. These projects were stopped then, but we now express our convictions and reaffirm that path. We consolidate the Bolivarian Revolution of Venezuela, the failure of the neoliberal policies imposed in Latin America, and start working in our way towards our second independence, our true independence.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. “The neoliberal model of the FTAA favors only a few, deteriorates labor conditions, increases migration, destroys indigenous communities, destroys the environment, privatizes social security and education, and implements laws that protects corporations over citizens (like the case of intellectual copy rights).” “Declaración Final de la II Cumbre de los Pueblos de América,” Mar del Plata, Argentina, <http://www.integracionsur.com/alca/mardelplata/CumbrePueblosDeclaracionFinal.html>, accessed March 8, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. “Proclama del Consejo Presidencial,” ALBA, 29 June 2009, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2097>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. “Contribución y Subscripción de la República de Bolivia a la Declaración Conjunta Firmada en Habana el 14 de Diciembre del 2004, entre los Presidentes del Consejo de Estados de la República de Cuba y de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela,” ALBA, 29 April, 2006, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=514>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. “Adhesión de Nicaragua al ALBA,” ALBA, 11 January, 2007, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1380>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. “Adhesión del Gobierno de la Mancomunidad de Dominica al ALBA,” ALBA, 26 January 2008, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/pdf/adhesion_mancomunidad_de_domin.pdf>, accessed Mach 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. “Declaración de Adhesión de la República de Honduras a la Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América,” ALBA, 25 August 2008, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=19,69>, accessed Mach 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. “Declaración de la República del Ecuador para su incorporación a la ALBA,” ALBA, 29 June 2009, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4605>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. “Antigua y Barbuda Declaración de Adhesión al ALBA,” ALBA, 24 June 2009, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4601>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. “Resolución de los Países Miembros de la ALBA sobre el Ingreso como Miembro Pleno de San Vicente y las Granadinas,” ALBA, 26 June 2009, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4602>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. For example, the statement of the Bolivian Government affirmed, “we adhere to ALBA, recognizing that the application of neoliberal projects and policies led to the proliferation of poverty, the increase of dependency, more inequality, and further extraction of our natural resources. Thus, we seek this true integration among the states of Latin America and the Caribbean in order to reach sustainable development, security, food sovereignty, the satisfaction of our people’s needs, and the unity of Latin and Central America. We seek an integration based on principles of unity, cooperation, and complementarity. We seek this integration to increase our independency, sovereignty, and identity. We also seek to regionally face unilateral and hegemonic pretentions.” “Contribución y Subscripción de la República de Bolivia a la Declaración Conjunta Firmada en Habana el 14 de Diciembre del 2004, entre los Presidentes del Consejo de Estados de la República de Cuba y de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela,” ALBA, 29 April, 2006, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=514>, accessed March 8, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. “Honduras withdraws from ALBA, El Salvador won’t join Despite FMLN support,” Venezuelan Analysis, 15 January 2010, <http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5070>, accessed March 26, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. “Acuerdo para la Aplicación de la ALBA-TLC,” ALBA, 29 April 2006, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2097>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. “Firma de Acuerdos entre la República de Cuba y la República Bolivariana de Venezuela,” <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1414>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. “V Cumbre del ALBA – Acuerdo Energético del ALBA entre Venezuela y Bolivia,” ALBA, 29 April 2007, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1803>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. “Declaración Conjunta de las Naciones Integrantes de la ALBA con Motivo del Nacimiento de la nueva TVES,” ALBA, 3 June 2007, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1608>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. “With the Bank of ALBA, we are breaking a capitalist mechanism. This bank is a political instrument for social and economic development in Latin America. We already have the building. There, we will also have ALBA’s Secretariat and Coordination. In two months we should be able to start financing different projects. This mechanism will be used by the smaller sectors, the neediest. For example, we already approved the project of coffee and geothermic in Dominica. There, the government has to be over the market, politics have to be the spearhead, and everything else comes after.” “Con el ALBA Despiertan los Pueblos,” ALBA, 24 January 2008, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2069>, accessed March 9, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. “We agreed in the analysis of the crisis that affects the foundations of the worldwide capitalist system. We reiterate our critics towards this economic model that is destroying our world and results from a geopolitical order of domination. We also question the international financial system, which has promoted the free circulation of capital and the supremacy of the speculative logic of profits over the needs of people.” (…) “In this sense, we reaffirm our conviction that the regional zone is a privileged space to achieve effective answers to build an economic and monetary region. Thus, ALBA shall: protect our economies from the destroying nature of transnational corporations, foment development, constitute a space free from inefficient global financial institutions and the monopoly of the dollar. Hence, We shall build a monetary region, which will initially include the countries of ALBA and the Republic of Ecuador. This will take place through the creation of a common account called SUCRE (Sistema Unitario de Compensación Regional) and the chamber of payment compensation.” “Declaración de la III Cumbre Extraordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la ALBA-TLC,” ALBA, 26 November 2008, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1974>, accessed March 9, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. Scot Wilson, “Venezuela and Colombia Square Off Over Rebel,” The Washington Post, 17 March 2001, , <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 9, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. “Brazil and Venezuela incentivate integration,” Gazeta Mercantil Online, 10 May 1999, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 9. 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. “Alongside our debate, the heads of state concluded that the economic crisis, together with the failure of the war in Iraq, have generated a dangerous situation of desperation in the administration of George W. Bush. This explains the increase of violence towards our region by the spokesman of the Government of the United States. They have utilized the problem of drug trafficking as an excuse to disqualify the progressive governments of the region. We agreed that in this year of elections, the Government of George Bush would increase its violence and war-oriented strategy. Notwithstanding, the continuous efforts of President Chávez have brought us a transcendental event. In 2008, the FARC has started to liberate kidnapped people thanks to the humanitarian effort of the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. These actions have always received the support of various governments, the international community and the consent of Colombia. This event allows us to open a process of peace in the region.” “Declaración Política de la VI Cumbre de la ALBA,” ALBA, 26 January 2008, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2668#1>, accessed March 9, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. Bill Van Auken, “Washington Endorses gunpoint election in Honduras,” 22 November 2009, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/nov2009/hond-n27.shtml>, accessed March 9, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. “We express that the coup d’état in Honduras, with support of the United States, had the purpose of stopping the progressive forces of transformation in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a perfect example of the fact that some social sectors and governments use the notion of democracy, human rights, and respect of law only for calculated purposes.” “Declaración Final de la VIII Cumbre del ALBA,” ALBA, 14 December 2009, <http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2009/12/14/declaracion-final-de-la-cumbre-del-alba/>, accessed March 9, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. “Acta resumida de la Primera Reunión del Consejo Político del ALBA-TLC,” ALBA, 9 August 2009, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=4970>, accessed March 9, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. “Declaración de la VII Cumbre del ALBA-TLC,” ALBA, 17 October 2009, <http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2009/10/19/declaracion-de-la-vii-cumbre-del-alba-tcp-en-cochabamba-bolivia/>, accessed March 9, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. “Declaración de los Países miembros de ALBA sobre la Solicitud de Extradición del Ex Presidente Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada y sus Colaboradores,” ALBA, 24 June 2009, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4596>, accessed March 9, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. “Por la Solidaridad y las Luchas de los Pueblos,” Vía Campesina, 16 April 2007, <http://viacampesina.org/sp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=260:ipor-la-unidad-la-solidaridad-y-las-luchas-de-los-pueblos&catid=15:noticias-de-las-regiones&Itemid=29>, accessed March 9, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. The introduction of this notion of development can be observed for example in the following segment of the declaration of adherence to ALBA by Morales: “Thus, we seek this true integration among the states of Latin America and the Caribbean in order to reach sustainable development, security, food sovereignty, the satisfaction of our people’s needs, and the unity of Latin and Central America.” “Contribución y Subscripción de la República de Bolivia a la Declaración Conjunta Firmada en Habana el 14 de Diciembre del 2004, entre los Presidentes del Consejo de Estados de la República de Cuba y de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela,” ALBA, 29 April, 2006, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=514>, accessed March 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. “Decimoprimero Reunión del Concejo Presidencial Andino,” CAN, 27 May 1999, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/IDocumentos/c_Newdocs.asp?GruDoc=06>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. Minutes of meeting number 709, ALADI, August 1999, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. “Venezuelan, Brazilian leaders voice concern over Plan Colombia,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 September 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed February 7, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. Minutes of meeting number 724, ALADI, February 2000, <http://www.aladi.org/>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. “The Presidents of South America remembered that the sub-regional processes of integration, in special MERCOSUR, the integration with Chile and Bolivia, the CAN, the Andean Corporation of Foment, The Latin American Fun of reserves, ALADI, the Treaty of Cuenca del Plata, the Treaty of Amazon Cooperation, the Group of Three, The Common Marker of Central America, and CARICOM, have been fundamental elements for the integration of Latin America. Thus, the process of integration in South America will include the constitution of a free trade agreement considering these sub-regional processes.” “Primera Cumbre Sudamericana de Presidentes,” Comunicado de Brasilia, 2000, <http://www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/CumbreSudamericanaBrasilia2000.pdf> , accessed January 4, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. “The Presidents of South America coincide in that the process of globalization, driven by equilibrium and fairness in its negotiations and results, could generate benefits for the countries of the region, such as increased trade, expansion of investment funds, and the increase of exchange in knowledge and technology. At the same time, this process generates challenges that must be faced with political responsibility and concrete actions by the governments of South America. In this way, we can make globalization an efficient mean to increase opportunities of growth and development for the region, increasing its levels of social welfare.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. “Hay que fortalecer MERCOSUR para ingresar al ALCA,” La Nación, 31 December 2000, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. “MERCOSUR disapproves Chile-U.S. free trade negotiations,” Merging Markets Datafile, Xinhua, 12 December 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. “MERCOSUR leaders united against common foe of US Congress protectionism,” BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 23 December 2000, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. Linda Diebel, “Brazil lays down line,” The Toronto Start, 22 April 2001, <http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.opac.sfsu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/>?, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. “Decimotercera Reunión del Consejo Presidencial Andino,” CAN, 24 June 2001, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/IDocumentos/c_Newdocs.asp?GruDoc=06>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Países Miembros del MERCOSUR, Bolivia y Chile,” MERCOSUR, 22 June 2001, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. “Declaración Ministerial de la Paz sobre la Institucionalización del Dialogo Político Comunidad Andina-MERCOSUR-Chile,” La Paz, 17 June 2001, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/actas/dec17-7-01D.htm>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. “Protocolo de Olivos,” Comunicado de Prensa, MERCOSUR, 18 February 2002, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. “Segunda Reunión de Presidentes de América del Sur,” “Consenso de Guayaquil sobre Integración, Seguridad e Infraestructura para el desarrollo,” 27 June 2002, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/documentos.htm>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. “The financial crisis and scarcity of resources affecting the region can weaken the basis of democracy. They impede the access to employment and minimum conditions of welfare for people. Thus, they highlight the importance of the promotion of the constitution of mechanisms of financial solidarity with democracy and governance at the international level.” (…) “When analyzing the negative effects for the region caused by the unfairness of the international financial system, the Presidents of South America reiterated their solidarity with the people and the Government of Argentina in their efforts to overcome this adverse situation. They called for the international financial community to extend their support to this brother nation of South America.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. “The Presidents of South America express their concerns over the increase in subsidies applied by developed nations towards our agricultural exports, which distort the market and the conditions of competition.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. “The presidents of South America agreed that the participation of countries with small economies in the FTAA needs to account for their special situation, needs, economic conditions and special opportunities. In this sense, we support the need to find appropriate mechanisms to reinforce the capabilities of these nations to participate in the processes of negotiations of FTAA. We also support the need of a complete and effective implementation of the results achieved in these negotiations.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, 18 June 2003, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, 8 July 2004, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, 16 December 2003, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, 18 June 2003, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. For example, the declaration stated that they “emphasize the importance of fomenting economic growth with equality to increase democratic governance and promote social development, which are the biggest challenges for the region.” “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes de MERCOSUR y Estados Asociados,” MERCOSUR, 8 June 2004, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. “Third Presidential Summit of South America,” South American Community of Nations, 8 December 2004, <http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com/historia/index.html>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. They mentioned, “The common history and solidarity of our nations, which have struggled common internal and external obstacles since the fights for independence, shows the underutilized potential of the region to reinforce our capacities of negotiation and international projection.” Ibid., (author’s translation) [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. “We, the Presidents of South America are convinced that in order to reach better life standards for our people, development should be promoted not only with policies of sustained economic growth, but also with strategies that foment environmentalism, more fair distribution of wealth, equal access to education, social inclusion, and sustainable development.” Ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR y de Estados Asociados,” MERCOSUR, 17 December 2004, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. “Decimoquinta Reunión del Concejo Presidencial Andino,” CAN, 12 July 2004, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/IDocumentos/c_Newdocs.asp?GruDoc=06>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. “Decimotercera Reunión del Consejo Presidencial Andino,” CAN, 18 June 2005, <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/IDocumentos/c_Newdocs.asp?GruDoc=06>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. “First Presidential Summit of the South American Community of Nations,” SCAN, 30 September 2005, <http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com/historia/index.html>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, 21 July 2006, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. “Comunicado de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes de MERCOSUR y Estados Asociados,” MERCOSUR, 21 July 2006, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. “The process of globalization has had many influences in our economies and societies. Recently, it was possible to achieve an alternative that is oriented towards economic growth, macroeconomic stability, re-distribution of wealth to avoid social exclusion and to reduce poverty, and the decrease of our vulnerability to external factors. In facing this situation, our regional integration represents an alternative to avoid some of the following problems of globalization: the deepening of poverty; the increase of asymmetries; and social, economic and political marginalization. With this framework, we will take advantage of our opportunities to develop. Thus, the construction of the South American Community of Nations seeks to develop a common space in social, economic, financial, environmental and infrastructural areas.” “Third Presidential Summit of the South American Community of Nations,” SCAN, 9 December 2006, <http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com/>, accessed March 10, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. “Manifiesto de Cochabamba,” Declaración política de la Cumbre Social por la Integración de los Pueblos, 9 December 2006, <http://attacargentina.com.ar/leer.php/2432016>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. “Construyamos una verdadera Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones para ‘Vivir Bien’.” South American Community of Nations, 9 December 2006, <http://www.comunidadsudamericana.com/historia/EvoMoralesPropuestaCSNCochabamba.pdf>, accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. “We reaffirm our commitment with the protection of our sovereignty, the respect to territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the people according to the principles of the United Nations. These principles assure the states’ rights to decide their strategies of development and global insertion without external interference.” “Third Presidential Summit of the South American Community of Nations,” SCAN, 9 December 2006, <http://www.uniondenacionessuramericanas.com/>, accessed March 10, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. “Declaración de Margarita,” Construyendo la Integración energética del Sur, 16 April 2007, <http://www.integracionsur.com/americalatina/DeclaracionMargaritaVzEnergia07.html>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. “Firma del Acta Constitutiva del Banco del Sur,” Casa Rosada, Buenos Aires, 9 December 2007, <http://www.integracionsur.com/sudamerica/ActaFundacionBancoSur2007.pdf>, Accessed March 10, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. “People might not agree with Lula, Rafael, Evo, Kirchner, Nicanor, or Chávez. But in order to disagree we need democracy and it is important to notice how we were 10 years ago. How was our economy? How were the worker’s salaries? How did our international credibility look? And how was our regional relationship? There was a lack of wiliness. There was weakness and the governments thought we could not unite… it was impossible for Argentine and Brazil to unite. It was not possible for Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina to unite. There were too many reasons for people to be distrustful.” Lula Da Silva’s speech, ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. “The Bank of the South was born, unthinkable 9 or 10 years ago. This is part of a set, of a system of ideas oriented towards our independency, which has been waiting for 200 more years.” Hugo Chávez’s speech, ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. “Our democracies have presidents that work for their people. But this is not a historic moment only due to our politics; it is historic thanks to Pachamama. This Mother Earth gives us the opportunity to improve our economies; it gives us natural resources to supply different demands. In this sense, the Bank of the South should allow us to solve our economic problems, but it should also help us work on social issues.” Evo Morales’ speech, ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. “Evo, the truth is that the work that we have achieved with Evo, with the Bolivian people, with our indigenous brothers and all the Bolivian people, has made us understand that we have common problems and should trust each other. It has made us understand the love for our lands. We, the people that belong to this Latin American nation; how many things have we learned from Evo? How many things did I learn and understand with Evo. Your struggles have made me one of your biggest followers. The struggles for your people, for the reinforcement of the indigenous identities of our brothers in Latin America, the importance of dignity without hypocrisy, the cultural transformation of the new times we are living in our region, all of these I am learning from you. There are many difficulties, because it is true that those who took us down into the dark night of neoliberalism are not resting. They still have hate, but we will defend ourselves with the happiness of our people.” Nestor Kirchner’s speech, ibid., (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. “We build our union based on our common history and the solidarity of our nations, multi-ethnic, pluri-linguistic, and multicultural. We build our integration based on the struggle for emancipation and South American union by our heroes of independence and liberty. We build our future together based on the Declaration of Cusco (8 December, 2004), the Declaration of Brasilia (30 September, 2005), and Cochabamba (9 December, 2006). We affirm our determination in the construction of a South American identity and citizenship. We affirm our commitment in the development of a region integrated in political, economic, social, environmental, and infrastructural areas to contribute in the union of Latin America and the Caribbean. We are convinced that these integration and union are necessary to move forwards in the sustainable development and welfare of our people.” UNASUR, 23 May 2008, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/tratado_constitutivo.htm>, accessed March 11, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. “Declaración de UNASUR,” Santiago de Chile, 18 September 2008, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/12-9-08com_bolivia.htm>, accessed March 7, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. “III Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo de Jefes y Jefas de Estado y de Gobierno de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericana,” UNASUR, 10 August 2009, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/10-8-09Dec_quito.htm>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. “Declaración de Santiago de Chile,” UNASUR, 10 March 2009, [http://www.prensaMERCOSUR.com.ar/apm/nota\_completa.php?idnota=4238](http://www.prensamercosur.com.ar/apm/nota_completa.php?idnota=4238), accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. “III Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo de Jefes y Jefas de Estado y de Gobierno de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericana,” UNASUR, 10 August 2009, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/10-8-09Dec_quito.htm>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. For example, MERCOSUR mentioned in July 2009, that the project of ALBA to create a common currency for the region was important to avoid the volatility of the financial world and to increase development in the region. “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” 24 July 2009, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. “Declaración de Buenos Aires sobre la situación en Ecuador,” UNASUR, 1 October 2012, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/30-9-10ecuador.htm>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. “Additional Protocol to the Constitutive treaty of UNASUR on the Commitment to Democracy,” UNASUR, 6 November 2010, <http://opnew.op.gov.gy/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1108:additional-protocol-to-the-constitutive-treaty-of-unasur-on-commitment-to-democracy&catid=34:bulletins&Itemid=70>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. “Declaración del Concejo de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de la UNASUR,” 11 March 2011, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/dec11-3-11.htm>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. “III Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo de Jefes y Jefas de Estado y de Gobierno de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericana,” UNASUR, 10 August 2009, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/10-8-09Dec_quito.htm>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. “The Presidents members, order the Political Council of ALBA to include in its agenda a bigger concentration in political integration for the region. They also demanded for the council to produce a document about the schedule of the integration, the mechanisms, and goals, so that the presidents could consider it and share it with the rest of the region. This should include the defense of our sovereignties to face the political and media campaign by the Empire. In this sense, we manifest our satisfaction with the creation of CELAC.” “Manifiesto Bicentenario de Caracas, Declaración Final de la IX Cumbre del ALBA,” ALBA, 19 April 2010, <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&new_topic=27&pagenum=12>, accessed March 11, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. “The heads of State expressed their satisfaction for the construction of a common space with the goal of deepening a political, economic, social and cultural integration in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). (…) They also state the importance of this construction for the convergence of all regional and sub-regional mechanisms of integration.” “Comunicado Conjunto de los Presidentes de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR,” MERCOSUR, 29 June 2011, [http://www.MERCOSUR.int/t\_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4](http://www.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=3379&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4), accessed March 11, 2012, (author’s translation). [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. “What’s good about our region? We have wealth, we have natural resources; we have the Amazon, so we have to figure how to develop. So we would have to extend our markets. We should not only sale to the European and North American market because they have crises and then we get affected. We need solidarity, complementarity, and competitiveness. For all these reasons, we are convinced that we need our integration, other financial institutions, we need to solve the problems of the abandoned people.” Interview to Evo Morales, Telesur, 03 December 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6j9ybn_2x0>, accessed March 26, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. “This integration is for the liberation of the exploited nations, because we share a struggle against capitalism, neoliberalism, and colonialism. After 500 years of indigenous resistance and 200 years of independence, we finally get together to liberate ourselves. We started with CAN, then created UNASUR, we passed through MERCOSUR, and now we form CELAC, which is the biggest organization, but it excluded the United States, which is very important for the liberation of our people.” Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. “XX Cumbre Iberoamericana de Mar del Plata,” CELAC, 4 December 2010, <http://www.oei.es/comunicadosdemardelplata.php>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. “Declaración de Caracas,” CELAC, 3 December 2011, <http://www.argenpress.info/2011/12/celac-declaracion-de-caracas.html>, accessed March 11, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. “Mujica Atento a las Trabas Comerciales,” 26 February 2012, Página 12, <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/ultimas/index-2012-02-26.html>, accessed March 15, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-466)