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EDITORIAL POLICY

Overview

The International Relations Journal at San Francisco State University strives to exhibit the diverse range of undergraduate and graduate research interests that flourish in our department.

Each semester, the Journal is offered as a course in which students participate as writers or editors in a peer review process, or as administrative staff members who assist authors and editors as well as guide the Journal through its production.

The goal of the course is to expose students to the peer review process, focusing on academic standards of argumentation and factual accuracy, citation formatting, and collaborative editing using Microsoft Word's “track changes” feature. More broadly, the Journal’s executive editors aim to help students develop writing/editing skills applicable in other courses and promote a deeper understanding of the discipline of International Relations as a whole.

Submissions & Process

The Journal encourages all students pursuing a B.A. or M.A. in International Relations to submit completed works (incomplete papers and abstracts are not accepted) at the beginning of each semester. From these submissions, the Journal’s executive editors assign students to positions on the writing and editorial boards as well as a number of administrative-level appointments.

The course curriculum includes a number of informational workshops and at least three rounds of structured editing and revision. All editing is anonymous and each submission is reviewed by three different editors.

The structured peer review is as follows: 
1. a submission is first edited by an undergraduate or graduate “peer expert” who has conducted prior research on topics and/or regions relevant to the paper and can thus provide fact checking and citation suggestions; 
2. second round editing focuses on clarity and academic tone my paring the manuscript with an editor unfamiliar with the paper’s subject; 
3. finally, the paper is edited for proper citation formatting and technical aspects. At the end of the semester, authors participating in this process are expected to submit a final manuscript for consideration by the Journal’s executive editors and the faculty advisor.

Publication of Articles

Only submissions that have gone through the peer review process and meet the content and formatting requirements will be considered for publication. The Journal is published yearly.

For Submissions and Back Issues: http://internationalrelations.sfsu.edu/content/international-relations-journal-0

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The staff of The International Relations Journal is grateful for the continued funding allocated by the Instructionally Related Activities Committee and the Department of International Relations at San Francisco State University for the production of this journal.

The production of this journal is a group effort and the managing editors would like to especially thank all the members of the editorial board and the contributing writers. The editorial board members edited the articles contained in this issue and both the editors and writers patiently endured the labor of multiple revisions of these articles, as well as corresponding with one another. The guidance and advice of Dr. Burcu Ellis in the International Relations Department has been indispensable to the publication of the Journal.
DEDICATION

To Professor Emeritus JoAnn Aviel:

With sincere gratitude for decades of dedication and teaching, we thank you.

- Model UN Students
Taiwan’s economic development after 1945 is remarkable. Many Taiwanese people have lifted out of poverty, and their living standard has significantly improved. Political economists and developmental economists generally consider Taiwan’s economic development a success, but they are puzzled by such a remarkable economic success given Taiwan’s limited land and scarce resources.

This paper traces Taiwan’s economic history from 1945 to present. It analyzes the government’s role in economic recovery, agricultural reform, and import substitution in the 1950s, export promotion policy in the 1960s, industrial upgrading in the 1970s, and economic integration with Mainland China since the late 1980s. The author argues that state intervention played a key role in initiating, sustaining, and transforming Taiwan’s economy over the past decades, and Taiwan’s economic experience can be a model for developing countries who struggle with neoliberal economic policies.

Taiwan1 is located off the southeastern coast of China. Its total area is 36,193 square kilometers, and its total coastline is about 1,139 kilometers.2 It is approximately 230 miles long and 85 miles wide at the center. Taiwan’s size is roughly the size of the Netherlands or the size of the U.S. states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut combined.3 As of July 2014, Taiwan had a population of 23.4 million.4 In comparison to other countries, Taiwan ranks above average in population (no. 49 of 221 countries) and ranks just below average in land area (no. 136 of 232 countries).5

From the above basic information, it seems that Taiwan is an underdeveloped country and Taiwanese people live in poverty because its limited land and huge population are burdens for itself. Under Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan’s economy thrived and surpassed all of East Asia except for Japan. After World War Two, Taiwan’s economy worsened dramatically. When the Republic of China (ROC) moved its government to Taiwan in 1949, some political economists and development economists called Taiwan a “basket case” – meaning that it had little or no chance of developing its economy. From 1945 through the 1960s, Taiwan appeared to have uncompromising prospects for economic success. From the mid-1960s, however, Taiwan’s economy took off and soon became a prosperous country.6 In 2013, its nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and nominal GDP per capita respectively stood at $489.13 billion and $20,952.7 Its export volume was about $305.44 billion, whereas its import volume was...

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1 The author would like to thank the peer reviewers and Professor Joel Kassiola for their feedback.
3 John Franklin Cooper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 2.
5 Cooper, Taiwan, 2.
6 Ibid., 151.
7 “ROC Vital Information,” Yearbook 2014; Unless otherwise noted, the $ sign refers to the U.S. Dollar.
about $269.9 billion.\(^8\) Taiwan’s rankings in many global survey rankings are respectable. For example, it ranked 17th in Heritage Foundation’s 2014 Index of Economic Freedom and 14th in World Economic Forum’s 2014-2015 Global Competitiveness Index, respectively.\(^9\)

Over the past decades, Taiwan’s economic development is remarkable. It has successfully transformed itself from an unproductive country to a prosperous country. It is not an exaggeration to call its experience an economic success. In order to examine Taiwan’s economic success, this paper traces Taiwan’s economic history from 1945 to present. It attempts to answer two questions: 1) How did the government play a key role in initiating, sustaining, and transforming Taiwan’s economy after 1945? and 2) Can other developing countries learn from Taiwan’s experience? In this paper, I argue that state intervention played a key role in initiating, sustaining, and transforming Taiwan’s economy over the past decades, and Taiwan’s economic experience can be a model for developing countries who struggle with neoliberal economic policies. This case study is of importance, as an uncompromising country with limited resources can modernize itself as long as the state plays an active but appropriate role.

1945 to the 1950s: U.S. Assistance, Agricultural Reform, and Import Substitution

From 1945 to the 1950s, although the U.S. government supported Taiwan’s economy, the ROC government initiated agricultural reform and import substitution policy. Immediately after World War II, Japan returned Taiwan to the ROC, then-legitimate government representing the whole of China. When the ROC moved its central government to Taiwan in 1949, it faced a war-ravaged economy that was primarily agricultural in nature. When the ROC moved its central government to Taiwan in 1949, it faced a war-ravaged economy that was primarily agricultural in nature. Revitalizing Taiwan’s economy became an urgent task for the new government.\(^10\)

The United States heavily supported the ROC government’s civil war against the Chinese Communist Party before 1949. But later it ceased to support

8 Ibid.
10 Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan, Taiwan’s Political Economy: Meeting Challenges, Pursuing Progress (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2012), 10.

the ROC government in 1949. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. immediately saw Taiwan as a geographically invaluable strategic point. Subsequently, the U.S. sent massive economic and military aid to strength the ROC government on Taiwan and helped revitalize the war-ravaged Taiwanese economy. Between 1951 and 1965, the U.S. government sent over $4 billion to Taiwan in the form of grants, loans, and military equipment.\(^11\) Over the 1950s, the U.S. economic assistance equaled about 6% of Taiwan’s GDP and about 40% of its gross investment. The ROC government spent 38% of the aid on financing imports of immediate goods (mainly cotton, metals, and fertilizer), 30% on consumer goods (mainly food), and 19% on capital goods (machinery and tools). Without the U.S. assistance, Taiwan probably would not be able to go through the difficult 1950-1965 period.\(^12\)

At the same time, the ROC government realized the importance of agriculture for sustainable economic development. The agricultural sector played three key roles for Taiwan’s early economic development. First, it provided enough food to feed the population. Second, it provided an exportable surplus to earn foreign currencies, mainly the U.S. dollar. Third, it could release labor to the industrial sector once the government reformed the agricultural sector successfully.\(^13\) In the late 1940s, agriculture became the most important sector in Taiwan as it accounted for over 90% of its exports. Given the dominant role of agriculture, the government began to reform it in three stages from 1949. First, in early 1949 the government forced landlords to reduce farm rent, limiting it to a maximum 37.5% of total main crops. Second, in June 1951 the government distributed public land on easy terms to farmers. Third, in 1953 the government obligated landlords to keep a minimal size of their land and to sell the rest of their land to farmers who currently rented the land. Landlords could get shares and bonds in public enterprises for compensation. To ensure the government could extract surplus from the agricultural sector, the government monopolized fertilizer and sold fertilizer to farmers at inflated price.

13 Li, The Evolution, 39.
es. It also collected crops from farmers at depressed prices. The results of the agricultural reform were splendid. Agricultural production grew by 4.6% in the 1950s, and agriculture supplied the bulk of Taiwan’s exports for most of the 1950s.15

The government also took the issue of industrialization seriously. Given Taiwan’s lack of raw materials and its population then grew at over three percent a year, raising living standards required labor-intensive production.16 After reforming the agricultural sector, the government moved to promote the production of industrial and consumer goods. The basic goal of the import substitution policy was to develop domestic industries that could produce basic necessities to replace the dependence on imports. In Taiwan’s case, the government promoted cement, glass, fertilizer, textiles, and several others; only sugar, tea, canned pineapple, and rice was encouraged to export.17

Taiwan’s import substitution policy had three parts. First, the government identified promising investment opportunities. It then devised plans and invited private entrepreneurs to carry them out. To help private entrepreneurs get profits, the government arranged low-interest loans and foreign aids for them. Second, the government imposed tariffs and instituted quotas on a wide range of imports with the exception of raw materials and machinery. Luxury goods and goods already produced domestically could not be easily imported. Tariff rates were high; on average, tariff rates could range from 46% in January 1955 to 65% in August 1959. Third, the government instituted a strict foreign currency control for both public sector and private sector importers to buy raw materials and machinery at favorable prices from abroad. In 1958, it devaluated the buying rate of the New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) from NT$24.7 to $1 to NT$40.0 to $1, and it implemented multiple foreign exchange rates for different imports. Public sector importers had more favorable rates than private sector importers. No free market in foreign exchange was allowed, as all foreign currencies had to be turned into the central bank. These policies helped Taiwan’s entrepreneurs produce industrial and consumer goods so as to replace imports in the domestic market.18

From 1945 to the late 1950s, Taiwan’s economic performance was quite good. GDP grew 12% in 1952 and just over 9% in 1953 and 1954. It then declined over the next eight years, but the growth rate never declined below 5.5%. Manufacturing as part of GDP rose from 11% to 17%. Although agriculture as part of employment remained above 50%, the rate declined steadily.19 Overall, the above-mentioned policies helped Taiwan recover from World War Two and lay the foundation for subsequent years’ economic development.

1960s: Export Promotion Policy

In the early 1960s, Taiwan’s import substitution policy began to run out of steam as slow economic growth appeared and domestic market saturated with domestically produced industrial and consumer goods. The government needed to revise its policy to change Taiwan’s course of economic development. Under these circumstances, the government favored export promotion policy in the 1960s.

The government implemented four new policies for the export sector. First, it passed a list of acts to encourage investment in export and tax exemptions for exporters. In 1960, it enacted the Statute for the Encouragement of Investment to improve the export investment climate. The Statute provided significant tax exemptions for private exporters. For example, any incomes earned from exports were exempted from the income taxes, and producers were exempted from the payment of custom duties on imported machinery and equipment.20 Second, the government favorably treated export enterprises with import tax rebates. In essence, customs duties incurred when export enterprises imported raw materials from abroad. When export enterprises exported products, the government returned the duties collected. The

15 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 11.
16 Wade, Governing the Market, 77.
18 Ibid., 15-19.
19 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 12-13.
20 Li, The Evolution, 78-79.
amount of import tax rebates increased rapidly. In 1965, it was NT$1,795 million. In 1968, the figure rose to NT$4,234 million. Third, the government encouraged publicly-owned banks to provide low-interest loans to private exporters. The Bank of Taiwan started this program first. It had two different low-interest loan programs. The first one would require private exporters to pay loans back in local currency with higher interest rate, whereas the second one would require them to pay loans back in U.S. dollars with lower interest rate. In 1960, the interest rate for the local currency loan program was 11.8%, but the interest rate for the U.S. dollar loan program was 6%. From 1962 to 1966, the two interest rates gradually merged. In 1970, the government completely phased out the local currency loan. Fourth, the government set up three export processing zones from 1965 to 1971. These export processing zones lured domestic and foreign investors to invest in labor-intensive production. In the zones, exporters enjoyed simplified application process and could easily buy and remit foreign currencies. All products produced in the zones were exempted from taxes in the first place, rather than having to apply for rebates later. All products from the zones were exported to foreign countries, mainly the United States and Japan. These export processing zones were significant in terms of economic value. In 1969, Kaohsiung’s export processing zone exported products worth $177 million and employed about 40,000 workers.21

This export promotion policy resulted in a huge success. From 1962 to 1973, Taiwan’s economic size grew by 11% on average. Manufacturing as part of GDP rose from 17% in 1962 to 36% in 1973. In contrast, agriculture as part of GDP fell from 50% to 31% on average. Exports as part of GDP rose from 11% in 1962 to 42% in 1973. Industrial goods dominated Taiwan’s total exports, jumping from 50% to 85%. The industrial goods also changed from food processing and textiles to electronics, heavy chemicals, and machinery though they primarily involved assembly works. Overall, the export promotion policy helped Taiwan become an industrialized country.22

1970s to the late 1980s: Industrial Upgrading

Beginning from the early 1970s, Taiwan’s economy began to face a series of crises. In 1973 and 1974, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled oil prices. Since Taiwan imported most of its oil from the OPEC countries, the rising oil prices immediately affected its domestic economy. Taiwan’s GDP grew at only 1% in 1974, but it grew at an average of 10% per year over the past decade. Inflation rose from less than 2% between 1961 and 1971 to 40% in 1974. At the same time, Taiwan was getting marginalized in international community. More and more countries severed their diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and Taiwan lost its membership in the United Nations in 1971.23

Facing such grim external and internal situations, the ROC government did not feel frustrated but launched a series of big projects to reassert economic leadership and to offset its declining economic growth. First, the government raised interest rates and prices to tackle rising inflation. In 1974, secured loan rate was raised to 16.5%, whereas long-term deposit rate was raised to 15%. The prices of oil and other energy-related products were raised more; the government raised the prices of gasoline and electricity by 80%. In late 1974, the government reduced income taxes to stimulate the economy. These policies involved high-risks, but they successfully stabilized Taiwan’s economy. Within a few months, the rate of price increases began to fall.24

At the same time, the government took steps to accelerate the development of Taiwan’s heavy industry. In 1973, the government launched the Ten Major Development Projects at the cost of $5 billion.25 These projects included steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, and nuclear energy. Some projects were led by state corporations. For example, China Steel Corporation was set up with total capital investment of NT$ 36.9 billion, of which only NT$ 682 million came from the private sector.26 It was essentially a state-owned enterprise, and in the 1990s it became the third most efficient producer in the world.27 Some projects involved large domestic private enterprises and multinational corporations such as China Petroleum Corporation, a state-owned enterprise. The energy crisis of 1973 aggravated shortages that had already impacted domestic supplies of petrochem-

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22 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 15-16.
23 Wade, Governing the Market, 96.
24 Ibid., 97.
25 Cooper, Taiwan, 160.
27 Clark and Tan, Taiwan, 19.
icals. Consequently, China Petroleum Corporation built two large naphtha cracking plants. Each plant could produce 230,000 tons of ethylene annually. It then cooperated with private enterprises to build 20 midstream projects to produce synthetic fibers, intermediates for plastic products, rubber, and detergent materials. In 1974, capitals from private enterprises accounted for about 43% of China Petroleum Corporation’s total investment.28 On the one hand, Taiwan’s heavy industry policy provided a countercyclical stimulus to the sluggish economy. Yet this policy laid a foundation to upgrade labor-intensive production and supplied materials for domestic industries. It actually could be seen as a second import substitution policy. Both the public sector and the private sector played a role in implementing this second import substitution policy. Due to this policy, Taiwan’s heavy industry grew at a rate of 12.2% on average from 1977 to 1986. In contrast, its light industry grew at a rate of 7.8%. During the 1976-1978 period, the economic growth returned to double-digit growth.29

Moreover, another economically phenomenal success came from government assistance for Taiwan’s private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) because they innovated and upgraded Taiwan’s light industry to advance technology. Taiwan’s SMEs were the driving force during the export promotion policy of the 1960s, as their exports accounted for almost half of manufacturing production and two thirds of exports. They upgraded Taiwan’s light industries from textile and shoe production in the 1960s to low-tech electronics assembly in the early 1970s.30 The oil crisis of the 1970s accelerated their industrial upgrading, in which the government played a role. When the first oil crisis hit Taiwan in late 1973, Taiwan’s government realized that Taiwan had to change its economic structure and to quickly move from labor-intensive industry to capital or technology-intensive industry. In 1979, the government approved a science and technology plan. This plan listed many programs to help the SMEs develop high-tech industry. Most importantly, the plan called for the establishment of a special area for the SMEs and the government to work together to foster high-tech industry. In 1980, Hsinchu Science and Industrial Park (Park) was established. It was located near National Tsing Hua University, National Chiao Tung University, and several state-owned and private research and development (R&D) organizations. The Park brought the SMEs, the universities, and the R&D organizations together, and it encouraged Taiwanese who studied information technology abroad to come to invest or work in the Park. The Park can be regarded as a joint project between the government and the SMEs. The growth of the Park was very rapid. By the end of 1992, 140 companies invested in it, and it had an annual turnover of $3.5 billion.31 By May 2015, the Park had various high-tech industries ranging from integrated circuits and telecommunications to biotechnology.32

Late 1980s to Present: Economic Integration with Mainland China

The year 1988 was a significant point for Taiwan’s economy. Beginning from 1988, Taiwan’s GDP growth never sees double-digits. At the same time, Taiwan’s growing prosperity keeps driving up labor wages, which in turn increase production costs. To resolve the problem of rising production costs, more and more Taiwanese private enterprises move their assembly lines overseas. Since the 1980s, Mainland China embarks on economic reform to attract foreign investment. The opening of Mainland China gives Taiwanese private enterprises an opportunity to lower their production costs and become a new export destination. Mainland China is also attractive since both sides share the same culture and language.33

After the ROC government repealed martial law in Taiwan in 1988, exports to Mainland China by Taiwanese private enterprises rose sharply. In 1988, Taiwan exported products worth $1.2 billion to Mainland China, and they constituted only 2.8% of Taiwan’s total exports. In 1992, the figure rose to $10.548 billion, and Taiwan’s exports to Mainland China accounted for 12.95% of its total exports. In 2000, Taiwan exported products worth $25.01 billion to Mainland China, and they constituted 16.86%...
of Taiwan’s total exports. The latest figures show that the export volume jumped to $77.279 billion in 2014, and they constituted 26.1% of Taiwan’s total exports. Now Mainland China is Taiwan’s biggest trading country and largest export destination. At the same time, more and more Taiwanese companies invest in Mainland China. The flow of Taiwan’s investment to Mainland China grows rapidly. In 1991, Mainland China accounted for 9.5% of Taiwan’s outbound investment. In 1995, the figure rose to 44.6%. In 2000, the figure fell to 33.9%. These figures are misleading to some extent, because some Taiwanese private enterprisers never invest directly in Mainland China from Taiwan. Instead, they set up corporations or subsidiaries in other countries and send their foreign direct investment (FDI) to Mainland China through these corporations or subsidiaries. Therefore, Taiwan’s FDI in mainland China could possibly be larger than the figures released by the ROC government. Growing FDI is accompanied by more large-scaled and sophisticated investment. In the early 1990s, the nature of Taiwan’s investment in Mainland China mainly concentrated on labor-intensive production. Beginning from the twenty-first century, however, Taiwan’s FDI in Mainland China has upgraded to heavy industry and information technology. Now it is estimated that about 75% of Mainland China’s information technology exports come from factories owned by Taiwanese private enterprisers.

The ROC government initially did not support Taiwanese private enterprises to send their projects and FDI to Mainland China, so it implemented some policies to discourage them from doing so. In 1995, then-ROC president Lee Teng-hui realized that Taiwan was becoming economically dependent on Mainland China. He initiated a “Go South” policy to encourage Taiwan’s business community to look for trade and investment opportunities in Southeast Asia. He also issued a guideline, stating that no Taiwanese corporations should invest more than $50 million in Mainland China. The above FDI figures show, however, that Lee’s policies did not work well. More and more Taiwanese companies invest in Mainland China directly or through a third location. Realizing the ineffective government policies toward Mainland China, the ROC government adopted a new approach in 2008. The administration of President Ma Ying-jeou encouraged the cross-strait trade and investment. In June 2010, Taiwan and Mainland China signed a free trade agreement-like document called Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). During the first phase of implementation, as many as 539 Taiwanese exports (worth about $13.83 billion) to Mainland China could enjoy reduced tariff rate. The agreement also called for liberalization of more export and services in the years ahead. Overall, the ECFA could pave the way for Taiwanese private enterprises to get into the Mainland China market more easily, but it could also deepen Taiwan’s economic dependence on Mainland China.

Assessment
After many decades of economic growth, Taiwan’s economic structure has been transformed. The changes are evident in many aspects. In 1952, agriculture accounted for about 56% of total employment. In 1962, the figure fell to 50%. In 1973, the figure fell further to 31%. In 1987, the figure declined to 15%. In 2000, the figure finally dropped to 8%. While agriculture as part of total employment declined, exports as part of GDP rose. In 1952, exports accounted for 9% of Taiwan’s GDP. In 1973, the figure rose to 42%. In 2000, exports accounted for 47% of its GDP. Of the 47%, 99% were industrial exports. Now Taiwan is no longer an agriculture-based country but an industrial and export-oriented country.

At the same time, Taiwanese people could get benefits from the economic success. In 1952, Taiwan’s GDP per capita was $167. The figure rose steadily. In 1973, it was $695. In 1987, the
figure rose to $5,397.\textsuperscript{41} In 2012, the figure stood at $20,386.\textsuperscript{42} GPD per capita is not the only measurement to illustrate the improving living standard of Taiwanese people, because other measurements show similar results. The Gini Coefficient measures a country’s income distribution. If a country’s coefficient is bigger, that means the country has a serious income inequality.\textsuperscript{43} Over the years, Taiwan’s Gini Coefficient remains stable. In 1964, Taiwan’s Gini Coefficient was 0.321.\textsuperscript{44} In 2011, the figure was 0.342. Since the 0.4 level is used as a predictor for social instability and China’s Gini Coefficient stood at 0.477 in 2011, Taiwan has done well to shrink wealth gap.\textsuperscript{45} Another useful measurement is United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI measures a wide range of indicators – not economic growth alone – to assess a country’s overall development.\textsuperscript{46} Although Taiwan is not an UN member, it uses the HDI methodology to calculate its own HDI. Among 188 countries in the world, Taiwan ranked 21st in the HDI in 2014.\textsuperscript{47} Taiwan’s HDI score was as same as those of Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg, and its score was higher than that of Finland.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 13 and 21.


\textbf{Lessons for Developing Countries}

Developing countries hope that they could have high incomes and better living standard one day. They have tried many methods to achieve economic success. Beginning from the 1980s, developed countries give them a prescription called neo-liberal economics. The developed countries believe that governments should not intervene in economy. Instead, governments should cut taxes and state spending, privatize all state-owned enterprises, deregulate various industries, and allow foreign exchange rates to flow freely. A lot of developing countries take this prescription. After many years, however, they are still either developing or underdeveloped. They do not see any hope of transforming their worse economies. Taiwan’s economic experience can be an alternative model to neo-liberal economics, and the developing countries can replicate it or modify it for their own benefits. Generally, Taiwan’s economic success has three components.

First, the United States was, and still is, an important ally for Taiwan. When the ROC government just moved to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan’s economy was fragile. Thanks to the U.S. economic and military aid, Taiwan’s economy stabilized and Taiwan did not need to afraid of Mainland China’s military threat. When Taiwan was in the export promotion years, the United States provided a market for Taiwan’s exports. During the industrial upgrading years, many Taiwanese who studied information technology in the United States returned to Taiwan. Although the United States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, the United States still militarily protects Taiwan’s security. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship shows that a developing country who wishes to become a developed country needs a reliable ally. That ally needs to have resources to provide significant economic assistance and military assistance for the developing country. The developing country should use the assistance to finance government spending, trade deficit and military. Taiwan has such a reliable ally, and this ally played an important role in early Taiwan’s economic recovery and development.

Second, developing countries should reform their agriculture and use the surplus from agriculture to finance industrialization. A lot of developing countries are primarily agricultural countries. Their people work primarily in the agricultural sector, but their governments favor industrialization rather than agri-
culture. Taiwan’s agricultural reform is a good model for them. Taiwan managed to successfully reform its agriculture. During its agricultural reform years, Taiwan did not only have enough food to feed its population, but it also had extra food to export. The surplus gained from exporting agricultural produce became an important asset to finance Taiwan’s early industrial projects. Taiwan’s agricultural reform had another important aspect: released people from the agricultural sector and moved them to the industrial sector. When its agricultural sector was reformed successfully, Taiwan needed fewer people to work in its crop fields. People who previously worked in the crop fields then moved into cities to find jobs in the industrial sector. To become industrialized countries, developing countries need money. They can earn money from exporting their agricultural produce first. If they reform their agriculture successfully, their agricultural sector will become mature. People will then leave their crop fields and find jobs in the industrial sector. Overall, Taiwan’s agricultural reform shows that agriculture can provide developing countries finance and labor.

Third, developing countries should become export-oriented countries to gain U.S. dollars. Many development economists argue that an export-oriented country will create dependence on export destinations. If export destination countries become unstable or hostile to developing countries, developing countries’ economies will suffer. However, Taiwan’s export promotion policy shows that an export-oriented country can earn more money than an import institution country. Dependence on the United States was not a big problem as the United States was a reliable ally for Taiwan. Therefore, it is important that developing countries should find reliable and trustful allies as export destinations. Once developing countries accumulate enough U.S. dollars through exportation, they will have enough financial resources to upgrade their industries. The newly-upgraded industries will help them export products worth of more values at a later time.

Conclusion

Taiwan’s economic success is remarkable. Taiwan has managed to change its position on the international division of labor, and it has successfully changed its economic structure from agriculture-based economy to knowledge and technology-based economy. During the past decades, state intervention played a key role in initiating, sustaining, and transforming Taiwan’s economy. At the same time, Taiwan has managed to improve its people’s living standards and to distribute incomes fairly and equally. Taiwan’s economic success totally contradicts neo-liberal economics, which advocates no state intervention. In the years ahead, Taiwan’s economy will face a significant problem: its growing economic integration with Mainland China. Unlike the United States, Taiwan does not view Mainland China as a reliable ally because Mainland China still views Taiwan as a renegade province. Now Taiwan’s economy heavily relies on Mainland China. If the relationship across the Taiwan Strait deteriorates, Taiwan’s economy will suffer. The ROC government must seriously handle the issue of Mainland China. Taiwan is a vibrant economy, and it will continue to be so. Overall, Taiwan’s economic success is a model for developing countries.

Author Biography

Ka Chio will graduate with a Master of Arts in Political Science from San Francisco State University in summer 2017. His areas of specialization include international politics, comparative politics, and modern Chinese history. His research interests focus on foreign policy analysis, political economy, democratization, and governance, especially with reference to the Greater China Region (Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Russia. He will complete his thesis on Sino-Russian relations in this summer. He plans to obtain a J.D. and a Ph.D. and return to S.F. State University as a faculty in future.

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Migration in Central America

Central America has been facing corruption, violence, and economic and dependency issues for many years. Many Central American migrants are fleeing their home countries and everything they know simply in order to survive and allow their children to survive. However, the path to safety is much darker and more challenging than people assume. This paper will analyze and explain why migration from Central America into the United States has increased so rapidly and question why this issue is not being globally recognized as a refugee crisis. Governments are failing to recognize this topic as a refugee crisis simply because they are acting on their own state interests.

Little action has been done to help ease the situation. However, the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in the United States created a “border rush” of Salvadorians who sought refugee in Canada to avoid deportation, which then forced Canada to redesign its refugee determination system.¹ The Mexican government has been rather harsh towards migrants from the south attempting to make their way to the United States. Joe Biden recently stated that, “The economies of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras remain bogged down as the rest of the Americas surge forward. Inadequate education, institutional corruption, rampant crime and a lack of investment are holding these countries back. Six million young Central Americans are to enter the labor force in the next decade. If an opportunity isn’t there for them, the entire Western Hemisphere will feel the consequences”.² As a result, President Obama requested $1 billion from Congress as an attempt to help Central America’s leaders make the difficult reforms and investments required to address the region’s interlocking security, governance, and economic challenges.³ This amount of aid is approximately three times what the United States generally has provided to Central America in the past.

Major causes of the migration crisis include unsafe living situations in Central America, increasing amounts of drug trafficking, and rising murder rates, which results in people searching for a safer place to live and raise their families. According to The Guardian, the murder rate in El Salvador alone increased by 70 percent last year (2015). Refugee advocates have been organizing petitions, rallies, and demonstrations in an attempt to gain attention and call for help.⁴ However, Central American refugees continue to rank low in domestic political agendas for the United States. This paper will outline different views on the issues of migration, compare the Central American migration crisis to the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as discuss migration.

¹ García, María Cristina, Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada (Berkeley: U of California, 2006).
³ AFP, “Obama to request $1 billion from Congress to help Central America.” The Tico Times, 2015.
as a human rights issue.

Literature Review

People migrate for many reasons, such as economic, political, environmental factors, or to join a family member. Economic migration is the movement of people from one country to another to benefit from greater economic opportunities.\(^5\) It is often assumed that such migration primarily occurs between less economically developed countries, as well as to the more economically developed countries and from former colonies to the country that was the imperial power. Political factors include that people are forced to migrate because of war, state policies that discriminate against particular groups of citizens and people who oppose those in power. These people are unable to return home because they have fears of being persecuted and are unlikely to receive any protection from their government. Environmental migrants are people who are forced to migrate from or flee their home region due to sudden or long-term changes to their local environment, which adversely affects their welfare or livelihood. This form of migration refers to members of a family coming to join one of their relatives who is residing in another country. This commonly includes fiancé(e)s, (proposed) civil partners, spouses, or unmarried same-sex partners, dependent children and elderly relatives.

Maria Cristina García, a historian and Andrew Carnegie Fellow, describes how the political upheaval in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala has taken a devastating human toll in recent years.\(^6\) Many Central Americans have traveled north from their home countries to escape war and search for safety. García focuses on the period of time between 1974 and 1996 in which over two million of the people who fled Central America settled in Mexico, the United States, and Canada. García tells the story of migration and how domestic and foreign-policy interests shaped the asylum policies of Mexico, the United States, and Canada. She describes the experiences of the individuals and non-governmental organizations that responded to the refugee crisis and worked within and across borders to shape refugee policy. García also addresses the legacies of the Central American refugee crisis, especially recent attempts to coordinate a regional response to the unique problems presented by immigrants. He also focuses on refugees and the challenges of coordinating such a regional response in the post-9/11 era.\(^7\)

Many refugees enter Mexico as either a safe haven or a place to pass through on their way to salvation. Mexico had offered protection and safety to people seeking a place where they can feel safe and be treated humanely. According to García, “In the twentieth century, over two hundred thousand people fleeing persecution sought refuge in Mexico.”\(^8\) This suggests that Mexico was a welcoming host to these clandestine people. According to New York Times author, Sonia Nazario, Mexico’s treatment contradicts with the United States’ plan. The two countries have come up with an agreement to keep the Central American people out of the United States by not letting them pass through Mexico.\(^9\) According to Christopher Galeano, who spent time in Mexico investigating what was happening to human rights groups there, “[t]he U.S. government is sponsoring the hunting of migrants in Mexico to prevent them from reaching the U.S. It is forcing them to go back to El Salvador, Honduras, to their deaths.”\(^10\)

The ideas presented by Nazario and García do not complement each other. It appears as though Mexico is abandoning their moral approach to this issue due to fulfilling the desires and promoting what is in the best interest of the United States. This is a bold move on Mexico’s part; because instead of partnering with their Latino neighbors, they are siding with their North American neighbors. This is taking a strong stance and clearly shows whom their allies are.

Even though the Mexican government has chosen not to assist these refugees, and is even taking actions to get rid of them, there are citizens and non-governmental organizations who are taking action to do what they believe is just. García talks about how around the year 1990, “[a] few thousand Nicaraguans were believed to be living and working without documentation in Mexico, particularly in Mexico City, relying on church groups and their network of family and friends for assistance” (Gar-

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\(^6\) García, María Cristina, Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada (Berkeley: U of California, 2006).

\(^7\) Ibid.

\(^8\) Ibid.


\(^10\) Ibid.
cia, 47). This parallels to Transnational Advocacy Networks. Groups such as church groups can work across nations by uniting people who have a similar set of values and who have a benevolent nature. Solidarity networks are groups of people who get together to try to obtain what is best for the public and have humans best interests in when working to help the accommodation of misplaced people.

The United States of America loves to hold the image that they are the country where a “nobody” can turn into “somebody”. The United States boasts the idea of the American Dream. This impression lures in immigrants who are desperate for a shot at success. Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s novel, One Hundred Years of Solitude, touches upon the idea of how depressing it can be to realize that your life will be stagnant. The habitants of Macondo, the specific town discussed in the novel, are stuck in this community. They see another group called the Melquiades represent this freely moving successful human while they are confined by their place of residence. One officer in the book explains that, “Bad luck doesn’t have any chinks in it,” he said with deep bitterness. “I was born a son of a bitch and I’m going to die a son of a bitch.”11 This reflects the sentiments of many people who feel trapped in a situation but end up staying lamentably put or take the risk to make a change. This change could be crossing the frontier into the United States of America.

Core Analysis - Theoretical Approaches to Immigration

From a Realist perspective, the overflow of immigrants from Central America is an absolute crisis because the migration issues threaten the security of the United States. In the past, migratory movements have been highly organized. For example, in 1946 Italy and Belgium signed an agreement, which guaranteed a possible recruitment of 2,000 Italian immigrants to Belgium per week.12 The Federal Republic of Germany then established the ‘guestworker’ system in the post-war era.13 By 1973, 2.6 million immigrants had gone to Germany. Recruitment was based on granting annual contracts to prospective immigrants and on the system of ‘rotation.’14 This constant rotation of foreign workers minimized the ability of the workers to put down roots in Germany and at the same time assured German capital of a flexible labor supply, which could be recovered during a recession. By admitting only single workers rather than families, social support costs for families were avoided. Additionally, by returning the workers to their home countries through the rotation policy, no costs of non-productive old age were required.15

A Liberal approach to migration, however, would argue that because we live in a world of anarchy, we should not pick up conflict and war but rather think differently and take a different approach to addressing the situation. Individual rights, democracy and limitations on the powers of the state are emphasized. Within Liberalism, migrants should have more rights and especially have the right to safety. The Liberal view focuses greatly on migration as a human rights issue.

The Feminist perspective is the viewpoint that all humans should be treated as equals, regardless of gender. This also can be viewed in the topic of migration, as all humans should be treated as equals regardless of nationality. There are certain morals that humane beings should share when dealing with the condition of their fellow beings. Nobody deserves to be treated as less-than another, regardless of gender or nationality. Women who are migrants or refugees face different struggles than male migrants. For example, the female is usually expected to care for the children and elderly while also providing an income. Women are also often more subject to sexual assault, harassment and violence, causing them to live in a constant state of fear.16 From a Feminist perspective, the migration crisis is a major violation of human rights.

The migrants fleeing war zones and other life-threatening situations in Central America should be considered refugees and be allotted refugee status. However, this is not the case. The United States has been very strict in titling migrants as refugees. Fem-

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11 Marquez, Gabriel Garcia. One Hundred Years of Solitude. (Editorial Sudamericanos, 1967).
13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Weiss, Julia. “Female refugees face physical assault, exploitation and sexual harassment on their journey through Europe.” Al Jazeera, January 18, 2016.
inists would also argue that not only the woman migrants, but rather all of migrants, including children and men need political, social and economic equality.

Post-structuralism plays an important role in the issue of migration. Post-structuralism strives to give voice to the people who are powerless, such as migrants. This theory emphasizes that in order to understand world views, it is necessary to study both the object itself and the systems of knowledge that produce the object. In this particular case, understanding migration requires not only the study of migration but the various causes of it that shape the different aspects of the lives of migrants. It also includes the structures and economies of the countries that are affected by it.

**Comparing Central American Migration Crisis to Syrian Refugee Crisis**

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over 3 million have fled to Syria’s immediate neighbors Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, while 6.5 million remain internally displaced within Syria. The Syrian refugee crisis was initially triggered by the nature of the Syrian Civil War. Citizens are fleeing or have fled because they have given up hope for their country. According to Patrick Kingsley from The Guardian, “Europe is an increasingly attractive option for Syrians since they have no secure legal status in the countries where they now live.”

In the Middle East, it is now almost impossible for Syrians to gain legal entrance to the neighboring Arab countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Kingsley points out, “The vast majority do not have the right to work; none of them are formally recognized as refugees; and many of their children are not in school. Some 400,000 Syrian children have fallen outside the education system, according to Turkish officials.”

At this point, it seems that the majority of Syrians have lost all hope in their country and see no reason in staying in their homeland. Many Syrians are able to gain refugee status once they leave their homeland in search of safety and security. Although the Syrian refugee crisis truly is a crisis, these people fleeing their homes are almost immediately labeled as “refugees,” so why are Syrians fleeing danger awarded refugee status but Central Americans in similar and legitimate predicaments not? According to the International Crisis Group, “The refugee question remains at the heart of politics, a recurrent source of passionate debate and occasional trigger of violence.”

Central American migrants are facing very similar circumstances as many Syrians and refugees fleeing the Middle East. In a working paper discussing refugees and the peace process, Elia Zureik of the Institute for Palestine Studies explains:

Analysis of (voluntary) migration tends to focus on individuals rather than groups. To the extent that groups are considered, they are treated as aggregates of individuals rather than as cohesive social units in the sociological sense of constituting communities with shared common historical experiences (Shami 1993). In contrast with immigrant status, refugee status is the outcome of involuntary forms of migration, in which displacement is often caused by events beyond the control of refugees, such as internal and external wars, state policies of expulsion and exclusion, development projects, and natural disasters.

Through this explanation, one can justify that the Central American “migrants” perfectly fit the mold of what a “refugee” is. However, the Central Americans are still fleeing their countries continue to be labeled as migrants rather than refugees, despite their struggles in finding new places to settle and call home. It seems that the main distinction made between the Central Americans and Syrians is that the Syrians are fleeing to countries willing to help them and are doing all that they can to open their doors as wide as possible in providing a safe and secure refuge for those fleeing danger. However, in the case of Central Americans it is more difficult to find a safe place to flee to. Many Central Americans see the north as their only option due to the Darién Gap, which is the break in the Pan-American Highway consisting of a large area of undeveloped swampland and forest be-

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18 Ibid.
tween Panama and Colombia. The Darién Gap makes it impossible for people or cars to pass between Panama and Colombia. This leaves transportation via boat or flight as the only options between Central and South America.

Thus, migrating north has consistently proven to be a much more attractive option for Central American migrants. However, this theme of migrating north has contributed to the issue of the lack of refugee status given to the migrants. The issue of refuge is not being recognized as widely or openly as the Syrian refugee crisis because the United States is not prepared or willing to help the Central Americans. As the United States policy on Central Americans gaining refugee status is now, according to Susan Martin, an international migration professor at Georgetown University and the author of several books on humanitarian crises, “[Migrants] would have to prove they fear persecution on the basis of their race, religion, nationality, political perspectives or membership in a particular social group.” Current United States policy on Central Americans gaining refugee status makes it very difficult for migrants to gain asylum. In addition to the difficulties of even getting to the United States border, the U.S. is funding the Mexican border control to stop refugees and send them home before they can make it to the U.S. border.

These migrants often times do not have the funds or resources to escape the dangerous situations that they face in their home countries. Those who are truly facing fear and have their lives threatened by gang violence still find it almost impossible to prove and legitimize this fear and/or life threatening circumstance to the United States government. However, even for those who are able to prove their need for asylum, it is not always enough. Martin states, “Violent threats, the type many have apparently told U.N. workers they face from drug cartels and gangs at home aren’t always enough to qualify for asylum, immigration legal scholars and humanitarian aid workers said.”

Reasons for Migration

People migrate for many reasons, from seeking new job opportunities to seeking a safer environment or different government, or even out of simple curiosity of a new lifestyle. However, migration out of Central America and into North America has become so prominent that it clearly needs to be classified as a crisis. The table on the next page illustrates a trend in migration.

As shown below, migration was very low in the 1960s and up until the 2000s increased at a stable rate. However, between 2000 and 2009, the migration rate absolutely skyrocketed. The number of migrants leaving Guatemala alone nearly doubled in those nine years. Other countries that showed an abnormally high increase of citizens fleeing include El Salvador and Honduras. Nicaragua saw the biggest loss of citizens in the 1980s and 1990s due to the Sandinista Revolution (1974-1979) and the Contra War (1979-1990). While some Central American countries show obvious trends of migration, others demonstrate a steady pace of population density. For example, Belize, Panama and Costa Rica show no obvious trends of time periods with many citizens leaving and migrating. These three countries have had no serious wars or specific times of danger and insecurity for their citizens. It is apparent that there is strong reason behind the unusually high number of citizens fleeing Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

In the path to leave their homeland, migrants are forced to pass through Mexico, which is becoming a more difficult journey every day. According to Garcia:

By the end of 2002, Mexico deported over three thousand Central Americans each week. One critic of Mexico’s new policies explained the post-9/11 era: ‘Anyone with any brains can see that Mexican foreign policy, with regards to migratory issues, tries to accommodate the United States and do its dirty work. . . . Mexico has placed the tortilla curtain not at the Rio Grande but at its border with Guatemala to impede the entry of migrants from Central America and the rest of the world.”

23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 García, Maria Cristina, Seeking Refuge: Central American
It is devastating that these migrants are leaving life-threatening situations in search of safety but are more often than not forced to continually face danger in the journey to safety. The journey was not always this difficult, according to Payan:

From 1848 to 1929, Mexicans crossed the border freely. In this period, it was not illegal to cross the border without papers. It sufficed to declare one’s citizenship, if there was anyone even guarding the point of entry (POE). The immigration acts prior to 1929 included provisions that allowed Mexicans to cross without papers. These acts were designed to exclude persons of nationalities other than Mexican—some actively targeted Asians, particularly the Chinese. But the 1929 Immigration Act made it illegal to cross the border from Mexico without papers. This was, in some ways, a response to the economic hardship of the 1920s. With this Act, open immigration was drastically curtailed.27

It is apparent that overall, immigration laws and regulations have always been closely tied to economic reasoning. In the case of Central American migration, migrants are not being recognized as refugees because obtaining the status of a refugee would entail the United States to offer more support and money. Currently, it seems as though the United States cares more about funding the Mexican government and Mexican military to do whatever they can to stop the migrants from reaching the United States border. Therefore, the United States is ignoring this human rights issue just so that they do not have to deal with it. The Syrian refugee crisis is being recognized because numerous countries are working together to offer all that they can to give the Syrian refugees access to safety and liberty. In contrast, the United States is not concerned with the hardships currently being faced in Central America and is putting more effort and money into hiding the problem and pushing the migrants away then actually dealing with it and helping these people struggling for their lives to find safety.

Central American Immigrants by Country of Origin, 1960 to 2009

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Sourced from: (http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states-0)
it displaces women, children, and families, putting people in very vulnerable and dangerous situations. Migration and migrants are increasingly the focus of human rights discussions. Yet the gap between policy and protection remains wide. According to Stefanie Grant from the Migration Policy Institute:

A migrant’s human rights are largely defined by the migration “category” to which he or she belongs, and by the reasons underlying that migration. At one end of the human rights/migration spectrum are voluntary migrants, including migrant workers and other economic migrants. At the other end, more than 10 million refugees are forced to leave their countries to escape persecution.28

As Grant explains, categorizing migrants can be a very difficult process. There are currently such a large number of people seeking asylum from dangerous circumstances that it can be almost impossible to compare every individual’s situation to one another and create a fair and even system to deal with these issues. The United States has offered asylum to a relatively small number of Central American migrants, which has allowed them to lead safer lives and given more a sense of security. There are still thousands of migrants being displaced from their families every day, feeling helpless and desperate, subsequently falling victim to many human rights issues.29

Dealing with human rights issues and violations is currently not of high priority of importance for the United States. It appears that human rights issues do not pose as a threat to the welfare of the United States, therefore it is of little concern to the U.S. government. If there is ever to be a change in the Central American migration issue the United States needs to change its outlook on the situation. This issue of migration and human rights violations can be resolved by creating a safer and more humane environment for the people of Central America.

Conclusion
Overall, Central America has been facing a long-time struggle for independence from the United States. Along the way, this struggle has been accompanied by governmental corruption, violence, and economic dependency. In recent years, migration from Central America into the United States has increased more rapidly than ever before. This issue has not yet been recognized globally as a refugee crisis due to the responsibility and investment that comes along with such a serious label. The United States actively chooses to push away and hide the issue of Central American migration rather than openly deal with and resolve it. If the Central American migration crisis were to be globally recognized as a refugee crisis, the United States would be deemed the responsible party to aid the region of Central America into safety.

Central American migrants fleeing violence and life-threatening situations, specifically in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, should be deemed as refugees. They often face no choice but to flee their home country or be subject to persecution stemming from recent instability in those countries’ governments and abnormally high rates of gang violence. This issue of migration truly is a human rights issue. It is continually failing to be recognized as a human rights issues due to the amount of responsibility that would be placed on the United States to make for safer circumstances for refugees. Governments are failing to recognize this topic as a refugee crisis simply because they are acting on their own state interests.

Author Biography
Christina English is a senior at San Francisco State University, studying International Relations and Spanish. She has taken a number of Latino Studies classes and is fascinated by Central American migration patterns and tendencies. In 2016, she spent two months backpacking Central America to immerse herself and strengthen her knowledge of the region. This paper will discuss her findings on Central American migration.

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29 Ibid.


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This paper looks to assert that the development of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear program delineates a posture of offensive realism in response to specific historical context that has left them with no alternative other than to maximize their military capability in order to preserve the survival of their state. Despite having been a signatory to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, North Korea has aggressively pursued the development of their own domestic nuclear weapons program as a means of refusing to allow the global power structure to limit how much power their state can attain. Global response of condemnation through international sanctions toward the North Korean regime has only increased the resolve in their perceived validity in the need to develop nuclear weaponry as a means of deterrence. Although their nuclear program is still relatively in its infancy, the rhetoric streaming through state-run propaganda clearly demonstrates that the program is being developed as tool for elevating its stature within the global power structure, while also being outwardly focused in providing deterrence from foreign intervention by what it perceives to be external security threats.

Since signing the armistice in 1953, North Korea has built the status of their regime by basing it upon a hyper-militaristic mentality. This is very likely because since its inception, North Korea has found itself locked into an emerging bipolar security structure, with one of the superpowers stationed on its border that directly threatening the survival of their state with both superior conventional and nuclear means. This was a major motivating factor that convinced North Korea that it required its own nuclear weapons program to bolster a significant deterrence to redress this ongoing security anxiety. There is a building of historical context that would only continue to construct a perception in North Korea that it cannot rely on outside institutions or treaties to provide a permanent means of security; that only a continual stride towards manufacturing an elaborate militaristic infrastructure could create enough of a deterrence to ensure the survival of their state. At a glance, this could

appear as though the situation in North Korea does give some legitimacy to defensive realist stand point, because it has caused an international reaction to try and prevent North Korea’s ascent to a more powerful position in the global security structure. But the fact that global efforts have little effect in preventing North Korea from attempting to maximize their own military capacity through nuclear weaponry, coupled with the rhetoric being broadcasted by North Korean propaganda, ultimately depicts a state that sees itself more as a major competitor in an offensive realist race to the top of the global power structure.

**Literature Review**

All realists believe that power is the currency of international politics, but the divide between classical realism and structural realism resides in the explanation of why states seek power. Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau believed the drive behind states seeking power was human nature; that all humans seek a path to generate more power. Structural realists disagree; they do not consider human nature as a critical motivator for why states want power, instead they see it as the architecture of the international system that pushes states to compete for power. Offensive realist John Mearsheimer would describe the global structure as “a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other.”

This is because states never fully know the genuine intentions of other states within the structure. It is this uncertainty that drives states to bolster their own military capabilities to establish a formal deterrence in order to ensure their own survival. It is impossible to predict if a state is actively seeking to alter the current balance of power by acting as a revisionist state as a way to improve its own standing within the global power structure, or to preserve the balance of power as a status quo state.

The ultimate goal and concern of a state is its own survival. Maintaining territorial borders and sovereignty is the first priority in the hierarchy of goals that states can pursue. States are rational actors that understand that they exist in a system of self-help, which necessitates devising strategies and building the material means to ensure their own survival. The distrust among states leave them pre-occupied with establishing enough military power to act as a deterrence toward other states, and forces states to constantly look for ways to shift the balance of power in their favor. The constant competition among states also invites the security dilemma, where the steps of one state takes vying to gain more power and enhance its standing within the global power structure, does so at the expense of other relative states. Since the competition for power exists as a zero-sum game, it is difficult for states to gain more power without threatening the security of other states.

Offensive and defensive realists have different perspectives regarding how much power is enough to establish an effective deterrence to ensure a state’s security. Offensive realists, like John Mearsheimer, believe that states should attempt to gain additional power at every feasible opportunity by any means possible, and in maximizing their own power, states will enhance their standing within the global power structure. According to the offensive realist perspective, these states will eventually move into a position where they may be able to pursue hegemony, which would ultimately ensure their own security.

Defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz, however, agree that there are many incentives for states to incrementally gain additional power, but that states should only strive for an appropriate amount of power relative to their closest competition. Defensive realists argue that overexpansion will cause balancing to occur when a state becomes too powerful; where a coalition of states will form to prevent an aspiring hegemon’s ascent to becoming a dominating global power.

**Core Analysis**

**The Origins of North Korea’s Nuclear Program**

In 1956, the Soviet Union began assisting North Korea in establishing its own nuclear program and started the construction of a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in Yongbyon. Then in 1959, the Soviet Union and North Korea signed a nuclear cooperation agreement which signaled an increase in nuclear technical knowledge that being was provided by the Soviet

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3 Ibid., 61.


5 Ibid., 80.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 81.
Union.\(^8\) During this time North Korea was also able to maintain a near parity with the conventional military capacity of South Korea throughout the 1960s, where it was able to balance the perspective power of its adversary through conventional weaponry.\(^9\) But when the Sino-Soviet split grew more pervasive, North Korea’s external support for its conventional military began to wane as its relationship with its benefactors became more complicated.\(^10\) By the early 1970’s, North Korea’s ability to maintain a balance of power on the Korean peninsula through conventional means quickly began to erode, while South Korea’s military capabilities had continued to advance technologically while being fueled by a growing economy. Meanwhile, South Korea also benefited immensely from the additional security afforded by the presence of the United States military that had also deployed nuclear armaments on South Korean soil, which at its peak amounted up to 950 warheads of various sizes and delivery systems.\(^11\)

In 1972, a diplomatic resolution was sought by both North and South Korea when they issued a joint statement in garnering a peaceful process towards reunification, but this was eventually abandoned the following year as little to no progress had been made. These factors all had an accumulated effect on driving North Korea to focus increasingly on developing its own domestic nuclear weapons program, but such requests were routinely denied by both countries. During this time, North Korea also began to independently start modernizing the IRT-2M research reactor that the Soviets had provided them. Simultaneously, North Korea also initiated construction of an indigenous copy of a British 5 mega-watt electric, gas cooled, graphite moderated reactor at the Yongbyon site in order to begin producing plutonium. This is a significant milestone where you can start seeing the intentions for the North Korean nuclear program. It would allow them to continue their nuclear ambitions under the pretense of a peaceful research facility, but also theoretically allowed them to start producing enough weapons-grade plutonium separated from the uranium fuel rods to manufacture one nuclear bomb a year.\(^12\) This demonstrates that the direction of North Korea’s nuclear program had always focused towards building a nuclear arsenal; because this specific size and style of reactor does not produce a tremendous amount of energy, but it is ideal for nations with limited nuclear infrastructure who are pursuing nuclear weapons development.\(^13\)

### International Attention and Scrutiny

After the United States discovered the reactor was operational, they began pressuring the Soviet Union to join the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. Only after conjoined pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union did North Korea finally accede to signing the treaty in 1985. Almost immediately it started becoming apparent that North Korea had very little intention of abiding by the conditions set forth


by the NPT. One significant stipulation of the treaty requires members to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect all plants containing nuclear material within 18 months of becoming a signatory. North Korea waited the entire 18 months before informing the IAEA that they had sent the wrong forms pertaining to the inspections. The IAEA responded by sending the correct forms and granting North Korea an additional 18 months to complete them; meanwhile North Korea’s nuclear reactors remained operational, and they were able to separate enough weapons-grade plutonium from their nuclear fuel rods to constitute one or two nuclear bombs. North Korea did not fully abide by the safeguards as outlined by the NPT until 1992.

When IAEA inspectors were finally granted access to North Korean facilities in 1992, they took numerous samples to measure the radioactive isotopes of the separated plutonium, and confirmed that North Korea must have separated weapons-grade plutonium from their fuel rods on at least three separate occasions. Then in 1993, when the IAEA were going to make another round of inspections, they were restricted from accessing two specific installations that they had visited the year before. North Korea cited that they were no longer associated with the nuclear program, and declared they were now military installations, and thus refused to permit access to either site.

North Korea’s refusal was cause for alarm for the IAEA who demanded a special inspection, which explicitly pertains to sites where it is suspected that fissile materials have been deliberately hidden. North Korea’s response was to remove the IAEA inspectors from their country, and become the first and only nation to have ever withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. This particular event is significant, because it illustrates the mindset North Korea has in regards to its nuclear program. It is explicitly directed towards weapons development, and demonstrates that they will remain driven to this pursuit even in the face of global condemnation.

### Ballistic Missile Development

In parallel with their nuclear program, North Korea has also made strides in peripheral industries such as their ballistic missile program. North Korea originally started with reverse-engineering Soviet era Scud-B missiles that they obtained from Egypt, creating a domestic version called the Hwasong-5. Throughout the 1980s North Korea became one of the leading exporters of not only ballistic missiles, but also missile components and technology as well. By 1990, North Korea had reverse-engineered several different Scud missile designs, which could carry a larger payload, and had successfully extended the potential reach of North Korean missiles.

In 1992, Pakistan signaled to North Korea that it was interested in acquiring missile technology to help bolster its own nuclear weapons program. At the time, Pakistan was experiencing a widening imbalance of air superiority with India after an order of F-16 aircraft from the United States had stalled. As an alternative, Pakistan began seeking an effective long range missile platform in which it could use as a nuclear delivery system. It is important to note that although Pakistan’s own nuclear program started around the same time as North Korea’s, its nuclear program was much more sophisticated. This is primarily due to the efforts of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a scientist who had previously worked for the nuclear program in the Netherlands; there he was working as a Dutch translator transcribing documents from German to Dutch. In 1974, he was given a highly classified document detailing a sophisticated breakthrough in centrifuge technology used for enriching uranium. In an act of espionage, Dr. Kahn smuggled the information back to revolutionize Pakistan’s own nuclear program. This is significant because when Pakistan was brokering a deal with North Korea to purchase ballistic missile designs, Dr. Kahn had an explicit role in the negotiations that would result in bartering nuclear information pertaining to sophisticated uranium enrichment. This collaboration was

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15 Ibid.
a watershed moment for North Korea’s own nuclear program; the exchange of ballistic missile designs for modern uranium enrichment centrifuges and expertise became a defining moment in the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

The 1994 Agreed Framework

Bolstered by the acquisition of new centrifuges, North Korea immediately set out to covertly begin construction on a 50 MWe facility in Yongbyon, and a 200 MWe facility in Taechon. Soon after breaking ground, construction was quickly halted when the two new sites were discovered by the United States; which would usher in a second round of negotiations in another effort to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. The 1994 Agreed Framework would see North Korea’s current reactors which could produce-weapons grade plutonium be shutdown, they would then be replaced by two 1000 MWe light water reactors which could not produce weapons-grade material. The agreement also stipulated that the United States would relax sanctions levied against North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act, and formal assurances that the United States would not pose a military threat through either conventional or nuclear force. In exchange, North Korea would once again grant access for IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities.19

The negotiations behind the Agreed Framework did halt the further development of North Korea’s program for some time; however bilateral talks became strained in 1998 when North Korea tested an ICBM platform under the guise of putting the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 satellite into space.20 The talks deteriorated altogether after Secretary of State James Kelly accused North Korea of having a clandestine uranium enrichment program in 2002. This ultimately led to the complete breakdown of the agreement, which was subsequently followed by President Bush declaring North Korea as part of the Axis of Evil. The relations between the two countries became outright hostile after the Los Angeles Times and New York Times obtained copies of the United States Nuclear Posture Review in 2002; releasing excerpts which explicitly stated that the United States included North Korea in a list of potential targets worthy of a preeminent nuclear strike if deemed necessary.21 This was ultimately the deciding factor that led North Korea to resume their nuclear weapons program; and in 2003 North Korean ambassador Ri Yong Ho publicly declared to Reuters that “North Korea possesses a workable nuclear device.”22

First Successful Nuclear Test

In 2006, North Korea detonated its first nuclear bomb in an underground facility near the town of P’unggey, afterwards stating that their “nuclear test was entirely attributable to the US nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure,” adding that North Korea “was compelled to substantially prove its possession of nukes to protect its sovereignty.”23 This is significant because it vocalizes North Korea’s perception of needing to maximize their power through nuclear weapons as the only means of deterrence towards having the world’s sole superpower stationed along their border, one that has historically and currently threatened their state with the use of nuclear weapons.

International Response

The international reaction to the successful nuclear test was to condemn the actions of North Korea and introduce a new round of sanctions through imposing U.N. Resolution 1718. These sanctions required North Korea to “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile,” “return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safe-


23 Ibid.
guards,” “suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching,” and “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.”

24 North Korea’s UN envoy, Pak Gil Son, rejected the resolution as “unjustifiable.”

25 He believed that the UN Security Council passed the resolution without considering the context in which North Korea was pursuing a nuclear weapons program; that it did not consider the pressure that the United States was exerting on North Korea was an affront to their own state security. The resolution also served to reinforce the North Korean suspicions that it could not rely on international institutions in order to relieve their own national security concerns.

Throughout 2007, the Six Party Talks was met with a mix of intermittent concessions as well as stonewalling. While there was plenty of dialogue between the parties involved, there were too many disagreements over the steps and time frames being demanded of North Korea to suspend operations at its Yongbyon 5 MWe facility. There was also a lack of consensus over what amount of compensation would be appropriate to persuade North Korea to shut down its reactor. Although there were small sporadic breakthroughs, most of the negotiations became fairly convoluted as each party placed their own immediate priorities above creating a unified and cohesive direction in the denuclearization of North Korea in manner that would provide a compromise with the demands and concerns of all the parties involved. Eventually, a small point of progress emerged when it was agreed that North Korea would partially disable its reactor and declare its full inventory of weapons-grade plutonium, and in return would receive one million tons of heavy fuel oil as well as $25 million in assets which had been frozen through international sanctions.


Satellites and Nuclear Tests

After North Korea claimed to have held up its own end of the bargain, the United States, Japan, and South Korea began to alter the terms of the agreement as they accused North Korea of providing an incomplete list of all the weapons grade plutonium they had produced. In protest of not fulfilling the concessions that were agreed upon in 2007, North Korea launched a modified version of its three-stage Taepodong-2 ICBM, claiming it was a peaceful attempt to put a satellite into orbit. The UN formally condemned the missile launch as a violation of the Security Council Resolution 1718, and introduced a new round of sanctions in the form of Security Council Resolution 1874. This new resolution further enhanced financial restrictions, and called for an even more comprehensive embargo of weapons and weapon technology to the country. The introduction of further sanctions evoked North Korea to respond by completely withdrawing from the Six Party Talks process, and removing the IAEA inspectors once again while proclaiming it will resume separating plutonium. One month later, North Korea conducted its second successful underground nuclear test with an estimated yield of around 4 kilotons. This only validated earlier suspicions that North Korea had not actually declared their entire plutonium stockpiles as required by agreements made during the Six Party Talks, and perhaps raised concerns over whether any amount of carrots or sticks could deviate North Korea from its nuclear weapons program.

In 2010, North Korea unveiled a new uranium enrichment facility and allowed Siegfried Hecker, the director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, to bring a team of colleagues and investigate the new reactor. Hecker was surprised when he was shown that the facility contained thousands of centrifuges


when he was expecting to see only a couple dozen. He also described the uranium enrichment facility as “ultra-modern and clean,” unlike the previous North Korean sites he had inspected in the past with the IAEA.\(^{31}\) North Korean officials told the team of scientists that they had only begun construction in 2009, but given the scale and sophistication of the facility this was impossible to believe.

Hecker would admit later in a formal briefing, that the centrifuges must have been installed in another facility and then moved to the installation where they were given a tour. Which alludes to the idea that North Korea must possibly have other clandestine enrichment facilities, and if they do, it will be very difficult to detect them.\(^{32}\) Of course now we know the centrifuges had originally come from Pakistan, but this in effect changes the framework of how we can approach North Korea, because now we have realized that we have no idea how long their uranium program has been running, how many facilities they may have, or if they are capable of producing highly enriched uranium as used in nuclear weapons.

### North Korea as a Space Power

After having demonstrated their capacity to maintain a sophisticated domestic nuclear program and their ability to manufacture nuclear weaponry, North Korea seemingly turned to focus on developing a proficient delivery system. In April of 2012, they attempted to launch the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 satellite into space on an Unha-3 missile system, which is essentially a Taepodong-2 ICBM.\(^{33}\) Just 90 seconds after liftoff, the missile veered off its projected course when the second stage boosters failed to ignite, causing it to plunge into the Pacific Ocean seconds after liftoff, the missile veered off its projected course when the second stage boosters failed to ignite, causing it to plunge into the Pacific Ocean.\(^{34}\) Despite strongly worded condemnation from the international community, North Korea was undeterred, and announced another launch later that year in December.

North Korea immediately set about preparing a replacement Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 satellite, and again used their Taepodong-2 missile system. This time the missile stayed on course, all three booster stages ignited successfully, and North Korea had put its first satellite into space.\(^{35}\) This was a significant achievement for North Korea, because not only had they become one of only ten nations capable of putting an object in orbit using their own domestic launch vehicles, but North Korea had also just advertised that they can now field a missile capable of being used as an ICBM with a potential range of around 6,000 kilometers.\(^{36}\) For North Korea this validated their perception that they are a major player in the global power structure; with this one launch they had ascended into a small circle of states with domestic space programs, but perhaps even more importantly, they emerged as the eighth member in the small club of nations to have genuine intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

Following the successful missile launch, the UN once again introduced another round of sanctions on North Korea for violating Resolutions 1718 and 1874. Resolution 2087 reiterated the call for strengthening international sanctions, and for North Korea to abandon is nuclear and ballistic missile programs. But it also introduced language that alluded to the possibility that the UN Security Council would be open to taking preventative measures against future provocations.\(^{37}\)

### Demonstration of Progress

North Korea once again responded to outside pressures with a show of force, and detonated their third nuclear test a month after the new U.N. Resolution. This time the detonation was estimated to

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have yielded anywhere from 6 to 9 kilotons.\(^{38}\) The larger yield in this test generated some new questions pertaining to the North Korea’s nuclear program. Since North Korea had suspended separation of weapons-grade plutonium for a period of time, it begged the question of how much plutonium they must have stockpiled. It also raised questions about North Korea’s covert uranium enrichment facility, and whether they had attained the ability to produce highly enriched uranium that would be required to generate weapons-grade uranium, and if so how long had they been capable of doing so and at what rate. The larger yield may have also signified that they were becoming more sophisticated in their nuclear weapons design, as many scientists believe the size and yield of previous North Korean tests may have demonstrated a lack of refinement or development in their design, and thus why they had produced smaller yields than what many other nations were capable of with their first nuclear tests.\(^{39}\)

In January of 2016, North Korea conducted yet another nuclear test at their underground facility outside of P’unggye. This time, North Korea declared to having detonated a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb; immediately hailing the test as a triumphant success. If true, this would be an impressive leap in North Korean nuclear technology, well ahead of schedule from what anyone could have predicted, and could have even more radical implications in altering the security situation in Korea. However, outside observers estimated the yield to have been only around 10 kilotons.\(^{40}\) This raised many doubts throughout the global community that the test could have been a successful detonation of a thermonuclear device. The explosive yield for fusion devices are generally measured in megatons, and this test was only a little larger than the nuclear test conducted in 2013.

Since the explosive yield did not match the parameters associated with a thermonuclear device, this suggested several other explanations for what could have occurred. The first possibility is that North Korea was indeed attempting to test a hydrogen bomb, and the fission device of the first stage did explode, but failed in triggering a fusion reaction in the second stage of the explosion.\(^{41}\) This could be why this test resembled the one conducted in 2013, but did not have the hallmarks of a thermonuclear test. Another possibility is that they did not test a hydrogen bomb at all, and had instead actually detonated a boosted fission device. This would entail including some fusion material like deuterium and tritium gas in the core which would increase the rate and efficiency of the fission reaction, resulting in a higher explosive yield.\(^{42}\) This might explain why the yield was slightly larger than their previous nuclear test, but many scientists think it should have been larger than the estimated 10 kilotons. If this is the case then it demonstrates that they are not quite at the level of engineering a more advanced fission device. But the most obvious option would be that they simply tested another basic form of fission detonation as they had previously, either with material from their plutonium stockpile, or possibly even highly enriched uranium produced in the clandestine programs that Siegfried Hecker had previously alluded to. For the time being however, it is virtually impossible to know exactly what North Korea tested or how successful the results were.

**Conclusion**

North Korea has actively pursued a domestic nuclear weapons program since its very inception as a state. It has defied international efforts to limit its acquisition of such weapons every step of the way, and remains determined to build a formidable nuclear deterrent for what it perceives as legitimate outside threats to its regime. Even as international sanctions began to mount, North Korea has audaciously refused to allow the global community to limit their ascent to becoming a nuclear power. They have been steadfast in their efforts of maximizing their military


power in an effort to validate their own perception of being a contender near the top of the global power structure. They have been one of the few nations to have been legitimately threatened with nuclear arms by the United States, which in itself elevates their own recognition of being an acknowledged threat to a known superpower.

North Korea sees its nuclear weapons program as the primary means to balance the power between itself and the United States, and that the only way it could ensure its own survival was through maximizing its own power in a way that would provide deterrence to prevent intervention and regime change. When the United States and South Korea regularly conduct massive war games and military exercises, North Korea regards such actions as a direct threat to their survival since their own conventional forces are decades obsolete, leaving the pursuit of nuclear weapons as being the only legitimate means of forming a substantial deterrence. There is also fact that the United States still currently identifies North Korea as a legitimate target for preemptive nuclear strike as outlined by the United States Nuclear Posture Review, which leaves North Korea with no other options but to pursue nuclear weapons as the only form of deterrence to that specific level of threat directed towards it. Kim Jung Un addressed this directly after conducting their forth nuclear test when he stated, “The DPRK’s H-bomb test ... is a self-defensive step for reliably defending the peace on the Korean Peninsula and the regional security from the danger of nuclear war caused by the U.S.-led imperialists.”

Essentially, North Korea finds itself locked in the global arena with the other major contenders bandwagoning together to prevent their state from rising the ranks of the global power structure. But North Korea has remained undeterred every step of the way, to the point where their nuclear program may now be immune to international sanctions, as their own domestic production may have reached the point where they no longer need to import major components or outside technical expertise necessary to continue developing their program. Furthermore, the manner in which the international community has poised with the carrot or the stick approach has only solidified their resolve in the pursuit of power, and driven the North Korean program literally underground where we can no longer obtain any major intelligence on their technological capabilities. The Hermit Kingdom lives up to its nickname, as we can only observe and estimate how sophisticated their weapons program has become, and since international response has only responded through eliciting the use of ineffectual sanctions, the North Korean nuclear weapons program will continue unimpeded until the international community responds with an appreciable means to slow or stop them, which is not likely to occur any time soon. This in itself demonstrates that there is some validity to offensive realism’s call to obtain power at any means necessary in order to present a form of deterrence that will ensure the security of the state, because as we have seen from the UN response, there are constraints to what level of commitment the international community will undertake to prevent a state such as North Korea from making the ascent to becoming a nuclear power.

Author Biography
Cody Folmar is a senior at San Francisco State University, and is currently majoring in International Relations with a focus on Intelligence and Security. He has previously covered subjects such as the rapid development of global urbanization in conjuncture with the future of conducting military operations on urban terrain, as well as the Ukrainian revolution and subsequent civil war in Eastern Ukraine. He is also in the process of starting an internship in the Bay Area with a federal agency that falls under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security.

Bibliography

AGREED FRAMEWORK OF 21 OCTOBER 1994 BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.” International


After the fall of the Soviet Union, a series of secessionist wars erupted throughout Eastern Europe, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia. Modernization helped initiate movements in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia where a rise in ethnic consciousness perpetuated a demand for political autonomy. Today, ethnic nationalist movements and separatist behavior portrayed by diasporic groups - such as the Basques in Spain - attest to the ongoing complexities and prevalence of nationalist ideology. Basque nationalism promotes the political unity of the Basque people and culture, calling for independence across the three Basque-speaking provinces. Its origins date back to the late 19th century during a period of forced assimilation and restrictive policies from Spain. Throughout the years, the Basque nationalist movement has included many separatist organizations with varying platforms and narratives. However, a consistent theme within Basque nationalism is the claim to autonomy based on the Basque ethnic identity which has its own unique race, history, and culture.

Ethnonationalist movements are characterized as communities united under a common descent, often times representing a region in search of a state. The identity construction process is an important consideration for separatists seeking autonomy from the state. These movements turn inward to preserve a solidified regional identity through expressions of language and culture. The construction of a strong nationalist identity is often necessary as breaking the territorial integrity of a nation comes with major pushback from the state and requires the full mobilization of a group’s political, cultural, and ideological distinctions.

Basque nationalism traces its origins to very exclusive and racially driven doctrines proclaiming the right to independence based on the Basque race. In literature, the case of Basque minority nationalism is often associated with violence and made synonymous with separatist terrorism. The internal rifts within the evolving Basque nationalist narratives display a deeply pluralized society residing at polar ends of the spectrum. Views towards immigrants tend to either advocate for models of civic liberalism or call for a retreat back to exclusion, with little to no ability to meet in the middle. Nevertheless, integration policies employed during the early 2000s population flow indicate a new consistency within Basque nationalism. Welcoming and inclusionary approaches to integration throughout Euskadi were made possible through the establishment of a new regional citizenship based on residence rather than ethnicity. The efforts of framing migration positively, and utilizing cultural priming techniques on Basque citizens, allude to a conscious decision to forge a new collective Basque identity based on values of inclusion and liberalism. Integration policies towards immigrants from diverse backgrounds were used to counter the political capacity of ETA terrorism and differentiate its identity from Spain’s, which held exclusionary policies towards immigrants at the time. This argument challenges common misconceptions that ethnic minority nationalists exclude immigrants from their movements out of fear that diversity will dilute their independence aims.

Subsequently, symbols highlighting both major and minor differences from the state are often employed. As a logical extension, one would assume that the need for self-preservation would lead to unfavorable views of immigrants who could be perceived as a threat to the stability of the movements which are ultimately rooted in race. Indeed, it is common for states striving to form their ethnonationalist identity to encounter legal disputes over immigration flow. However, this paper argues that this is not the case in a number of autonomous regions around the world that employ more welcoming immigration policies compared to other states. At that juncture, this paper will confront the question: Are minority nationalists capable of integrating immigrants in their goal for self-determination without simultaneously diluting their ethnic identity?

This paper demonstrates how ethnic groups may gain moral high ground, exert political control, and culturally prime their citizens to promote diversity and human capital in their region through inclusive migration policies that separate them from their opponents who refuse entry to immigrants, especially asylum seekers. The case of the Basques will be used to demystify common correlations between diasporic communities and immigration. Considering the unique ethnic classification of Basque nationalism and its roots in racially-driven doctrines, many would assume that they would have strict restrictions on immigrants of diverse backgrounds. However, this is not the case: the autonomous region accepted considerably more internally displaced people (IDPs) than Spain during the diverse population flow in the early 2000s.

The inclusionary and multicultural policies put forth in the Basque integration plan helped to further their independence aims and can be viewed as a response to Spain’s forced assimilation and exclusionary immigration policies. It also represents a move away from a Basque nationalism commonly synonymous with violent ETA terrorism, as a way to establish the true Basque identity and show how the nation wants to be perceived within Spain. This paper contributes to a crucial body of work by scholars challenging the assertion that immigrants dilute ethnic minority nationalists and their goal for independence. Rather, it will explore the mutually beneficial relationship between the state, immigrants, and the separatists.

Identity Construction

The ideological perception of a nation and the image it projects to the world are widely studied through a nationalist lens. The process of identity construction is a deliberate move to separate any political entity from the rest of the world. Scholars of nationalism argue every nation develops a framework to forming their collective identity to some degree, however debates surrounding levels of legality within his process differ. Brass presents a theoretical framework asserting that ethnicity and nationalism are not inherent but rather conscious social and political constructions put forth by the state. Triandafyllidou argues that a nation’s identity is only made officially recognizable through its contrast to other identities. Anderson’s concept of the nation expands upon Marx idea of “imagined communities” meaning that identity is not an organic structure but rather the result of a deliberate and tireless process of reconstruction.

The task of constructing an identity as far-reaching as a national identity requires that residents share fundamental attitudes and beliefs systems. This understanding of a nation creates a collective identity, where residents associate their individual processes of thinking with that of the larger nation. In this context, a person’s relationship to the nation blurs concepts of individuality with the greater concern of upholding the national identity. It is within this connection that strong sentiments of patriotism and national pride come into play. The “comradeship” of the community guarantees deep psychological connections that prevail regardless of injustice and exploitation. Identity priming experiments in Western Europe highlight how prioritizing national identity over personal identity results in the rise of exclusionary reactions towards immigrant groups. The experiment highlighted how approaches to immigration strictly from a national identity viewpoint result in heightened fear towards immigrants with participants

citing serious concerns over economic and cultural integration as well as their overall safety.8

Assumed Homogeneity

It was the emergence of nationalist ideas in the nineteenth century during the French Revolution that gave way to a new outward projection of nationalism, focused on difference. Symbols reinforcing national difference has proved dangerous over time, ultimately devolving into a social tool used to gauge and differentiate between those who ‘belong’ within the confines of the nation’s identity and those on the fringe. Forces of globalization have helped to rapidly intensify the exclusion of people residing outside of the projected identity. Hobsbawm argues that there is nothing less organic, or more dangerous, than the concept of an exclusive and singular national ethnic identity.9 When a nation aspires to be politically and culturally homogeneous; the urgency to eradicate the ‘others,’ a coined term used to address the groups who are most commonly viewed as a threat to the survival of the nation intensifies. These groups are categorized to include ethnic minorities, immigrant communities, and a small nation existing within a larger multinational state.10 Within this classification of ‘other,’ the term is expanded to include an intensified threat known the ‘significant other.’ The nature of this paper will focus on the ‘significant other’ who are perceived as the greatest danger to the state. The feature that causes this group to stand out above all internal threats is their direct impact on the most defining aspects of the state. These groups inflict anxiety into the heart of state through their ideals of self-determination, along with territorial claims and ethnic disputes. In their more subtle form, the ‘significant other’ are believed to lead to the deterioration of language and culture by blurring of the ‘distinctiveness of the in-group.’11 In a multiethnic state, this path of ‘national unity’ is accompanied by programs of forced integration used to eliminate ethnic cultures and languages of the ‘significant others.’12

Cultural Priming

Policies of integration at the societal level help to eliminate discrimination in the labor market and forced cultural integration. The role of the community may forge new attitudes of inclusivity that rethink a new regional identity rooted in diversity. Many times the national language that is adopted to accompany these policies is crucial. The priming of citizens can significantly influence public opinion and national identity. Symbols reinforced through narratives, values in the media, entertainment, and even sporting events may influence the way citizens form their own personal identity - as well as their views of immigrants within their society.

According to a global poll by the BBC in 2005, citizens from all over the world listed national identity and religion are the two most defining elements of their personal identity. Therefore, the reinforcement of symbols - either exclusionary and inclusionary - toward immigrants can significantly influence public opinion. These symbols may galvanize citizens who are already deeply concerned with their national identity. Conversely, symbols can be used to reinforce the mutual benefits of immigrant populations and the cultural diversity and economic incentives they bring to the region. This paper focuses on the cultural priming of a community including exercises which encourage multiculturalism at the local level. Social conditioning may increase a region’s approach to immigration by forming a civic identity, and involving a citizen’s identification with a certain political system thereby helping to establish his individual rights and duties.

Autonomy/Self-Determination

State imposed goals of national homogeneity and forced integration policies focused on the incineration of cultural practices and language, are the most cited reasons prompting sub-nationals to pursue autonomy. Sub-national groups are “culturally-distinct nations below the level of the state.” 13 Autonomy movements challenge the structure of the state and

8 Ibid.
appeal for sovereignty based on their distinct ethnic identity. Ghai identifies an overwhelming trend in recent autonomous movements; suggesting that “it has been seen as a panacea for cultural diversity, and as, under the influence of identity politics dawns on us, autonomy seems to provide the path to maintaining unity of a kind while conceding claims to self-government.”

Minority sub-nationalist groups typically achieve either full or partial autonomy through special forms of representation and power sharing.

Much like the process of identity construction within the nation; autonomous movements carefully construct and repackage their ethnic identity to validate their appeal for self-determination. Smith, the architect of the ‘core doctrine’ of early nationalist theory, correlates ethnic nationalism to the root cause of universal minority plight. The reasoning behind this theory argues that the process by which ethnic minorities redefine and construct their identity acts to “politicize its culture and are drawn into purifying the community of ‘alien’ elements, which in turn may lead to the expulsion and even the extermination of minorities, the ‘outsider within’.” Thus the question is raised, are minority nationalists capable of integrating immigrants in their quest for self-determination without simultaneously diluting their ethnic identity? Kymlicka suggests that at first glance, the answer to this question points to a resounding ‘no’ as immigrants are seen to pose a threat to sub-nationalist movements.

According to Bauböck, population flows and immigration closely determine the boundaries of citizenship. The psychological fear of diluting precious cultural practices and dying languages, therefore, has vast impacts on immigration policies. However, more recently, scholars have argued that autonomous regions can adopt policies that benefit both immigrants and aims of separatism. Olivieri argues that immigration policies and identity discourses are shaped by ‘popular perception,’ meaning that how secure sub-state nationalists are in their separatist narrative will influence their openness to multiculturalism. For example, insecurity in Catalan nationalism led to an increase in exclusionary policies against immigrants during the nation-building process. While there are those who discuss the tension over immigrant integration, not all scholars believe they have to be exclusionary. Barker suggests that sub-nationalist policies “varies across space and time” challenging the common conceptions that they are purely hostile. From this perspective, immigration can provide much needed economic advantages and remedies to demographic issues such as an aging population. Ghai argues that through extensive studies in India, Canada, and Spain; it is possible for ethnonationalist autonomy arrangements to benefit both sides through the diffusion of conflict and creation of more peaceful interactions within the state.

**Multiculturalism**

Integration policies pose a series of difficult questions for sub-nationalist groups. Methods range between multicultural policies in support of immigrants unique ethnic identities and practices and ‘one-sided’ policies of assimilation which pressure immigrants to renounce aspects of their distinct cultural identity. These methods are derived from two very opposing theories - one that promotes the national interests of the state mainly from an economic standpoint, and then social identity, which consider-

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17 Ibid.
itions national identity a larger and most important marker of group membership. This paper focuses on diversity, positing it as a new marker of identity. Multiculturalism invokes a pluralisation of the national identity and seeks to strengthen the sense of the nation. In a multicultural society, integration for immigrants liberally manifests itself in many forms. It enables immigrant groups the right to pursue their ideal model of integration without positing one model as inherently better, nor making one more tangible than the other.

For example, ethnic minority groups may wish to pursue full assimilation - granting them all of the rights of other integrated citizens, while others may want to maintain their cultural differences. Even more, some will adopt a mixture of the two methods, creating what is called a “cosmopolitan mixed identity.” Tariq Modood, a scholar of multiculturalism and advocate of minority rights, argues that within integration there is no single model that is going to be suitable for all groups. Therefore, in order to promote a fully functioning system capable of integrating large numbers of minority groups, it is crucial to consider all possible models and political responses.

Case Study: Basque Country

Euskadi, also known as the Basque Country, is the historic, territorial, and cultural representation of the Basque people, who have inhabited the region for several thousand years. Euskadi is situated at the edge of the Pyrenees Mountains and sprawls the border between France and Spain on the Atlantic coast. With a surface area of 20,664 kilometers and a population of approximately three million, the small ancient country maintains a strong identity. The Basques gained partial autonomy in 1979 when Spain’s constitution issued an official Autonomy Statute of Basque Country which established a community of autonomous Basque regions. Within article two of the statute, the provinces of Alava, Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, and Navarra, were guaranteed the right to self-governance. The larger entity of the Basque Country was divided into three politically and legally distinct territories; the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), the Autonomous Community of Navarre, and Iparralde also known as the French Basque Country. All three regions belong to a larger state; two within Spain (BAC and the Autonomous Community of Navarre) while Iparralde belongs to the French Republic.

As a minority nation, once subjected to overtly repressive forms of control by Spain, the Autonomous Statute provided a legal framework for the historic territories to regain self-governance over their institutions and organization. Under the statutes of autonomy, the Basque government assumes control over “sectorial policies of integration including work, education, housing, healthcare, and social affairs.” The 1981 Economic Agreement contributed to economic control by enabling each province management over sectors of integration, tax collection, and inspection as well as the redistribution of wealth. Despite increased autonomy, the statute grants Spain exclusive power over immigration, prohibiting the Basque government from pursuing their own individualized model for immigration. However, integration policies are the mode by which the Basque government has regained a sense of regional control while addressing the consequences of state-imposed otherness beyond the state: integration policies and inclusive citizenship as a government paradigm in the Basque Country. Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque Country (CEIC/UPV): 4.

33 Ibid.
Evolving Immigration narratives within Basque Nationalism

Integration policies employed during the early 2000s population flow allude to a new consistency within Basque nationalism premised upon models of civic engagement. However, early Basque regional politics favored policies of exclusion towards non-native groups. The “father” of Basque nationalism and leader of the PNV nationalist party, Sabino Arana, promoted ethnically based identities and used race as a marker for citizenship by differentiating between “true” native born Basques and non-native’s in order to exclude those on the periphery from gaining membership. Arana first introduced the ideological basis driving Basque nationalism during a major population flood in the region prompted by a period of rapid industrialization. Starting in the 1880s, immigrants migrated from Spain in large numbers with aspirations of joining the major steel and mining movements. In Bilbao alone, the population increased from 35,505 in the year 1877 to 83,306 in 1900. Within this population increase, out of 80 percent of the immigration demographic, approximately 50 percent of the incoming immigrant population identified as non-Basques.

The population flow experienced in Basque Country during this time transitioned the region from a largely agrarian based economy towards a more diverse labor force with distinct economic classifications. Arana viewed this new working class society of immigrants as a threat to the social cohesiveness of the Basque identity. The subsequent cultural classification of the nationalism birthed out of this fear, ultimately led to a correlation placing immigrants as an overwhelming threat to the very survival of Basque Country. Views towards immigration continued to lean towards exclusion as Basque society increased its capital and distinct classes were formed. The multifaceted society, was now apart of a three-tiered society, including the upper middle class, urban lower class, and the new urban immigrants. Nationalism became a plausible and tangible method to suppress the zealous immigrant population thus preserving the Basque identity, “in the presence of the peaceful invasion of the maketos.”

It wasn’t until 1932 that the PNV reversed these policies and officially accepted non-ethnic Basques as members of the Basque community. This shift in policy prompted a gradual integration process for mainly Basque-born ethnic Spaniards. From the 1950’s onward, these groups integrated with relative ease due to their familiarity with Basque society and cultural practices. While this move can be seen as a step in the right direction for shifting conceptions of ‘Basquesness’ or what it meant to be a Basque in the modern age, it failed to confront effective modes of integration for people coming from more diverse corners of the world. The question of when and in what nature to integrate immigrants from places such as North Africa and Europe wouldn’t be developed until years later when the Basque identity was becoming more secure and the nationalist movement was picking up steam.

In order to understand the modern form of Basque identity and separatism, one must consider the years of forced exile and repression the Basques experienced under the Spanish dictatorship of Francisco Franco from 1939 to 1975. The Franco period decimated all outward projects of Basque nationalism through concentrated efforts of political suppression and forced cultural cleansing. By eliminating the symbols and practices fueling the various minority aspirations of the region, Franco and his regime hoped to target and subdue the groundwork acting to support the political platforms of the autonomous movements. Until his death in 1975, the Basque language, flag, songs, and celebrations were forbid-

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41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.


44 Ibid.

den. Franco declared the northwestern provinces of Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia as ‘traitorous provinces.’ During the Franco years, crucial aspects of the Basque identity were lost. To this day, the region is attempting to compensate for the lack of written word and literature due to the linguistic repression during Franco’s regime.

In 1959, a new player in Basque nationalism emerged largely as a response to the brutal repression under the fascist regime. ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) which translates to Basque Country and Freedom, inserted itself into the spine of the Basque struggle for independence. ETA’s campaign based itself upon the Marxist ideology relying on a violent struggle, it represented a move away from traditional Basque independence models under the leadership of the Basque Nationalist Party. At the height of ETA’s influence during the final Francois years, each eintza (ETA’s action) directly influenced the resulting ‘popular mobilizations’ among the Basque society. The repressed youth were particularly drawn to ETA’s campaign and micro-aggressions such as the Basque-Madrid conflict helped retain the need for ETA’s presence. From the 1960’s onward, with ETA at the helm, the Basque identity was rooted in violence and opposition. Conversi argues that during this time, the focus of nationalism was made synonymous with ETA’s violence:

In the aims of the nationalists, violence proved to be an effective substitute for culture insofar as it contributed to delineate the ‘boundaries’ of the Basque community by sharply demarcating outsiders from insiders.

Conversi further concludes that nationalist membership focused on a citizen’s involvement in the armed struggle. A citizen’s level of belonging moved away from Arana’s manifesto built on race, towards a person’s allegiance to ETA:

Basques, in ETA’s eyes, were distinguished from non-Basques mainly on the basis of their involvement in the struggle for Basque liberation. Lacking a discrete and visible element such as language, the requirements of Basque identity have shifted to a simpler voluntarist dimension. The more a person is involved in the struggle, the more he/she is accepted as a member of the national community. Hence, the most radical option was likely to be considered also the most ‘Basque’ and thus the most morally acceptable. As a consequence, the social environment was far more polarized in Euskadi than in Catalonia, with each nationalist stressing his/her nationalist credentials in order to be accepted by the ‘moral community.’

The downfall of ETA stemmed from a loss of popular support from the people, combined with a concerted police enforcement effort and bipartisan political pressure. The changing perception of Basque nationalism resulted in more inclusionary policies towards immigrants. The shift from a nationalism rooted in race to “language and action,” led to a more open and inclusionary form of nationalism. Quite interestingly, the focus on integration resulted in a scaling back in the pursuit of independence from Spain, “as a lessening of out-group

48 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
behavior and in-group bias in the Basque Country.\textsuperscript{58}

In other words, the Basque nationalist movement sourced this population flow to confront the inconsistency in its nationalism.

\textbf{Framing Migration}

The development of a first Basque integration policy began in 2001 with the Directorate of Immigration under the auspices of the Ministry of Housing and Social Affairs.\textsuperscript{59} The efforts of the ministry resulted in the first Basque immigration plan (PVI) issued in 2003 and set a precedent for future government action by establishing policies of integration for foreigners arriving in Basque Country.\textsuperscript{60} The plan reflected the exponential growth of immigrants from 21,140 in 2000 (1\% of the total population) to 139,369 in 2010 (6.4\% of the total population).\textsuperscript{61} This new wave of diverse immigrant workers came from all over the world with four main host countries including, Latin America with 49.10 percent, Europe - 28.6 percent (particularly recent EU member countries), Africa - 17.39 percent, and Asia - 5.5 percent.\textsuperscript{62}

The PVI developed broad parameters of Basque citizenship and extended a set of rights and obligations for all Basques.\textsuperscript{63} Reflecting the political climate, it condemned Spain’s government for their restrictive policies against immigrants based on Spanish citizenship models, jus sanguinis and jus soli, which allow municipalities in Spain to register immigrants that are ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ according to Spanish immigration law.\textsuperscript{64} Instead, the Basque government pursued an ideological basis for citizenship based on the jus domicile model—citizenship based on residence, “to extend equality of civil, social, economic rights to everyone regardless of their place of origin or legality, according to the Spanish immigration law.”\textsuperscript{65} The plan emphasized heightened awareness and broad values of acceptance at a time when Spain’s narrative focused on the political and social exclusion of immigrant populations.

The PVI represents definitive opposition and condemnation of Spanish immigration policy, and additionally, it indicates a palpable social change within the perception of Basque nationalism.\textsuperscript{66} The policies aimed at integration set out to fundamentally redefine what it meant to be Basque. Under the new immigration plan, immigrants were only perceived as integrated once granted full citizenship. The narrative included all foreign variations of the ‘other,’ regardless of their country of origin; “In summary, the ‘other’ to whom the Basque immigration plans are directed is a foreign, non-European Community immigrant, with few resources and at risk of exclusion. Nothing in those plans marks him from the viewpoint of race, ethnic group or the idea of a minority; nor, in how he is conceived, is recourse taken to questions relating to racism, xenophobia or the rejection of immigrants.”\textsuperscript{67}

The three main nationalist parties - the PNV, Izquierda Unida (IV), and the Partido Popular (PP) - all subsequently endorsed the bill after it was drafted.\textsuperscript{68} The tripartite coalition of nationalist groups in Basque Country partnered with immigrant organizations to counter or in many ways work around the Spanish controlled immigration laws. The coalition


\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.


formed a pro-immigrant discourse promoting liberal policies of acceptance using the 2003 PVI. Since that time, the coalition has promoted a regional narrative that reinforces the ideological and political goals of the immigrant plan. The PP ultimately challenged that the plan, citing that it was useless due to the control of the Spanish state over immigration, however, their endorsement remained. Despite the coalition editing the bill twice, the political consensus of the immigration plan has maintained its integrity.

Public Policy Discourse

Basque public institutions and society play a significant and encouraging role within the implementation of integration policy. A statement by the President of the Basque Regional Government reinforces a new multicultural Basque society following years of conflict; “We went from a rural to industrial people. Now we want Basque people from everywhere, from all ideologies, to come and participate and debate their ideas about where we are and where we’re going.”

Public institutions are viewed as active participants responsible for carrying out services guaranteeing the rights of citizenship. The guidelines of the 2003 PVI have been accompanied by policies of multiculturalism particularly in municipalities with high immigrant populations. This interaction between levels of state and the public enables a consensus among Basque integration policy:

Both the society and the Basque Public Administration must understand very clearly that we are living together with new citizens and that it is necessary to propitiate a structural change that permits inclusion without distinctions as the only way of achieving an intercultural society.

Basque citizens are socially primed to view immigrants as a cultural extension of their identity. Emerging narratives throughout Basque municipalities posit assimilation of the ‘other’ with great importance to reinforce a new collective Basque identity. In order to assist non-Spanish and Euskera speakers, larger cities, such as Bilbao installed multilingual machines in administrative offices to ensure that immigrants had access to services and legal documents including housing and work permits. In 2004, a center for immigrants called Norabide was opened in Vitoria offering legal advice, language classes, psychological counseling and translation service for immigrants.

Social and NGO Participation

There is a heightened social awareness among the Basque population including a tendency to participate in organizations and interact with other members of their society. Labor unions or class unions, business organizations, and social movements are an ingrained aspect of a Basque citizens’ life. Non-governmental organizations tend to focus on promoting the living conditions for marginalized Israelis. The management of otherness beyond the state: integration policies and inclusive citizenship as a government paradigm in the Basque Country. Collective Identity Research Centre, University of the Basque Country (CEIC/UPV). 9: http://www.ces.uc.pt/projectos/toler-ace/media/wp2/WorkingPapers%202_Spain-BasqueCountry.pdf.


75 Ibid.

or disadvantaged people and are particularly active in immigration issues and political asylum.\textsuperscript{77} The Cear-Euskadi is an organization that promotes solidarity and integration of refugees from countries in conflict.\textsuperscript{78} Perhaps one of the reasons that the immigration plan has been so successful can be accredited to the multitude of surveys and reports conducted to further understand the reality of immigration issues. The Basque Observatory of Immigration Ikuspegi posts an annual ‘yearbook’ that uses a statistical approach to comprehend immigration phenomenon in various sectors including the educational system and labor markets.\textsuperscript{79} The Ikuspegi also conducts surveys to weigh the attitudes towards immigration and the integration process.\textsuperscript{80} The analysis provided by these various reports then is used to offer potential suggestions for migration and integration to policy makers.

The Basque Observatory of Immigration and Ikuspegi additionally partners with the Basque Service of Integration and Intercultural Coexistence Biztzen to host conversations on integration and immigration.\textsuperscript{81} At a conference on Cultural and Religious Diversity in the Basque Country in 2013, politicians were invited to come together to confront the issues directly impacting their immigrant populations. The deputy Minister of Social Affairs, Iñigo Pombo, used the conference to call for further collaboration between public institutions and the Basque society to guarantee an “honest and civilized” society in which “institutions do not humiliate people and people do not humiliate each other.”\textsuperscript{82}

Educational System

In 1999, there were 6,291 foreign youth (ages zero through twenty-nine), living in Basque Country. By 2000, the number reached 56,068.\textsuperscript{83} The numbers indicate an overwhelming rise in young immigrants in the region. Immigrant youth demographics come with both a set of unique challenges and advantages within integration policy. On one hand, these youth are expected to successfully integrate into Basque state institutions and the educational system. This may pose an overwhelming lifestyle change on an expedited learning track. However, the schooling system may be sourced as a vital asset in “solving the challenges of societal co-inclusion between natives and immigrants.”\textsuperscript{84} If integration programs and the curriculum are structured efficiently, the school can provide the knowledge needed for successful integration; including a familiarity with the Basque lifestyle, language, and customs.\textsuperscript{85}

Within a school setting, immigrants may also become sensitized to the hardships of minority culture; “they also become familiar with the experience of being different, and with the level of acceptance or rejection this generates.”\textsuperscript{86} Furthermore, the school provides immigrant youth with the skills and knowledge for their future occupation within Basque society. The Basque’s view all of these factors as potential opportunities to generate understanding and acceptance in immigrant youth; the link between education and integration is therefore undeniable.

In the educational system, specifically in the regions of Navarre and Basque Autonomous Country (BAC), immigration has been debated within the curriculum and debates over language instruction in pre-primary, primary school, secondary school, and pre-university or vocational training.\textsuperscript{87} The Basque educational opted for a narrative reflecting thoughtful policies of integration among immigrant children. The initial plan in 1982, the Special Education Plan, established the integration of schools. The Basque Public School Law 1/1993; affirmed that “public powers guarantee the provision of free and quality instruction for all, in a bilingual, diverse, Basque public school, serving Basque society socially, and cultural-

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 140.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 140.
ly routed in its environment, particularly compensating for inequalities, and integrating diversity. 88

In 2003, the Basque Ministry of Education released a report entitled Programa para la atención del alumnado inmigrante (Plan to care for immigrant pupils). 89 The plan called for the specific focus of helping students from immigrant families and made assisting immigrant children a concern of the greater society by citing that if not paid proper attention, neglect of the ‘other’ could ultimately result in stunted educational opportunities for both native and immigrant children alike. 90 The 2003 program for Serving Immigrant Students established guidelines for promoting acceptance in schools and “responding to their linguistic, curricular, and tutorial education needs.” 91 Therefore, narratives towards immigrants in Basque schools mirrored symbols of multiculturalism put forth by the PNV immigration plan. Basque educational authorities set out to develop extensive programs of acceptance and promotion of cultural diversity. 92 This can be seen in larger sweeping reform programs aimed at interculturalism as well as through small gestures. For example, in Basque Country many primary school entrances include a welcoming message written in the foreign languages represented by the student body. 93 Programs for “linguistic reinforcement” to support Euskara learners, 94 realize the necessity for more Euskara usage and are implemented to ensure its knowledge becomes a variable of inclusion rather than exclusion. 95

Analysis

The lessons learned from the evolution of the Basque nationalist identity alludes to a larger message within surges of intense forms of nationalism. Studying minority nationalist groups within Spain is particularly useful within the field of international affairs because it contributes unparalleled insight into modern identity politics. The case of the Basques is particularly useful at providing knowledge within popular perception and identity due to its classification as a diasporic minority-nationalist group at extreme risk of losing its linguistic and cultural history. The Basque case exemplifies how integration policies and the assimilation of immigrants can be initiated largely through public mobilization. It shows how the public of minority regions, or perhaps a state within a nation, can concentrate on local policies granted under their control to make tangible change in their society. Further, the pairing of policies at the governmental level with increased public agency through framing and cultural priming tools, can help to create a system where inclusive policies are reinforced through daily interactions between the locals and immigrants.

Integration policies used by the Basques under the sectoral policies were sourced as the mechanisms needed to perpetuate the ideological shift in the larger Basque nationalist movement. With a nationalism commonly made synonymous with violent acts of terrorism, the Basque society and government collectively supported the open integration policies employed in the 2000s under the PVI plan, in order to reinvent Basque identity and shift common associations with separatist terrorism. The stateless nation reconceptualized the Basque identity through policies of multiculturalism towards immigrants, in order to exhibit the high level of unity within their collective nationalism while also indicating how they expected to be treated within Spain.


90 Ibid.


95 Ibid.
This paper concludes that the divergent nationalist ideologies first within the PNV and then ETA, required the complete mobilization of the Basque citizenry through societal framing and cultural priming techniques, in order to shift conceptions of Basque nationalism and counter the ETA’s violent campaign.

The ideological and symbolic portrayal of Euskadi in this paper highlights how culturally diverse that region truly is. Due to the fact it is not possible to trace the exact origin of its people and language, the Basque identity as an entity is highly pluralized and deeply fragmented. This stands in contrast to the neighboring autonomous movements, such as in Catalonia, in the way that Basque movements of independence appeared to be lacking a foundation with pronounced goals and values. However, despite cleavages, the Basque identity is unparalleled in its strength; “Quite the contrary, it’s strongly oppositional and antagonistic character guarantees a continuous rehearsal of the nation as a ‘daily plebiscite’.”

This constant ‘rehearsal’ acts as an ever-evolving pendulum to which the Basque people conduct self-regulating checks and balances to their movements, and these pendulum swings have enabled the Basques to adjust in order to survive through the hard times, as well as obtain strides forward during years with less repression. Over time, Basques have continuously reassessed their identity, reflecting on both their steps forward, as well as backward, in their long walk towards independence. This does not indicate a weak sense of self, but rather alludes to the pure resiliency of the Basques, and their ability to think realistically for their long-term goals of independence.

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The Pan-Kurdish Myth: A Study of Pan-Kurdish Nationalism and Party Politics

By Miles Theodore Popplewell

This paper is designed to examine the issue of Pan-Kurdish nationalism: The ideology of establishing a Kurdish nation-state out of the geographical Kurdish homeland that is currently possessed by four different countries. Using various, primarily qualitative sources, the author will construct an argument that puts the theory of Pan-Kurdism’s prevalence into question. Instead of a Pan-Kurdish narrative that unifies the Kurdish homeland into one single political movement that calls for unification, the political reality presents us with two divergent ideological camps, one dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), based in Iraq and led by Massoud Barzani, and the other dominated by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), based in Turkey and ideologically led by Abdullah Öcalan. The ideological argument between these two represent two different frameworks for nationalism, and through the presented data, are a major barrier to the existence of Pan-Kurdish rhetoric in the homeland.

This paper is meant to address the broad issue known to most scholars as the “Kurdish question,” but with a focus to analyze the narrative of Pan-Kurdish nationalism and to assess just how pervasive this narrative is in Kurdish politics. The “Kurdish question” pertains to the fact that the Kurdish people, an ethno-linguistic group comprising roughly 30-35 million people, live in a region split between four different countries, all of which have put this group in positions as minority groups who have experienced various levels of disenfranchisement throughout the modern histories of these countries. The Kurds are often referred to as the largest ethnic group without its own independent state, though the veracity of that assertion is debatable. Nevertheless, the size of the Kurdish population is substantial, and their present situation in the current state system has posed numerous difficulties for all states involved in geopolitical affairs of the Middle East. All four countries (Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran) have faced the challenge of appropriately dealing with the Kurdish question, specifically through acknowledgment of the Kurds as a separate ethnic group with its own set of political considerations to be made.

In the past few years, the presence of the Kurdish question has become ever more prevalent in the mainstream media coverage. Since the rise of the Islamic State, the various Kurdish groups that have been combatting their expansion have also received a great increase in media coverage. In Syria, the Kurdish population in the north has set up their own autonomous area, known as Rojava,1 to defend themselves against ISIS expansion. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq has been able to stop major ISIS offensives from taking any more territory. The KRG’s forces, known colloquially as the Peshmerga,

1 As of December 2016, the region’s official name assigned by its government is the Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria. Despite this, the name Rojava, meaning “east” in Kurdish, is still colloquially used to describe this autonomous region in Syria, especially among its Kurdish residents.
have been known for years to be an effective fighting force, and their greatest difficulty in their war with ISIS appears not to be due to training or morale (KRG forces have been considered by most analysts to be highly combat effective), but rather due to logistic support and procuring appropriate weaponry and ammunition in order to continue their campaign. To the north of Syria and Iraq is Turkey, where the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK (Partiya Karkarên Kurdistanê), have been in conflict with Ankara since the 1970’s, with a brief ceasefire having ended in September 2014.

These political movements that are driven by a strong sense of Kurdish identity have been characterized by the western media as actively pursuing an independent Pan-Kurdish state. This characterization has also lead to assuming a strong cohesion between various Kurdish organizations throughout these countries that desire an independent Pan-Kurdish state, one that would take territory from all four major countries in order to exist. There are a number of factors that can lead to this assumption in the west. One reason is that the Kurdish people have, despite being territorially divided, have managed to maintain both linguistic and cultural identity, and this has been the primary point of contention that they have shared with their central governments for decades. Another reason is that these Kurdish movements have experienced, to varying degrees, oppression and/or disenfranchisement from aspects of political society in all of their home countries. Another reason is the relative friendliness that many Kurdish groups have shown to Western powers, while other groups in the region have been quick to condemn any US or European involvement in Middle Eastern events. For example, since the first Gulf War ended in 1991, the US and the Iraqi Kurds have shared a mutually beneficial, though not always stable, partnership. Indeed, the Kurdistan Regional Government has been cited by most western news outlets as the one lasting success story that came out of the Iraq War. Economic development, boosted by the protection offered by the no-fly zone, was able to flourish in Kurdish-controlled Iraq while the rest of the country endured crippling decline brought on by sanctions.

While once-affluent areas of Baghdad have been transformed into slums, new housing development projects around cities like Erbil and Sulaymaniyah may give the observer the impression that they are in some American suburb. Given the success of the KRG in terms of maintaining a level of internal stability and economic growth that the rest of Iraq is still struggling with, many have seen this as a strong indicator for supporting independence.

A final reason, and one that is most pertinent to recent events, involves the Kurds’ involvement in the war against ISIS.3 Various Kurdish groups based not just in Iraq and Syria, but also in Turkey, have chosen to conduct military campaigns against the Jihadist semi-state, but not without causing political complications that go beyond the issue of quelling political Islamism. Nonetheless, the Kurds, especially in Iraq, have been given increased media and political attention due to the relative competency and efficiency of their military forces. In fact, the cause of Kurdish independence is now being discussed more openly in America and elsewhere, though current policymakers are still adamant about maintaining the integrity of Iraq as a country.4 However, it is difficult to translate this support for KRG independence into support for a full Pan-Kurdish state.

With all of these various, but related, reasons that have been listed, the idea that there exists a Pan-Kurdish narrative in the political activities and discourse of the many Kurdish actors has been assumed by many lay observers of Kurdish affairs. After all, the Kurds throughout the Middle East all share a sense of cultural unity and, to a degree, linguistic unity as well. Also, the political values of democracy, more secularized society, and improved conditions for women, appear to be shared through-

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2 It should be noted that all four of the major home states that the Kurds reside in are, or at some point were, driven by National movements that inherently contradicted the ability of the Kurds, as a nation of their own, to operate as their own group. In Turkey, the rise of Kemalism coincided with increased oppression of the Kurds in the southeast of the country. In Syria and Iraq, Arabist-driven Ba’athism clashed with Kurds’ desires to maintain their identity. Even in Iran, where the Islamic Republic has been less driven by nationalism, but more by politicized Shi’ism, the predominantly Sunni Kurds have faced years of varying degrees of political and religious persecution. What all of these regimes share is their drive to establish homogeneity within their states, thus denying the Kurds, as citizens of these states, their ethnic identity.

3 The author, while acknowledging the primacy of the name Da’esh outside of US, has chosen to use the American colloquial term.

out the population, no matter what home country. Despite these generic facts about Kurdish political identity, further investigation brings this common assumption into question. Are the Kurds as unitary in their movements as we are lead to believe? Is Pan-Kurdism really as pervasive in the rhetoric as we are meant to believe? How internally stable would a Pan-Kurdish state be? We can even go further into regional specifics and question the political unity of areas such as Rojava and the KRG themselves.

The author hopes to present a more scrutinizing analysis of the Pan-Kurdish narrative in order to present the complex network of Kurdish political groups that may in fact prove to be a greater barrier to the establishment of Pan-Kurdism than what has been previously estimated. When examining the narrative of Pan-Kurdism that we have been given, there are several implications that do not appear to present themselves as facts in the Kurdish political system, especially when it comes to political and ideological unity. Instead of depicting a movement of pan-national unity, this paper presents facts that question that depiction and instead suggest a Kurdish world divided in political schism.

Literature Review

The amount of scholarly research on Kurdish studies has increased substantially over the past few decades, with contributions coming from various academic disciplines, be it anthropology, sociology, economics, or political science. Institutionally, however, there have been few academic organizations devoted to the study of Kurdish culture or politics. As of now, there is the Kurdish Studies Network (established in 2009), which does have its own journal, the Center for Kurdish Studies, based at the University of Exeter, and the recently established Kurdish Political Studies program at Central Florida University. Other than these institutions, and maybe a few smaller ones, there has been little academic concentration on Kurdish studies. The level of data that has been collected, especially quantitative, is still developing. However, the rise in interest is without a doubt substantial, very probably due to the Kurds’ rise in geopolitical significance. With this rise in interest, from both academic sources and media, there is sufficient writing that has been compiled from various journals and other sources that would make an effective analysis possible.

In particular, the level of work that has gone into the subject of Iraqi Kurdistan has risen substantially since the period of political and economic growth began in 1992. The literary focus on Iraqi Kurdistan should come as no surprise given the political context of recent years. Compared to every other predominantly-Kurdish region, it is the only one to have achieved universally-recognized autonomy. In 2011, the Institute for Global Leadership at Tufts published its Fall publication of the New Initiative for Middle East Peace (NIMEP) Insights Journal, in which undergraduates were given the opportunity to write and publish academic pieces on various aspects of the KRG. The volume possessed several pieces pertaining to KRG politics, military affairs, economic relations, as well as more social/health-related issues of Iraqi Kurdistan. Even though the articles were entirely written by undergraduates, their ability to travel to the KRG and have access to primary sources, interviews, and first-hand observations have made their subsequent studies valuable sources for future academic inquiries.

The aim of this paper, however, is to present a broader picture of the Kurdish affairs that go beyond the scope of the KRG, though most of the English-language literature related to the Kurds has been focused on that area. One article that holds a place in the literary core of this project is “Constructing narratives of Kurdish nationalism in the Urban space of Diyarbakır, Turkey” by Muna Güvenç, published in the Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, also in 2011. The premise of Güvenç’s work is to analyze the driving forces of Kurdish identity in the urban space of Turkey, specifically within the southeastern city of Diyarbakir, which is predominantly Kurdish. In a country like Turkey, where the Turkish government has worked to expand Turkish identity at the expense of other national rights, there is a great challenge to maintain and redevelop national identity. The Kurds, making up a very significant minority in the country, have proven to be a major roadblock to the nation-state ideal that the Turkish government, since its Kemalist origins, has strived so hard to maintain. Güvenç, who claims Diyarbakir to

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5 Syrian Rojava has also declared itself an autonomous region of Syria in November 2013, due to the administrative crisis that has erupted from the civil war. Despite this, there has been no de-jure recognition yet by any other government, even in the KRG, where the parliament voted to recognize in October 2014, but the Executive branch has yet to recognize.
be “the central city for Kurdish politics,” (Güvenç, p. 28), records the developments of modern Kurdish political movements, mainly choosing to focus on the national movement that has operated within the legal framework of Turkey’s prescriptions for civil action. She goes on to analyze the remarkable fortitude of Kurdish identity that has been maintained in the area by its civil society and local government.

When it comes to the core problem that we face in the guise of Pan-Kurdism, the level of academic interest is wanting. Instead, most academics have chosen to compartmentalize the Kurds as a subject into their home countries in virtually all aspects. Because of this, the problem of Pan-Kurdish nationalism is rarely asked, and very rarely even alluded to by scholars. Fortunately, Djene Rhys Bajalan has presented a paper on this very subject, which delineated the status of the Pan-Kurdish nationalist movement to a conference of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) in 2009. Bajalan goes further in his brief, but succinct, overview of the structural/ideological differences that exist in Kurdish nationalism, specifically focusing on the movements in Iraq and Turkey, given the politically-high profile that both movements have. He concludes that there exists both a split between two movements for various reasons, but primarily due to the ideological differences that exist between the Turkish-Kurdish and the Iraqi-Kurdish movement (p. 13). Bajalan even goes as far as to say that instead of a Pan-Kurdist state is less likely than two Kurdish states actually forming, one governed by PKK ideology, and the other governed by the KDP-KRG. This would certainly imply that the level of internal rhetorical dispute between these two groups is as great a barrier to a Pan-Kurdist state as the home countries like Iraq or Turkey.

Aliza Marcus’s book Blood and Belief (2007), which focuses on the PKK’s history (but goes further in dealing with the strenuous history it has shared with the KDP), is the most extensive qualitative text that this paper has at its disposal. The PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, as it is known in English, ought to be considered a more important actor in current political affairs than what many western policy analysts have given them credit for. Based primarily on interviews that Marcus conducted with a number of former self-claimed PKK fighters, this volume does much to provide a narrative of the PKK that is marred with military struggle, political challenges, rhetorical transformation, and the crises of its ever-present leader and founder, Abdullah Öcalan, reverently called Apo, or “uncle” by supporters. Like Bajalan, Marcus paints a picture of dispute between the PKK and the KDP-KRG in several instances. The narrative that Marcus provides no doubt does much to attributed several acts of ethnic fratricide to the KDP, or Kurdistan Democratic Party. Marcus recounts, in the early history of the new Kurdish movement in the 1970’s, when the KDP was in violent conflict with the PUK (People’s Union of Kurdistan), eventually laying a massive ambush for the PUK Peshmerga in 1978. This would just be the first of many years of violent clashes between the two major parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. Marcus counts further examples of inner clashes that exist throughout the history of the Turkish and Iraqi regions.

We then have the doctoral thesis by Yesiltas (2014). Aptly titled “Rethinking the National Question,” Yesiltas’ project is extremely ambitious, as she has chosen to cover the societal experiences of Kurds in all of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey, making her project both expansive, but well relevant to the subject that we are examining. Yesiltas’ primary contribution is the theoretical direction that she has taken, which turns away from what she refers to as the “narrowly scoped framework of ethnic nationalism” in order to analyze the way that Kurdish nationalism is articulated. By dividing her sections among the four major Kurdish movements, Yesiltas provides qualitative data from each country that can then be adequately compared and contrasted. The author stresses the role that the Kurds play in all of these regions as democratizing agents in all four home countries. It is this role, Yesiltas argues, that has transformed Kurdish nationalism from a nation-state driven paradigm to one that is governed by the popular desire for democratization. In all four countries, Kurdish

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6 The level of ideological animosity between the more pro-western KRG (largely led by the KDP) and the Marxist-inspired PKK has only grown in the past decades. This has only been exacerbated by the KRG’s deepening trade relationship with Turkey, which has become the region’s greatest trading partner. See economic report by Invest in Group (2013). This study is one of the few that has been able to fully grasp the issues.

7 (Bajalan, p. 15)

8 (Marcus, p. 41)

9 (Yesiltas, p. 33)
nationalism has made the link that the achievement of their national rights can only be brought to fruition by the transformation of their home states into democratic polities, which would not be governed by nation-building and homogeneity.

Arakelyan (2013) also covers the subject of Kurdish nationalist discourse, but with the core focus being made on the political paradigms in Iraqi Kurdistan, and analyses of Kurdish nationalism in the other countries are pushed more to the periphery, though they are still presented to some extent. Despite this seeming imbalance in methodology, Arakelyan contributes to the discussion of Pan-Kurdish nationalism. In doing so, he addresses the political paradigm of the Kurdish diaspora and their support for Pan-Kurdish statism. This ideology is most pervasive, rhetorically, in the diaspora. The concluding reason that Arakelyan gives for this is their existence outside of the political frameworks that exist in the Kurdish homeland (p. 33). Unbounded by the regionalization that has split the Kurds apart in the Middle East, diasporic Kurds are quick to unite and homogenize, identifying less as Kurds of a specific region, but as unanimously Kurds of “the homeland.”

An important primary source, written directly by Abdullah Öcalan, is the treatise Democratic Confederanism. Methodologically driven by Marxist-Leninist theory, Öcalan’s piece divulges the ideological framework in which he desires the national rights of Kurds to be maintained. He wholeheartedly rejects the idea of the nation-state in his work, critiquing it partly as thus:

“Assuming that we would compare the nation-state to a living god then nationalism would be the correspondent religion. In spite of some seemingly positive elements, nation-state and nationalism show metaphysical characteristics.”

Öcalan goes further to remark on the institutionalized oppression of women as an inherent construct found in nation-state ideology, as well as further stressing likeness between the orthodoxy of traditional nationalism and religious extremism (p. 16). He then goes on to state his principles of “democratic confederalism,” a political theory of his development that he presents as an antidote to traditional nation-building that is epistemically-constrained within a capitalist framework.

These sources, accompanied by others should give an efficient overview of the literary framework in which this study will be conducted. The range of focus and theoretical lenses is wide enough to give an unhindered body of data that we can then methodologically utilize to conclude on the major hypothesis of this paper.

The major methodological shortcoming that this body of literature has is the temporal distance they all share from the current political realities of the Middle East. The spillover of the Syrian Civil War into Iraq, most illustrated by ISIS’ declaration of the caliphate in June of 2014, has proven to be a major development for the Kurdish movements that was all but totally unanticipated by most scholars. Indeed, the rise of ISIS just might be creating an epistemic shift in this section of academia, but the level of literary output that has been published in the past few years has not been keeping up with the situational gravitas that is ISIS’ encounter with Kurdish nationalism. One of the few academic acceptations is Gunter (2015), who provides a good framework for analyzing the various political actors on the Kurdish side versus the spread of ISIS, and how the Kurdish actors in Syria and Iraq have articulated their political objectives to the rest of the world.

For years, political Jihadism and Kurdish society have not had the opportunity to interact that frequently. In Iraq, the Kurds in the north were seldom victim to car-bombings or shootings, with most of the sectarian violence occurring in the south of the country between Arab Sunni and Shi’a groups, leaving Iraqi Kurdistan almost free to pursue their economic development. Kurds elsewhere, except perhaps in Iran, were not as exposed to religious sectarian violence. However, the spread of the Islamic State to Kurdish areas in both Syria and Iraq have been a growing focal point of concern for countless observers, many of whom are more than willing to use the narrative of the Kurdish nation once again striving

10 (Öcalan, 2011, p. 15)
against a new rival. Nonetheless, the relationship between ISIS and the Kurds is ironic, given their dichotomizing disposition. After all, both ISIS and the Kurdish actors, by and large, see themselves as new developments that are bringing about a geopolitical shift in the Middle East.\footnote{Gunter, M. (2015). The Kurds in the changing political map of the Middle East. \textit{Kurdish Studies}, 3(1), 65.}

**Methodology and Research**

Given the methodological constraints that have been previously stated, the vast majority of data presented here will be qualitative. This qualitative design method will be conducted through the document analysis of various sources, both secondary and primary. Academic literature printed in the last decade serves as the theoretical foundation of our analysis. However, due to the lack of volume for contemporary\footnote{Having been published in the last two years.} academic output, primary sources will be analyzed as well in order to supplement the academic data and provided a more temporally-relevant paradigm for discussion. Fortunately, news organizations have provided much data input with regards to the political affairs of the various Kurdish movements, especially in their relation to the ISIS conflict that has shown no signs of ceasing anytime soon. The focus was to use English language articles from Rudaw, a news organization based in Iraqi Kurdistan, to provide most of the primary sources, as it is one of the few primary sources that the author finds that gives political insight from the Iraqi Kurdish framework through the English language.

This fact leads us to understand another limitation, which is linguistic. There is very little doubt that the majority of literary output on the subject of Kurdish nationalism has been published in non-English languages (specifically languages such as Turkish, Kurmanji, Sorani, Arabic, and others of the region). This unfortunately cuts off what could be a significant portion of data that has yet to be translated and exposed to the English-medium academic world. For the most part, the only way that access could be made was through their citations in academic sources that have been used. Nonetheless, this limitation would only be substantial should further research proceed in the future that would require great primary source material from the Kurdish perspective.

Through further analysis of the data to be presented, this paper proposes the following hypothesis and questions for research:

**Hypothesis:** The prevalence of a Pan-Kurdish nationalism in the discourse of political movements in the Kurdish homeland is not substantial.

**Question 1:** How synchronized are the activities of the various Kurdish political movements throughout the four home countries?

**Question 2:** How vast is the ideological disparity between the different Kurdish movements?

This project’s case study will provide a narrative of political developments, based upon the accrued data. First, the evolution of Kurdish nationalism will be presented, with a primary focus on the movements in Turkey and Iraq, and their relations to one another. This is due to both of these movements being the primary actors within the greater model of Kurdish nationalism that exists in the Middle East. Then the schismatic framework that exists between these two movements will be presented, which will no doubt question the veracity of the claim that Pan-Kurdish nationalism dominates the political discourse throughout the Kurdish homeland, especially through the policymakers of its various movements.

**Case Studies**

**Troubles from Turkey**


This rebellion was suppressed, and in 1934 the Turkish government implemented a series of policies in order to assimilate the Kurds into Turkish political society, a process that has met with little success, but has had a lasting impact.\footnote{Ibid.}

The new wave of Kurdish nationalism began with the formation of PKK in 1975, led by Abdullah
Öcalan. This foundation coincided with developments for Kurds in Iraq, where Mustafa Barzani’s movement had been defeated militarily by Iraq’s Baathist government. The primary reason that Öcalan cited for Iraqi Kurdistan’s failure was that region’s movement’s continued ties to traditional clan-based “feudalism,” its reliance on the United States and the Shah for support, and the political rhetoric that called for autonomy, not independence. Öcalan’s organization, on the other hand, was possessed a theoretical foundation born out of Marxism, diverging away from nation-state ideology due to its perceived links to both feudalism and capitalism, and thus antithetical to the democratic society that the movement was envisioning. Öcalan’s call for independence of Kurds was a cry for freedom not just from other nation-states, but from a Kurdish nation-state itself, as such a reality would only serve to perpetuate the institutions of oppression that the PKK was trying to dismantle. This aversion resulted in the political philosophy of “democratic confederalism,” in which nation-state independence would be disbanded in favor of collectives in Kurdistan, with no centralized political nexus that would serve to propagate a political and economic elite. This Pan-Kurdism has met with mixed results in the political discourse of the Kurdish homeland, as the PKK has vilified any other Kurdish group who sought regional autonomy and not unification as “imperialist stooges.” This tension has arisen out of the influence of the political frameworks of the different home states. In Turkey, which was a firm US ally during the Cold War, the PKK naturally took up an anti-western position, and thus was labeled as a terrorist group not just by Turkey, but by the United States as well as other allied powers. This status continues today and has impacted the political situations of the other Kurdish movements that stem from the PKK’s ideology.

Essentially, this is the PKK’s political foundation that has since become a major point of contention between them and more traditional or moderate Kurdish movements, namely in Iraq. In 1999, Öcalan was arrested and has since been serving life imprisonment. This has not kept him, however, from publishing his ideology and continuing to influence PKK activities, though his lack of presence has been a factor in some instances. Indeed his imprisonment has done little to curb the political influence and power that the PKK has established. In Iran, for instance, PJAK (Free Life of Kurdistan Party) has been strongly influenced by PKK ideology has waged a low-level insurgency against the Iranian government for years, yet this still has not kept them from officially being designated a terrorist group by Turkey and the U.S. Likewise, the PYD (Democratic Union Party) in Syria has been commonly linked to the PKK in both the west and by oppositional groups, primarily the KDP. In Turkey itself, the organization has expanded its presence into the social sphere, with southern cities like Diyarbakir (the largest Kurdish majority city in Turkey) having prominent politicians being jailed for their ties to the PKK.

Reconciliation in Iraq

The PKK can be most sharply contrasted with the KDP, both its philosophical and political rival in the inner paradigm of Kurdish national politics. Founded in 1946 by Mustafa Barzani, the party has always served as a foil to the nation-building of Iraq, where Arabization policies took place under the Baathists. The ethnic struggle of the Kurds in Iraq was articulated through several experiences; in 1975 over 600,000 Kurds were deported from their homes in this program of Arabization. This deportation coincided with two major events: one being the defeat of the KDP in that year and Barzani’s subsequent exile, and the other the development of a new Kurdish party in Iraq, the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).

Headed by Jalal Talabani (who would later be president of Post-Saddam Iraq), the PUK has served at varying instances as a partner and a rival for support to the KDP. The rivalry between the KDP

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16 (Marcus, 2007, p. 34).
17 (Yesiltas, 2014, p. 15).
18 (Öcalan, 2011, p. 26).
19 (Bajalan, 2009, p. 13).
20 (Arakelyan, 2013, p. 15), (Gunter, p. 76).
22 (Güvenҫ, 2011, p. 36).
23 (MacQueen, 2015, p. 431).
24 (Bajalan, 2009, p. 6).
25 Barzani would die, exiled in the US, in 1979. His son, Massoud Barzani, has since been the leader of the KDP, as well as serving as the President of the KRG, which has currently is controlled by a KDP-majority, since the position was made official in 2005.
and PUK appears to be mostly driven by clan identity and personality politics, with the Barzani clan in the North (also Kurmanji-Kurdish speakers) and the Talabani in the south (who are Sorani speakers) forming two separate and constantly competing power blocs. So embedded, and yet ideologically abstruse, is this rivalry that many Iraqi Kurds are unable to explain the true differences between the two groups. This rivalry culminated in several instances of violence, most especially after the establishment of Kurdish autonomy in 1992 under the new KRG. In 1994, civil war broke out between the Peshmerga forces of both parties, an event that sharply contrasted with the relative progress that had been made in democratization of that region. The civil war would not end until 1998, costing thousands of lives, and had such a political spill-over that other state actors became involved, with Turkey supporting the KDP and Iran supporting the PUK.

The strenuous relationship between the PUK and the KDP served to be the major barrier to establishing a permanent democratic structure in the KRG region. The tensions have gone down significantly since the US-mediated ceasefire in 1998 and even further since the KRG was officially declared in 2005. However, there still exists a lack of harmony in the political rhetoric between the KDP and the PUK, a dichotomization that is tied to Kurdish affairs throughout the homeland. The rivalry is also another dimension of the greater rivalry between the KDP and the PKK, as both of these actors are competing for political influence. While the PKK is driven by a pro-independence rhetoric, the KDP is more conservative in its calls for regional autonomy and is quick to avoid any such Pan-Kurdish rhetoric. These rivalries represent an intense barricade to any form of unified Pan-Kurdish political activity, and the political turmoil that can be traced to the Syrian Civil War has only served to further political stalemates between groups such as the PUK, KDP, and PKK.

However, there is some cause for political optimism, for since the Kurdish civil war ended in 1998, both political camps have been quick to avoid Kurdish violence as much as possible, and there does appear to be improved rhetoric of good intent between both the PKK and the KDP, as both have expressed solidarity in their commitment against a common enemy. However, this solidarity has not improved into jointed activity between these groups, nor has it shifted one another’s political positions into harmony. The PKK still emphasis a new-wave Marxist version of nationalism that calls for an independent Kurdistan governed through a non-centralized democracy. The KDP, on the other hand, has been known to constantly postpone a referendum on independence, a referendum that Barzani himself has instigated in order to keep the KDP name relevant in Pan-Kurdish politics, but only as a ploy to maintain popular support, which is more open to independence rhetoric than are KDP-led policy-makers. Referendum rhetoric has since largely been abandoned, with the most common excuse being that time and effort must be dedicated to defeating ISIS, and should not be diverted to such a vote. The more furtive reason, however, is that the KRG does not wish to jeopardize its beneficial relationship with Turkey and the United States by holding such a referendum that would only serve to cause further nationalist aggravation in the neighboring Kurdish regions.

Conclusion

The Kurdish homeland is beset by division by their home states, and this, in turn, has caused different nationalist frameworks to develop in all four regions. The divergent movements that exist have shown facilitatory signs of reconciliation, especially in recent years, as certain Kurdish political and para-military factions have combined their operations to combat ISIS. However, there is still very little organizational unity in the broad network of Kurdish nationalism, and the level of cooperation between two ideological camps (one headed by the PKK and the other by the KDP) is still very limited. What appears to the layperson to be a monolithic movement with a singular geopolitical agenda is, in fact, a wildly divided set of political and social factions.

The data that has been presented largely sup-

26 (Devigne, 2011, p. 49).
27 (Arakelyan, 2013, p. 50).
28 (Yesiltas, 2014, p. 87).
30 (Yesiltas, 2014, p. 324).
ports this conclusion, and has shown that there is a deep-seated lack of Pan-Kurdish unity across the homeland, as both nationalist camps have shown a rivalry that is driven by various factors. The political legitimacy of the KDP rests on its relationship with official state powers like the US, Iraq, and Turkey. This relationship sets itself apart from the PKK, which has always been an actor outside of the peripheries of legitimate power. Furthermore, the ideological rivalry that the PKK has with the KDP, and thus the KRG, is driven by a postmodern theory of nationalism that the KRG policy makers simply do not follow, once again due to its relationship with legitimate states.

With regards to the prospects of a Pan-Kurdish state, the likelihood there is for such an outcome to occur is constrained as much by internal Kurdish politics as it is by the host states that have actively tried to quell such nationalist activities for decades. The rhetoric, however, can be found in the Kurdish public, both in the homeland and in the diaspora, and even in groups such as the PKK. But officially designated institutions such as the KRG have constantly proved not to be supportive of such rhetoric, and as long as this is the case, then the likelihood of Pan-Kurdish nationalism becoming a unifying norm will never become fully realized.

**Author Biography**

Miles Popplewell is a Master’s student in the International Relations Department. His primary area of interest is Middle Eastern studies, with an emphasis on Kurdish politics, culture, and language. He graduated from UC Berkeley in 2014 with a Bachelor’s in History and Anthropology. He has taken courses in the Kurdish languages, and will be doing further studies for his Master’s Thesis.

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